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Introduction: Hal Scheffler’s 
Extensionism in Historical 
Perspective and its Relevance 
to Current Controversies
Warren Shapiro and Dwight Read
Hal Scheffler was one of the world’s great anthropologists and, without 
question, its foremost authority on human kinship. These considerations 
in themselves would be quite enough to merit a collection of essays in 
his memory, but his work also touches upon certain larger issues in our 
appreciation of the human condition, as well as current social controversies.
It was for his extensionist position on kinship terminologies—what he 
liked to call ‘systems of kin classification’—that he was best known. 
In a nutshell, Scheffler would come to raise two questions: (1) What is 
the primary meaning—what he called the focus—of kinship terms like 
English ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘brother’, ‘sister’ etc.? (2) By what procedures 
do people extend these meanings from their foci to others? His answers, 
based upon meticulous analyses of kinship terminologies in various parts 
of the world, were that focal membership is supplied mostly by nuclear 
family relationships, from which relationships it is extended to people—
even to things—outside the nuclear family; and that these extensions are 
accomplished by ordered sets of rules that have considerable generality 
cross-culturally.
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The man himself1
Harold Walter Scheffler was born in St Louis, Missouri, United States, on 
24 October 1932, to working-class parents, William C. Scheffler, an office 
clerk, and Dorothy C. Scheffler (née Briggs), a housewife. He registered 
at Southeast Missouri State College in 1952, moving to the University of 
Missouri the following year. Hal’s quest for his first degree was interrupted 
by service in the United States Army (1954–55) but, after an honourable 
discharge, he returned to his studies, receiving a BA in anthropology and 
sociology in 1956. He went on to postgraduate study at the University 
of Chicago, from which he received an MA in anthropology in 1957. 
Remaining at Chicago in pursuit of a doctorate, and with support from 
the Carnegie Corporation and the Fulbright Foundation, he carried out 
18 months of fieldwork on the island of Choiseul in what was then the 
British Solomon Islands, 1960–61. This research was the basis of his 
PhD dissertation (1963), under the joint supervision of Fred Eggan and 
David Schneider. A revision of this work was published by the University 
of California Press two years later as Choiseul Island Social Structure 
(see below). In the interim Hal taught anthropology at the University of 
Connecticut and Bryn Mawr College before moving to Yale University 
the year he received his doctorate. He remained at Yale for four and 
a half decades, before retiring in 2008. Two years later he began to suffer 
from Parkinson’s disease; he passed away from the associated dementia 
on 24 July 2015, survived by his wife Jan Simpson, his daughter Mary 
Lindholm, and a sister, Joan Wiesehan.
Choiseul Island kinship
Scheffler’s first publication on kinship, based upon his doctoral dissertation, 
was his book-length treatment of sociality on Choiseul Island (Scheffler 
1965), now part of the independent Solomon Islands. Two things deserve 
special emphasis in Scheffler’s Choiseul analysis. First, there are rich data 
on distinctions made by the Choiseulese themselves. Second, Choiseulese 
ideas about kinship are not so different from our own.
1  We are especially indebted for this personal information from Jan Simpson, Hal’s widow, her 
secretary Mary Smith and Ray Kelly, his Yale colleague.
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With regard to the first point, even though more distant kin are superficially 
classed with one’s parents, siblings, children, and other close kin, these 
latter are said, in native parlance, to be the ‘true’ members of their 
respective kin classes (Scheffler 1965: 75, 81). The singling out of focal 
membership by words translatable as ‘true’ (or ‘real’) is typical of a very 
large number of kinship terminologies throughout the world—a point 
Hal Scheffler would repeatedly make in subsequent analyses (e.g. Scheffler 
1972b: 354; Scheffler 1973: 766; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 43) and 
which probably supplies the most frequently encountered evidence in 
the ethnographic literature for the extensionist position (Shapiro 2016, 
2017). With regard to the second point, Scheffler notes an expression in 
the Choiseul language that he translates as ‘kin’, which implies that they 
idiomise kinship in ways that are entirely familiar to English speakers.
Towards a general theory of human kinship
A year after the publication of his Choiseul analysis, Hal Scheffler put 
forward nothing less than a general statement on human kinship. In this 
important but neglected essay Scheffler lays the groundwork for his 
general position on human kinship, to wit:
[D]ifferent societies perceive ‘the facts of procreation’ differently … 
but they differ within certain clear limits and have … the same formal 
organization. All such theories provide for the existence of a ‘genitor’ 
and a ‘genetrix’ (parents), their offspring, who are related to one another 
(as ‘siblings’), and … for the existence of what may be called genealogical 
connections [among] such persons … Kinship as a cultural phenomenon 
has to do first and foremost with any particular person’s … relationships 
with other persons as these are … conceived to result from what his 
culture takes to be ‘the facts of procreation.’ From the point of view of 
any particular [person], he, his mother, and her brother do not constitute 
a procreatively or socially self-sufficient unit. [Instead h]is father … is 
as necessary to his existence as is his mother … so … it is the triad self-
genitor-genetrix that should be considered to be the ‘atom’ of kinship. For it is 
that unit which ‘generates’ the elements ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ … Clearly, then, 
the elementary relations of a kinship system are parent/child, husband/wife, 
and sibling/sibling … These are of course the constituent relationships of the 
nuclear family [emphasis added] (Scheffler 1966: 83–84).
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The competing position to which Scheffler alludes is that of Claude Lévi-
Strauss (1963: 31–54), who maintained that the irreducible elements in 
human kinship are those between two men, one of whom has married the 
other’s sister, and the son of the first man. While Lévi-Strauss’s schema 
has been challenged statistically (Ryder and Blackman 1970), Scheffler’s 
formulation fits virtually all the data at our command.
Adoption in the New Hebrides
Scheffler’s concern with kinship semantics, especially his emphasis 
on the distinction between focal and nonfocal members of a kin class, 
is developed in his article on adoption in the northern New Hebrides 
(Scheffler 1970b). Much earlier, based on his own fieldwork, William 
H.R. Rivers (1915) had argued that among some of the peoples of the 
New Hebrides:
the relationship of parent and child does not come into existence 
by the facts of procreation and parturition, but [rather] it is such acts as 
the payment of the midwife, the first feeding of the child, or the planting 
of a tree on the occasion of a birth that determine who are to be the 
parents of the child (Rivers 1915: 700). 
Scheffler provides a counterargument based on earlier ethnographic 
literature on the area. He notes that in the pertinent languages one’s 
procreative parents are distinguished from others in their kin classes 
by a lexical marker translatable as ‘the real (or main) thing’, ‘very’, and 
‘undoubted’ (Scheffler 1970b: 373)—in short, they enjoy focal status in 
these classes. He further notes that only the ‘real’ parents must undergo 
various taboos, lest harm come to their child. ‘Such beliefs and customs,’ 
he adds, ‘are virtually incomprehensible unless [the people] presume 
some sort of substantial and inalienable … connection between the child 
and his [or her] genitor and genetrix’ (ibid.: 374). Thus, by the end of 
1970, Hal Scheffler had presented a general theory of human kinship 





The move to Yale played a vital role in the development of Scheffler’s 
thought and hence his career. The anthropology department there had 
been influenced by eminent linguists such as Edward Sapir, Leonard 
Bloomfield and George Trager, and linguistics was widely seen to have 
a rigour that was lacking in much earlier ethnography circa 1950. This 
move led to Hal Scheffler’s collaboration with his senior colleague Floyd 
Lounsbury consequent upon his—Scheffler’s—move to Yale in 1963. 
At the time Lounsbury was in the process of establishing himself as an 
important linguist (see especially Lounsbury 1963), and a year later he 
published the first two of his analyses of a system of kin classification 
(Lounsbury 1964a, 1964b), followed in the next year by another 
(Lounsbury 1965). His concern in this latter group of articles was with 
what he called a ‘formal analysis’ of the pertinent kinship terminologies—
more especially, with stipulating a focal member for each lexically labelled 
but unmarked kin class and then, by appealing to sets of genealogically 
based and ordered rules, showing that these rules could account for the 
allotment of kin terms to particular genealogical positions, including 
distant ones, as these had been recorded in, or inferred from, the pertinent 
ethnography. In this sense his argument was extensionist, though it was 
much less attuned to native distinctions than the extensionist position 
that Hal Scheffler was developing.
The collaboration between Scheffler and Lounsbury led to their jointly 
authored volume A Study in Structural Semantics: The Siriono Kinship 
System (1971). The Siriono are a group of nomadic hunter-gatherers in the 
Bolivian Amazon, known to the anthropological world primarily through 
a monograph by Allan Holmberg (1969). The goal of the Scheffler and 
Lounsbury project was to provide a formal semantic analysis of a particular 
kinship terminology, in the sense noted in the preceding paragraph. At the 
same time they were concerned with wider matters. A key point they noted 
is that kin terms are polysemic, that is that each term has several significata, 
or meanings, and these significata are semantically related. They provided 
the English kin term uncle as an example of such polysemy. Uncle has as 
one of its meanings ‘my parent’s brother’, but it may also mean ‘my aunt’s 
husband’, or even ‘my grandparent’s brother’, that is my great-uncle. 
The first meaning can also be expressed, using genealogical dimensions, 
by the statement ‘male consanguineal relative of the first ascending 
(i.e. the parental) generation and the first degree of collaterality’, whereas 
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the third definition excludes the criterion ‘first ascending generation’ 
and the second excludes the criterion ‘consanguineal’. Hence the second 
and third meanings are, in this sense, extended versions of the meaning 
provided in the first definition. Nonetheless, all three meanings have to 
do with ‘uncleness’, hence the kin term uncle in English is polysemic, that 
is its several meanings are semantically related.
Because several critics (e.g. D’Andrade 1970; Tyler 1966; Wallace 1965) 
have argued that this sort of analytical procedure is more reflective of the 
heads of Scheffler and Lounsbury than those of ‘the natives’, it is well 
worth noting here that the latter two take considerable pains to relate 
their principles to Siriono understandings (Scheffler and Lounsbury 
1971: 40–47). Because this concern with native conceptualisation occurs 
regularly in Scheffler’s other writings but not in Lounsbury’s, we believe 
its occurrence in what Hal Scheffler liked to call ‘the Siriono book’ reflects 
his influence upon his senior colleague, and probably explains why his 
name occurs first in their joint production.
‘Social paternity’
Hal Scheffler’s analysis of New Hebridean adoption was part of his project 
to dispel the idea that in certain communities paternity is established not 
by procreation but by ‘social’ or performative criteria, an argument put 
forward not only by Rivers but, as well, by more recent scholars, most 
notably David Schneider (1984). The most exhaustive treatment of the 
ubiquity of locally posited notions of biological paternity and the secondary 
status of ‘social paternity’ can be found in an encyclopedic article in which 
Scheffler (1973: 749–51) pointed out that the claims for an ‘ignorance of 
physiological paternity’ in the Trobriands and among Aboriginal people 
are without merit. Instead, the reported entry into the mother by a spirit-
being is not held to cause conception, as the ‘ignorance’ theory holds, 
but rather is posited to occur at foetal quickening: it thus appears to be 




In his work subsequent to the collaboration with Lounsbury, Hal 
Scheffler combined his senior colleague’s concern with formal analysis 
with his own emphasis upon explicit native theory. This can be seen in 
two articles he published in 1972. One of these, based upon his own 
fieldwork among the Baniata of the Solomon Islands (Scheffler 1972b), 
is, from the standpoint of anthropological debate, his most important 
publication. In  his Introduction to this analysis he tells us that ‘[t]he 
principal aim of this study is to demonstrate the ethnographic [i.e. the 
psychological] validity, in this instance and others, of positing [rules] of 
[kin] terminological extension’ (ibid.: 350). Scheffler further observes that 
kin-term product statements (see Read Chapter 2) ‘may be used … to 
specify extended ranges of terms. For example, the people say “the dare 
of my ae is my ae also,” i.e. “my father’s brother is my ‘father’ also…”’ 
(Scheffler 1972b: 350). In other words, the kin-term product of the kin 
term dare (‘brother’) and the kin term ae (‘father’) is the kin term ae 
(‘father’), according to informants, and the extension of the kin term ae to 
the genealogical position occupied by the father’s brother is through the 
kin-term product stipulating that ‘the dare of my ae is my ae’. It should 
be emphasised that it is the kin-term product rule that determines the 
application of a kin term to a particular genealogical position beyond primary 
kin, not vice versa, as conventional genealogical diagrams suggest (Read 
2007). Analogous considerations apply to the ‘mother’ and ‘child’ terms.
Aboriginal kinship terminologies
Scheffler’s other 1972 article was an Afterword to the publication of 
a manuscript left by Donald Thomson, based upon that anthropologist’s 
fieldwork on the Cape York Peninsula (Scheffler 1972a), and Scheffler’s 
own interviews with Lauriston Sharp, who also worked on Cape York. Both 
of these ventures culminated in his seminal Australian Kin Classification 
(Scheffler 1978), one of whose chief goals was to counter ‘social category’ 
views of Aboriginal sociality. Such views had been common in Victorian 
theory (e.g. Fison and Howitt 1880; Lubbock 1912: 84 et seq.; Morgan 
1877: 50–60), but were subsequently challenged by early twentieth-
century scholars, pointing to the apparent ubiquity of the nuclear 
family among Aboriginal people and the unsustainability of Victorian 
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claims of communal social regimes (e.g. Lang 1905; Malinowski 1913; 
N. Thomas 1906). But none of the latter had much sophistication in 
semantic theory.2
Australian Kin Classification, we believe, is best viewed as the culmination 
of the more empirically grounded studies of Aboriginal sociality that 
appeared in the previous decade.3 The book begins with a statement of 
various theories of Aboriginal kinship, including the procreatively based 
one sometimes espoused by A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (e.g. 1913) as well as 
various ‘social category’ perspectives. In order to lay the basis for his chief 
argument that Aboriginal sociality is indeed kinship based, Hal Scheffler 
here repeats his 1973 thesis against claims of ‘ignorance of physiological 
paternity’ among Aboriginal people. Aboriginal notions of fatherhood, 
he concludes, are founded upon native appreciations of the reproductive 
process, though augmented by a spiritual experience at foetal quickening, 
usually though not always undergone by the presumed genitor.4 From here 
he proceeds to a comprehensive and meticulous analysis of the pertinent 
ethnographic literature that forms the core of the book. His conclusion 
from all this is that:
kin-class statuses are the elementary structures of Australian [Aboriginal] 
social life. Originating in nuclear families and in the genealogical relations 
[within] them, these statuses are extended to encompass … virtually 
all social relations within human communities … Beyond this they 
are extended metaphorically to encompass … social relations between 
human communities and the community of the Dreamtime [i.e. the 
mythical] beings. In this way, Australian [Aboriginal] cultures establish 
a moral community that embraces the cosmos … In postulating a morally 
ordered universe and in attempting to comprehend it metaphorically, by 
analogy with the forms of their own social life, [Aboriginal] Australians 
demonstrate … their intellectual kinship with the rest of [hu]man kind … 
Dissent from the opinion that ‘kinship’ is a misnomer for … [Aboriginal] 
Australian culture is likely now, no less than in the past, to encounter 
charges of ethnocentrism … and of imposing alien forms on social and 
cultural categories that it is our first responsibility as anthropologists to 
comprehend … As it happens, however, some of the concepts by which 
2  For partial exceptions, see Howitt (1891) and Lang (1905: 49).
3  This is not to say that subsequent work has been without value. But none has the theoretical 
sweep and scholarly detail of Hal Scheffler’s great work.
4  In some areas a distinction is made between the ‘finder’ and the genitor (Goodale 1971: 137–38; 
Stanner 1960: 254). For a theorisation of this arrangement, including Christian baptism and other 
non-Aboriginal examples, see Bloch and Guggenheim (1981) and Shapiro (1988).
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[Aboriginal] Australians order their social lives – indeed … the most 
fundamental concepts – are not at all alien to us or to the rest of [hu]man 
kind. Clothed in their own linguistic forms … [and] elaborated upon 
in somewhat unusual ways, concepts of kinship are as basic as they are 
pervasive in [Aboriginal] Australian social life (Scheffler 1978: 530–31). 
Wider implications of Hal Scheffler’s thought
This last quote is key. Current kinship studies as we write are dominated 
by what Lounsbury (1969) called ‘complete relativism’, largely because of 
the publications and personal influence of David Schneider (e.g. 1968, 
1972, 1984), who did indeed argue that kinship, at least outside the 
West, is a misnomer. As Scheffler lucidly points out (see below), this is 
disrespectful of our common humanity. In his review of Schneider’s 1968 
book, Scheffler (1976) was highly critical of Schneider’s use of the term 
‘symbol’, upon which Schneider’s critique of kinship studies depends. 
Thus he—Scheffler—refers to ‘Schneider’s … casual and unanalyzed use 
of the word [symbol] in its many ordinary, everyday senses’ (ibid.: 85). 
More generally, Schneider’s ‘method’ was entirely intuitive, unchecked by 
a concern for intellectual discipline (Fogelson 2001: 41, 53). Consider the 
following bit of rambling, meant to pass for ‘analysis’:
Sexual intercourse is love and stands as a sign of love, and love stands for 
sexual intercourse and is a sign of it. The two different kinds of love … 
are nevertheless both symbols for unity, identity, oneness, togetherness, 
belonging. Love symbolizes loyalty, faith, support, help, and so forth 
(Schneider 1968: 52).
We alluded above to another implication of Hal Scheffler’s scholarship—
one which we consider most important from an intellectual standpoint. 
We are referring here to his emphasis upon what was once called ‘the 
psychic unity of humankind’. Here special emphasis, we think, should be 
placed upon his insistence—supported by an enormous mass of evidence—
that, apparently everywhere, systems of kin classification are ordered into 
classes which contain focal and nonfocal members, and that the focal 
membership of these classes is constant, or very nearly so. More particularly, 
it embraces an individual’s mother, father, siblings and children. These 
people thus everywhere constitute a conceptual unit and in most cases 
a residential unit as well, at least when the children are young. And in 
most of those few cases in which such residential unity is absent and the 
mother resides with her dependent children in the absence of a mate, 
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sometimes augmented by one or more of her siblings, there is nonetheless 
not only a recognition of fatherhood but, as well, the (presumed) genitor 
has a special and locally recognised relationship with his children (Gough 
1961: 364; Sobo 1993: 147; Stacey 2009: 247). For Scheffler, contrary to 
the claims of Schneider and his followers, ‘the facts of procreation’ viewed 
cross-culturally ‘differ only within certain clear limits … What all these 
[latter] enterprises’, he observed, ‘have in common is that they would 
deprive us of any dimensions of human, cross-cultural similarity, other 
than our symbol-creating capacity, by reference to which cross-cultural 
differences may be ordered’ (Scheffler 1991: 375).
Hal Scheffler and gender studies
Hal Scheffler’s work on kinship in itself is a major intellectual 
accomplishment—surely enough to count him among the most important 
anthropologists who have ever lived. But his scholarship was not confined 
to kinship studies. The analysis most pertinent here has to do with gender 
classification, which he tackled in his 1991 contribution to feminism. 
Several scholars (e.g. Herdt 1994; Roscoe 1994; W. Thomas 1997) have 
accepted at face value claims of a ‘third sex’ in certain nonwestern societies. 
But here is Scheffler’s response:
Consider [the] claim that in some North American Indian societies 
‘gender role’ rather than genital anatomy determined … classification as a 
male or a female … [This] argument is intended to liberate gender from 
any biological basis … [and] to show that a system of two genders is by 
no means inevitable. [Such scholars] acknowledge, however, that ‘gender 
role’ is definable only as … behavior normative for a member of one or the 
other genital-sex class … and that assignment to one or the other sex class 
is typically at birth and not dependent on any … behavior on the part of 
the person being classified. Because, logically, categories must be defined 
… by criteria independent of the normative implications of inclusion 
in those categories, certain forms of conduct cannot be both criteria for 
and normative implications of inclusion in … the same category. It must 
be that [we] are dealing with situations in which some men (less often 
women) are permitted to act, in some degree, as though they were women 
(or men), and may be spoken of as though they were women (or men), or 
as an anomalous ‘he-she’ or ‘she-he.’ … It is only to be expected that [one] 
cannot … produce any linguistic data to demonstrate that [members 
of the alleged ‘third sex’] are treated in any language as a genuine third 
gender [emphasis in original] (Scheffler 1991: 377–78).
13
INTRODUCTION
In short, Scheffler argues that the focal gender classes in these societies 
are ‘male’ and ‘female’, with the ‘third gender’ labels derived from these 
foci, just as a godfather is a specialised kind of ‘father’. And the defining 
characteristics of these foci are genital anatomy: pertinent behaviour, 
Scheffler argues (e.g. 1972c: 312, 1973: 766; Scheffler and Lounsbury 
1971: 39), is not logically prior but logically subsequent—just as how 
a father should behave is logically subsequent to those criteria that define 
being a father in the first place. We think it a matter of considerable 
intellectual importance to underscore the similarities between Scheffler’s 
analyses of gender and his findings on kinship.
Shortcoming of Scheffler’s analyses
Despite the great respect we have for Hal Scheffler’s scholarship, we do 
not consider it beyond criticism. Recall that in his 1966 general statement 
on human kinship he maintained that ‘it is the triad self-genitor-genetrix 
that should be considered to be the “atom” of kinship—that is that unit 
which generates the elements “brother” and “sister”, and that this “formal 
organization” is universal’. This is a prescient statement of what Dwight 
Read (Chapter 2; see also Read, Fischer and Lehman 2014) has called the 
Family Space concept. We believe this to be a necessary construct if we 
are to take account—as we must—of those situations in which a marriage 
occurs but the couple does not co-reside, those in which extramarital 
genitorship is recognised even in the absence of coresidence, those in 
which neither condition applies but the presumed genitor is nonetheless 
recognised, and those based upon adoption, fosterage, or the remarriage 
of one of the natal parents. In all of these situations genealogies may be 
constructed that are not—not necessarily, anyway—based upon the ‘facts 
of procreation’ that Scheffler emphasised. But although the concept was 
put forward while he was still active, Hal Scheffler never took note of it, 
nor of the pertinent ethnographic materials that made its development 
necessary.
The essays
Warren Shapiro’s essay (Chapter 1) grounds Hal Scheffler’s ideas in the 
classic ethnographic case of the Trobriand Islanders east of Papua New 
Guinea. He shows that the extensionist position is hardly new, and that ‘the 
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natives’ themselves, quite contrary to the arguments of the performativists, 
really are extensionists; which is to say that, contrary to Schneider and his 
admirers, extensionism is not a Eurocentric imposition upon nonwestern 
peoples. The essay carries the implication that kin ties established through 
procreation are everywhere basic, as Hal Scheffler contended. By contrast, 
other principles upon which kinship is reckoned are everywhere logically 
dependent upon local procreative notions.
Dwight Read’s essay (Chapter 2) considers Scheffler’s extensionist 
argument in view of the immense ethnographic corpus on what he 
calls ‘kin-term products’. The essay continues a project he began more 
than three decades ago (Read et al. 1984; see also Leaf and Read 2012; 
Read 2001, 2007). He  demonstrates how a kinship terminology can 
be generated from the terms designating the relations making up 
a conceptual nuclear family—what he calls the Family Space (see Figure 4 
in Chapter 2). The concept is rooted in mathematical theory, which will 
be unfamiliar to most readers, but it is empirically necessary, for reasons 
we have already noted.5 Using the kin-term product concept, he proceeds 
to work out a sort of ‘grammar’ for the kinship terminology. From here 
he shows how the genealogical employment of kin terms is derived from 
the ‘grammar’, rather than the reverse. His essay is not easy reading, 
so the reader should prepare, but it provides vital insights into kinship 
cognition. Specifically, it demonstrates how the extensionism that forms 
a centrepiece of Hal Scheffler’s scholarship derives from the internal logic 
of a kinship terminology, much as we understand how the structure of 
English sentences derives from the (mostly unconscious) rules of English 
grammar.
Extensionist theory is first and foremost meant to provide richer 
ethnographic description. This is just what is in evidence in the essay by 
Andrew Strathern and Pamela Steward (Chapter 3). Their chief concern is 
the practical employment of kin terms among the Melpa of the Papua New 
Guinea Highlands. Yet at the same time they provide rich ethnographic 
5  We might note here the marriage of two women among the Nuer of South Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 
1951: 108–09) and elsewhere in Africa (e.g. Cadigan 1998; Krige 1974; Oboler 1980). But in all of 
these cases, so far as we can see, such marriages constitute only a minority of conjugal unions and in no 
instance is the actual genitor denied all rights with regard to the children he has sired. The commune 
movement in the United States in the nineteenth century and, more recently, the kibbutz movement in 
Israel might be thought to constitute a class of exceptions to our generalisation, but nothing is clearer in 
the relevant literature than the problems these arrangements have encountered in attempting to suppress 
the pair-bond, parents’ interest in their own children, and other forms of favouritism towards close kin 
(e.g. Brumann 2003: 409 et seq.; Kanter 1972: 91, 158; Spiro 2004: 562).
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support for the extensionist position. Thus they report that adoptive 
kinship is here lexically marked relative to its procreative analogue, much 
like the English adoptive mother and adopted child in relation to mother 
and child, respectively. As we understand them, they invoke a  more 
comprehensive notion of meaning which includes both procreative and 
performative significance, but at the same time they acknowledge that the 
latter builds upon the former. To boot, they are concerned with kinship 
metaphor—something with which, as we shall see, another essay deals.
In his superb summary, noted above, of what we know about human 
kinship, Hal Scheffler (1973: 758) stressed that kinship everywhere is 
reckoned through both parents—that is bilaterally. In many societies, 
Scheffler (ibid.: 756–65) went on to point out, this essential bilaterality 
is augmented by notions which are based not upon the reckoner but 
rather upon ancestral figures—which are, in Goodenough’s terms, not 
‘ego-oriented’ but rather ‘ancestor-oriented’ (Goodenough 1961). 
The latter are usually associated with real or posited collectivities, often 
involved in the control of productive property. We have known since at 
least 1920 that hunter-gatherers usually lack such categories (Lowie 1920: 
148 et seq.). Most Amazonian societies—even the Siriono—practise some 
horticulture, but Rusty Greaves and Karen Kramer (Chapter 4) worked 
with one group that subsists exclusively by foraging. The ‘patrilocal band’ 
model of hunter-gatherer sociality espoused by Service (1971: 46–98) 
does not fit here, nor are there any ancestor-oriented social categories. 
The  sole modes of social differentiation are locality, age, sex and ego-
oriented kinship. This last, Greaves and Kramer point out, dovetails nicely 
with Hal Scheffler’s ideas on focality and extension.
Any general theory of human kinship must take account of attachment in 
early childhood (Cassidy and Shaver 2008), which is just what the essays 
by Fadwa El Guindi (Chapter 5) and Vicky Burbank (Chapter 6) do. 
Analysing her ethnographic materials on Qatari Arabs, El Guindi shows 
that both suckling and procreation are held to establish kinship, as does 
marriage. She notes a distinction between wet-nursing, which is often 
a paid service and which antedates Islam, and suckling. It is only the latter 
that has kinship connotations. Even so, kinship through suckling—usually 
called ‘milk kinship’ in the pertinent literature—is, among Qatari Arabs, 
locally construed to be logically derived from procreative kinship, which 
perforce enjoys focal status—as indeed it does, apparently, throughout the 
Islamic World and parts of Europe (e.g. Chapman 2012; Khatib-Chahidi 
1992; Parkes 2006). Adoption, for its part, is unrecognised.
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But this is not the case amongst the Aboriginal people of Numbulwar, 
southeast Arnhem Land, whose sociality is the subject of Vicky Burbank’s 
essay (Chapter 6). Here adoption is recognised as a means by which 
kinship is created. Now it might be thought that adoption poses problems 
for a theory of kinship based upon procreation, because it results in the 
transfer of attachment mechanisms to people other than the natal parents, 
or, more commonly, the sharing of these mechanisms with those parents 
(Silk 1987). Warren Shapiro, however, has shown that adoption seems 
usually not to affect this theory, that is that natal parents retain focal 
status in the local ‘parent’ categories (Shapiro 2016). Burbank presents 
a partly contrary case. At Numbulwar both adoptive and procreative kin 
are said to be ‘close family’ in the local creole, but the latter are said to 
be ‘closer’ than the former. This suggests a ‘layered’ focality, something 
which Hal Scheffler noted in his Choiseul analysis (Scheffler 1965: 74) 
and which Shapiro found in his research among the Aboriginal people 
of northeast Arnhem Land (Shapiro 1981: 38–40). Moreover, the ‘close’ 
status of adoptive kin at Numbulwar suggests a rapprochement between 
extensionists and performativists.
Just as Hal Scheffler’s ideas have relevance for more searching 
ethnographic analyses, so they shed light on historical process. Thus 
Pat McConvell (Chapter 7) considers the extensive research done by 
Scheffler on Aboriginal kinship terminologies as a basis for enquiry into 
historical change in these terminologies, as well as for the reconstruction 
of their ancient predecessors. He shows that these reconstructions fit well 
with extensionist theory, particularly in the ways in which this theory 
illuminates their semantic properties. But, like Strathern and Stewart, 
he thinks that extensionism needs to be augmented by a consideration 
of the pragmatic usage of kin terms. McConvell further points out that 
not all semantic change in the pertinent terminologies fits what might 
be predicted from Scheffler’s seminal analysis of such systems (Scheffler 
1978): some, for example, disrespect gender and generational classes.
So, however valuable they are, we ought not to regard Hal Scheffler’s ideas 
as Received Truth. In fact, Warren Shapiro, in his role as editor, made 
a point of inviting scholars with a track record of contesting Scheffler’s 
thought to participate in this Festschrift. Thus Scheffler was critical of 
the idea that an ‘alliance’ relationship is foundational to human kinship 
(e.g. Scheffler 1970b, 1973: 780–86, 1977). It needs to be added here 
that, after his initial formulation of what would come to be called ‘alliance 
theory’, noted above, Lévi-Strauss (1949) would develop his scheme into 
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one emphasising societies with paternally (or, less often, maternally) 
based groups that regularly intermarry, as opposed to those in which such 
groups exist but prefer to scatter their marriages among a large number 
of equivalent groups, and those that have no such groups. In the former 
class of societies, he maintained, kinship terms are not polysemic: rather, 
each has a single meaning, and this meaning refers primarily to intergroup 
relations and only incidentally to close kin. This might be considered 
a variety of the ‘social categories’ position. Bob Parkin (Chapter 8), the 
only ‘alliance theorist’ who has taken serious account of the extensionist 
position, is here concerned with the disappearance of regular intermarriage 
between groups. He points out that this disappearance stems from 
nonmarital factors which prevent group interaction. Otherwise he 
maintains the ‘alliance theory’ position on kin terms. His essay, however, 
does not counter Hal Scheffler’s viewpoint that kin terms in societies with 
intermarrying groups are like kin terms everywhere else: their foci are 
close procreative kin, from which they are extended to others, including 
those related by marriage.
The ‘performativist’ view of kinship is taken up in Linda K. Watts’s essay 
(Chapter 9). Previously, Watts had authored two exceptional analyses 
of the kinship terminology of the Zuni of New Mexico (Watts 1997, 
2000) in which she seriously engaged the extensionist position. For her, 
the expression ‘kinship terminology’ is a misnomer: she prefers ‘relational 
terminology’, because, she has argued, the foci of the terms in question 
are provided by people with whom one is especially close emotionally, 
who may or may not be close procreative kin. The argument is pursued 
further in this volume. Her essay is without question the most passionate 
and erudite defence to date of the performativist position. As such, it 
invites a rethinking of the extensionist theory, though not, we think, 
an abandonment of it.
Watts also stresses the necessity for richer linguistic analysis in kinship 
studies, which we fully endorse. She draws attention to the fact that such 
an analysis of a ‘relational terminology’ would be more encompassing 
than one concerned solely with terms of reference, which have received 
by far the most attention in kinship studies: here her position is similar to 
those taken in several of the other essays in this volume, particularly those 
of Strathern and Stewart, Burbank, and McConvell. Watts’s advocacy 
would, she notes, lead to a fuller appreciation of the range of relations 
an individual has with others. Thus the native terms that anthropologists 
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translate as ‘mother’ and ‘father’ do indeed, we think, have primary 
reference to procreation, but this does not preclude extensive connotative 
meaning.
This links up with Bojka Milicic’s essay (Chapter 10). But while Watts’s 
chapter is concerned with synchronic ethnographic studies, Milicic 
pursues the role of metaphor in human thought more generally, including 
its possible origin as one of the ways by which kinship is conceptualised. 
Kinship and metaphor, she points out, are both fundamentally relational: 
kinship involves the relation of individuals to one another, metaphor the 
relation of one semantic domain to another through analogy, as when her 
Croatian informants liken their kinship networks to winding clusters of 
plants. Milicic suggests that, in the course of human evolution, thinking 
about kinship is what led to metaphorical thought. Her essay thus deals 
with an area noted but insufficiently explored by Hal Scheffler, but, like 
his concern with focality in nonmetaphorical kinship, she roots it in our 
species’ heritage.
Doug Jones’s essay (Chapter 11), like McConvell’s, is concerned with 
historical change in kinship terminologies, but, like Milicic’s, it focuses 
upon more general properties of human thought. More specifically, his 
focus is on how these properties impose internal constraints on change in 
systems of kin classification. Such systems, he suggests, display a degree 
of cross-cultural regularity suggestive of a common structural foundation, 
and this foundation transcends variation in local theories of procreation. 
The suggestion, then, is that Hal Scheffler’s ideas, relying as they do on 
such theories, need to be supplemented. In the same vein, Jones expands 
the extensionist argument by calling attention to certain constraints on 
kin-term usage not considered by Scheffler.
An even more unabashedly innatist position is taken in the essay by 
Michelle Escasa-Dorne and Bill Jankowiak (Chapter 12), whose argument 
dovetails nicely with Hal Scheffler’s interest in gender. Just as Scheffler’s 
analysis provides no support for modish claims about gender classification, 
so the findings of Escasa-Dorne and Jankowiak square not at all with 
current arguments concerning gender equality in sexual behaviour. More 
specifically, these two scholars studied partner-preferences as indicated on 
Internet dating sites; since one can be largely anonymous on such sites, it 
might be expected that women would be more inclined to shake off what 
could be called ‘conservative’ social views, and more inclined consequently 
to approximate men in this area. But, it turns out, this is anything but 
19
INTRODUCTION
the case: even on the Internet men evidence significantly more interest 
in casual sex with multiple partners than women do, whereas when it 
comes to committed relationships the reverse is true. We should perhaps 
emphasise here, especially given the political climate in academia these 
days, that the tendencies discovered by Escasa-Dorne and Jankowiak 
are just that—tendencies. Their research found that some men prefer 
committed relationships, some women casual sex with multiple partners. 
Biology is not destiny: it is likelihood. All of the chapters in this Festschrift, 
in fact, should be read with this in mind.
Conclusion
Even an Introduction should have one. We believe we now have 
a  general theory of human kinship that is consistent with all the data 
at our command: kinship is primarily about locally posited procreative 
ties, thence extended to other social relationships, as well as to construed 
relationships with the phenomena of nature and of people’s imagination. 
Moreover, the relation of all this to the nuclear family, though not 
absolute, is strongly tendential. These are truly monumental conclusions, 
and we have Hal Scheffler most of all to thank for them. We hope that the 
essays that follow are worthy of this remarkable scholar.
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Hal Scheffler Versus David 
Schneider and His Admirers, 
in the Light of What We Now 
Know About Trobriand Kinship
Warren Shapiro
[T]he anti-kinship views of … David Schneider have been influential 
… out of proportion to their good sense … I have often wondered how 
or why it is that such logically and empirically shoddy claims got to be 
so widely accepted … Many anthropological lemmings, infatuated with 
radical cultural constructionism … have blindly followed [him] over 
a cliff. Paying no attention to or even denying the validity of a distinction 
between the literal and the metaphoric, they have enabled themselves 
to create numerous esoteric ‘others’ whose ‘relationship systems’ are for 
the most part nothing more than clones of Schneider’s interpretation of 
‘American kinship’ … They would thereby open the way for virtually 
endless commodity differentiation unconstrained by even the most 
minimal standards of intellectual or social value (Scheffler 2003: 341–43).
[I]t is important to remember, as bearing upon the status of the family, 
that in many primitive tribes the terms used for the immediate members 
of the family are either distinguished from the same terms in the extended 
sense by the addition of some particle, or terms corresponding to 
‘own’ are used … Family is family, whatever the system of relationship 
(Goldenweiser 1937: 301).
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My goal in this chapter is to further Hal Scheffler’s critique of the 
so-called  ‘new kinship studies’ (see my first epigraph), using a strictly 
ethnographic/analytical basis. Following his lead—he began this critique 
years earlier (Scheffler 1976)—I have argued in quite a few places (Shapiro 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) that these 
studies, indebted mostly to David Schneider’s publications, especially his 
A Critique of the Study of Kinship (Schneider 1984), are empirically and 
analytically badly flawed. Here I provide further evidence of these flaws. 
I forewarn the reader that he/she will have regularly to refer back to the 
presentation of Scheffler’s ideas in the Introduction to this volume.
I need first to say something about the new kinship studies. As shown 
in  the Introduction, Hal Scheffler has made a strong case that kin-
reckoning throughout the world is based upon native notions of 
procreation. Schneider, by contrast, argued that an emphasis upon 
procreative kinship derives not from the ethnography itself but, rather, 
from the cultural background of the western ethnographer, emphasising 
as it does procreation in kin-reckoning: he took Hal Scheffler, among 
others, to task on this very matter (Schneider 1984: 113–26).1 The new 
kinship studies, then, emphasise nonprocreative or performative means of 
establishing kinship connexion, like commensality (e.g. Carsten 1997); 
name-sharing (e.g. Sahlins 2013: 68–73), or just saying that two or more 
people are kin (e.g. Weston 1991). This in itself is fine, but in so doing 
these scholars fail to appreciate an obvious but nonetheless salient fact, 
noted in the Introduction but well worth repeating: whenever two people 
are recognised as kin to each other, by either procreative or performative 
means, they ipso  facto are recognised as members of reciprocal kin 
classes. These classes, moreover, have an internal structure, to which an 
enormous literature is testament. If one chooses not to deal with this 
literature, which is what the performativists mostly do (see below), 
he or she is unable to raise (let alone answer) the question of focality, 
of the semantic relationships of the various forms of kin-reckoning 
within a community. To take Janet Carsten’s highly celebrated example: 
it is misleading to imply that, among Malays, both commensality and 
1  Actually, Schneider argued that the primacy of procreative notions does not hold even in American 
kinship, and that it was projected onto ethnographic data by anthropologists committed to a genealogical 
model of kinship. Hence he could argue that American kinship has two ‘distinctive features’ that are 
on a logical par with each other—‘biogenetic relationship’ and ‘code for … conduct’—the latter having 
nothing to do with procreation (Schneider 1968: 101). Scheffler (1976) has criticised this argument—
and, indeed, Schneider’s entire analysis of his data from Chicago and environs.
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procreation are equally means of establishing kinship. For the fact is that 
there is overwhelming evidence, completely ignored by Carsten, that for 
these people commensality and other forms of performative kinship are 
derived from, are modelled upon, procreative ones (Shapiro 2011b)—just 
as Hal Scheffler would have predicted.
I offer as my first piece of evidence my second epigraph, taken from 
the second edition of Alexander Goldenweiser’s introductory text. 
Now I know that Goldenweiser is not a household name, even in 
anthropological households.2 But his anticipation some of Hal Scheffler’s 
ideas is remarkable, and if he and Scheffler are even half right about what 
were once openly called kinship terminologies, then we need seriously to 
question whether Schneider and his admirers have anything resembling 
an argument. Could it be, rather, that the assumption of the primacy 
of procreative kinship was not an assumption, that the heads of the 
practitioners of (what might be dubbed by default) the old kinship studies, 
however influenced by their personal experience, were also influenced by 
what they indeed found in the field?
Goldenweiser was surely generalising from the ethnographic data available 
at the time he wrote. Indeed, there are examples aplenty in the early 
literature on both sides of The Pond (e.g. Freire-Marreco 1914; Lowie 
1912; Rivers 1914; Speck 1918; Walker 1914), but they have achieved 
the semioblivion that attaches, however undeservingly, to Goldenweiser. 
For my part I would argue that anyone claiming expertise in human 
kinship should be aware of at least some of this scholarship, but I am 
prepared, for present purposes, to be lenient. My example, therefore, 
is drawn from what is the best-known ethnographic corpus we have, 
a corpus with which, it seems fair to presume, all kinship specialists are at 
least partly familiar. I deal mostly with data which are directly pertinent 
to extensionist theory. But, following Hal Scheffler’s emphasis on the link 
between that theory and the importance of the nuclear family (again see 
the Introduction), I begin my analysis of each case with the ethnographers’ 
report of domestic life.
2  Goldenweiser is not a voice in the wilderness. Comparable statements on focality and extension 
can be found in Kroeber (1917: 73), Firth (1936: 261), Keesing (1990: 163–64), and, most recently, 
Goodenough (2001: 217). The last named makes the vital point that procreative kinship provides 
a model for other forms of kin-reckoning (ibid.: 210–11) and thus anticipates one of my arguments 
here. Goodenough’s essay should be required reading for anyone who believes that Schneider had 
anything resembling an argument. In the present context, the following remark is especially significant: 
‘I agree with Harold Scheffler that all systems of social relationship recognized by anthropologists 
cross-culturally as kin relationships are rooted in parturition’ (ibid.: 217).
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Trobriand kinship
Early in The Sexual Life of Savages Bronisław Malinowski calls our attention 
to ‘the groups of people sitting in front of their dwellings’, informing us 
that ‘each group consists of one family only – man, wife, and children’ 
(1929: 17). Other ethnographers of the Trobriands echo him. Thus Harry 
A. Powell notes that ‘[a] man and a woman united by the marriage contract 
are responsible for one or more dependent children, whom they bring 
up as members of a single household’ (1956: 137). Susan P. Montague 
tells us that ‘people prefer to live in nuclear family units, one to a house’ 
(1974: 33). Mark Mosko observes that during certain ceremonies men 
‘sleep and socialize’ in a special edifice because these rituals ‘forbid co-
habitation with wives and children’ (2013: 493). And elsewhere Mosko, 
citing information from Katherine Lepani, another scholar who has 
recently worked in the Trobriands, tells us:
that it is only when a couple agree to create a publicly affirmed domestic 
relationship that they initiate sexual relations with one another and also 
lie and sleep together, sit and eat as a couple … and so on (2005: 58).
To turn to wider circles of sociality: Malinowski tells us that only people 
of one’s own local matrilineal3 group are lexically marked as ‘real kinsmen’ 
(veyola mokita), in contradistinction to kakaveyola, which he translates 
as ‘pseudokindred’ and ‘spurious kinsmen’, that is members of a more 
inclusive matrilineal category but not of one’s own local group (Malinowski 
1929: 495–96, 513, 527; see also Powell 1956: 191). ‘Real kinsmen’, by 
contrast, may also be rendered simply as veyola—that is, without the 
lexical marker (see also Malinowski 1926: 113; Powell 1969b: 602–03; 
Weiner 1976: 53–54, 1983: 695)—much as when I refer to my mother 
I virtually never say my real mother: I assume that the expression my mother 
is taken by my listener to mean the focal member of her kin class and not, 
say, my Cub Scout denmother when I was a boy. This example apparently 
has Trobriand counterparts. Thus Bernard Baldwin reports an expression 
3  I use the label ‘matrilineal’ here because it has become standard in kinship studies. In truth there 
is only scant evidence that Trobrianders make much of extended genealogical chains. Malinowski 
(1929: 498, 527) and Powell (1956: 97 et seq.) are quite explicit on this point (see also Sider 1967: 
96). It is probably more accurate to render these groupings as matrifilial, insofar as membership 
is dependent upon that of one’s mother and is identical with it. Compare Keen (1994), who, to 
my mind rightly, refers to Yuulngu groupings as patrifilial rather than ‘patrilineal’. This is a more 
appropriate label in most of Aboriginal Australia, as well as in both halves of Native America (Murphy 
1979; Tooker 1971; see also Shapiro 1979: 13–14). 
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that he translates as ‘she who begot me’ and ‘the real one’, ‘which is used 
sometimes in speech to specify the actual mother as apart from the crowd 
of maternal aunts and foster mothers’ (1945: 228). Montague even notes 
that nonfocal members of the Trobriand ‘mother’ (ina) class can be said to 
be ‘not ina’ (2001: 175–76)—in other words, not the focus of the ina class, 
though still, apparently, called ina. But she maintains that focal ina status 
is based on nurturance rather than procreation—specifically on who feeds 
(especially, apparently, breast-feeds) the individual in question (ibid.; see 
also Baldwin 1945: 224; Crain, Darrah and Digm’Rina 2003: 12; Powell, 
cited in Sider 1967: 96; Powell 1969a: 192–94, 1969b: 603). But Annette 
B. Weiner tells us that in cases of adoption ‘everyone knows the child’s 
true genealogy’, and that ‘adoption does not effect a severance between the 
child and its true parents’ (1976: 124). Still, I found Montague’s statement 
curious, so I ran it by Gunter Senft, an anthropological linguist who has 
worked in the Trobriands and written extensively on their ideology and 
sociality (Senft 1985, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2009, 2011). In an email 
communication Senft tells me that small children single out the people 
who nurture them as ‘real’ members of both the ‘mother’ and the ‘father’ 
classes but then, where pertinent, they are corrected by their elders, who 
nominate their procreative parents (8 October 2013). We ought certainly 
to attend to children’s models of the world, here and elsewhere, but for 
comparative purposes we need to rely on adult models (Scheffler and 
Lounsbury 1971: 9). I conclude, therefore, that despite Trobriand lack 
of concern with extended genealogies (see footnote 3), the procreative 
mother is the focal member of her kin class; and, moreover, that close 
maternal kin provide one focus for general Trobriand ideas about kinship. 
But this latter conclusion, though true de facto, needs to be modified, for 
the pertinent criterion is locality rather than genealogy; and, this being so, 
it provides some support for the performative position.4
4  With the exception of this last conclusion my remarks will be seen to jibe with Lounsbury’s 
well-known analysis of Trobriand kin classification (Lounsbury 1965), but is less tied to extended 
genealogies and more to native distinctions. Many of these distinctions appeared in the ethnographic 
record after he wrote but Malinowski was far from oblivious to them (see main text). This being so, 
I can only wonder why Lounsbury failed to take account of them. Dwight Read and I consider this 
matter in the Introduction.
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In his initial publication on the Trobriands, Malinowski tells us: 
the state of knowledge … is just at the point where there is a vague idea as 
to some nexus between sexual connection and pregnancy, whereas there is 
no idea whatever concerning the man’s contribution towards the new life 
which is being formed in the mother’s body (1916: 407).
Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski would have us believe, are, according to 
the established expression, ‘ignorant of physiological paternity’: conception 
occurs, in native theory, when a spirit-child (baloma) enters a woman, 
her husband only ‘opening the way’ through repeated copulations (ibid.: 
412–13; see also Malinowski 1927a: 89)—this presumably is the ‘vague 
idea’ to which Malinowski alludes. It would extend this essay very 
considerably if I were to consider the intellectual background to this 
‘finding’, as well as its influence on subsequent scholarship.5 Suffice it 
to say, for present purposes, and regarding the latter concern only, that 
Marshall Sahlins accepts the ‘finding’ uncritically, as part of his argument 
that human kinship is or can be independent of biological considerations 
(1976: 37–39); and that, more recently, Sarah Franklin in a supposedly 
comprehensive view of human conception ideologies inspired by David 
Schneider, does much the same (1997: 33–43), as does Janet Carsten 
(2000: 8).
In point of fact, there is contrary evidence even in Malinowski’s initial 
presentation. Thus he describes a ritual bath undergone by a woman, 
which occurs ‘four to five months after the first symptoms of pregnancy’ 
(1916: 404). The ceremony, he tells us, ‘is connected with incarnation 
of the spirit children’ (ibid.: 405), and he further notes:
The view taken by one of my informants was that during the first stage of 
pregnancy the [spirit-child] has not really entered the woman’s body … 
Then, during the ceremonial bathing, the spirit-child enters the body 
of the woman (ibid.).
Other informants, Malinowski continues, disagreed. In The Sexual Life 
of Savages, these data are repeated (1929: 225), but we also learn that:
5  It is well worth noting here that Hal Scheffler pointed this out some time ago, citing also 
remarkably similar findings for Aboriginal people, the other locus classicus for claims of ‘ignorance 
of physiological paternity’ (Scheffler 1973: 749–51, 1978: 5–13; see also Shapiro 1996, 2014: 
25–33). I deal with these matters more comprehensively in an essay on Trobriand kinship currently 
in preparation. 
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Pregnancy is first diagnosed by the swelling of the breasts and the 
darkening of the nipples. At this time a woman may dream that the spirit 
of one of her kinsmen brings her the child from the outer world to be 
reincarnated [emphasis added] (ibid.: 211). 
This is to say that the woman is already pregnant when entered by the 
spirit-child. This is made plainer by Carveth Read (1918): writing only 
two years after Malinowski’s initial formulation, he states expressly that 
spirit-entry occurs at foetal quickening. Subsequently, Leo Austen reported 
this as well (1934: 103). Thus he tells us that a woman encounters the 
spirit-child in a dream when she is already pregnant, which state is held to 
result from ‘the blood filling up the uterus … intermix[ing] with some 
water-like fluid from the woman’s body. Where the fluid comes from is 
unknown’ (ibid.: 108; see also Mosko 2005: 58). We shall see in a moment 
that there is reason to believe that it is anything but unknown. The thing 
to note now is that what we are dealing with is not a conception ideology 
at all: it is a doctrine about the generation of the spiritual aspect of the person, 
and, as such, is comparable to baptism in Christianity, as well as to other 
metaphysical ideas to which Göran Aijmer (1992) has given the label 
animation.
There is considerable evidence that water, either in ritual bathing or 
swimming in the sea, is in native ideology a semen surrogate. I shall 
present only some of this evidence here. As noted, Malinowski reports 
that a woman’s husband is supposed to ‘open the way’ for the spirit-child 
by repeated sexual intercourse. In Trobriand mythology a comparable 
‘opening’ is caused by rain—or, especially noteworthy, this—by stalactites, 
whose dripping ‘water’ does the ‘opening’ (Malinowski 1916: 411–13; 
1927a: 89; 1927b: 50–51; 1929: 182–83, 426; 1960: 89). In case there 
is any doubt about the entailed symbolism, we have the direct statement 
from Alex C. Rentoul (1932: 275) that the stalactite in question ‘is looked 
upon as a phallic symbol’ (see also Barton 1917: 109; Malinowski 1929: 
182–83; Senft 2011: 18). Malinowski (1916: 404) also notes that 
a woman swimming in the sea announces her pregnancy by saying ‘A fish 
has bitten me!’—erotic biting, he elsewhere notes, being a  common 
practice in coitus (1929: 333–34). There is, in this connection, considerable 
evidence that fish represent spirit-children in Trobriand symbolism and, 
less certainly, the ‘water’—that is, semen-surrounded phalluses from which 
the spirit-children are implicitly held to emanate (see especially Crain, 
Darrah and Digm’Rina 2003: 15; Glass 1986: 54, 58; Malinowski 1929: 
172–76; Senft 2011: 31). Patrick Glass’s research based on Malinowski’s 
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unpublished fieldnotes as well as his publications, and his—Glass’s—own 
examination of Trobriand art in various museums, echoes and expands 
upon this (Glass 1986, 1988). Glass notes that a particular shoreline in 
the Trobriand area is called momola—an expression which, following 
Malinowski (1929: 167, 339), he translates as both ‘semen’ and ‘female 
sexual discharge’. ‘[I]t was generally by bathing in the momola’, Glass 
tells us, ‘that women announced that they had become pregnant’ (1988: 
63–64). Malinowski insists that that ‘[t]he spermatic fluid … serves 
merely the purposes of pleasure and lubrication’ (1916: 408–09; see also 
Malinowski 1929: 167). But this conclusion is gainsaid by Glass’s 1986 
analysis of the artwork on Trobriand war shields. These shields contain 
more or less explicit images of phalluses, the female reproductive tract, 
coitus, semen and human embryos. Thus Glass is led to the following 
conclusion: ‘What is overtly negated on land (male fertility) takes place 
on the seashore, momala (semen … ), through water and fish … which 
[are] linked to the phallus’ (1986: 58). Glass even has an explanation for 
the covert nature of this symbolism: ‘The Trobrianders,’ he tells us, ‘were 
very guarded about articulating their knowledge of paternity for fear of 
offending “the ears of the spirits” [emphasis added]’ (ibid.: 60; see also Glass 
1988: 60–61; Senft 1996: 386–87, 2011: 29–30). In other words, one 
does not talk about sex, or talks about it only circumspectly, in connection 
with the sacred—something which is hardly confined to the Trobriands.
Now Malinowski seems to have worked almost exclusively with men 
(Malinowski 1916: 362; Senft 2009: 221), but Alex Rentoul, a resident 
colonial magistrate, was less limited. Not long after Malinowski’s report, 
Rentoul noted a decided concern among Trobriand women with native 
measures ‘to expel the male seed [emphasis in original]’ after coitus in an 
attempt to abort pregnancy (Rentoul 1931: 153; see also Powell 1980: 
701; Senft 2009: 221–22, 2011: 33–34).6 Some of Rentoul’s further 
remarks are worth pursuing:
[T]ogether with this practical knowledge of physiological paternity, 
there has always existed the magico-religious explanation … [T]his is the 
Story of Birth, as it is believed by intelligent Trobrianders as thoroughly 
as a modern [western religious] congregation would believe the curate’s 
shy announcement that during the night the angels had brought him 
a little son … Presently the [spirit-child] will visit the woman and place 
6  Malinowski, by contrast, says that he ‘can say with complete confidence [that] no preventive means 
of any description are known, nor the slightest idea of them entertained’ (1929: 197; see also Malinowski 
1927b: 75–76). It seems fair to suggest that his assuredness on the matter was grossly misplaced.
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upon her forehead a miniature babe … The babe descending the body 
of the mother will visit each breast for nourishment, then descending 
further will enter the womb, where it will remain until the day of its birth. 
In this process the father’s part is simply ‘to keep open the way’ by sexual 
intercourse (1931: 153).
Note the apt comparison with western religious notions connected 
with conception, presaging Sir Edmund Leach’s well-known conclusion 
(Leach 1966). Note, too, that the spirit-child is held to enter the mother 
nonvaginally—through the forehead—suggesting that it is seen as 
antithetical to carnal generation (see footnote 10). Thus Malinowski tells 
us that the heads of chiefs are sacred (1926: 92; 1929: 34), but in an email 
communication to me Mark Mosko notes that the heads of everyone 
are ‘regarded as in some sense bomaboma (“sacred”)’ (1 May 2014). 
Moreover, according to Rentoul, entrance occurs ‘presently’—that is after 
conception: we now know that this is at (or, probably, deemed to be the 
cause of ) foetal quickening. A final consideration in Rentoul’s remarks is 
that the ‘physiological theory’ was most plainly held by Trobriand women: 
this is in fact a recurrent theme in subsequent ethnographic and theoretical 
literature on the area (Austen 1934: 104, 113; Hocart 1954: 99; Mosko 
1985: 211; Powell, cited in Montague 1971: 359; Senft 2011: 33–34; 
Sider 1967: 95–96, 105; Young 2004: 431). Why, then, should Trobriand 
men be so concerned with the spiritual contribution to the fetus?
Here, I think, we need to recall that the local matrilineal group is construed 
to be part of one of the four clans that, in native theory, have always 
existed, and that emerged from the Underworld at the Beginning of Things 
(Eyde 1983: 67–68; Malinowski 1926: 113; 1929: 494; Montague 1971: 
354). It is thus much like Aboriginal Australian patrifilial groups, which 
William E.H. Stanner aptly calls ‘sacramental corporations of a perennial 
order’ (1960: 253). Malinowski himself noted that the ‘ignorance’ theory 
‘gives a good theoretical foundation for matriliny: for the whole process 
of introducing new life into a community lies between the spirit world 
and the female’ (1929: 179). This ‘new life’, he further tells us, is held 
to be a reincarnation of an old one, which merely housed its spirit, and 
that this spirit has always existed and will continue to do so, going to yet 
another individual after the demise of its present host. He notes further 
that the spirit is specific to a particular local matrilineal group, from 
which it cannot be alienated (Malinowski 1926: 113; 1929: 182; but see 
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Malinowski 1916: 406). From this perspective, then, each local matrilineal 
group is self-generating through a process in which sexual intercourse has no 
place, given the incest barrier within each such group (see Moore 1964).
Moreover, the ongoing social and spiritual life of each such group seems 
to be a male concern. Men of the group own its gardens and have a virtual 
monopoly on garden and other magic, as well as local political leadership 
and kula trading (Brindley 1984: 93–94; Glass 1986: 50; Malinowski 
1929: 41, 43; Montague 1971: 362; Mosko 1995: 774 et seq., 2013: 
493; Weiner 1977: 67). By contrast, Montague (1983: 38–39) tells us 
that in Trobriand theory women are construed as animal-like, as not quite 
the real human beings that men are held to be (see also Crain, Darrah 
and Digm’Rina 2003: 9). This is especially remarkable in view of the 
fact that even those Trobriand men who insisted on the ‘magico-religious 
explanation’ with Malinowski were entirely explicit on the ‘physiological 
explanation’ in accounting for animal reproduction (Malinowki 1916: 
411, 413; see also Rentoul 1931: 153; but see Malinowski 1927b: 64–
67).7 So it makes sense that men, being human beings par excellence, 
and, as such, leaders of enduring corporations, should wish to sustain the 
fiction that their reproduction is noncarnal, especially in public encounters 
with anthropologist and other foreigners (see Austen 1934: 103–04, 113; 
Montague 1971: 359; Mosko 1985: 211, 226, 2013: 492–96; Powell 
1969b: 652; Rentoul 1932: 275; Senft 1995: 216; Sider 1967: 95–96, 
105; Weiner 1976: 122).8
From this perspective we can understand the unkind reception Malinowski 
got when he expressly raised the ‘physiological theory’ with informants. 
Thus he tells us that ‘as a means of testing the firmness of their belief 
[in spirit-entry], I sometimes made myself … aggressively an advocate of 
the … physiological doctrine of procreation’ (1929: 185). When he did 
this, he goes on, ‘I was sometimes astonished at the fierce opposition evoked 
by my advocacy of physiological paternity [emphasis added]’ (ibid.: 186). 
7  Later Malinowski claimed that this conclusion is incorrect (1927b: 62–67, 1929: 192). But he 
appears not to have inquired deeply into Trobriand theories of animal reproduction. Moreover, 
he concludes that ‘animals are not subject … to the same causal relationships as man’ (ibid.).
8  Senft deals with several modes of speech recognised by Trobrianders (1985, 1991). He notes that 
although sexual talk is normally prohibited, in one of these modes it can occur: it is said to be ‘only 
playing’ (1991: 238–39; see also Weiner 1983). Malinowski (1929: 467, 486, 1960: 87) was aware 
of ‘bad talk’, but it seems never to have occurred to him that the avoidance of such discourse was one 
of the factors that led him to conclude that Trobrianders are ‘ignorant of physiological paternity’. Senft 
speculates that Malinowski ‘became the victim of the Trobriand Islanders’ love to make fun of people – 
with their … lying or joking or indirect language … and they really took him for a ride’ (2011: 35).
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Further evidence of such a ‘fierce opposition’ is provided in Reo Fortune’s 
account of the neighboring Dobuans (Fortune 1934). Since there is 
considerable mixing between the two peoples:
The Dobuans know the Trobriand belief that procreation is from the 
reincarnation of spirits of the dead, not from the biological father. They 
say bluntly that the Trobrianders lie. The subject is not brought up 
between Trobrianders and Dobuans as it has been the subject of anger 
and quarrel too often in the past. My Dobuan friends warned me not to 
mention the matter in the Trobriands before I went there. Once I was 
there I deliberately made the experiment. The Trobrianders asserted the 
spiritual belief, just as Dr. Malinowski had published it. But the head of 
every Dobuan in the room immediately was turned away from me towards 
the wall. They affected not to hear the conversation; but afterwards when 
they had me alone they were furious with me (ibid.: 239).
In other words, Trobriand men—it is men who deal with outsiders 
(Brindley 1984: 94)—pretend that coitus and procreation are unrelated, 
while Dobuan men pretend that they are unaware of the ‘fierce opposition’ 
of Trobriand men to the ‘physiological theory’. I cannot explain why 
Trobrianders and Dobuans, who share much the same ideology and 
sociality, differ so starkly in what they are willing to talk about in public, 
but it is surely clear that, on the Trobriand side, something more is at 
stake than a knowledge of the real facts of life—something Edmund 
Leach recognised in his famous article on ‘Virgin Birth’ (Leach 1966). 
Jerry Leach seems to have hit the nail on the head:
Trobrianders believe in spirits of the dead who reincarnate themselves 
[within] their … matrilineal group[s]. The formal belief seems to deny 
males any role in reproduction, and the Trobrianders convinced Malinowski 
that their religious belief was a true statement of their actual knowledge … 
[H]owever, males are recognized as part of the reproductive process … The 
public denial of this seems intended for the ears of the spirits[,] who jealously 
guard their pre-eminent role in the formation of new human beings, but it has 
led the world to believe that the Trobrianders do not associate intercourse 
with [conception] [emphasis added] (quoted in Glass 1986: 47).9
9  This is part of a more general denigration of sexual reproduction in the Trobriands, a subject 
that is beyond the scope of the present essay (for details see Mosko 2013: 495, 500). A subsequent 
essay by Mosko (2014) provides a remarkable statement of Trobriand pseudoprocreative thought 
(see also Brindley 1984: 17 et seq.; Tambiah 1968: 197). There are two ironies in all this. One is that, 
thanks mostly to Malinowski, these people have been portrayed, both in anthropological and popular 
circles, as inhabitants of ‘islands of love’ (Senft 1998). The other, with the same indebtedness, is that 
alleged ‘ignorance of physiological paternity’ in the Trobriands is part of this thought: it has absolutely 
nothing to do with real-world knowledge. 
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Indeed, as Gunter Senft put it in an email communication to me, ‘all the 
discussions about virgin birth in the Trobriands were simply void from the 
very beginning’ (8 May 2015).
It is also plain, it is worth noting, that in Trobriand thought spiritual 
generation is modelled on carnal generation, just as it is in baptism 
(see especially Gudeman 1972) and many other rituals which, following 
Hiatt (1971), are aptly dubbed pseudoprocreative.10
The same phenomenon is reflected in Malinowski’s report that the father 
is said to be ‘a stranger’ or an ‘outsider’ (tomakava) (1927a: 39; 1927b: 14, 
1929: 5, 1960: 39). Once again Sahlins sees in this evidence of a radical 
disconnect between the facts of biology and native representations of 
these facts, and once again he is wrong (1976: 38). Weiner’s rendition of 
tomakava as referring to ‘nonclanspeople’ (1976: 53–54) is probably closer 
to the truth. But the term is also applied to people in mourning regardless 
of matrilineal group affiliation (Seligman 1910: 720), so, whatever its 
focal significance, its widest application would seem to be something like 
‘anyone who is outside the sphere of normal social relations in the situation 
at hand’ (see also Montague 2001: 181–82). Comparable considerations 
apply to the Trobriand father. Here is Weiner on the matter:
Malinowski … placed great emphasis on the classification of [one’s] 
father as tomakava … ‘stranger,’ rather than own kinsman (veyola tatola). 
My informants [however] said that no one would ever call their father 
10  Schneider (1989) has objected to my use of this label (Shapiro 1988), presumably on the grounds 
that it assumes the logical priority of (what he takes to be) only western ideas about kinship. This is not 
so. In all the Aboriginal ceremonies mentioned in Hiatt’s classic analysis, there is abundant evidence that 
ritual generation is modelled on native appreciations of the processes of carnal reproduction. This is also 
true of those rituals, like Easter celebrations, that commemorate an antithesis between (what we might 
call) women’s ability to give life and men’s ability to give death, regarding the latter as ontologically 
superior to the former. On this see Jay (1985, 1992) and Rosaldo and Atkinson (1975). Thus Jesus is 
said never to have participated in carnal generation, to have been born of a woman who was similarly 
a nonparticipant, and who was impregnated nonvaginally—through the ear. Compare the Trobriand 
doctrine that spirit entry occurs in the mother’s head (Malinowski 1927b: 34–35, 47, 61, 1929: 175, 
188; Mosko 2005: 58; Rentoul 1931: 153), remarkably similar notions in Aboriginal Australia (Shapiro 
2014: 25–33), and the propositions that the Buddha was born through his mother’s sexual abstinence 
and entered her in prefoetal form through her side. Malinowski also mentions spirit entry through the 
vagina and the abdomen for the Trobriands, but he says that the former proposition is ‘decidedly less 
authoritative’ than the one that ascribes entry via the head (1929: 176, 181). I suspect this means that he 
was told this by younger male informants. In any case, Senft’s male informants mentioned vaginal entry 
as well as entry through the head (Senft 2011: 31–32), but the former mode, apparently, only occurs if 
the woman ‘swims somewhat carelessly’ (ibid.: 31). Jay Crain, Allan Darrah and Linus Digm’Rina note 
that, to avoid another pregnancy during lactation, a Trobriand woman covers her loins with a skirt and 
then covers her head—the latter to prevent spirit-entry, ‘which would spoil her milk’ (2003: 16). We are, 
alas, not told what prevents her husband from lifting the skirt.
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tomakava. They said [instead] that he was the most important kinsman 
(veyola) they had. It was only in conversations or debates concerning … rights 
of a [local matrilineal group] where a man as father would be referred to as 
tomakava [emphasis added] (1976: 124; see also Powell 1969a: 178; Sider 
1967: 103–06).
In an email communication Gunter Senft confirms Weiner on this last 
matter, but he points out that none of his informants held that the father 
was veyola to his children (13 September 2012). Apparently, the term is 
reserved for maternal kin (see also Lepani 2012: 70). Nevertheless, I think 
it reasonable to conclude that Trobriand notions of fatherhood are based 
on native appreciations of the reproductive process—as is probably the 
case everywhere else. Even Malinowski would eventually hedge on his 
initial formulation (Pulman 2004–05). A key point in this regard is the 
conceptual unity of husband and wife, quite apart from matrilineal group 
affiliation. Thus in an email communication Kathy Lepani informs me of 
a word—kalitouna—‘meaning the man and woman who gave life to you’ 
(8 June 2012).11 She adds—apropos Montague’s analysis of Trobriand kin 
terms (see above)—that the word ‘generally isn’t used to refer to adoptive 
parents, although children might well choose to refer to their adoptive 
parents’ in this manner ‘as an expression of endearment, respect, and 
gratitude’ (ibid.). In a later email Dr Lepani notes that the word tounai, 
apparently cognate to kalitouna, means ‘true parent’, as does toula unai’I, 
‘where toula means “true” or “genuine”’ (23 September 2012). In the same 
vein, Mark Mosko, in an email communication to me notes a Trobriand 
expression toil una’I, which can be used to refer to one’s mother and 
one’s father as a couple. He further notes that una’I means ‘to conceive’! 
(13 August 2012).
We have already seen that ina, the Trobriand ‘mother’ term, has the 
primary significance of ‘genetrix’. Is there evidence, therefore, that tama, 
the ‘father’ term, primarily denotes one’s genitor? Trobrianders have 
a Crow-type kinship terminology: all members of one’s father’s matriline 
are designated by a single term, or two terms depending on sex. Even this 
rendition of Crow-type logic suggests that one’s father is the focal member 
of his kin class, for he provides the conceptual focus for its terminological 
isolation: the class is defined in the first place by reference to him (see 
Introduction). Moreover, Malinowski expressly notes that ‘[t]he primary 
11  This is apparently the same word that Weiner (1976: 123) renders as kalitonai and that she 
translates as ‘true father’.
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meaning of tabu [the term for females of the father’s matriline] is “father’s 
sister”’,12 and that both this term and the ‘father’ term (tama) are applied 
more widely, to any local matrilineal group other than one’s own (1929: 
502, 515). Presumably this means that the father’s sister is rendered as 
tabu makita; in any case, as noted in the Introduction, we know from 
other Crow-type systems that this relative is separated by subclassification 
from other members of her kin class, who are lexically unmarked or 
else rendered by a lexical marker meaning ‘false’ or some such. In any 
case, reverting to the Trobriands, what we seem to have here is a native 
extension rule that says, in effect, ‘Let any female member of any local 
matrilineal group other than my own be terminologically equated with my 
father’s sister’.
It would be most unusual if analogous considerations did not apply to 
the ‘father’ term: indeed, I know of no ethnographic instance in which 
this is the case. So we should not be surprised to find, in a recent essay by 
Mark Mosko (2014) on Trobriand magic, that a magical spell that a man 
utters is said to be ‘his child’—that is something that emanates from him.13 
The entailed notion—that a man can give birth—or otherwise create—
through his head or mouth—has numerous ethnographic parallels. 
In  the Old Testament, God creates by naming; in the New Testament, 
Jesus is regularly referred to as The Word: hence the Holy Spirit’s entry 
into Mary’s ear. Aboriginal fathers ‘find’ the spirits of their children in 
utero in dreams, which occur, as in the Trobriands, at foetal quickening 
(Malinowski 1929: 197, 1927b: 75–76). A Piaroa man in the Venezuelan 
rainforests may refer to his child as ‘my thought’ (Overing 1985: 167). 
In Greek mythology Athena springs from the head of Zeus, just as this 
12  Elsewhere, in The Sexual Life of Savages, Malinowski says that the father’s sister’s daughter is the 
‘true’ member of her kin class (1929: 101). It may be that both are subclassified in this way.
13  I must note that this analysis is my own. I have for some time maintained an email correspondence 
with Professor Mosko, and after reading his latest article I wrote to him about my conclusions. In the 
main, he seems not to agree with them. Thus, in a communication dated 15 March 2015, he maintains 
that ‘everything anyone produces from their labors of all kinds, including the production of magical 
spells, is a gwadi, i.e. a child’ with respect to the producer, and that he finds no reason to grant ‘privileged’ 
status to the procreative father/child relationship. Yet in the article just cited he says that magical spells 
are ‘modeled on … the ordinary reproduction of offspring [emphasis added]’ (2014: 33). And elsewhere 
he suggests, with regard to the gardening of yams, a series of metaphorical equations, to wit:
The gardener is the yams’ father (tama) and his wife their mother (ina). And like their 
human children, their yams are gendered. Capable of reproducing, yam seeds are like 
daughters. As agents of exchange and feeding other humans, subsistence yams are likened 
to human sons … Even the manner of sowing yam seeds is suggestive of these parental 
relations. During … planting, the gardener turns the soil with his digging stick … Nearby 
he inserts a vertical yam stick. My interlocutor … likened the soil to a womb and the stick 
to an erect penis (Mosko 2009: 686).
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essay is my brainchild. In the working-class Brooklyn precincts in which 
I was raised, an older man might say to a younger one, ‘I knew you when 
you were just a gleam in your father’s eye’. The ‘gleam’ carries at least 
two connotations—lust (which could never be expressed more directly in 
regard to one’s mother) and illumination—both connected with semen. 
Thus a seminar is a gathering in which illumination is supposed to take 
place. Alas, the symbolism of light in the Judaeo–Christian tradition is far 
too complex a matter to be considered here. Finally, among Janet Carsten’s 
very many errors of omission in her analyses of Malay sociality is the 
absence of a detailed account of the male role in reproduction—something 
that, happily, Carol Laderman has corrected. Consider this doozy: 
before conception takes place in the mother’s womb, the father has been 
pregnant for forty days. Indeed, people remember ex post facto male 
food cravings preceding the wife’s pregnancy. The baby begins life not 
as a creation within the mother’s belly, but in a more elevated sphere: his 
father’s brain (Laderman 1982; see also Laderman 1983: 75).
More prosaic evidence for the Trobriand father being considered kin to his 
children comes from the classification of patrilateral parallel cousins with 
siblings and matrilateral parallel cousins (Sider 1967: 105). Since the last 
two are unquestionably one’s kin, it would be most unusual if someone of 
the same kin class and the same degree of genealogical proximity were not 
so regarded: certainly I know of no such case in the ethnographic record. 
In sum, Trobriand kinship, like kinship probably everywhere else, is 
founded on local appreciations of the reproductive process within the 
nuclear family, from which it is extended to other people and things.14 
The performative interpretation of it is quite mistaken. The focal members 
of kin classes are close procreative kin, and there are native extension rules. 
Finally, pace Sahlins, there is indeed a ‘third party’ posited in Trobriand 
generative ideology, but it has nothing to do, in native theory, with 
conception: not only is it not posited to occur at conception, but, as well, 
it is seen as antithetical to it (Shapiro 2013).
14  This is not the same as Malinowski’s conclusions about extension (Malinowski 1962: 138), which 
deal with the ontogenic processes whereby children acquire and employ kinship terms, although the 
correlation between the two senses of ‘extension’ is probably very high (Scheffler and Lounsbury 
1971: 61–62).
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
46
Conclusion
All of these conclusions are part of Hal Scheffler’s legacy. In the Introduction 
Dwight Read and I referred to his pointing out the near-ubiquity of the 
nuclear family. His concern with kinship terminologies is what he is best 
known for, but his demonstration that performative kinship notions are 
derived from procreative ones runs a close second. A concern with cross-
cultural regularities is entailed by these conclusions.
All this being so, I conclude that Hal Scheffler was very nearly right on 
the mark when it comes to discerning what human kinship is primarily 
about. By contrast, although performative criteria clearly have a role in 
kin-reckoning, it is a logically and empirically subordinate one, and so 
Schneider and his admirers are well off that mark. Hence the conclusion 
seems reasonable that Hal Scheffler was the single most important figure 
in the history of kinship studies.
Acknowledgements
I am especially grateful to Herb Damsky, Tom Parides, Dwight Read 
and Gunter Senft for encouragement, and for their comments on earlier 
versions of this essay. Thanks are also due to the last-named, as well as to 
Ira Bashkow, Kathy Lepani and Mark Mosko for pertinent information 
supplied to me via email. Bashkow notes that both Alex Rentoul and 
F.E. Williams:
preferred, in treating the issue of [Trobriand] paternity, to insist that 
the Trobrianders had a pragmatic, common sense level of reproductive 
knowledge. Williams … was willing to grant that the Trobrianders 
might in certain contexts hold an elaborate ‘magico-religious theory’ of 
conception. But [he] insisted that they also had ‘a common sense theory’ 
(1996: 11).
Both views could in fact be ‘held … by the same individuals, who 
diplomatically cited one or the other depending on context’. He is quoting 
from an unpublished letter from Williams to Leo Austen. Although 
Williams is well known among Melanesianists for his fieldwork elsewhere 
in Papua New Guinea (e.g. Williams 1936), both Bashkow and I incline 
to the view that he never visited the Trobriands. 
47
1 . HAL SCHEFFLER VERSUS DAVID SCHNEIDER AND HIS ADMIRERS
References
Aijmer, Göran. 1992. ‘Introduction: Coming into existence’. In Coming 
into Existence: Birth and Metaphors of Birth, edited by Göran Aijmer, 
pp. 1–19. Gothenburg, Sweden: Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Social Anthropology. 
Atkinson, Clarissa W., Constance H. Buchanan and Margaret R. Miles 
(eds). 1985. Immaculate and Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and 
Social Reality. Boston: Beacon Press.
Austen, Leo. 1934. ‘Procreation among the Trobriand Islanders’. Oceania 
5(1): 102–13. doi.org/10.1002/j.1834-4461.1934.tb00133.x
Baldwin, Bernard. 1945. ‘Usituma! Song of heaven’. Oceania 15(3): 
201–38. doi.org/10.1002/j.1834-4461.1945.tb00425.x
Barton, F.R. 1917. ‘The spirits of the dead in the Trobriand Islands’. 
Man 17:109–10. doi.org/10.2307/2788966
Bashkow, Ira. 1996. ‘“To be his witness if that was ever necessary”: Raphael 
Brudo on Malinowski’s fieldwork and Trobriand ideas of conception’. 
History of Anthropology Newsletter 23(1): 3–11.
Basso, Keith H. and Henry A. Selby (eds). 1976. Meaning in Anthropology. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Brindley, Marianne. 1984. The Symbolic Role of Women in Trobriand 
Gardening. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
Carsten, Janet. 1997. The Heat of the Hearth: The Process of Kinship in 
a Malay Fishing Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_______. 2000. ‘Introduction: Cultures of relatedness’. In Cultures of 
Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship, edited by Janet 
Carsten, 1–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crain, Jay, Allan Darrah and Linus Digm’Rina. 2003. ‘Trobriand health 
and the cosmetics of cyclical ontology’. Trobriand Islands Digital 
Ethnography Project. Online: trobriandsindepth.com/Trobriand%20
health.html (accessed 3 June 2017).
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
48
Eyde, David B. 1983. ‘Sexuality and garden ritual in the Trobriands and 
Tikopia: Tudava meets the Itua I Kafika’. In Concepts of Conception: 
Procreation Ideologies in Papua New Guinea, edited by Dan Jorgensen. 
Special issue of Mankind 14: 66–74. doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1835-
9310.1983.tb01252.x
Feinberg, Richard and Martin Ottenheimer (eds). 2001. The Cultural 
Analysis of Kinship: The Legacy of David M. Schneider. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press.
Firth, Raymond. 1936. We, the Tikopia: A Sociological Study of Kinship 
in Primitive Polynesia. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Fortune, Reo F. 1934. Sorcerers of Dobu: The Social Anthropology of the 
Dobu Islanders of the Western Pacific. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co.
Franklin, Sarah. 1997. Embodied Progress: A Cultural Account of Assisted 
Conception. London: Routledge. doi.org/10.4324/9780203414965
Freire-Marreco, Barbara. 1914. ‘Tewa kinship terms from the pueblo 
of Hano, Arizona’. American Anthropologist 16(2): 269–87. doi.org/ 
10.1525/aa.1914.16.2.02a00070
Glass, Patrick. 1986. ‘The Trobriand code: An interpretation of Trobriand 
war shield designs’. Anthropos 81(1–3): 47–63.
——. 1988. ‘Trobriand symbolic geography’. Man (n.s.) 23(1): 56–76. 
doi.org/10.2307/2803033
Goldenweiser, Alexander A. 1937. Anthropology: An Introduction 
to Primitive Culture. New York: Crofts.
Goodenough, Ward H. 2001. ‘Conclusion: Muddles in Schneider’s 
model’. In The Cultural Analysis of Kinship: The Legacy of David 
M. Schneider, edited by Richard Feinberg and Martin Ottenheimer, 
205–18. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Gudeman, Stephen. 1972. ‘The compadrazgo as a reflection of the natural 
and spiritual person’. Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland 1971: 4, 45–71. doi.org/10.2307/3031761
Hammel, Eugene A. (ed.). 1965. Formal Semantic Analysis. Special issue 
of American Anthropologist (n.s.) 67(5).
49
1 . HAL SCHEFFLER VERSUS DAVID SCHNEIDER AND HIS ADMIRERS
Hiatt, Lester R. 1971. ‘Secret pseudo-procreation rites among the 
Australian Aborigines’. In Anthropology in Oceania: Essays Presented 
to Ian Hogbin, edited by Lester R. Hiatt and Chandra Jayawardena, 
77–88. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.
Hiatt, Lester R. and Chandra Jayawardena (eds). 1971. Anthropology 
in Oceania: Essays Presented to Ian Hogbin. San Francisco: Chandler 
Publishing Company.
Hocart, Arthur M. 1954. Social Origins. London: Watts.
Jay, Nancy. 1985. ‘Sacrifice as remedy for having been born of woman’. 
In Immaculate and Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and Social 
Reality, edited by Clarrisa W. Atkinson, Constance H. Buchanan and 
Margaret R. Miles, 283–309. Boston: Beacon Press.
——. 1992. Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and 
Paternity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, Doug and Bojka Milicic (eds). 2011. Kinship, Language, and 
Prehistory: Per Hage and the Renaissance in Kinship Studies. Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press.
Jorgensen, Dan (ed.). 1983. Concepts of Conception: Procreation Ideologies 
in Papua New Guinea. Special issue of Mankind 14(1).
Keen, Ian. 1994. Knowledge and Secrecy in an Aboriginal Religion: Yolngu 
of North-East Arnhem Land. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Keesing, Roger M. 1990. ‘Kinship, bonding, and categorization’. In On 
the Generation and Maintenance of Person: Essays in Honour of John 
Barnes, edited by Warren Shapiro. Special issue of The Australian 
Journal of Anthropology (TAJA) 1(2–3): 159–67. doi.org/10.1111/ 
j.1757-6547.1990.tb00380.x 
Kroeber, Alfred L. 1917. ‘Zuni kin and clan’. American Museum of Natural 
History, Paper 18: 41–204. New York: American Museum of Natural 
History.
Laderman, Carol. 1982. ‘Putting Malay Women in Their Place’.  Women 
of Southeast Asia, edited by Penny Van Esterik, 79–99. De Kalb, Ill.: 
Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
50
——. 1983. Wives and Midwives: Childbirth and Nutrition in Rural 
Malaysia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Leach, Edmund R. 1966. ‘Virgin birth’. Proceedings of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (1966): 39–49. 
doi.org/10.2307/3031713 
Lepani, Katherine. 2012. Islands of Love, Islands of Risk: Culture and HIV 
in the Trobriands. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Lounsbury, Floyd G. 1965. ‘Another view of the Trobriand kinship 
categories’. In Formal Semantic Analysis, edited by Eugene A. Hammel. 
Special issue of American Anthropologist (n.s.) 67(5) Part 2: 142–85. 
doi.org/10.1525/aa.1965.67.5.02a00770
Lowie, Robert H. 1912. ‘Social life of the Crow Indians’. Anthropological 
Papers of the American Museum of Natural History 9(2): 181–248.
Lyons, Harriet, Ann Chowning, Claudia Gross and Dorothy Ayers 
Counts (eds). 2005. A Polymath Anthropologist: Essays in Honour of 
Ann Chowning. Research in Anthropology and Linguistics Monograph 
6. Department of Anthropology, University of Auckland
Malinowski, Bronisław. 1916. ‘Baloma: The spirits of the dead in the 
Trobriand Islands’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland 46: 353–430. doi.org/10.2307/2843398 
——. 1926. Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
——. 1927a. Sex and Repression in Savage Society. Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co. Ltd; reprint 1960, Oxford: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
(page references are to the reprint edition).
——. 1927b. The Father in Primitive Psychology. New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company.
——. 1929. The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia: 
An Ethnographic Account of Courtship, Marriage, and Family Life among 
the Natives of the Trobriand Islands, British New Guinea. London: 
Routledge.
——. 1962. Sex, Culture and Myth. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
Inc.
51
1 . HAL SCHEFFLER VERSUS DAVID SCHNEIDER AND HIS ADMIRERS
Margolis, Maxine L. and William E. Carter (eds). 1979. Brazil: 
Anthropological Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Charles Wagley. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Montague, Susan P. 1971. ‘Trobriand kinship and the Virgin Birth 
controversy’. Man (n.s.) 6(3): 353–68. doi.org/10.2307/2799026
——. 1974. ‘The Trobriand society’. PhD dissertation, Department of 
Anthropology, University of Chicago.
——. 1983. ‘Trobriand gender identity’. In Concepts of Conception: 
Procreation Ideologies in Papua New Guinea, edited by Dan Jorgensen. 
Special issue of Mankind 14(1): 33–45. doi.org/10.1111/ j.1835-
9310.1983.tb01249.x
——. 2001. ‘The Trobriand kinship classification and Schneider’s cultural 
relativism’. In The Cultural Analysis of Kinship: The Legacy of David 
M. Schneider, edited by Richard Feinberg and Martin Ottenheimer, 
168–86. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Moore, Sally F. 1964. ‘Descent and symbolic filiation’. American 
Anthropologist 66(6) Part 1: 1308–20. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1964.66.6 
.02a00060
Mosko, Mark. 1985. Quadripartite Structures: Categories, Relations, and 
Homologies in Bush Mekeo Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753084
——. 1995. ‘Rethinking Trobriand chieftainship’. Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 1(4): 763–85. doi.org/10.2307/3034960
——. 2005. ‘Sex, procreation, and menstruation: North Mekeo and the 
Trobriands’. In A Polymath Anthropologist: Essays in Honour of Ann 
Chowning, edited by Harriet Lyons, Ann Chowning, Claudia Gross 
and Dorothy Ayers Counts, 55–61. Research in Anthropology and 
Linguistics Monograph 6. Department of Anthropology, University 
of Auckland.
——. 2009. ‘The fractal yam: Botanical imagery and human agency in 
the Trobriands’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15(4): 
679–700. doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2009.01579.x
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
52
——. 2013. ‘Omarakana revisited, or “do dual organizations exist?” in 
the Trobriands’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 19(3): 
482–509. doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12046
——. 2014. ‘Malinowski’s magical puzzles: Toward a new theory of magic 
and procreation in Trobriand society’. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic 
Theory 4(1): 1–47. doi.org/10.14318/hau4.1.001
Murphy, Robert F. 1979. ‘Lineage and lineality in lowland South 
America’. In Brazil: Anthropological Perspectives: Essays in Honor of 
Charles Wagley, edited by Maxine L. Margolis and William E. Carter, 
217–24. New York: Columbia University Press.
Overing, Joanna. 1985. ‘Today I shall call him “Mummy”: Multiple 
worlds and classificatory confusion’. In Reason and Morality, edited 
by Joanna Overing, 152–79. Association of Social Anthropologists 
Monograph 24. London: Tavistock Publications.
Overing, Joanna (ed.). 1985. Reason and Morality. Association of Social 
Anthropologists Monograph 24. London: Tavistock Publications.
Powell, Harry A. 1956. ‘An analysis of present day social structure in the 
Trobriand Islands’. PhD thesis, University of London.
——. 1969a. ‘Genealogy, residence and kinship in Kiriwina’. Man (n.s.) 
4(2): 177–202. doi.org/10.2307/2799567
——. 1969b. ‘Territory, hierarchy and kinship in Kiriwina’. Man (n.s.) 
4(4): 580–604. doi.org/10.2307/2798197
——. 1980. ‘Review of Annette B. Weiner, Women of Value, Men 
0f Renown:  New Perspectives on Trobriand Exchange’. American 
Anthropologist 82(3): 700–702. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1980.82.3. 02a 
01180
Pulman, Bertrand. 2004–05. ‘Malinowski and ignorance of physiological 
paternity’. Revue francaise de sociologie 45: 121–42. doi.org/10.3917/
rfs.455.0121
Read, Carveth. 1918. ‘No paternity’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britin and Ireland 48: 146–54. doi.org/ 10.2307/ 
2843507
53
1 . HAL SCHEFFLER VERSUS DAVID SCHNEIDER AND HIS ADMIRERS
Rentoul, Alex C. 1931. ‘Physiological paternity and the Trobrianders’. 
Man 31: 152–54. doi.org/10.2307/2791374
——. 1932. ‘Papuans, professors, and platitudes’. Man 32: 274–76. 
doi.org/10.2307/2789803
Rivers, William H.R. 1914. The History of Melanesian Society, vol. 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosaldo, Michelle Z. and Jane M. Atkinson. 1975. ‘Man the hunter 
and woman: Metaphors for the sexes in Ilongot magical spells’. 
In  The  Interpretation of Symbolism, edited by Roy Willis, 43–75. 
London: Malaby Press.
Sahlins, Marshall D. 1976. The Use and Abuse of Biology: 
An  Anthropological  Critique of Sociobiology. Ann Arbor, MI: 
The University of Michigan Press.
Sahlins, Marshall. 2013. What Kinship Is – And Is Not. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226925134.001.0001
Scheffler, Harold W. 1973. ‘Kinship, descent, and alliance’. In Handbook 
of Social and Cultural Anthropology, edited by John J. Honigmann, 
747–93. Chicago: Rand McNally.
——. 1976. ‘The “meaning” of kinship in American culture: another 
view’. In Meaning in Anthropology, edited by Keith H. Basso and Henry 
A. Selby, 57–91. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
——. 1978. Australian Kin Classification. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
——. 2003. ‘Observations on The Fall of Kinship’. Journal of Cognition 
and Culture 3(4): 341–43. doi.org/10.1163/156853703771818091
Scheffler, Harold W. and Floyd G. Lounsbury. 1971. A Study in Structural 
Semantics: The Sirionó Kinship System. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
Schneider, David M. 1968. American Kinship: A Cultural Account. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
——. 1984. A Critique of the Study of Kinship. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
54
——. 1989. ‘Australian Aboriginal kinship.’ Man (n.s.) 24(1): 165–66.
Seligman, Charles G. 1910. The Melanesians of British New Guinea. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Senft, Gunter. 1985. ‘How to tell – and understand – a dirty joke in 
Kilivila’. Journal of Pragmatics 9(6): 815–34. doi.org/10.1016/0378-
2166(85)90005-0
——. 1991. ‘Prolegomena to the pragmatics of “situational-intentional” 
varieties in Kilivila language’. In Levels of Linguistic Adaptation: 
Selected Papers from the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, 
August 1987, edited by Jef Verschueren, 235–48. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. doi.org/10.1075/pbns.6.2.15sen
——. 1995. ‘Notes from the field: Ain’t misbehavin’? Trobriand pragmatics 
and the field researcher’s opportunity to put his (or her) foot in it’. 
Oceanic Linguistics 34(1): 211–26. doi.org/10.2307/3623120
——. 1996. ‘Past is present – present is past: Time and the harvest rituals 
on the Trobriand Islands’. Anthropos 91(4–6): 381–89.
——. 1998. ‘“Noble savages” and the “islands of love”: Trobriand Islanders 
in “popular publications”’. In Pacific Answers to Western Hegemony: 
Cultural Practices of Identity Construction, edited by Jürg Wassmann, 
119–40. Oxford: Berg.
——. 2009. ‘Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski’. In Culture and Language 
Use, edited by Gunter Senft, Jan-Ola Östman and Jef Verschueren, 
210–25. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
——. 2011. The Tuma Underworld of Love: Erotic and Other Narrative 
Songs of the Trobriand Islanders and their Spirits of the Dead. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins. doi.org/10.1075/clu.5 
Shapiro, Warren. 1979. Social Organization in Aboriginal Australia. 
Canberra: The Australian National University Press.
——. 1988. ‘Ritual kinship, ritual incorporation, and the denial of death’. 
Man (n.s.) 23(2): 275–97. doi.org/10.2307/2802806
55
1 . HAL SCHEFFLER VERSUS DAVID SCHNEIDER AND HIS ADMIRERS
——. 1996. ‘The Quest for Purity in Anthropological Inquiry’. Denying 
Biology: Essays on Gender and  Pseudo-Procreation, edited by Warren 
Shapiro and Uli Linke, 167–189. Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America.
——. 2003. ‘Review of Richard Feinberg and Martin Oppenheimer 
(eds) The Cultural Analysis of Kinship: The Legacy of David M. 
Schneider’. American Anthropologist 105: 375–77. doi.org/10.1525/
aa.2003.105.2.375
——. 2005. ‘Universal systems of kin categorization as primitivist 
projects’. Anthropological Forum 15(1): 45–59. doi.org/10.1080/ 
0066467042000336706
——. 2008. ‘What human kinship is primarily about: Toward a critique 
of the new kinship studies’. Social Anthropology 16(2): 137–53. 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2008.00038.x
——. 2009. ‘A.L. Kroeber and the new kinship studies’. Anthropological 
Forum 19(1):1–20. doi.org/10.1080/00664670802695418
——. 2010. ‘The old kinship studies confronts gay kinship: A critique of 
Kath Weston’. Anthropological Forum 20(1): 1–18. doi.org/10.1080/ 
00664670903524178
——. 2011a. ‘The nuclear family versus the men’s house: A re-examination 
of Mundurucú sociality’. Anthropological Forum 21(1): 57–75. 
doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2011.549450
——. 2011b. ‘What is Malay kinship primarily about? Or the new 
kinship  studies and the fabrication of an ethnographic fantasy’. 
In Kinship, Language, and Prehistory: Per Hage and the Renaissance in 
Kinship Studies, edited by Doug Jones and Bojka Milicic, 141–51. 
Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
——. 2012. ‘Anti-family fantasies in “cutting-edge” anthropological 
kinship studies’. Academic Questions 25(3): 394–402. doi.org/10.1007/
s12129-012-9314-7
——. 2013. ‘The nuclear family and its derivatives: That’s what kinship 
is!’ Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford 5(2): 171–93.
——. 2014. ‘Contesting Marshall Sahlins on kinship’. Oceania 84(1): 
19–37. doi.org/10.1002/ocea.5033
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
56
——. 2015. ‘Not “from the natives’ point of view”: Why the new kinship 
studies need the old kinship terminologies’. Anthropos 110: 1–13.
——. 2016. Why Schneiderian kinship studies have it all wrong: 
With  special reference to adoptive kinship’. Structure and Dynamics 
9(2): 218–39. Online: escholarship.org/uc/item/1vp7c25g (accessed 
31 May 2017).
Shapiro, Warren (ed.). 1990. On the Generation and Maintenance of 
Person: Essays in Honour of John Barnes. Special issue of The Australian 
Journal of Anthropology (TAJA) 1(2–3).
Sider, Karen B. 1967. ‘Affinity and the role of the father in the Trobriands’. 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23(1): 90–109. doi.org/10.1086/
soutjanth.23.1.3629296
Speck, Frank G. 1918. ‘Kinship terms and the family band among 
the northeastern Algonkian’. American Anthropologist 20(2): 143–61. 
doi.org/10.1525/aa.1918.20.2.02a00010
Stanner, William E.H. 1960. ‘On Aboriginal religion. II: Sacramentalism, 
rite and myth’. Oceania 30(4): 245–78. doi.org/10.1002/ j.1834-
4461.1960.tb00226.x
Tambiah, Stanley J. 1968. ‘The magical power of words’. Man (n.s.) 3(2): 
175–208. doi.org/10.2307/2798500
Tooker, Elizabeth. 1971. ‘Clans and moieties in North America’. Current 
Anthropology 12(3): 357–76. doi.org/10.1086/201211
Verschueren, Jef (ed.). 1991. Levels of Linguistic Adaptation: Selected Papers 
from the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 1987. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Walker, James R. 1914. ‘Oglala kinship terms’. American Anthropologist 
16(1): 96–109. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1914.16.1.02a00080
Wassmann, Jürg (ed.).1998. Pacific Answers to Western Hegemony: Cultural 
Practices of Identity Construction. Oxford: Berg.
Weiner, Annette B. 1976. Women of Value, Men of Renown: New Perspectives 
on Trobriand Exchange. Austin: University of Texas Press.
57
1 . HAL SCHEFFLER VERSUS DAVID SCHNEIDER AND HIS ADMIRERS
——. 1977. ‘Trobriand descent: Female/male domains’. Ethos 5(1): 54–70. 
doi.org/10.1525/eth.1977.5.1.02a00050
——. 1983. ‘From words to objects to magic: Hard words and the 
boundaries of social interaction’. Man (n.s.) 18(4): 690–709. doi.org/ 
10.2307/2801903
Weston, Kath. 1991. Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Williams, F.E. 1936. Papuans of the Trans-Fly. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Willis, Roy (ed.). 1975. The Interpretation of Symbolism. London: Malaby 
Press.
Young, Michael W. 2004. Malinowski: Odyssey of an Anthropologist. 




Extension Problem: Resolution 
Through an Unexpected Source
Dwight Read
I said, indeed, that the science of colour was mathematical … the absolute 
certainty of a science cannot exceed the certainty of its principles … And 
if these principles be such that on them a mathematician may determine 
all the phenomena of colours … the science of colour will be granted 
mathematical (Sir Isaac Newton 1782 [1672]: 342).1
Prologue
A long-standing issue in kinship theory stems from the presence of kinship 
terminologies with kin terms having genealogical referents crosscutting, 
rather than following, the pattern for genealogical relations. The notion 
that the genealogical referents should be in agreement with genealogical 
relations arises from the assumption, going back to Lewis Henry Morgan, 
that the kinship relations identified through a kinship terminology are 
based on procreation in conjunction with marriage. If both kin terms 
and genealogical relations are determined mainly through procreation, 
then, at first glance, it appears that they should be mutually consistent, 
but this is not the case for some terminologies. Despite attempts from 
Morgan onwards to account for this seeming anomaly, the issue still 
1  I thank Burt Voorhees for bringing this quote to my attention.
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remains unresolved. Much of the writing of Harold Scheffler, both 
alone and in conjunction with Floyd Lounsbury, was directed towards 
a possible resolution of the ‘extension problem’ of a terminology having 
kin terms with both close and distant genealogical referents. They 
proposed that a kin term has a primary meaning expressed through the 
genealogical referent(s) closest, in a culturally meaningful way, to speaker 
and a secondary meaning provided by the other referent(s). The primary 
meaning, they argued, derives from procreation and so the resolution 
task becomes, from their perspective, one of addressing the secondary 
meanings that do not derive from procreation in any obvious way. Their 
solution involved first relating the secondary referents to the primary ones 
and then accounting for why more distant genealogical referents should 
be so equated as genealogical referents of a kin term.
Their project was only partially successful. They implemented the first 
part of the project through formal equivalence rules that reduced the 
secondary referents to the primary ones, but the second part became mired 
in debates over whether the equivalence rules had cultural saliency or 
merely provided an elegant, formal descriptive account of a terminology. 
Though their project did not achieve all of its goals, it did establish that 
terminologies are not just a collection of terms with genealogical referents 
whose patterning is determined by external factors such as the group 
organisation of the society in question, as argued by Edmund Leach (1958) 
for the Trobrianders. Instead, their work implied that terminologies must 
have an internal logic, thereby contributing to our understanding of what 
is common across terminologies despite surface differences. It is here 
where Scheffler’s work will leave an enduring mark.
In my contribution to this Festschrift, I begin, in effect, where the work 
of Scheffler and Lounsbury left off, namely by working out the internal 
logic of kinship terminologies and using this logic to resolve the extension 
problem. Another motivation for so doing, beyond its relevance to 
furthering our understanding of kinship systems by resolving the extension 
problem, relates to whether it is culturally reasonable to consider kinship 
terminologies as being mathematical in the manner expressed in the 
epigraph to this chapter when we replace the word ‘colour’ by the phrase 
‘kinship terminologies’, hence amenable to formal analysis in a culturally 
salient manner using mathematical reasoning. A positive answer would 
confirm what W.H.R. Rivers foresaw as a possibility: ‘the time will come 
when … parts of the description of social systems of savage tribes will 
resemble a work on mathematics’ (1914: 10).
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2 . ExTENSION PROBLEM
Carrying out this enterprise in toto requires rethinking widespread 
assumptions such as ‘kin categories are genealogically structured’ and 
‘kinship space is built up recursively out of genealogical primitives’ 
(Jones Chapter 11) that have led to an ontology going from procreation 
to genealogical relations to categories of genealogical relations to kin 
terms as labels for those categories and then replacing this ontology with 
a different one. The different ontology is based on tracing the implications 
of the cultural knowledge that culture bearers bring to bear when they 
compute kinship relations directly from kin terms without reference to 
the genealogical relations that supposedly are the underpinnings of those 
terms. Considering kinship terminologies from this perspective has been 
surprisingly fruitful and leads to resolution of the extension problem by 
showing that the extensions are the consequence of the generative logic 
giving structure to kinship terminologies.2 To go from where Scheffler and 
Lounsbury left off to this resolution of the extension problem, though by 
a different route than the one they followed, is the primary goal of this 
chapter and is necessarily a long trip, but hopefully one worth taking, as it 
validates the basic ideas that Scheffler had about the extension of kinship 
terms, but by a different means than the one he used.
Introduction
The distinctions among, and organisation of, the terms making up 
a kinship terminology relate to various aspects of social systems through 
the kinship relations they represent. These kinship relations have generally 
been viewed, since the time of Lewis Henry Morgan (1871), from the 
perspective of being formed either through procreation or through 
marriage. Typically, analysis begins by working out the distribution of 
kin terms over genealogical positions in accordance with the genealogical 
method introduced by Rivers (1910, 1912; see also Warren Shapiro 
Chapter 1). In the genealogical method, informants are asked for the kin 
terms that would be used by speaker for persons in various genealogical 
positions with respect to speaker. The underlying presumption has been 
that the structural pattern of kin terms over genealogical positions should 
reflect the structural organisation of genealogical relations, though 
2  In email correspondence, Warren Shapiro suggested to me the possibility that the generative 
logic underlying kinship terminology structure addresses the extensionist problem (2009). What 
I present here is my follow-up to his suggestion.
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modified according to the way the social organisation of a society relates 
to, and is expressed through, the kinship relations corresponding to the 
kin terms. However, from the very start of Morgan’s systematic study of 
kinship terminologies, terminologies like that of the Seneca (Iroquois) 
presented an anomaly by virtue of having kin terms with genealogical 
referents that crosscut the structural pattern of genealogical relations. In 
the Seneca terminology, the kin term no-yeh’ (‘mother’) (and similarly 
hä-nih’ (‘father’), is used not only for mother, a lineal relation, but also 
for collaterally related females in her generation, meaning that the 
terminology does not systematically distinguish lineal from collateral 
genealogical relations.3 Morgan, through his background as a lawyer, was 
familiar with the importance of this genealogical distinction for English 
family law regarding inheritance. Accordingly, he divided terminologies 
into those that consistently keep lineal genealogical relations separate from 
collateral relations and those that do not. He referred to the former as 
descriptive terminologies and to the latter as classificatory terminologies. 
In his scheme, the English terminology is descriptive and the Seneca 
terminology is classificatory.4
With regard to the occurrence in some societies of the classificatory 
terminologies, Morgan asked: Why should a term used for individuals 
with a close, lineal relation to speaker also be extended to speaker’s distant 
collateral relatives? In particular, why should there be kin terms such as 
no-yeh’ and hä-nih’ that refer to mother and father, respectively, as well 
as to persons in collateral positions of the same generation and sex as 
mother and father? This disjunction between the pattern of genealogical 
relations corresponding to kin terms in what he called the classificatory 
terminologies and the pattern of genealogical distinctions derived through 
procreation has come to be known as the extension problem. For what 
reason are there terminologies in which genealogical referents of a kin 
term are extended from close, lineal genealogical relations consistent with 
procreation to more distant, collateral genealogical relations for some 
of the kin terms?
3  Because an English word such as mother can either refer to a genealogical relation or to a kin 
term, I will use italics when the word refers to a kin term. The English kin-term translation for a non-
English kin term will be given in single quotes.
4  The classificatory part of Morgan’s two-part typology has subsequently been divided into 
bifurcate merging terminologies in which the lineal terms merge together both lineal and collateral 
genealogical relations as their referents and the lineal line of kin terms are bifurcated into terms 
that distinguish between matrilateral and patrilateral relations, and generational terminologies that 
primarily distinguish between sex and generation of the kin-term referents.
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Morgan’s answer to this question derives from his assumption that kinship 
relations are determined either through procreation or marriage. If the 
pattern for the genealogical referents of a kin term does not derive from 
procreation, as was evident for the Seneca terminology, then it must 
derive from marriage or a combination of procreation and marriage. 
Accordingly, Morgan hypothesised an earlier practice of group brother-
sister marriage as a way to account for terminologies with kin terms that 
include both lineal and collateral genealogical referents. This, however, was 
subsequently dismissed as empirically unfounded (but see Knight 2011 
for an alternative viewpoint), leaving the extension problem unresolved.
The solution to the extension problem that will be presented here requires 
reconsidering the widespread assumption that kin terms are primarily 
names for already established categories of genealogical relations. This leads 
me to ask whether the kinship relations labelled by the kin terms making 
up a kinship terminology are derived directly from primary relations, 
such as the relations linking family members. The (positive) answer to 
this question leads me to the discovery that kinship relations identified 
through kin terms can be derived directly from the family relations 
through a computational logic based on the way culture bearers determine 
kinship relations directly from kin-term usage. Once this logic has been 
worked out, I can then show how the extension problem is resolved by 
reference to an unexpected source for a solution, namely whether siblings 
are culturally understood as those persons who share the same parents as 
oneself rather than as the children of one’s parents other than oneself. These 
two ways of conceptualising siblings are biologically equivalent, but differ 
according to whether parents are viewed from the sibling’s perspective as 
having commonly shared ascendants or from the parent’s perspective as 
their descendants. As we will see, the first way for conceptualising siblings 
both underscores extension of the referents of kin terms from lineal to 
collateral genealogical relations and accounts for  Morgan’s distinction 
between descriptive and classificatory terminologies. This makes the 
distinction between these two kinds of terminologies, and the presence of 
terms in the classificatory terminologies that include both collateral and 
lineal genealogical referents, a consequence of properties internal, rather 
than external, to the kinship system.
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Previous attempts to solve the 
extension problem
Like Morgan’s proposed solution, possible answers to the extension 
problem offered subsequent to him have also been problematic. Some 
have used a semantic/linguistic approach to resolve or even dismiss the 
problem (Buchler and Selby 1968). Notably, Alfred Kroeber (1909) 
attempted to dismiss the problem by asserting that Morgan had erred in 
making a distinction between descriptive and classificatory terminologies 
in the first place since, in his view, all terminologies have kin terms that 
are classificatory in their scope, but his argument rests upon a misreading 
of Morgan’s classificatory/descriptive distinction. Morgan’s distinction is 
not based on whether kin terms are descriptive or classificatory (Kroeber’s 
misreading), but whether the terminology structurally and consistently 
distinguishes between lineal and collateral genealogical relations. Morgan 
was fully aware that English terms such as English uncle or aunt are 
classificatory in Kroeber’s sense, yet the English terminology is descriptive 
in his schema since the kin terms with lineal genealogical referents do not 
include collateral referents.5
Subsequent to Kroeber, Arthur Maurice Hocart (1937) and Joseph 
Daniel Unwin (1929) also dismissed the extension problem. They 
each considered the problem to be an artefact of how the problem was 
defined in the first place. Hocart considered that assigning a primary 
and an extended meaning to a kin term reflected more the way kin 
terms were elicited and learned by the ethnographer than the cultural 
reality of the primary/extended distinction. Thus, he argued, the term 
tama in Melanesian terminologies ought to be translated as ‘all males of 
the previous generation on the father’s side’ (Hocart 1937: 546) in an 
undifferentiated sense, rather than as tama meaning, first of all, father, 
and then, by extension, ‘father’s brother, father’s father’s brother’s sons 
and so on’ (ibid.: 545). However, whether a term such as tama should be 
considered polysemic (Scheffler’s position, discussed below) or monosemic 
(Hocart’s and Unwin’s position) does not resolve the problem identified 
5  See, for example, Morgan’s (1871) comment regarding the English terminology: ‘the second 
[collateral line], uncle, cousin, cousin’s son, and cousin’s grandson … reveal[s] a tendency to avoid 
the full descriptive phrases. It is evident from the present structure and past history of the English 
system … [that] an uncle was described as father’s brother, or mother’s brother [italics in the original, 
bold added]’ (32, 33).
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by Morgan regarding the discordance between the genealogical referents 
of the term and the structural pattern of genealogical relations. Instead, 
viewing kin terms monosemically mainly changes what a resolution to the 
problem needs to address.
Others, such as Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard (1929, 1932), Brenda 
Seligman (1929), and Bronisław Malinowski (1927a, 1930) used a social 
learning approach to account for the presumed kin-term extensions going 
from primary to extended meanings (Buchler and Selby 1968). In this 
approach, the extensions are considered to be psychological phenomena 
reflecting how behaviour patterns are learned by a growing child, initially 
in accordance with a child’s close, genealogical relations and subsequently 
extended to more distant genealogical relations. Evans-Pritchard (1929), 
for example, argued for the extension of the emotions and sentiments 
expressed within the family to individuals outside of the family as the 
source for kin-term extensions. For Malinowski, more was involved than 
the extension of sentiments within the family to those outside of the 
family. Malinowski considered the so-called classificatory terms to result 
from a gradual substitution process through which the child undergoes 
vicarious parent substitutions involving close kin relations in which ‘the 
substitute parent resembles in certain respects the original one and … 
the naming [of kin terms] expresses this partial assimilation’ (1962: 73). 
As others have pointed out, though, Malinowski incorrectly equates the 
learning process of a child with the evolutionary origin of the kin terms 
whose meanings are being learned by the child. In addition, no criterion 
is provided for when the substitution process should occur and when it 
should not, hence the argument becomes circular when used to resolve 
the extension problem.
Other scholars such as A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, though accepting the 
assumptions made by Morgan, included properties in addition to those 
of reproduction and marriage as a way to account for the extensions. 
Radcliffe-Brown (1950) hypothesised, as a solution to the extension 
problem, what he dubbed ‘the equivalence of siblings’, meaning that 
a term used for one sibling would be used in the same manner for all other 
siblings. According to this hypothesis, if speaker refers to genealogical 
father by the kin term ‘father’, then speaker would extend that kin term 
to speaker’s father’s brother. However, Radcliffe-Brown did not provide 
a criterion for when the hypothesis is applicable (Murdock 1949); hence 
every terminology should be classificatory according to his hypothesis if 
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it applies at all. Also problematic, his hypothesis did not address features 
common to classificatory (but not descriptive) terminologies such as an 
older/younger distinction in the referents of the sibling kin terms.6
A formal attempt to resolve the 
extension problem
Primary versus secondary meaning of kin terms
The extension problem has also been addressed formally, first by Floyd 
Lounsbury (1964, 1965) with regard to the logic of kinship terminologies, 
then with Harold Scheffler (especially Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971), 
and subsequently by Scheffler alone (see in particular, Scheffler 1978) 
with regard to the semantics of kinship terminologies. They, too, assumed 
that kinship relations are engendered through procreation, but avoided 
turning to marriage as the basis for the extension of the genealogical 
referents of kin terms. They accomplished this by separating the category 
of genealogical referents into two parts: (1) primary (or kernel) referents 
consisting of close genealogical relations and (2) secondary referents 
consisting of the more remote genealogical relations (Lounsbury 1965: 
149). For the classificatory terminologies, the primary referents of a kin 
term are its lineal referents and the collateral referents its secondary 
referents. For a descriptive terminology, such as the English terminology, 
the primary referents include most, if not all, of the genealogical referents 
of a kin term; for example, the primary referents of English uncle are 
father’s brother and mother’s brother. After determining the primary 
referents, they constructed equivalence rules that formally relate the 
secondary meanings to the primary meanings.
6  The matter is more complex, though, than just not addressing the older/younger distinction. 
The  term translated as ‘older brother’ or ‘older sister’ is, in some classificatory terminologies, also 
used for a reference person younger than speaker. In the Tongan terminology, a male speaker refers 
to the son of the older brother of father as ta’okete (‘older same-sex sibling’) regardless of their 
relative ages, even though the terminology makes no distinction between father and father’s brother, 
with both of these males referred to as ta’mai (‘father’) (Biersack 1982: 184). From an ascending/
descending perspective (discussed below), ta’okete would be ‘ascending same-sex sibling.’ Since ta’mai 
is an ascending primary term, ‘son’ of ta’mai can be considered to be part of the ascending kin-term 
structure and so referring to ‘son’ of ta’mai as ta’okete for the older brother of father, regardless of the 
relative ages of speaker and alter, is structurally consistent.
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Their methodology of equivalence rules has played a central role in our 
understanding of the semantics of kinship terms (McConvell Chapter 7) 
and was utilised extensively by David Kronenfeld (2009) as part of his 
analyses of the kinship terminology of the Fanti in Ghana, Africa, from 
a behavioural perspective. Since others have already discussed the widely 
appreciated ground-breaking character of Lounsbury’s work in detail, 
there is no need to review it further here. In addition, the importance of 
Scheffler’s contribution to this work is also well established, as discussed 
in the Introduction and in the chapter by Patrick McConvell, hence also 
needs no further elaboration. Instead, the thread I take up in this chapter 
relates to the reasons, despite the important contribution that equivalence 
rules have made to our understanding of the logic of kinship terminologies, 
that these rules do not resolve the extension problem. Then I show that, 
in lieu of considering kin terms formally as a means for the categorisation 
of genealogical relations, if we trace out, instead, the implications of the 
logic by which culture bearers compute kinship relations directly through 
the kin terms making up their kinship terminology (which may be done 
without reference to genealogical relations), we now find a solution to the 
extension problem.7
The underlying problem with the equivalence rules as explanation 
for kin-term extensions is that they leave unanswered the reasons why 
terminologies like the classificatory terminologies deviate so widely in 
both their semantic and their syntactical form from the genealogical 
framework generally assumed to be the basis for the systems of kinship 
relations expressed through kinship terminologies. More specifically, 
Lounsbury and Scheffler’s proposed resolution of the extension problem 
through equivalence rules has three critical problems (discussed below) 
that limit their role to one of identifying clues leading to answers, rather 
than providing the answers, with regard to questions about intersystem 
differences in the structure and organisation of kinship terminologies.8
7  Other formalism accounts include the book by the mathematician Sydney Gould (2000) aimed 
at improving on the equivalence rules and the book by Pin-Hsiung Liu (1986) aimed at formally 
showing how the genealogical space is structured by a kinship terminology. With regard to Gould’s 
book, Scheffler (2002: 295) comments that his attempt to improve on the formalism of equivalence 
rules ‘has to be reckoned a complete failure’. Anna Wierzbicka (2016: 409 n1) criticises Gould for 
the lack of natural language evidence justifying his assumption, made for formal reasons, that ‘father’s 
child’ and ‘mother’s child’ are primary relations.
8  The limitations apply equally to the work of Gould (2000). These limitations also include the 
circularity that enters in when the equivalence rules are read as being explanatory of the extension 
problem, since delineation of the rules requires already knowing both the structural organisation 
of kin terms as a kinship terminology and the genealogical definitions of kin terms.
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Another major concern is the issue raised virtually a half-century ago by 
Kris Lehman—perhaps the foremost scholar in the area of integrating 
mathematical reasoning with anthropological theorising. Lehman 
recognised that the equivalence rule analysis relied upon a formally naïve 
(in a mathematical sense) notion of genealogy that leads to a genealogical 
space infinite in size, hence exceeding the capacity of the human mind to 
consider all possible genealogical relations making up a genealogical space 
in a holistic sense (Lehman 2011). This implied, he pointed out, that 
a kinship terminology system, supposedly derivative from a genealogical 
space (see Jones Chapter 11), cannot provide the kind of holistic analysis 
presumed by the methodology of equivalence rules. Instead, he argued, 
rather than relying on an intuitively understood genealogical space 
expressed through the notational system of kin types, the methodology of 
equivalence rules needs a well-formulated mathematical representation of 
the genealogical space before one can adequately define, in a conceptually 
closed manner (see Leaf and Read 2012; Jones Chapter 11), what 
would formally constitute an adequate extension-based analysis of 
kinship terminologies. Accordingly, Lehman developed a mathematical 
representation of the genealogical space that he referred to as the Primary 
Genealogical Space (PGS) (see Lehman and Witz 1974). From this 
perspective, a formal system should, for example, encompass Kronenfeld’s 
(2009) formal representation of the Fanti kinship terminology.
Subsequently, and building on the arguments of Read, Lehman came 
to realise that the entire equivalence rule enterprise was inadequate and 
could not achieve its goals: 
Lounsbury’s rewrite system said nothing about the organization of the 
genealogical space itself … [and] there is no evidence to suggest that … 
compacting of PGS [through rewrite rules] generates the actual structure 
of any KTS [Kin Term Space] (2011: 260, 262). 
That is, the rewrite rules leave unexplained precisely what we want to 
understand, namely the basis upon which one kinship terminology differs 
structurally from another kinship terminology. As Lehman notes: 
Read and his colleagues (Behrens and Read 1993; Read and Behrens 1990; 
Read 2001, 2007, 2010a, 2010b; Bennardo and Read 2005, 2007) have 
shown persuasively that a KTS has a distinct algebraic structure that is not 
all that much like PGS, and that is altogether unlikely to be generated by 
the compacting of PGS (2011: 264). 
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Where, by ‘compacting’, Lehman means the equivalence rule mapping of 
genealogical relations expressed through kin-type notation to the extended 
meaning of the kin terms making up a kinship terminology. It is precisely 
an analytical foundation suitable for explicating the structure of a kinship 
terminology that is lacking in the formalism developed by Lounsbury and 
Scheffler, a lack that stems from the following three problems with their 
equivalence rules paradigm.
Problem 1: Description versus explanation
By itself, the distinction between primary and secondary referents 
only describes, but does not explain, the structural difference between 
descriptive and classificatory terminologies, as Lounsbury (1965: 175–81) 
recognised. Scheffler and Lounsbury attempted to build explanation into 
the primary/secondary distinction through the equivalence rules, but 
the rules are open ended (Chomsky 1963); that is, there is no restriction 
on what can be an equivalence rule. Thus it is always possible to make 
the extended, genealogical referent of a kin term equivalent to a primary 
referent with a rule such as: ‘Rewrite the non-primary genealogical 
referents for a kin term as a primary genealogical referent for that kin 
term’, with one rule per term, along with the stipulation that the rule 
applies only to that term. Consequently, just being able to formally reduce 
the extended genealogical referents of kin terms to primary referents 
through equivalence rules only describes how the extended referents of 
a kin term can be related to its primary referents (Keen 1985), not why 
the extensions occurred in the first place (Read 2000).
Problem 2: Equivalence rules provide a window only 
partially opening onto the structural logic of kinship 
terminologies
Though equivalence rules, by themselves, are not explanatory, 
nonetheless the rules indicate that there is an underlying logic to kinship 
terminologies since many of the rules are not terminology specific. 
As Roy D’Andrade has commented: ‘it is reassuring that most analyses 
[of kinship  terminologies] can be accomplished with only a few rules’ 
(1970: 112–13). The parsimony of the rules used to formally connect 
the primary and secondary referents of a kin term suggests that there is 
a structural logic by which the kin terms form a coherent whole, but they 
do not make that logic evident. As Keen has put it, the equivalence rules 
‘may be said to capture “underlying principles” in some sense [emphasis 
added]’ (1985: 82). It is through making the logic of those underlying 
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principles complete, and not the equivalence rules, per se, that provides, 
as we will see, the means to effect a culturally salient resolution to the 
extension problem. 
Problem 3: Cultural saliency
Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971) recognised that the equivalence rules do 
not provide an explanatory account unless they are meaningful to the users 
of the terminology. Though Lounsbury sketched out a possible sociological 
justification for the equivalence rules he had adduced for the Trobriand 
terminology, he also considered his sketch to only be ‘a suggestion as to 
the kinds of data in which we might expect to find some answers’ (1965: 
180). Yet with regard to the kinship terminology of the Fanti, instead of 
finding ethnographic support for equivalence rules, Kronenfeld (2009) 
discovered that the rules were not meaningful to the Fanti. Kronenfeld 
had analysed their terminology in two ways: first, through an equivalence 
rules account based on the formalism of Lounsbury (1964, 1965) 
that he referred to as an ‘L analysis’, and second, through the way the 
Fanti determined the kinship relation between two individuals directly 
from kin terms without reference to genealogical relations using what 
Kronenfeld referred to as the relative products of kin terms (actually, 
kin-term products, as discussed below).9 Kronenfeld referred to the latter 
as an ‘F analysis’ and commented that the Fanti ‘explained or justified 
their terminological assignment of kinsmen [emphasis added]’ (2009: 60) 
through the ‘logic contained in the relative products’. He observed that: 
The F analysis seems closer to the way Fanti define their own kin terms 
than does the L analysis. It is based on the categories that the Fanti use, 
and it performs the operations on these categories that Fanti informants 
were observed to use … the F analysis is psychologically real in the sense 
that it very directly represents what my informants did in their heads 
when they themselves calculated correct kinship relations (ibid.: 67).
For the Fanti, it is the ‘F analysis’, based on products of kin terms, and not 
the ‘L analysis’, based on equivalence rules, that is culturally salient. Kris 
Lehman makes much the same point with regard to the Lai (Haka) Chin 
among whom he did fieldwork: 
9  As noted by Lehman (2011: 264–65), ‘kin term products … are algebraically not the same thing 
as the relative products of kin type strings.’
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Any speaker simply knows that, for example, C[fa] of B [u-naau] = C [fu], 
whilst C of Z [far] = grandchild [tu]. One can more or less indirectly 
deduce such equations from the logic of the PGS > KTS morphism map 
[i.e. from the equivalence rules], but that is demonstrably not what native 
speakers do; it is not how they represent or talk about such knowledge 
[emphasis added] (2011: 264).
Despite recognising its cultural saliency, Kronenfeld rejected the 
F  analysis for comparative purposes since the Fanti categories and 
relations among them are not universal, whereas, he argued, the units 
for the L analysis are derived from a genealogical space that is universally 
applicable:  ‘[T]he categories and operations of [the F] analysis are too 
peculiar to the Fanti to make them a good basis for comparing the Fanti 
system with others’ (Kronenfeld 2009: 70). Kronenfeld reconciled the 
two kinds of analysis by viewing them as having different purposes, 
hence different criteria for analytic validity: criteria relating, he asserts, to 
psychological reality in the case of the F analysis and to the requirements 
of intersystem comparison for the L analysis (ibid.: 70; see also Keen 
1985).10 The value of the L analysis, he says, lies in ‘how well it facilitates 
comparison  of the given system with other similar ones’ (Kronenfeld 
2009: 69), and the L analysis, he argues, unlike the K analysis, identifies 
‘the different means by which different kinds of social facts can affect 
a  terminology’ (ibid.), which presumes that social facts are the driver 
of terminological distinctions, a proposition found wanting in previous 
attempts to resolve the extension problem through, for example, 
marriage rules.
While Kronenfeld observes correctly that some of the specific properties of 
the Fanti terminology are not universal, his conclusion that this obviates 
intersystem comparison through what he calls an F analysis is not correct 
unless one were to limit comparison to using the units and kin-term 
products of the Fanti terminology. Obviously, units specific to the Fanti 
terminology cannot be treated as universal units upon which intersystem 
comparison of structural differences among kinship terminologies 
should be based. What Kronenfeld did not recognise, though, is that the 
principles leading to the generation of a kinship terminology from primary 
kin terms—the latter being the kin terms specifying family relations 
10  This dichotomy is rejected by Anna Wierzbicka (2016) on the grounds that one and the 
same analysis can both elucidate the cognitive/psychological operations employed by the users of 
a terminology and enable a cross-cultural comparison of terminologies.
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(Read, Fischer and Lehman 2014)—leads universally to computational 
systems enabling culture bearers to determine kinship relations (Read 
2007; Leaf and Read 2012; Read, Fischer and Lehman 2014), and 
these computational systems can be the basis for comparison.11 It is the 
structure generated from the units of a kinship terminology, not the units 
themselves, through which intersystem structural comparison should be 
made.
What is common across kinship terminologies is a conceptually bounded 
set of kin terms (Leaf 2006; Leaf and Read 2012), the kin-term product 
(technically, a binary product) as the means for working out the structural 
relations among those kin terms, and culturally salient, structural equations 
giving a terminology structure its particular form. By recognising that 
intersystem comparison may be made at the level of these elements, 
Lehman (2011) draws the opposite conclusion as does Kronenfeld from 
the ethnographic facts establishing the cultural saliency of computing kin 
relations using kin terms and the kin-term product. Whereas Kronenfeld 
sees noncomparable units, Lehman perspicaciously observes: 
It seems to me that one of the most significant facts … is something that 
I have never been able to handle effectively from the standpoint of PGS, 
namely, that Read’s algebraic structures are in large measure based upon 
the kin knowledge speakers have of the proper way to ‘navigate’ the KTS 
system … the KTS structure is indeed independently motivated [from 
PGS] and … products in KTS become a symbolic computational system 
[emphasis added] (2011: 264).
We can compare computational systems of kin terms with regard to their 
structural properties even when each is built out of different units since 
a structure is determined by the relations holding among units, not by 
the individual properties of the units, hence comparison may be made 
with regard to those relations rather than the properties of the units 
connected through those relations (see Read 2011 for examples of this 
kind of structural comparison across otherwise unrelated domains). For 
11  Were his argument applied to the comparison of the grammars of different languages, analysis 
could not be made unless each language was first expressed using a universal vocabulary. Kronenfeld 
does not take into account the fact that structural forms are analytically comparable even when 
each is generated from different units and structural equations. The basis for structural differences 
among terminologies needs to be made evident, not simply described through translating them into 
a common framework such as genealogical relations organised in the form of the genealogical grid. 
Even here, though, the supposed universality is problematic with terminologies that have sibling kin 
terms differentiated by criteria in addition to sex since sibling kin types typically only incorporate sex 
as a distinguishing feature.
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kinship systems, we may make comparison through the product relations 
structurally connecting kin terms to one another, rather than through the 
properties of the kin terms, per se, such as their genealogical definitions. 
It is the logic of making kinship relation computations using primary 
kin terms, then, that leads, as we will see, to a resolution of the extension 
problem.
Kin-term calculations and cultural saliency
The kind of kin-term calculations made by the Fanti or the Lai (Haka) 
Chin without reference to genealogical relations is widespread and has 
been commented upon by numerous ethnographers (Keen 1985 and 
references therein), thus showing the widespread, if not universal, cultural 
saliency of emic calculations like this. For instance, in reference to the 
Kariera, a huntergatherer group in Western Australia, Radcliffe-Brown 
wrote:
The method of determining the relationship of two individuals is 
extremely simple. Let us suppose ... that two men, A and B, meet each 
other for the first time. The man A has relative C who is his mama. At the 
same time, C is the kaga of B. It immediately follows that A and B are 
kumbali to each other (1913: 150–51).
Similarly, Marshall Sahlins comments for the Moala Fijians:
[Kin] terms permit comparative strangers to fix kinship rapidly without 
the necessity of elaborate genealogical reckoning—reckoning that typically 
would be impossible. With mutual relationship terms all that is required 
is the discovery of one common relative. Thus, if A is related to B as child 
to mother, veitanani, while C is related to B as veitacini, sibling of the 
same sex, then it follows that A is related to C as child to mother although 
they never before met or knew it. Kin terms are predicable. If two people 
are each related to a third, then they are related to each other (1962: 155).
In reference to the Kondaiyankottai Maravar, a Dravidian language group 
in southern India, Anthony Good writes:
If ego knows what term to use for alter A, and also knows what term 
A uses for alter B, he can easily work out what term he himself should use 
for B (1981: 113).
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With regard to the Shipibo, a horticulture group in Amazonian Peru, 
Clifford Behrens observes that:
Kin terms are elicited from informants without their recourse to 
genealogical relationships; rather, terms of reference are assigned to 
individuals by tracing only through the terms themselves … Two women 
used the kin terms they applied to a third individual in order to determine 
the kin relation between their offspring and that person (1984: 146).
In the same vein, Stephen Levinson notes with respect to those living 
on Rossel Island in New Guinea:
Kinship reckoning on Rossel does not rely on knowledge of kin-type 
strings ... What is essential in order to apply a kin term to an individual 
X, is to know how someone else, of a determinate kinship type to oneself, 
refers to X. From that knowledge alone, a correct appellation can be 
deduced. For example, suppose someone I call a tîdê ‘sister’ calls X a tp:ee 
‘my child’, then I can call X a chênê ‘my nephew’, without having the 
faintest idea of my genealogical connection to X (2006: 18).
Laurent Dousset also makes it evident that reckoning kinship relations 
between individuals in this manner applies not only to the two persons 
in question, but also to everyone in the community:
When two foreigners can both trace their classificatory relationships 
towards a third person, the remaining relationships among all other 
members of the community can be deduced from this set [emphasis added] 
(2005: 22).
Others have also commented on the way kin relations can be determined 
directly from kin terms, such as Rusiate Nayacakalou (1955) for the 
TokaToka villagers in Fiji, Martin Silverman (1971) for the Banaban 
Islanders in Polynesia, Raymond Case Kelly (1977: 69) for the Etoro of 
Papua New Guinea, Masri Singarimbun (1975: 147) for the Karo Batak 
of North Sumatra, Joanna Overing Kaplan (1975: 181) for the Piaroa of 
the Orinoco Basin, Lorna Marshall (1976) for the !Kung san of Botswana, 
Richard Feinberg (1981: 106) for the Anuta of Polynesia, Peter Gow 
(1991: 193–94) for the Piro of the Peruvian Amazonia, Aparecida Vilaça 
(2002: 352) for the Wari’ of Brazil, and Alan Barnard (2010: 252) for the 
Naro of southern Africa, among others. 
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Kin-term products
These observations imply that if two persons know their respective kin-
term relationship to a third person, then they may compute the kinship 
relation they have to each other through their cultural knowledge regarding 
how the kin terms making up their kinship terminology are interrelated. 
They do the computations without reference to the genealogical relations 
subsumed under the kin terms. I will refer to computing a kin term from 
a pair of kin terms in this manner as the kin-term product of that pair of 
kin terms.12 We may formally define (compare with the quote above from 
Good 1981) the kin-term product as follows:
Definition: Suppose K and L are kin terms, then the kin term product of 
the kin terms K and L, is a kin term M that speaker would (properly) use 
(if any) for alter 2 when alter1 (properly) refers to alter 2 by the kin term 
K and speaker (properly) refers to alter 1 by the kin term L (Read 1984: 
422). 
I include, parenthetically, the expression ‘properly’ in the definition to 
indicate that the kin-term product refers to usage that most, if not all, 
culture bearers agree is correct, or view as being their way to use this kin 
term. I also include, parenthetically, the caveat ‘if any’ since even though 
the kin term product may be meaningful, it need not correspond to a kin 
term. For example, for English speakers, the product of the kin terms 
father and father-in-law does not correspond to an English kin term even 
though the kin-term product father of father-in-law is meaningful; that is, 
this corresponds, for English speakers, to a situation where speaker refers 
to a man [alter 1] as father and that man refers to another man [alter 2] 
as father-in-law, which is meaningful from a communication viewpoint, 
yet speaker does not have a kin term that refers to alter 2. Additionally, the 
definition states ‘is a kin term’ rather than ‘is the kin term’ since, in some 
situations (though not often) the kin-term product may correspond to 
more than one kin term. For example, for English speakers, the kin-term 
product mother of 1st-cousin-once removed (where mother and 1st-cousin-
once removed are kin terms) may either be the kin term 1st-cousin or the kin 
term great-aunt since 1st-cousin-once-removed is a self-reciprocal kin term 
used either for speaker’s first cousin’s child or speaker’s great-aunt’s child.
12  Read (1984) introduced the expression kin-term product to designate computations with kin 
terms in place of the expression relative product since the latter does not specifically refer to kin-term 
computations and is generally used to refer to the concatenation of genealogical relations.
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We will formally denote that the kin-term product of the kin terms K 
and L leads to the kin term M by the equation, K o L = M (read: ‘the 
product of the kin term K with the kin term L, denoted by K o L, is the 
kin term M’ or in simple word form, ‘K of L is M.’ Here ‘of ’ is formally 
denoted by the symbol ‘o’, ‘is’ by the symbol ‘=’, and K, L and M are kin 
terms, not persons or genealogical relations. Thus (for English speakers), 
if alter 1 refers to alter 2 by the kin term daughter (= K) and speaker refers 
to alter 1 by the kin term aunt (= L), then speaker, drawing upon her or 
his cultural knowledge, knows that she or he may properly refer to alter 
2 by the kin term cousin (= M) and so the kin-term product of daughter 
and aunt is cousin (see Figure 1); more formally, daughter o aunt = cousin. 
What we derive or express through the kin-term product is, or can be, 
expressed in a culturally salient manner.13 This does not mean that results 
obtained through the equivalence rules lack cultural saliency, only that the 











Figure 1. Kin-term product of L (aunt) and K (daughter) is M (cousin)
Labelled (black) arrows show the reference kin term (properly) used by speaker and alter 1 
and by alter 1 for alter 2 . The grey arrow shows the term known from cultural knowledge 
to be (properly) used by speaker for alter 2.
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
13  Kin-term product equations can be elicited systematically from informants as Leaf (2006) 
discusses in detail and illustrates with the Punjabi terminology (see also Leaf and Read 2012).
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Assumed genealogical basis for kin terms 
contradicted by ethnographic evidence
The fact that culturally meaningful computations are made consistently 
by culture bearers through the kin-term product strongly suggests that 
a kinship terminology is not simply a list of terms corresponding to 
already determined categories of genealogical relations, as has generally 
been assumed, but has an underlying computational logic that enables 
culture bearers to make kin-term computations in a consistent and 
noncontradictory manner without reference to genealogical definitions 
of kin terms. From this perspective, a kinship terminology would be 
structured through kin-term products made with primary kin terms, 
where the primary terms are terms for the family relations, rather than 
through an ontological sequence beginning with genealogical relations. 
For English speakers, the primary terms include the kin terms father, 
mother (or parent), brother, sister (or sibling), son, daughter (or child), 
husband and wife (or spouse).
Thus we need to reconsider the assumption that the ontological 
sequence for the kinship relations expressed through the terms making 
up a kinship terminology is: procreation → genealogical relations → 
categories of genealogical relations → kin terms. In this sequence, the 
genealogical relations are assumed to stem from procreatively determined 
parent/child connections, augmented by a marriage relation that links 
a putative father with a presumed mother. The first part of the sequence, 
procreation → genealogical relations, is not problematic so long as we 
include the caveat that it involves procreation as it is locally understood 
and culturally expressed (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 37),14 meaning 
14  Going from procreation to genealogical relatedness is only problematic when one insists that 
the latter refers to a biological connection between speaker and referent; that is that a genealogy is the 
same as a pedigree. Numerous ethnographic accounts have established that biology is not a universal 
driver for genealogical relatedness, as it is locally recognised, if only because neither the statuses of 
motherhood nor of fatherhood from which genealogical connections are derived are constrained to 
biological mother and biological father. However, this does not imply the irrelevance of the biological 
facts underlying procreation, only that these biological facts do not universally determine cultural 
understanding of procreation; hence genealogical relatedness cannot be assumed universally to 
be constructed through biological parent and offspring. Local accounts of procreation are neither 
completely independent of, nor totally determined by, the biological facts. Instead, procreation is 
understood culturally and, while this understanding is not divorced from the biological facts, it may 
include aspects that are culturally recognised yet do not have a biological basis. This can be seen in 
the quite different accounts in various societies regarding who contributes what and under what 
conditions to the formation of an offspring recognised as a societal member and thereby understood 
to have genealogical connections to other societal members. For example, as Keen (1985) discusses, 
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that culturally  understood procreative relations may be conceptually 
disconnected from biological procreation. What is problematic in this 
ontological sequence, though, is the assumption that genealogical relations 
are first categorised by generally unspecified criteria into a relatively 
limited number of categories, and these are then linguistically labelled 
and constitute the kinship terminology.
The fundamental assumption of this ontological sequence, namely that the 
meaning of a kin term is first and foremost genealogical, is contradicted 
by numerous ethnographic accounts regarding kinship systems in which 
genealogical relations are neither central nor even critical to how group 
members understand kinship relations. With regard to the !Kung San 
from Botswana, Africa, for example, Lorna Marshall comments: 
[They] were apparently not always assiduous in teaching their children 
the exact biological position of their kinsmen … and a person would not 
always know why he applied a certain term to someone, but he would 
know that the term he used was proper [emphasis in original] (1976: 204).
In other words, the underlying genealogical relations are not of primary 
concern to the !Kung San. Instead, what is of concern to them are 
aspects of their kinship system, such as the kin tie between two persons 
established through name giving, that do not have a direct counterpart 
in genealogical (let alone biological) relations. Similarly, Shapiro refers 
to the difficulty his informants had in making genealogical calculations, 
but not calculations based on kin-term products: Aboriginal Australians 
easily decode the messages ‘“aunt’s children” and “X’s children” but not 
the message “father’s sister’s children”’ (1982: 274), and: 
the Bahaya of Tanzania attribute fatherhood for a woman’s first child to the man who first had 
intercourse with her even if that occurred more than nine months prior to her giving birth (Moller 
1958), the Atta negritos in the Philippines allow for partible paternity in which more than one man 
can be considered to be the genitor of a child (Armando Marques-Guedes, personal communication 
to Ian Keen, n.d.), and the older Lusi people from Kaliai, West New Guinea assume that multiple 
copulatory acts are needed for foetal development, thus more than one man may contribute to this 
process (Counts and Counts 1983). Scheffler makes the distinction between genealogical relations 
and biological relations explicit when he says that for a critique made of his use of connotation and 
metaphor to be valid: 
[O]ne would have to accept the absurd assumption that kinship terms refer to biogenetic 
relationships of the sort known only to the sciences of biology and genetics. The only tenable 
assumption is that they refer to relationships ‘known’ to or posited by the people who use the terms. 
The components of their significata … are cultural constructs [emphasis added] (1972: 322; 
compare with Greaves and Kramer Chapter 4).
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In dealing with such relatively remote kin-types and even with close 
collateral kin, informants were generally more comfortable operating 
through the relationship terminology: it made little or no personal or 
social difference to them whether (say) an alleged brother of the MM was 
in fact a MMB or a more remote ‘brother’ of the MM (ibid.: 275; see also 
Shapiro Chapter 1).
Scheffler and Lounsbury make much the same point with regard 
to formalisms such as componential analysis: 
[F]ew, if any informants ever offer statements about the meaning of their 
kin terms which correspond … to the statements of these definitions as 
expressed in componential analyses … If asked directly what the term 
‘cousin’ means, a competent informant is likely to respond with ‘my 
cousins are the children of my uncles and aunts’, i.e. … as a relative 
product [read: kin-term product] … From our experience and that of 
other ethnographers (see Nayacakalou 1955), we know that in general 
that this is the way in which other peoples typically respond to direct 
questions about the ‘meanings’ of their kin terms (1971: 140). 
They go on to discuss how children, when learning a kinship terminology, 
do not learn the meaning of kin terms and the relationships among terms 
by reference to genealogy, but directly through the kin-term product 
(relative product in their vocabulary):
[For] a person from a society with an Iroquois-type terminology … the 
son of any man he calls ‘father’ is to be called ‘brother’ … He need not 
inquire into whether the [son] is his father’s long-lost brother, or his 
father’s FBS, or his father’s FZS, etc., in order to know how to classify 
him (ibid.: 142). 
In other words, the child only needs to know that the kin-term product 
equation, ‘son’ o ‘father’ = ‘brother’ (read: ‘“son” of “father” is “brother” for 
the kin terms translated as son, father and brother, respectively’), applies to 
any male he refers to as ‘father’. He does not need to know the genealogical 
relation(s) involved, let alone the actual biological relations. Thus even 
Scheffler and Lounsbury, despite their emphasis on procreation as the 
basis for kinship relations, recognised that kin relations are not computed 
from genealogical relations simpliciter, let alone, as Jones (Chapter 11) 
points out, relations determined and structured by a biologically defined 
coefficient of relatedness. They did not explore the logic, though, of kin-
term products and how this leads to a solution to the extension problem. 
It is this logic and its implications for solving the extension problem that 
I will now address in the remainder of this chapter.
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The kin-term product logic of kinship 
terminology structures
I begin by graphically expressing the structure for the terms making up 
a kinship terminology by taking kin-term products with the primary kin 
terms for all of the kin terms in the terminology. Figure 2a shows the 
structure for the American/English kinship terminology formed in this 
manner using the primary terms parent, child, and spouse, along with self, 
where self provides the starting point for the structure.15 The terminology 
has a ladder-like structure for both the lineal kin terms and the first line 
of collateral kin terms. Compare this with the very different, symmetric 
structure for the kinship terminology of the Shipibo (see Figure 2b). 
Yet other structural forms for kinship terminologies are presented in Read 
(2013). Note that the connector, ‘of ’, in the kin-term product of a pair 
of kin terms, may be interpreted as a binary operator acting over each pair 
of kin terms making up a kinship terminology. With this interpretation, 
the kin-term product leads to expressing, in a natural way, a kinship 
terminology as having the structural form of an abstract algebra, where 
the latter consists of a set S of elements (here, S is the set of kin terms), 
at least one operator defined over that set of elements S (here, the kin-term 
product interpreted as a binary operator) and subject to a set of structural 
equations (here, the kin-term product equations giving the terminology 
its structural form, to be discussed below). Viewing a kinship terminology 
as having an algebraic structure (Read 1984) is culturally salient and leads 
to analysing a kinship terminology as a symbolic, computational system 
based on the kin-term product. 
15  The American/English terminology has both sex-marked and neutral primary kin terms such as 
mother, father and parent. The generative logic of the American/English terminology shows that the 
terminology is based on the neutral primary kin terms, with sex marking introduced by bifurcating 
the lineal neutral kin terms such as parent, grandparent … into sex-marked kin terms. In this way, 
parent becomes the ‘covering’ kin term for the kin terms mother and father, grandparent becomes the 
covering kin term for the kin terms grandmother and grandfather, and so on (see Read 2007; Read and 
Behrens 1990; and Leaf and Read 2012 for details). This, however, is not universally the means by 
which kin terms become sex marked.
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Figure 2a. Structure of the American/English kinship terminology
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
Figure 2b. Structure of the Shipibo kinship terminology
Both structures are based on kin‑term products. Each arrow corresponds to a primary kin 
term, as shown in the key for each diagram, and shows the consequence of taking the 
kin‑term product of a primary kin term with a kin term. Thus, the arrow with an open arrow 
head in Figure 2a going from the kin term aunt to the kin term first cousin shows that the 
kin‑term product of the primary kin term child with the kin term aunt is the kin term first 
cousin: child o aunt = first cousin .
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
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Kinship terminologies viewed as symbolic, 
computational systems
Notably absent from the ontological sequence given above is the ontological 
basis for the various kinship terminology structures made evident through 
kin-term products of kin terms with primary kin terms. Morgan’s attempt 
to account for the structural differences between the Roman terminology 
(used by him as a canonical example of a descriptive terminology) and the 
Seneca/Iroquois terminology led him to an unsuccessful excursion into 
hypothesised past marriage practices. Similarly, Scheffler and Lounsbury’s 
subsequent attempt to resolve the extension problem through equivalence 
rules can justifiably be critiqued as insufficient for the reasons outlined 
above; nonetheless, their equivalence rules partially expose an underlying 
logic for the system of kin terms making up a kinship terminology. That 
there is an underlying logic is suggested by the fact that only a few rules 
are needed to describe the relationship between the secondary and the 
primary genealogical referents of the kin terms. Instead of referring to 
genealogical relations as a way to account for structural properties, though, 
the implied structural logic needs to be linked to fundamental kinship 
concepts, such as reciprocity of kinship relations; that is if speaker has 
a kinship relation to alter (expressed through the kin term K), then alter 
has a kinship relation to speaker (expressed through a kin term L), that 
may be expressed through kin-term products.16 For example, for English 
speakers, if speaker refers to alter as child, then alter refers to speaker as 
parent, hence parent and child are reciprocal kin terms and parent o child 
= self (read ‘parent of child is self’) since speaker refers to himself/herself as 
self. (Defining reciprocity of kin terms through the kin-term product in 
this manner will be discussed in more detail below.) A structure derived 
from kinship properties like reciprocity makes it possible, as we will see, 
to connect kin terms to genealogical relations rather than the reverse, as 
has generally been assumed, and from this the extension problem may 
be solved. Rather than staying with the assumption that kin terms are, 
first of all, genealogical relations, we need, as David Schneider phrased it 
(but without providing a means for implementation), a different way to 
consider kinship terminologies other than through genealogical relations:
16  The term L, in some cases, may be the same as K, as occurs with the kin term sibling (= K) 
for English speakers. When K and its reciprocal term L are the same term, then K is said to be self-
reciprocal.
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[T]he genealogically defined grid is the only analytic device that has been 
applied to most of the systems which anthropologists have studied. There 
has been almost no systematic attempt to study the question without 
employing this device. To put it simply, it is about time that we tested 
some other hypotheses (1972: 49).
The different way (contra the performatist view of kinship derived from 
Schneider and critiqued by Shapiro Chapter 1), which we will now 
discuss briefly (see Read and Behrens 1990; Read 2001, 2007; Leaf and 
Read 2012 for more complete discussions) to provide the background 
for resolving the extension problem, is to consider a kinship terminology 
as a (symbolic) computational system based on the logic of kin-term 
products and integrated with fundamental kinship concepts such as 
reciprocity of kin terms. The logic of this computational system underlies 
the computation of kinship relations through kin-term products in the 
manner well attested to in the ethnographic accounts mentioned above 
and leads us, as we will see, to resolution of the extension problem.
From procreation to the Family Space
As we have seen, the kin-term product enables determining kin-term 
relations among individuals even when relevant genealogical relations are 
unknown. We now turn computations like this around. Instead of kin-
term products being computed using already known kin terms, we will 
use the kin-term product to generate new kin-term relations from the kin 
terms for primary relations. This enables us to use the kin-term product 
systematically as a way to generate the kinship relations corresponding to 
the terms of a kinship terminology from primary relations. In addition, 
the kin-term product enables prediction of the kin types (genealogical 
relations) subsumed under the kin terms for these generated kinship 
relations. The predictions are typically 100 per cent correct, thereby 
providing strong evidence for the validity of modelling a kinship 
terminology as a structure generated from primary relations. Once all of 
this is in place, we can then resolve the extension problem.
To carry out the argument, we first identify culturally salient, primary 
relations from which the kin-term relations making up a kinship 
terminology can be generated. These primary relations must be meaningful 
to culture bearers even absent the kinship terminology, just as we must 
have a beginning concept—the concept of singleness—for generating the 
counting numbers that is already understood prior to generating those 
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numbers. The relations that will play an analogous role in the generation 
of kin-term relations will be the relations forming what we will refer to as a 
Family Space (Read, Fischer and Lehman 2014; see Figure 3). By a Family 
Space will be meant a mental construct, not the instantiation of a mental 
construct such as the nuclear family that is part of the phenomenal domain. 
As Shapiro has put it succinctly: ‘[the] Nuclear family is a proposition … 
it emphasizes Behaviour, not Mind’ (1982: 260). The Family Space can be 
thought of as being composed of the relations expressed through a cultural 
representation of procreation, not as an encoding of, or elaboration on, 




Figure 3. Minimal graph of the positions, indicated by boxes, making up 
a Family Space
Four positions are necessary as there is both a vertical (parent‑child) division and a horizontal 
(husband–wife and sibling–sibling) division. A person(s) may be assigned to each position 
by cultural criteria .
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
Just as ‘singleness’ is taken to be axiomatic for the purpose of formally 
generating the counting numbers, the relations making up the Family 
Space will be axiomatic for formally generating kin-term relations. 
By being axiomatic will be meant that these relations are self-evident to 
culture bearers without reference to a kinship terminology, in the same 
sense that ‘singleness’ is understood without reference to the counting 
numbers, as can be seen through the ways that ‘singleness’ is expressed 
linguistically for English speakers through phrases such as ‘I have a book’, 
‘the object over there’, ‘my dog is brown’, and so on. Just as ‘singleness’ 
is understood without reference to the counting numbers generated 
from the concept of singleness, the relations of the Family Space are 
understood by culture bearers without reference to the kin-term relations 
generated from them and making up a kinship terminology. Instead, the 
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family relations are understood through the way the biological facts of 
procreation are culturally understood and formulated. The relationship 
of mother to child (and reciprocally, of child to mother), for example, is 
initiated through (but need not be in complete accordance with) biological 
birth and mothering behaviours, hence does not require reference to kin-
term relations to be understood. In all societies, culture bearers recognise 
a mother/child relation and its attendant behaviours however it may 
be culturally expressed and culturally instantiated (see Read 2002 for 
a discussion of cultural instantiation).
As shown in Figure 3, the Family Space has four positions: the mother, 
father, daughter and son positions, and three kinds of connections between 
the possible pairs of these positions.17 The first kind of connection is 
shown by the four vertical connections (solid lines in Figure 3) determined 
through motherhood and fatherhood and their reciprocal concept of 
childhood. From a formal viewpoint, the logical possibility of a parenthood 
connection from a mother or father position back to itself is excluded by 
the fact that selfing does not occur under biological procreation. Further, 
and critically, motherhood involves not only the concept of giving birth 
to a child, but also the idea of engaging in mothering behaviour towards 
that child.18 There are two child positions, indicating conceptually 
17  Keen (1985) somewhat similarly builds a hierarchy of what he calls ‘kin-relational expressions’, 
starting with first-order expressions and their definitions (see his Table 1); for example, ‘one’s mother 
is the female person who gave birth to one’ exemplifies what he considers to be a first-order kin-
relational expression and its definition for English speakers. His goal, to establish a foundational basis 
upon which higher-order kin-relational expressions can be built, is similar to what is discussed here. 
However, Keen does not fully succeed in his endeavour since his first-order definitions are essentially 
biological definitions and thus take the endeavour outside of the cultural context that is germane to 
his task. As we know through reproductive technologies, adoption and the like, the English kin term 
mother does not simply refer to ‘the female person who gave birth to one.’ Indeed, any attempt to 
formally define a foundational concept such as mother runs into the problem of an infinite regress. 
For this reason, as has long been established in mathematics, an axiomatic system begins with terms 
undefined within the axiomatic system. Thus, for the Family Space we begin with, for example, 
mother as an undefined concept within the formalism, but a concept whose meaning is intuitively 
known to culture bearers. An enculturated individual ‘knows’ that someone is a mother, not because 
of a formal definition, but because of one’s experience, and the experience of others, with regard to 
behaviours that are understood to be part of the essence of what it means to be a mother, hence mark 
the fact that one is dealing with an instance of the mother relation.
18  Surrogate mothers become biological mothers, but do not take on the status of motherhood by 
that fact alone. It is the female who has contracted for the offspring with a surrogate mother who takes 
on the status of motherhood, regardless of her biological connection to the offspring, by engaging 
in mothering behaviours legitimised through the contractual relationship with the surrogate mother. 
Who takes on the status of being mother, let alone motherhood, becomes uncertain, though, when 
the contractual relationship is violated or declared null and void. The latter has, in at least one case in 
Canada, led to a child not having a legally recognised mother (Baudouin and Blaikie 2014).
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the procreative property of being able to have more than one child. 
Second, there is a horizontal connection between the two child positions 
(see dashed line in Figure 3) that we can refer to as a sibling connection. 
From a formal viewpoint, the logical possibility of the sibling connection 
coinciding with the parent/child connection is excluded by the facts of 
biological procreation. However, the sibling connection would, according 
to procreation alone, still allow for three possible modalities: (1) a shared 
mother but not a shared father, (2) a shared father but not a shared mother, 
and (3) a shared mother and a shared father. Third, the first two modalities 
are culturally erased by marriage establishing a spouse connection between 
the mother and father positions and the cultural assignment of birth 
legitimacy through the presumption of a parent/child connection from 
a child position to both a male marked position and a female marked 
position, themselves connected by a spouse relation (see dotted line in 
Figure 3).19 Thus the act of marriage identifies a male as (putative) father 
for the future offspring-to-be of a female and her offspring are thereby 
culturally recognised as legitimate societal members for the social group 
in which the female is recognised as a proper societal member.20 Fourth, 
from a formal viewpoint, marriage, in and of itself, does not exclude the 
possibility that the spouse connection coincides with either the parent/
child connection or the sibling connection. These two possibilities are 
excluded by the universal incest taboos prohibiting marriage between 
parent and child and between siblings (see discussion in the chapter by 
Fadwa El Guindi), thus making the only structure consistent with the 
biological constraints on procreation and the cultural constraint on 
marriage between parent and child or between siblings expressed through 
the universal incest taboos be the one shown in Figure 3. This suggests 
that the incest taboo prohibitions on marriages between parent and child 
and between siblings may be universal for the reason discussed by Mary 
19  In the United States, most states legally make the husband of a woman the presumed (legal) 
father of her child unless the presumed father has challenged that status on the grounds that the child 
was not the consequence of sexual intercourse between him and his wife.
20  With the exception of commoners among the Mosuo of China for whom marriage is not 
required for the child of a woman to be recognised as legitimate (Shih 2010), the common (though 
not exclusive) means across societies for a community to legitimate a female as bearer of children 
(that is for her children to be considered legitimate from the viewpoint of the community) is through 
marriage, however it may be locally construed (Malinowski 1927b, 1929, 1930; Gough 1959; 
Lehman 2011).
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Douglas (1966) regarding the food taboos of the Old Testament, namely 
that which would violate the understood order is made taboo in order to 
prevent it from being perceived as a possibility.21
The words naming the relations making up the Family Space, whether or 
not, in any particular instance, all of the positions defining the relations are 
instantiated and given content, are (in English) father, mother (or parent), 
son, daughter (or child), brother, sister (or sibling, a recent addition to 
the English vocabulary), and husband, wife (or spouse) (see Figure 4). 
These English words are also polysemic in the manner discussed by 
Scheffler since they refer to both genealogical and kin-term relations. For 
example, consider English ‘mother’. Alone, the word ‘mother’ does not 
distinguish whether a pedigree relation, a genealogical relation or a kin-
term relation is involved. Thus when an English speaker says: ‘Mary is my 
mother’, we do not know from that statement alone and without further 
elaboration, whether the speaker is saying that Mary begat speaker, or 
if speaker is saying that the kinship relation between Mary and speaker 
is that of mother, and reciprocally, child, even though Mary is not the 
begetter of speaker. It may be that Mary is being recognised as mother of 
speaker in the genealogical sense of a presumed begetter (even if she is not, 
factually, the biological mother), or it may be that she is being recognised 
as mother of speaker in a kin-term sense, in which case procreation need 
not be involved; for example, speaker was adopted by Mary. For clarity, 
as discussed in footnote 3, I will italicise the word denoting a relation 
when it is being used in a kin-term sense; for example, mother, when the 
word ‘mother’ is being used in a kin-term sense.
21  The claim that the parent-child and sibling incest taboos are the consequence of the presumed 
Westermarck Effect (see, e.g. Wolf and Durham 2004; and Turner and Maryanski 2005) can be 
discounted on the grounds that there is (1) no unequivocal evidence supporting the assertion that 
persons raised together will have abhorrence (not just indifference) at the idea of having sex together 
(Leavitt 2005; Shor and Simchai 2009, 2012; Rantala and Marcinkowska 2011; El Guindi and 
Read 2012; Read 2014) and (2) under genetic equilibrium conditions, the frequency of phenotypes 
expressing deleterious effects due to the formation of homozygous genotypes for recessive, deleterious 
alleles is independent of the mating system (Read 2014), hence over evolutionary time scales 
sufficient to reach genetic equilibrium, inbreeding alone does not select for a particular mating type. 
The upsurge in deleterious effects that occurs with a shift to inbreeding from outbreeding is due to 
the change in mating type, not to inbred matings, per se. Under genetic equilibrium conditions, the 
rate of occurrence of homozygous genotypes for deleterious alleles tracks the mutation rate for 
the appearance of deleterious alleles, not the mating type.
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From the Family Space to genealogical tracing
Consider first the recursive process of genealogical tracing. Genealogical 
tracing, which we will only consider briefly, begins by cultural instantiation 
of the positions making up the Family Space. Under the presumption that 
procreation takes place in the context of marriage, there will be assigned 
both a female, call her B, recognised as the mother and a male (call him 
C) recognised as the father of the individual A instantiated as self (see 
Figure 4). Let us refer to the former two individuals as the genealogical 
mother and the genealogical father, respectively, of person A instantiated 
as self. Genealogical tracing now proceeds recursively. We apply the 
same argument to each of B and C; e.g. for societal member B, there 
is understood to be person D who is the genealogical mother of B and 
person E who is understood to be the genealogical father of B. We may 
now apply recursively the same argument to each person that has just 
been identified, and so on.
Figure 4. Graph of the Family Space with a self position for reference
There are two ways the sibling positions may be represented: (A) The sibling positions are 
related to the parent positions via the parent/child relation. (B) The sibling positions are 
related to the self position directly and to the parent position indirectly. In both (A) and (B), 
the spouse relation identifies the person instantiated as spouse to be the ‘other (legitimate) 
parent’.
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
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Similar arguments apply to the son and daughter reciprocal positions 
for the parental positions in the Family Space, except that there need 
not be a person culturally instantiated as son or daughter in an instance 
of a family, and similarly for the affinal positions of wife and husband. 
Note that while many authors have assumed, as discussed by Schneider 
(1984), that genealogical relations are biological, there is nothing in the 
recursive procedure for genealogical tracing that requires genealogical 
mother or genealogical father to be instantiated by biological mother 
or biological father, respectively, of the person instantiated as self. Thus, 
contrary to Schneider’s assumption, kinship may involve genealogical 
relations without, at the same time, presuming that these are necessarily 
biological relations. To put it simply, a genealogy based on genealogical 
parent and genealogical child need not be a pedigree. Nonetheless, there 
is still a biological substrate due to the fact that the status of, for example, 
motherhood in the Family Space is modelled on biological mother and 
the behaviours presumed to be associated with being a biological mother.
From the Family Space to a kinship terminology
Now consider how kin-term relations can be generated from the relations 
in the Family Space through the kin-term product. I will not provide a full 
account here (for a more detailed account see, e.g. Read 2000, 2007; Leaf 
and Read 2012; Read, Fischer and Lehman 2014). Instead, I shall limit 
myself to deriving only what is needed to resolve the extension problem 
through showing how the extension from close to more distant genealogical 
relations follows directly from the way kin-term relations are generated 
from the relations in the Family Space. The latter will also provide the 
basis for making predictions of the genealogical relations corresponding 
to a kin-term relation. Though I will illustrate the argument using the 
American/English terminology, it applies equally to other terminologies 
(Read 2007; Leaf and Read 2012).
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Generation of an ascending kin-term structure; predicted 












{mm, fm, mf, ff}
Figure 5. Kin-term product of parent with itself generates a new 
kin-term relation, parent o parent, given the name grandparent
The kin types subsumed under the kin terms corresponding to the black arrows are marked 
with a black dashed line. The predicted kin types (in grey) associated with the generated 
kin term grandparent = parent o parent are determined by taking the product of the sets of 
kin types subsumed by the kin terms in the kin‑term product parent o parent: {m, f} x {m, f} 
= {mm, fm, mf, ff}.
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
Let us begin with self and the kin terms corresponding to the non sex-
marked, primary kinship relations of the American/English terminology, 
namely the primary kin terms parent, child, and spouse.22 Start with the 
ascending primary term, parent, and form the kin-term product parent 
o parent determined by alter 1 referring to alter 2 by parent and speaker 
referring to alter 1 by parent (see Figure 5). Then parent o parent will be 
the generated kinship relation between speaker and alter 2. This generated 
relation has the name grandparent, which indicates that the kin-term 
22  The choice of non sex-marked primary relations stems from the fact that all of the sex-marked 
terms in the American/English terminology come in pairs for which a kin-term product that 
terminates at, or begins with, one term of the pair is matched precisely by a kin-term product that 
terminates at, or begins with, the other term of that pair. For example, for the pair grandmother, 
grandfather, each kin-term product with one term of the pair, such as son o grandmother = uncle, is 
matched by a corresponding kin-term product, in this case son o grandfather = uncle, with the other 
term of the pair. For products in the other direction, father o mother = grandfather = father o father 
is matched by mother o mother = grandmother = mother o father. Thus the sex-marked primary terms 
can be considered to be the bifurcation of neutral terms into male and female marked terms. Were 
we to use the sex-marked (rather than the neutral) primary terms as generators, we would end up 
with a generative account that requires introducing numerous ad hoc equations solely to ‘force’ the 
generated structure to match the observed structure, whereas with the neutral primary terms, no ad 
hoc equations are needed.
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product, parent o parent, determines a kinship relation recognised as 
such by culture bearers. This also establishes the meaning of the kin term 
grandparent to be the name for the generated kinship relation, parent o 
parent. Note that constructing new kinship relations from primary kin 
terms through the kin-term product parallels the process of generating 
new symbolic numbers from the symbolic primary counting number 
1 through the binary operation ‘+’; that is, from the primary symbolic 
number 1, construct the new symbolic number 1 + 1 and give it the name 
two and symbolise it by ‘2’. From the symbolic number 2, construct the 
new symbolic number 1 + 2 and give it the name three and symbolise it 
by ‘3’, and so on.
The kin-term product also predicts a category of genealogical relations 
corresponding to a kin term such as grandfather generated as the kin-
term product of primary kin terms, or more generally, a category of 
genealogical relations corresponding to a kin term that is the kin-term 
product of a primary kin term with an already generated kin term. (In the 
following discussion, for succinctness in referring to the members of 
a  genealogical category, I  will use kin-type notation, using lower case 
letters, for the genealogical relations: for example, f, m, s, and d will be the 
kin types corresponding to genealogical father, mother, son and daughter, 
respectively.) The predicted category is determined by computing, in 
the order corresponding to that of the kin terms in the product of the 
kin terms generating the kin term in question, all possible products of kin 
types, one from each category of genealogical relations corresponding to 
each primary kin term in the kin-term product generating the kin-term 
relation, with each product formed in the order of the kin terms in the 
kin-term product. Thus for grandparent = parent o parent, we form the 
category of predicted genealogical relations for grandparent by computing 
{m, f } × {m, f } = {mm, fm, mf, ff}, using the formal brace notation for 
sets, since the category of kin types corresponding to the primary kin 
term, parent, is, from the Family Space, the category consisting of the 
kin types m and f and can be denoted by the set {m, f } (see Figure 5, 
dashed lines).23 The predicted set of genealogical referents, {mm, fm, mf, 
ff}, is precisely the actual set of genealogical referents for the kin term 
grandparent.
23  I use the convention that kin-term products are written from right to left so that a kin-term 
product may be read directly as an English phrase by substituting ‘of ’ for the kin-term product symbol 
‘o’. Thus daughter o aunt may be read ‘daughter of aunt’, and this corresponds to alter 1 referring to alter 
2 by the kin term daughter and speaker referring to alter 1 by the kin term aunt. In contrast, products of 
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We continue the construction process for kin terms by forming, 
recursively, all possible products of the primary kin term parent with 
each term that is generated, and giving each new product a name when 
it generates a kin-term relation recognised as such by culture bearers. 
Thus, following this procedure, we next introduce great-grandparent as 
the name for the kin term corresponding to the kin-term product parent 
o grandparent since the kin-term relation corresponding to this kin-term 
product is recognised as such by culture bearers; that is great-grandparent 
is the kin term that speaker properly uses to refer to alter 2 when alter 1 
refers to alter 2 as parent and speaker refers to alter 1 as grandparent. To 
form the predicted set of genealogical referents corresponding to the kin 
term great-grandparent = parent o grandparent, we compute the product 
of the categories of kin types corresponding to parent and grandparent, 
respectively, and obtain {m, f } × {mm, fm, mf, ff} = {mmm, fmm, mfm, 
ffm, mmf, fmf, mff, fff } as the set of genealogical referents for the kin 
term great-grandparent. Next, we introduce great-great-grandparent as the 
name for the kin-term relation given by the kin-term product parent o 
great-grandparent (since this kin-term product is recognised as a kin-term 
relation by culture bearers) and determine the set of genealogical referents 
for the kin term great-great-grandparent by computing {m, f } × {mmm, 
fmm, mfm, ffm, mmf, fmf, mff, fff } = {mmmm, fmmm, …, mfff, ffff}, 
which is precisely the category of genealogical referents for the kin term 
great-great-grandparent, and so on. For the American/English terminology, 
this process continues indefinitely, hence a new kin term is included for 
each additional product with the primary kin term parent.
In other terminologies, the sequence of new kin terms does not continue 
indefinitely and the kin-term products eventually become reflexive, or 
are not considered to determine a kinship relation, or make a closed 
kin types are written from left to right so that a kin-type product string can be read using the possessive 
form for each kin type in the product except the last one; thus ‘fm’ is read as the genealogical relation 
f ’s m, or ‘father’s mother’, With this convention, the product of the categories of kin types formed by 
taking the product of the category of kin types corresponding to each term in the kin-term product 
becomes reversed from that of the kin-term products. For example, the kin-term product father o mother 
(read father of mother) corresponds to the kin-type category product {f } × {m} = {mf} (read ‘the category 
of kin types whose only member is m’s f, or mf, for short’). That is, the category in question is formed 
by first taking a kin type from the first category in the product of categories and then taking the kin-
type product of it with a kin type from the second category, with the order of the kin-type products 
reversed from that of the kin-term products. Hence the predicted genealogical relations for the kin term 
grandfather = parent o parent (read, using sex-marked kin terms in place of parent, ‘mother or father of 
mother or father’) is the category of kin types given by {mm, fm, mf, ff}, where the kin-type products are 
read in the indicated order: ‘m’s m, f ’s m, m’s f, or f ’s f ’.
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loop as occurs when the kin-term product of a primary ascendant kin 
term with the most ascendant kin term in the terminology is equated 
with the most descendant kin term, as happens in the terminology for 
the Kariera, a hunter-gatherer group in Western Australia (Radcliffe-
Brown 1913; see discussion in Leaf and Read 2012). Reflexivity can be 
represented structurally by an equation that defines the next product in 
the sequence of products to be equal to the current product. Thus, in 
the Tongan terminology with primary ascending male-marked kin term 
tamai (‘father’), we generate the sequence of ascending kin terms given 
by: tamai, tamai o tamai = kui (‘grandparent’), and tamai o kui = kui (see 
Bennardo and Read 2007). The last equation indicates that kui is used in 
all ascending generations from the second generation upwards.
Here, corresponding to tamai o tamai = kui, we have the predicted 
category of genealogical relations given by {f } × {f } = {ff}, which obviously 
is not the full set of genealogical relations for the kin term kui. We also 
need to consider other products of primary ascending terms equal to 
kui. For the Tongan terminology, this includes kin-term products using 
the primary female-marked kin term fa’e (‘mother’) as well. We find that 
kui is also generated by fa’e o fa’e = kui, fa’e o tamai = kui, and tamai o 
fa’e = kui, which implies that the kin-type products {m} × {m} = {mm}, 
{m} × {f } = {fm} and {f } × {m} = {mf} are also referents of the kin term 
kui, hence ff, mm, fm, and mf are included in the predicted category of 
kin types corresponding to kui. In other words, included as genealogical 
referents of a kin term are the kin-type products corresponding to any 
kin-term product that equals (that is, is reducible to, using the structural 
equations) the kin term in question. We will use this property below to 
show how the extension problem is resolved through the generative logic 
for classificatory terminologies. Before doing so, we need to continue 
further with this overview of the process by which a kinship terminology 
is generated from primary kin terms.
Structural equations are crucial to this generative process as they can be 
used to express cultural concepts regarding kinship relations embedded 
within the kinship terminology. Whereas English speakers consider kinship 
relations to extend indefinitely in an ascending direction and are labelled 
with a new kin term in each generation, Tongans consider, as noted above, 
each of these kinship relations to be marked with a new kin term only 
up to the +2 generation, with the kin term in the +2 generation repeated 
in subsequent generations. This reflexive property may be denoted, as 
indicated above, by introducing the structural equations tamai o kui = kui 
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and fa’e o kui = kui into the generative process for the Tongan terminology. 
Note that structural equations like this that express differences between 
English and Tongan speakers in their respective ideas about kinship 
relations are taken as axiomatic in the formal representation. The reason 
for differences like this among kinship terminologies is an interesting 
question in its own right whose (as yet uncertain) answer lies outside the 
immediate purview of the generative logic for a kinship terminology or 
that of any account of kinship terminologies for that matter.
Generation of a descending kin-term structure; predicted 
categories of genealogical relations
Typically (see discussions in Read 2007; Leaf and Read 2012), the 
generation of a kinship terminology continues by next generating 
a  descending structure isomorphic to the ascending structure that has 
just been generated. The isomorphic descending structure is formed 
by introducing a (generally distinct) primary descending term for each 
primary ascending term used to generate the ascending structure.24 The 
primary descending term corresponding to a primary ascending term 
will be said to be structurally isomorphic to that ascending term, and vice-
versa. For the American/English terminology, the structurally isomorphic 
primary descending term corresponding to the (single) primary ascending 
term parent will be the primary term child. For the American/English 
terminology, the descending structure isomorphic to the ascending 
structure with terms parent, grandparent (= parent o parent), great-
grandparent (= parent o grandparent) … will be the isomorphic structure 
with terms child, grandchild (= child o child), great-grandchild (= child 
o grandchild) … In addition, the isomorphic version of any structural 
equation that is part of the ascending structure will be included in the 
descending structure. For the Tongan terminology, an isomorphic copy 
of the ascending structural equation tamai o kui = kui, (read: ‘father’ 
of ‘grandfather’ is ‘grandfather’), namely (for a male speaker) foha o 
mokopuna = mokopuna, where foha (‘son’) is structurally isomorphic to 
tamai (‘father’) and mokopuna (‘grandson’) = foha o foha, is included in the 
descending structure. The predicted categories of kin types corresponding 
to the descending kin terms are then generated in a manner analogous 
to the way the predicted categories of kin types are generated for the 
ascending kin terms.
24  For the English terminology, there is but one primary ascending term, namely parent, but in 
other terminologies such as the Tongan terminology, more than a single ascending primary term is 
used to generate the ascending structure (see Bennardo and Read 2007 for details).
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Reciprocal kin terms
Not yet included in the construction is a structural criterion that defines 
the structurally isomorphic English kin terms, parent and child, introduced, 
respectively, in the generation of the ascending and the descending 
structures, to be reciprocal terms and not just isomorphic corresponding 
kin terms. With regard to usage, if speaker refers to alter by the kin term 
L (e.g. child), then the reciprocal term for L is the term K (i.e. parent) that 
alter properly uses for speaker. In addition, when considering reciprocal 
kin terms, the sex of speaker may need to be taken into account, as 
well as whether the reciprocal is determined within just the domain of 
consanguineal relations, or in the domain of both consanguineal and 
affinal relations, which depends on whether affinal relations have yet been 
introduced in the construction process.
The definition of reciprocal terms determined through usage can be 
transformed into a structural equation. To do this, note that when 
generating a kinship terminology by first generating a structure of 
ascending terms and next an isomorphic structure of descending terms, 
the genealogical references for the kin terms constructed so far will just 
be consanguineal genealogical relations since affinal kin terms have 
not yet been introduced, hence we will identify the structural equation 
that defines kin terms K and L to be reciprocal terms in the domain of 
consanguineal relations.
The usage definition for K and L to be reciprocal kin terms can be restated 
using the kin-term product. For example, if L = child and K = parent, 
suppose alter 1 refers to alter 2 as parent and speaker refers to alter 1 as 
child. Then since child and parent are reciprocal terms and we are only 
considering (so far) consanguineal genealogical relations for speaker, alter 
2 must be speaker. We now ask: What expression does speaker use for 
alter 2 = speaker? and the answer, obviously, is myself (or self, for short). 
Thus, parent o child = self is the kin-term equation corresponding to the 
fact that parent and child are reciprocal kin terms. Note that if we reverse 
child and parent in this equation and alter 1 refers to alter 2 as child and 
speaker refers to alter 1 as parent, then alter 2 need not be speaker and if 
alter 2 is not speaker, then speaker refers to alter 2 as sibling. Thus, child o 
parent = sibling for English speakers. Observe that the predicted kin-type 
referents for sibling derived from the kin-term equation child o parent 
= sibling are given by {s, d} × {f, m} = {fs, ms, fd, md} = {b, z}, where 
b (z) is the genealogical relation standing for fs or ms (fd or md). Thus, 
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the kin-term product parent o child = self defines parent and child to be 
reciprocal kin terms, whereas the kin-term product child o parent defines 
a new kin-term relation, sibling, with predicted genealogical referents {b, 
z}. In algebraic terms, we have also established that the kin-term product 
is not commutative for the American/English kinship terminology since 
parent o child ≠ child o parent.
The form of the structural equation, parent o child = self, that defines parent 
and child to be reciprocal kin terms is not specific to the American/English 
terminology or to these primary kin terms, but is a general property of 
kinship terminologies and primary kin terms. The structural form of the 
equation, parent o child = self, defining child to be the reciprocal of parent is 
(in words): ascending primary term of descending primary term is self, where 
the descending primary term is structurally isomorphic to the ascending 
primary term. In general, if K and L are structurally isomorphic primary 
ascending and descending kin terms, respectively, and if alter 1 refers to 
alter 2 by K and speaker refers to alter 1 by L, then the structural equation 
K o L = self defines K and L to be reciprocal kin terms. In some cases, such 
as with the primary kin term spouse that expresses the affinal relation for 
English speakers, the kin term is self-reciprocal, meaning that we have, for 
the kin term spouse, the structural equation spouse o spouse = self. A self-
reciprocal primary kin term is neither an ascending nor a descending kin 
term, just as 0 is neither a positive nor a negative number.
We may structurally define the reciprocal kin term for a nonprimary kin 
term K as follows. Since K is not a primary kin term, it is generated from 
primary kin terms, so we may write K as a product of primary kin terms, 
say K = P1 o P2 o … o Pn, where each Pi is a primary kin term and the 
same primary kin term may appear more than once in a sequence of kin-
term products of primary terms. The reciprocal kin term for K, which 
we will denote by Kr, is given by the kin-term product of the reciprocal 





r denotes the reciprocal kin term for the primary kin 
term Pi. For example, from sibling = child o parent, we determine that 
the reciprocal of sibling is given by siblingr = parentr o childr; that is by the 
kin-term product of the reciprocal of parent (= child) and the reciprocal of 
child (= parent), in that order, so the reciprocal of sibling is given by child 
o parent = sibling, hence sibling must be a self-reciprocal kin term and so 
is neither an ascending nor a descending kin term.
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American/English Kinship Terminology
Primary Kin Terms
Self, Parent, Child, Spouse
Structural Equations
Reciprocal Definition Equation for Child and Parent 
Child o Parent = Self 
Spouse Definition Equation 
Spouse o Spouse = Self 
Affinal Equations 
Spouse o Parent = Parent 
Spouse o Child o Parent = Child o Parent o Spouse 
Affinal Restriction Equations 
Parent o Spouse o Child = 0 
Parent o Parent o Spouse = 0 
Structural Rules
Sex Marking of Kin Terms
Kin term K is sex marked if Spouse o K is a kin term or Spouse o Kr is 
a kin term, where Kr is the reciprocal term for K 
Generated Kinship Terminology Structure
Figure 6. Primary kin terms and structural equations for generating the 
American/English terminology
Bottom graph: Generated structure isomorphic to the kin‑term map for the American/
English terminology (see Figure 2a).
Source: Constructed by © Dwight Read.
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Though sibling and spouse are both self-reciprocal, sibling differs structurally 
from spouse due to the (axiomatic) kin-term product equation spouse o 
parent = parent (see Read 2007; Leaf and Read 2012) corresponding to 
the cultural knowledge of culture bearers that ‘spouse of parent is parent’, 
whereas sibling o parent defines a new kin term for English speakers. 
For this latter kin-term product, we have for its name and using sex-
marked kin terms, either sibling o parent = aunt or sibling o parent = uncle. 
These examples show how, through the generative logic for the kinship 
terminology, we can account for properties of the kin terms making up 
a kinship terminology and the way kin terms in this terminology are 
structurally linked to one another.
Generation of the complete American/English kinship 
terminology
We will not go through the entire process of generating the American/
English terminology through kin-term products, a process that uses, as 
shown above, the set G of generating terms given by G = {self, parent, 
child, spouse}. Interested readers can consult Read (1984, 2000, 2007); 
Read and Behrens (1990); Bennardo and Read (2007) or Leaf and 
Read (2012) for details. We only present here the final set of structural 
equations used to generate the American/English kinship terminology 
and the structure generated from these structural equations (see Figure 6). 
As can be seen from Figure 6, the structural equations for the American/
English terminology are culturally salient and express properties of 
the terminology familiar to the users of the terminology. This is no 
coincidence, but stems from the kinship terminology being generated 
through structural properties (primary terms and structural equations) 
that are culturally salient.
The generated structure can be shown to be isomorphic to the empirically 
derived structure for the American/English kinship terminology shown 
in Figure 2a, hence we now have an explanation for the structural form 
of the American/English kinship terminology by reference to the cultural 
knowledge shown in Figure 6. Other terminologies will differ from the 
American/English kinship terminology by different choices of primary 
terms used to generate the terminology and/or in the equations that 
express structural properties embedded in the kinship terminology.
99
2 . ExTENSION PROBLEM
Two culturally salient definitions for sibling in the 
Family Space
One additional property of the Family Space is needed before we can 
account for the extension of the referents of kin terms from closer to 
more distant genealogical relations. Structurally, there are two ways that 
a sibling may be defined: (A) speaker’s sibling is the child of speaker’s parent 
other than speaker and (B) individuals A and B are siblings when the 
parents of A are also the parents of B (see Figure 4). Empirical justification 
for these two ways to conceptualise sibling comes from ethnographic 
observations regarding the importance of the sibling relation when sibling 
is conceptualised through shared parents, as occurs, for example, with 
the Kaluli and the Tangu groups of New Guinea (see also Knight 2011). 
According to Edward Schieffelin, when the Kaluli work out kin relations: 
[They] frequently invoke a sibling relationship as the link that explains 
the application of a term – ‘I call him brother because my father calls his 
father brother’ … [T]he sibling relationship takes precedence over descent 
[parent-child links] whenever the principles are in conflict [emphasis in 
original] (1976: 54–55).
Likewise, Kenelm Burridge notes the Tangu consider that: 
[S]iblingship is the determinant that descent [parent-child links] might 
have been expected to be … descent was probably always calculated from 
siblingship … and siblingship rather than descent always provided the 
definitive norms of social behavior (1959–1960: 128, 130). 
R.R. Nayacakalou, an indigenous Fijian ethnographer, makes a similar 
comment for the Fijian classificatory terminology: ‘[I]f A is a classificatory 
father to B, and C is also a classificatory father to B, then A and C are 
classificatory brothers, even if no genealogical tie can be traced between 
them’ (1955: 48).
He also identifies conceptualising siblings in Fiji through what he calls the 
‘principle … of common parentage, which binds together the members 
of a sibling group’ (ibid.: 46) (see Figure 4(B)). German Dziebel finds 
that both definitions (A) and (B) of sibling are needed to accommodate 
differences among terminologies regarding sibling kin-term relations. 
He then links siblings defined through common parents with classificatory 
terminologies: ‘[I]f alternatively Ego prefers to think that he shares ... 
common ascent with his siblings, 0 generation terminology will be 
Bifurcate Merging [i.e. classificatory]’ (2007: 233).
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These two ways of conceptualising sibling shown in Figure 4 correspond 
to a compound kin term (Figure 4(A)) versus a primary generating kin 
term (Figure 4(B)). Definition (A) implies that the kin term translated as 
‘sibling’ is a compound kin term: ‘sibling’ = ‘child’ o ‘parent’. Definition 
(B) implies that ‘sibling’ is a primary generating kin term.25
Generating a classificatory terminology
We next consider the structural properties introduced logically when 
‘sibling’ is one of the primary generating terms. As we will see, the addition 
of ‘sibling’ as a generating term leads to classificatory terminologies. For 
simplicity of notation in the following, we will use capital letters F, M, S, 
D, B, B+, B-, Z, Z+, Z- to denote the kin terms for the father, mother, 
son, daughter, brother, older brother, younger brother, and sister, older 
sister, and younger sister relations, respectively, in the Family Space. We 
begin by generating male marked kin terms (or equivalently, we begin by 
generating female marked kin terms).26 Let A = {male self, F, B+} be the 
25  Keen (1985) incorrectly assumes sibling must be a second-order kin relationship; that is, sibling, 
as a kin-term concept, must be conceptualised through the kin-term product, ‘child’ of ‘parent.’ This 
ignores the ethnographic evidence, a small part of which has been presented here, showing that, for 
many groups, sibling is conceptualised as a first-order kin relationship (to use Keen’s vocabulary), and 
hence is a primary generating term. Wierzbicka (2016) makes a related error by assuming that the 
prerequisite for having a ‘sibling’ kin term is having a linguistic term for a sibling concept in which 
sibling is ‘undifferentiated in gender and relative age’ (ibid.: 412). Since such a sibling concept is 
not universally given linguistic recognition, she argues that sibling is not a universal concept. Her 
assertion, however, confounds sibling as a structural relation in the Family Space that may, on the one 
hand, be incorporated into a system of kin-term relations expressed through the kin terms making 
up a kinship terminology in different ways (see Read 2011, 2014 for examples), with, on the other 
hand, sibling as a genealogical relation undifferentiated in gender or by relative age. ‘Sibling’ from 
the perspective of the conceptual system of kin-term relations making up a KTS expressed through 
a kinship terminology, and ‘sibling’, from the perspective of the conceptual system of genealogical 
relations making up what Lehman and Witz (1974) referred to as a PGS, are not one and the same 
thing. In her example of Kyardild kin terms, Wierzbicka provides definitions for their ‘sibling’ 
terms that do not require the use of the technical construct, ego, or the kin-type, sibling; that is, her 
definitions reinforce the incorrectness of the ontology going necessarily from procreation to genealogy 
to kinship terms. For the Kyardild sibling kin term wakatha, she gives the definition (contra Keen’s 
assumption): ‘a man can say about a woman “this is my wakatha” if he can think about her like this: 
“her mother is my mother, her father is my father”’—but this just defines one of two structural ways 
the sibling relation can be part of the Family Space (see Figure 4), each of which can be defined (as 
must be the case) without using concepts that depend upon already having the KTS or the PGS in 
place. In other words, her argument validates taking the Family Space to be axiomatic. Further, since 
she has provided a definition of their kin term, wakatha, that does not require reference to a KTS or 
to the PGS, wakatha is a linguistically recognised primary kin-term concept, hence a generating term 
for their kinship terminology.
26  The rationale for first generating structures of male marked, or female marked, terms has been 
discussed extensively, and illustrated with the Tongan, the Kariera, the Trobriand and the Dravidian 
terminologies in: Read and Behrens 1990; Bennardo and Read 2007; Read 2010a; Leaf and Read 2012.
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generating set for the ascending, male-marked kinship terms and include 
both the structural equation F o B+ = F (‘father’ of ‘older brother’ is 
‘father’), in agreement with the second definition for sibling given above, 
and the structural equation B+ o B+ = B+ (‘older brother’ of ‘older brother’ 
is ‘older brother’) that structurally identifies B+ as a sibling kin term in the 
ascending structure.
Typically, classificatory terminologies become reflexive beyond the +2 
generation, so we also include the equation F o (F o F) = F o F, or more 
succinctly, F3 = F2. The distinct kin terms we generate from A and the 
structural equations F o B+ = F, B+ o B+ = B+ and F3 = F2 are: 
F, F2, B+, B+ o F, and B+ o F2 (‘father’, ‘grandfather’, ‘older brother’, ‘older 
brother’ of ‘father’, and ‘older brother’ of ‘grandfather’, respectively). 
Note that at this stage in the construction, B+ o F (‘older brother’ of 
‘father’) and B+ o F2 (‘older brother’ of ‘grandfather’) are each distinct 
kin-term relations since no structural equations that would reduce these 
kin-term products to a simpler form have yet been introduced.
Next, we generate an isomorphic structure of descending terms using the 
generating set D = {male self, S, B-}. Then we introduce the structural 
equations F o S = male self and B+ o B- = male self = B- o B+ to define F 
and S as a pair of reciprocal kin terms and B+ and B- as a second pair of 
reciprocal kin terms. Since the descending structure will be isomorphic to 
the ascending structure, we also include the structural equations S3 = S2 
and S o B- = S that are isomorphic to F3 = F2 and F o B+ = F, respectively. 
Note that the equations isomorphic to the two equations B+ o B- = male 
self = B- o B+ are just these two equations again, so no new equations 
would be introduced through including the isomorphic forms of these 
two equations.
One other general property of kinship terminologies needs to be 
introduced, namely that the reciprocal version of a structural equation is 
also a structural equation for the terminology (see Scheffler 1986), which 
follows from the isomorphism between the ascending and the descending 
structures. Thus, from the equation S o B- = S, we include the reciprocal 
structural equation B-r o Sr = Sr, which corresponds to B+ o F = F. This last 
equation introduces the structural equation, ‘older brother’ of ‘father’ = 
‘father’. Further, from B+ o F = F, it follows that B- o B+ o F = B- o F, and 
since B- o B+ = male self, we have: 
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B- o F = B- o B+ o F 
= male self o F. 
Since male self o F = F,27 it follows that B- o F = F, and so B o F = F, 
where B is either B+ or B-; that is ‘brother’ of ‘father’ is ‘father’. From the 
equation B o F = F, it follows that the reciprocal of this equation, namely 
Fr o Br = Fr; i.e. S o B = S, is also a structural equation for the terminology. 
Thus, the structural equations, B o F = F (‘brother’ of ‘father’ is ‘father’) 
and S o B = S (‘son’ of ‘brother’ is ‘son’), fundamental to distinguishing 
classificatory terminologies as a distinct class of terminologies, are the 
logical consequence of generating a kinship terminology when a sibling term 
is also a generating term. Hence Morgan’s distinction between descriptive 
and classificatory terminologies can now be expressed structurally 
through whether the terminology has ‘sibling’ as a primary, generating 
term (classificatory terminologies) or whether ‘sibling’ is a compound kin 
term of the form ‘child’ of ‘parent’ is ‘sibling’ (descriptive terminologies).
For our purposes here, I need not carry out the generation of a classificatory 
terminology any further. Interested readers can consult Bennardo and 
Read  (2007) for the generation of the Tongan classificatory kinship 
terminology, Read (2010b) for the generation of a Dravidian terminology, 
and Leaf and Read (2012) for the generation of the Kariera kinship 
terminology for examples of generating a classificatory terminology. 
I now assume that we have done the rest of the construction and turn 
to resolving the extension problem, using the classificatory kin term 
‘father’. The means for so doing with the kin term ‘father’ will also serve as 
a canonical procedure for showing how the extension problem is resolved, 
in general, through the logical consequences of having a sibling term as 
one of the generating terms. I carry out this demonstration in three parts.
27  The kin-term product male self o F means alter 1 refers to alter 2 as F and male speaker refers to 
alter 1 as male self. The kin-term product, male self o F, will be equal to the kin term M that speaker 
(properly) uses for alter 2. Since speaker refers to alter 1 as male self, then alter 1 is speaker, hence the 
fact that alter 1 refers to alter 2 as F means that speaker refers to alter 2 as F, thus male self o F = F. The 
equation, F o male self, may be shown in a similar manner. In general, the term, self will be an identity 
element for the kin-term product; that is, for any kin term K, self o K = K = K o self. The sex-marked 
terms male self and female self will be identity elements for kin-term products of kin terms with the 
same-sex marking, as shown above for male self and F.
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Resolution of the extension problem
Part 1: Primary kin types for the lineal kin terms
I begin by noting that the generating term, F, generates the lineal 
sequence of ascending kin terms given by F, F2, F3 = F2, with predicted, 
corresponding categories of kin types {f } and {ff, fff, …} for F and F2, 
respectively. Let S be the descending generating term isomorphic to F. 
The term S generates the lineal sequence of descending kin terms, S, S2, 
and S3 = S2, with {s} and {ss, sss, …} as the predicted genealogical categories 
of kin types corresponding to S and S2, respectively. This part of the 
construction structurally subsumes the reduction made by Scheffler and 
Lounsbury of the genealogical categories corresponding to lineal terms to 
their primary (lineal) kin types, except whereas they needed to rationalise 
the reason for so doing, the generation of a classificatory terminology 
already provides the underlying structural basis for distinguishing the 
primary kin types for the lineal kin terms (see also the discussion of this 
topic by Shapiro Chapter 1).
Part 2: Extension of ‘father’ to father’s brother
The structural equations B+ o F = F = B- o F, with corresponding kin-type 
products: 
{b+} × {f } = {b-} × {f } 
= {fb-, fb+}
= {fb}, 
extend the category of genealogical kin types corresponding to ‘father’ 
to include fb, where b refers either to genealogical older brother, b+, or 
genealogical younger brother, b-. Similar arguments may be made for 
other kin terms expressed as products of primary terms. 
Part 3: Extension of ‘father’ to same generation, male 
collateral relations
We still need to establish the structural basis for F including the male 
collateral genealogical relations fffss (= ffbs), ffffsss (= fffbss) … within the 
domain of referents for F. We do this as follows. We map any genealogical 
string expressed as a product of kin types to a corresponding kin-term 
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product formed by mapping each kin type in the product of kin types 
to the kin term that subsumes that kin type, then we compute the 
reduction of the resulting kin-term product to an irreducible kin term 
using the structural equations for the terminology, and lastly we assign the 
genealogical string in question to this kin term. Thus, from the kin type 
product, fffss (father’s father’s father’s son’s son), for example, we form the 
corresponding kin-term product S o S o F o F o F (‘son’ of ‘son’ of ‘father’ 
of ‘father’ of ‘father’).28 Observe that:
S o S o F o F o F = S o (S o F) o F o F 
= S o B o F o F 
= S o (B o F) o F
= S o F o F 
= B o F 
= F (since S o F = B and B o F = F), 
hence the genealogical relation given by the kin-type product fffss 
corresponds to the kin-term product S o S o F o F o F = F, and so the 
genealogical relation fffss is included under the kin term F. By a similar 
argument, any genealogical string of the form, f(n times)s(n - 1 times), 
corresponds to a kin-term product that reduces to F, hence in addition 
to the genealogical relations f and ffs = fb, the sequence of male collateral 
genealogical relations fffss (= ffbs), ffffsss (= fffbss), … are also genealogical 
relations included under the kin term F. In a similar manner, we may 
determine the predicted assignment of any genealogical string to a kin 
term by reducing the corresponding kin-term product with the structural 
equations for generating the kinship terminology to a kin term K that 
is irreducible, then assigning the genealogical string to K. We find that 
the predicted assignments matches the observed assignments for all kin 
terms, consequently we have an explanatory argument (see Read 2008) 
for the categories of genealogical relations associated with the kin terms in 
a classificatory kinship terminology.
It follows, then, that terms such as no-yeh’ (‘mother’) and hä-nih’ (‘father’) 
in the Iroquois terminology do not refer, as discussed by Shapiro (Chapter 
1), to a unitary class of undifferentiated, co-equal members, but to a class 
with a natural differentiation, starting with a class member who is in 
a lineal relation to speaker that is then extended to include other members 
who have a genealogical relationship to speaker in accordance with the 
28  As discussed in footnote 23, I use the convention that the order for the product of the kin terms 
is reversed from that of kin-type products when going from kin-type products to kin-term products.
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computational logic of the kinship terminology for that kin term. Whether 
we think of the former as the focal member of the class or in some other 
manner is not critical. What the generative logic makes clear is that the 
members of the class instantiated through procreation (as it is culturally 
understood) are necessarily differentiated according to genealogical 
criteria.29 Further, cultural recognition of this differentiation may be 
made to varying degrees, as exemplified by the Siriono who linguistically 
mark the differentiation through modifiers meaning ‘real’ (Scheffler and 
Lounsbury 1971; see discussion by Shapiro Chapter 1) and by the Tiwi 
for whom marking, or even acting on, the differentiation, appears to be 
unimportant (Goodale 1971). In both of these cases, the differentiation 
derives from the generative logic of a classificatory terminology. 
The use of modifiers seems to be a way to resolve the difference between 
the generative logic that categorises individuals (some with lineal and 
others with collateral relations to speaker) in the same manner and the 
genealogical framework that distinguishes between lineal and collateral 
relations. It is the generative logic that requires the assignment of 
individuals, some with lineal, or others with collateral, relationship to 
the same kin-term category. From the perspective of class logic, being 
assigned to the same class makes them coequal as class members, but the 
genealogical logic still requires that they be differentiated. Resolution of 
this disjunction, when it is culturally salient, is achieved by using modifiers 
that differentiate the primary class members as focal or ‘real’ kin, thereby 
distinct from the secondary class members.
Yet why should there be terms requiring this differentiation in the first 
place? If it is necessary to use a modifier to distinguish genealogical father 
(mother) from other genealogical relations also referred to by the same kin 
term, why not simply have a kin term that refers just to the genealogical 
father (mother) in the first place? Or, if what a kin term designates could 
change, essentially independent of the other terms, then why have not 
the kin terms in question each bifurcated into one term that refers only 
to genealogical father (mother) and a second term that refers to the other 
genealogical referents? The extensive evidence regarding what seems 
to be a common practice of using modifiers to make a distinction not 
otherwise made within the kin terms (see Shapiro Chapter 1) strongly 
29  Of course, additional individuals may also be recognised as members of a class through 
nongenealogical cultural instantiation of kin terms, as discussed by Andrew Strathern (1973) for the 
Melpa of the New Guinea Highlands.
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suggest that modifiers come into play because making such a change is 
not possible without violating the logic of the terminology. As shown 
here, making a  distinction between genealogical father (mother) and 
other genealogical referents through different kin terms would violate 
the internal consistency of the terminology in question due to the logical 
connection between conceptualising sibling as a primary relation and 
having a classificatory terminology. Thus, the frequent use of modifiers 
may be less a confirmation of a procreative basis for kinship relations and 
more a way to maintain the logical consistency of a kinship terminology, 
yet recognising the primacy of the father (mother) relation as it is expressed 
in the Family Space.
Conclusion
The explanatory argument presented here resolves the extension problem 
through appeal to the generative logic of a terminology and whether or 
not the sibling relation is conceptualised as a primary kinship relation. 
The generative logic is expressed using culturally salient kin-term 
products and structural equations. These equations suffice to account for 
the regularities expressed through the equivalence rules for classificatory 
terminologies in the following manner. When there is a sibling generating 
term, the lineal terms are generated not only by an ascending generator, 
and reciprocally by a descending generator, but also by products with 
the sibling generator. These products reduce to lineal kin terms, thereby 
bringing collateral relations into the scope of the genealogical relations 
subsumed under lineal kin terms, thus accounting for the equivalence 
rules that extend lineal to collateral genealogical relations, or vice-versa. 
Consequently, the extension of the genealogical referents of kin terms from 
lineal to collateral genealogical relations is not mysterious. It follows from 
the sibling relation being conceptualised (through procreation) by shared 
parentage. What has, heretofore, hindered recognition of this underlying 
logic has been the invalid presumption that genealogical kinship relations 
are first established through procreation and then categorised in some 
manner, usually by a means assumed to be external to the terminology, 
with kin terms playing a secondary role as a linguistic labelling system for 
those categories.
Rather than being based on external factors, the underlying generative 
logic is based on culturally salient ideas about kinship relations applied 
to the primary relations making up the Family Space. This leads to 
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clarification of the relationship that kinship terminologies have to local 
ideas about procreation and kinship. The kinship ideas do not simply give 
biological procreation a cultural overlay. Instead, they lay the foundation 
for a generative logic that incorporates nonbiological properties such as 
isomorphism between ascending and descending kin-term structures, 
reciprocity among kin terms, structural criteria for distinguishing between 
male-marked and female-marked kin terms, introduction of affinal kin 
terms either through structural criteria (see, for example, the analysis of 
the Kariera terminology in Leaf and Read 2012) or through expansion 
of the core kinship terminology by including an affinal kin term as 
a generating term (see Read 2007; Leaf and Read 2012 for details), and 
the culturally different ways that siblings are conceptualised. The last 
property leads to the disjunction between genealogical structure and 
the structure of the classificatory kinship terminologies that concerned 
Morgan, and was addressed formally, though incompletely, through 
the equivalence rules introduced by Lounsbury and elaborated upon 
by the work of Scheffler. While the concept of a sibling relation may 
ultimately have developed from the facts of biological reproduction, 
viewing kinship terminologies as symbolic (in a mathematical/linguistic 
sense) computational systems makes evident the way kinship terminology 
structures can deviate from their biological underpinnings. This allows 
us to bypass Schneider’s antigenealogical position and does not require 
appeal to other formalisms such as the natural semantic metalanguage 
formalism developed by Wierzbicka (1992) and co-workers. It permits 
us to recognise what derives from our biological heritage directly and, 
at the same time, to appreciate what is new by virtue of our cognitive 
ability to construct symbolic systems, from whence derives the inherent 
mathematical character of kinship terminologies.
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Action, Metaphor and 
Extensions in Kinship
Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart
In this chapter we honour the fundamental and enduring contributions 
of Harold Scheffler to the study of kinship in human societies. Scheffler 
has vigorously pursued the topic of the primary reference of kin terms, 
and it is on this topic that the most controversy has tended to emerge. 
We recognise the force of Scheffler’s arguments, and we seek to mediate 
between the different viewpoints on the fundamental issues at stake by 
considering the evidence further from contexts of action and from some 
aspects of linguistic theory. Scheffler also made important contributions 
to the study of descent and the question of cognatic descent as a category 
of analysis (e.g. Scheffler 1965, 2001), changing his mind about this arena 
of discussion in his 2001 book. We do not engage with this issue here, but 
it remains important, especially in the analysis of Pacific Island societies 
and their flexible systems of affiliation (see e.g. Strathern and Stewart 
2004a on the Duna case from Papua New Guinea).
In our book Kinship in Action (Strathern and Stewart 2011) we argued that 
an important focus in kinship studies is found in the context of action as 
well as in linguistic classifications of kin types, foundational as these are 
for general frameworks of action. An action-based approach enables us to 
understand the pragmatic issues behind ways in which kin classifications 
are applied in practice. This argument is relevant for the long-standing 
debates in kinship studies regarding the ‘meaning’ of kinship terms; 
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do they refer to primary kin types of a genealogical kind or do they refer to 
broad classifications? Clearly, in practice they can do both, depending on 
contexts of action. However, there is another way to enter the discussion. 
Language is intrinsically influenced by metaphorical applications of 
meanings, seen as ‘extensions’ from elementary structures that are tied 
to embodied experience. The ‘extended mind’ that evolutionary thinkers 
have identified as crucial for the development of human culture and 
language lends itself well to a context of sociality in which kin terms are 
applied both to close bodily relations and to wider sets of persons with 
whom cooperation is advantageous. ‘Extensions’, added to primary points 
of reference, are intrinsic to the whole process of human development. 
This viewpoint mediates between the opposing ideas of primary kin types 
versus kin classifications.
Kinship studies in anthropology, seen as being at the heart of the 
discipline in its early phases, have gone through a number of changes. 
Kinship terminologies were at first taken as proxy evidence for states 
of evolution of society. Theories of ‘group marriage’, for example, were 
broached as a means of apparently explaining classificatory terminologies. 
In these and other approaches one viewpoint tended to prevail: that 
a distinction between genealogical usages deriving from immediate links 
of reproduction (and marriage) and extended classificatory usages is to be 
found universally. In this viewpoint, the genealogical ties are implicitly 
taken as basic and self-explanatory and it is the classificatory usages that 
require further explanation. This explanation can then be found in terms 
of local logics of the equivalence of persons within genealogical grids or 
in terms of group or category membership and potentiality for marriage 
affiliations. While the concern for using kin-term structures as evidence 
for social evolution fell away, basic assumptions about the subject matter 
of kinship continued, and fed into a further phase of in-depth modelling 
of the putative logics of extension and equations between kin types. 
In the United States (US), this analytical method reached its climax in the 
work of the ethnoscientists who tended to equate ‘culture’ with linguistic 
classifications and developed extensionist kin-term analysis as a master art 
for revealing kinship structures. Among the many prominent exponents 
of this approach, the work of Floyd Lounsbury (e.g. Lounsbury 1964) 
clearly stood out, enabling a method of positing extension rules that could 
order the distribution of kin-term assignments over a set of genealogical 
positions, starting from basic genealogical foci. (‘Genealogy’, however, 
can itself also be an ambiguous term, referring either to ideas of biological 
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procreation or to legal principles, or to both of these semantic domains.) 
Harold Scheffler and Floyd Lounsbury collaborated on a sophisticated 
analysis of the Siriono kinship system, exploring the strengths of this 
mode of analysis (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971; see also Scheffler 1978 
on Australian Kin Classification).
A strongly negative reaction against this method, and all other approaches 
that assumed a genealogical grid, came also from within the US with the 
work of David M. Schneider. Schneider’s deconstructive strategy was to 
question the whole category of ‘kinship’ as a universal, genealogy-based 
grid of relations (Schneider 1984). In Schneider’s view, the category was to 
be seen as ethnocentric, tied to English-language usages, and inapplicable 
as a general model. Schneider used the example of his work on Yap in 
Micronesia to question the genealogical basis of paternal filiation there, 
because the spirits of children were thought to come as a gift or form of 
bestowal from the ancestors (thagith), not from sexual procreation. A new 
child’s name was accordingly given to it by male elders of the tabinau 
(local group) to which it was affiliated, acting in the place of the ancestors 
in this regard. Dogmas of this kind are common enough in societies with 
matrilineal descent (e.g. the famous but often misconstrued case of the 
Trobrianders of Papua New Guinea). The important thing is that they 
are dogmas, and that in practice and informally there is ample evidence 
of knowledge among the Trobrianders that sex and procreation are linked 
(see a discussion in Strathern and Stewart 2011: 36–38 and also 39–41 
on the Yapese case with critiques of Schneider’s argument). Schneider’s 
stance, however, and his influence over others, gave rise to a school of 
cultural relativistic work on kinship that dissolved it as a category under 
sociality in general. Kinship studies as a separate domain of enquiry 
appeared to have suffered a serious blow.
More nuanced and thoughtful reconstructive approaches have since 
emerged. What we call kinship, in its social sense, can be composed of 
several elements, from basic significata, however these are formulated, 
to extended considerations of practice, embodiment, emplacement, 
consumption of food, political solidarity and the like. Especially food 
giving, care and identifications with locality have long been recognised 
as important for many New Guinea societies (see e.g. Strathern 1973; 
also Meigs 1984; Kahn 1986). What we call ‘adoption’ is another 
complicating factor in analysis, which can be resolved in various ways 
by stressing that kin terms refer to roles and statuses and in adoption the 
assumption of a parental role gives access to parental status. None of these 
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
122
complications necessarily validates or invalidates the general arguments 
about whether kinship is to be seen as based on genealogy or not. Rather, 
they obviate this argument by concentrating on practice as a domain in 
its own right. Among Melpa speakers of Mount Hagen in the Papua New 
Guinea Highlands, people will privilege either genealogical classifications 
or local solidarity, depending on circumstances. People also supplement 
kinship with friendship ties based on food sharing and the adoption of 
food names to make a more personal and special relationship of solidarity 
than a kin term alone can convey (see Strathern 1977). For the most 
part, then, a contemporary approach is to situate kinship relations within 
broader fields of sociality without, however, dissolving them entirely. 
The phenomenon of kin terms is culturally widespread, if not universal. 
It must obviously be rooted in embodied (‘biological’) facts that cannot 
be ignored. Kinship therefore survives as a living category of cross-cultural 
human behaviour and practice in spite of Schneider’s deconstruction.
Warren Shapiro, editor of this volume, (pers. comm., n.d.) has pointed 
out to us, referring to one of his own writings (Shapiro 2009) that 
‘adoptive kinship is usually (always?) lexically marked, i.e. nonfocal’. 
The observation is true for the Melpa speakers of Papua New Guinea. 
A child taken over by someone else after the demise of its original parental 
figures is described as mbo nunggökli, ‘nurtured’. Adoption was considered 
in some nuanced detail in various places in Strathern (1972), and also more 
recently in Strathern and Stewart (2011). Our point here is not to contest 
this issue, but to extend the argument into considerations of practice, 
while not denying the focal character of primary kin terms as Scheffler, 
and Shapiro following in the same vein, have done. We acknowledge here 
the arguments put forward by Shapiro in the present volume. Our own 
observations here about the importance of practice are also in effect 
fundamental to the topic of kinship at large.
The overall theoretical question nevertheless remains. Is there an essence of 
kinship that is culturally universal, and does it reside in the recognition 
of sexual and procreative relationships and the ties that derive from these 
as  they are culturally defined? Our approach to this general issue is to 
deflect it further again, not just into the character of social practice but into 
the domain of linguistic practice. This can easily be justified by pointing 
out that the classic arguments have revolved around the interpretation 
of linguistic usages, specifically in relation to kin. The arguments 
have been all about semantics or meanings, and since the question of 
meaning is complex and disputed, it is little wonder that disagreements 
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remain. Two further linguistic approaches are available. One is linguistic 
pragmatics. How do people use terms in practice? Clearly, they extend 
them in ways that suit their own pursuits of interests. Clearly, also, this 
cannot be done with total fluidity. Pragmatics require plausibility, and 
this means that some semantic principle has to be invoked to justify the 
usage. Gender, age, locality, marriage, or religion may all be called into 
play, leading to or resulting from ties of exchange. Indeed, for Papua New 
Guinea, exchange is certainly as fundamental a principle as any other, so 
it must be reckoned with in any consideration of the bases for sociality 
as well as the manipulation of these bases by aspiring leaders. Generally, 
then, contemporary ethnographic analyses of kinship as a topic have been 
guided by an exposition of cultural pragmatics.
Another resource from linguistic theory can be brought to bear on the 
problem in hand. This has to do with the meaning of the term meaning 
itself. There are endless arguments about this, implicating both philosophers 
and linguists. In general, these debates mirror the fundamental matters at 
stake in kinship theory. Do words have a core referential meaning which 
then can be extended by means of transfers or extensions, including to 
the realm that we call metaphor? This, again perhaps with an English 
language bias, might appear to be a common-sense statement. In fact, 
the whole idea of a metaphor, something carried over from one domain 
into another, tends to suggest this stance although the technical sense 
of the term ‘extension’ in kinship analysis is not identical with the term 
‘metaphor’. The one-to-one correspondence between words and things 
they ostensibly name in the world of observation and experience fails to 
take into account the much greater human capacity to build complex 
meanings through imagination and association. As one theorist, Robert 
Logan, put it, words can be ‘strange attractors’ of meanings (2007: 45–50). 
Also, as they are tools to explore human experience, words and the larger 
utterances in which they appear, as in poetry and song, acquire a power 
that goes far beyond their ability to name things. These observations 
suggest, in turn, that a tendency to accrete rich and complex meanings 
around at least certain terms in a given language is fundamental to the 
development of language itself as a consistent part of experience. This 
observation, then, can be applied to kinship terms. Such an observation 
in no way invalidates the notion of elementary meanings of kin terms, 
but it does suggest that because of their fundamental primary significance 
they lend themselves to productive extensions, and that their full range of 
meanings resides in such extensions as well as in an elementary referential 
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or naming grid of references. Again, this does not amount to a denial 
of the theory of focal meanings for kin terms as classificatory devices. 
It does indicate that the extensions beyond such a focality are also socially 
important. This is not a trivial point, because it enables us to place debates 
about meaning in a broader context of action.
This chapter is not intended as a detailed exposition of the kin terms in 
a given societal area, such as among the Melpa speakers of Mount Hagen 
in Papua New Guinea. This kind of exposition was made in an earlier 
publication (Strathern 1980a). Nevertheless, we give here a few examples 
of how the analytical scheme we have outlined can be applied. We take 
the Melpa terms that are glossed under the rubric of ‘father’ (summarised 
in Strathern and Stewart 2011: 185). The basic reference term involved is 
tepam, while the address form is ta. In order to distinguish an ‘immediate’ 
sense of the term from other usages, the qualifier ingk, glossed as ‘genuine’, 
‘true’, can be added, in a general contrast with tepam mburlukna, ‘backside 
father’, referring to same-generation collateral male kin on the father’s side. 
Mburlukna thus operates as a modifier in conjunction with ingk. These 
two terms form an implicit semantic pair, mutually defined. So far, this 
clearly corresponds to the ‘focal-meaning’ theory of kin terms, as well as the 
theory of extensions. The extensions depend on the wider social structure 
of subclans and clans within which social relations modelled on the focal 
usages are extended. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that the extension of 
the term to lineal male collaterals in no way implies that the relationship 
of the propositus or hypothetical ego is the same with all of those classified 
in this way. Equally, however, the sheer fact of such a classification implies 
some basis of solidarity that is marked out, or made available, through 
the terminology itself. The classification lays out a determinate area of 
potentiality, demarcated from other arenas of the kin universe. From 
a sociocentric standpoint what is significant is that all those included in 
the class are tepamal, ‘fathers’ (in the plural form), and can be invoked or 
referred to as such, without any necessity for cited genealogical reckoning 
(although this may be known, if not to ego, then to others, and may be 
detailed in accordance with the situation). From an egocentric viewpoint, 
this class of tepamal also refers to a field of objective potentiality within 
which subjective affiliations can be sought or may be brought into play by 
the fathers/tepamal themselves. Obligations to help, support, or protect in 
warfare, disputes, or exchanges go with the classification. The extensions 
are cognitively ‘real’, and from this perspective they are important in the 
sociocentric context of clan relationships. The ingk classification, equally, 
125
3 . ACTION, METAPHOR AND ExTENSIONS IN KINSHIP
is fundamental from the egocentric viewpoint. The overall logic has to be 
found in the combination of the egocentric and sociocentric domains, 
and it is this logic that provides the grounding for ‘kinship in action’ 
(the title of our book, Strathern and Stewart 2011).
Our observations here are founded on a detailed knowledge of social life 
and the place of kinship in it in the Melpa (Hagen) area, dating from 1964 
to very recent times. They are not impressionistic or fleeting suggestions. 
When we write that kinship includes both egocentric and sociocentric 
aspects, we are also following in a tradition of writing that recognises these 
two domains of usage. However, we note that sociocentric usages among 
the Melpa are also founded on putative procreative relationships centring 
on ancestral figures.
Further classifications present other dimensions of complexity. Tepam as 
a reference term can also be applied to MZH, normatively outside of the 
lineal clan relationship. How is this to be explained? The first example 
we gave depends on an equation in egocentric terms of F with FB; this 
further example rests on an equation between female siblings, such that 
M = MZ, and also F = MH, so we arrive at the proposition MZH = F. 
This is pure classification. In action terms MZH does not carry the same 
weight as F or FB; but again it marks out a field of potentiality, based as 
much on the presumed solidarity of sisters as on anything else. In essence, 
when we assess the social significance of these kinship classifications we 
have to go to the sphere of action in order to find the answers. This may be 
an obvious point, but it has to be borne in mind as a counter to analyses 
based purely on linguistic classifications.
Address terms present another level of cultural complexity. The term ta is 
used reciprocally between father and son and between father and daughter. 
The address usages, signalling immediacy and intimacy of relationship, 
express the sameness of the relationship with the father among brothers 
and sisters, while the reference term is geared to differences in inheritance 
and succession associated with gender. In addition, however, the fact that 
the address terms are reciprocal points up another cultural value: the 
tendency to pair units. Ta indicates the shared relationship between father 
and child. As an extra marker the father may say kang ta or ambokla ta 
(boy-ta, girl-ta), and the child may say wuö ta (man-ta). What, then, is the 
focal meaning of ta? It seems to be the relationship F-Child rather than 
an elementary kin-type (such as F or S). The reciprocal address term for 
M-Child is ma (again, specifiable as ambokla ma or kang ma). Taking this 
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into account reveals something important about the way the Melpa 
think of kin terms, which can be recognised only if we free ourselves 
from the assumption that the elementary units must always be markers 
belonging to a universal analytic language. Over and above this point 
there is the fact of divergence between address and reference contexts. 
The reference contexts do lend themselves to being parsed via single kin-
type categories. Two separate modes of classification thus operate within 
what we delimit as the kinship system. Moreover, as we have noted, the 
equations between kin types must not be taken as expressing complete 
identifications. Finally, here, ‘father’ terms are inflected also in terms of 
sibling order. Tepam komone is ‘elder father’, that is FeB, and tepam akele is 
‘junior father’, that is FyB. The overall outcome of these explorations into 
what we have deliberately picked out as very obvious aspects of the wider 
kin term system is that by this means it is evident both that focal meanings 
are present and important and that extensions are readily made and follow 
a grid that is stamped with wider structural relations. As well, there is the 
somewhat more radical point that Melpa address terms signalling shared 
intimacy or closures of relationship must be understood as elementary 
reciprocal pairs.
There is another way we can put all this, also derived from linguistic 
theory and its application to discussions of ritual action. Recent theories 
of ritual have concentrated on performativity and efficacy. Ritual actions 
that have performative effects have to be seen as comparable to what 
the philosopher J.L. Austin called ‘illocutionary statements’ (Austin 
1962). Austin classified linguistic statements—and note here that we 
are discussing statements, not isolated lexemes or ‘words’—as constative, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary. Constative statements were, for him, 
simple statements about the world, like referential namings. Illocutionary 
statements, by contrast, created situations in the world by their social 
performativity. It turns out that these kinds of statements tend to be 
important because of being constitutive of ritual actions. Statements in 
rituals, as well as nonverbal actions, create or affirm social realities and 
changes in these realities. Initiation rituals that confer a new status on 
people are iconic examples of this process. Perlocutionary statements 
are ones that have further consequences beyond, or separately from, 
illocutionary effects. They relate to possibly unintended but implicated 
results of statements.
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Perlocutionary effects are examples of the complex consequences of 
actions. In Austin’s terms, the phrase ‘You’re fired’ is an illocutionary 
statement, but the perlocutionary effects of such a statement may include 
a protest strike by a workers’ union or the suicide of the person who is 
fired. Similarly a statement such as ‘The argument of your paper is wrong’ 
may result unintentionally in provoking enduring enmity or retaliation.
We can now apply a version of this tripartite classification of statements 
to the question of kinship terms. Some usages of terms may be simply 
constative, statements of a perceived or asserted naming of self-evident 
realities. These usages would correspond to what have been called ‘focal’ 
meanings. Other contexts of usage may have an illocutionary dimension. 
In other words, by naming someone as a kinsperson, they creatively make 
them so in the local context. As with all ritualised usages, this will work 
only if an authorisation of it is present in the overall context; but the 
statement itself is constitutive. For example, in certain field contexts, 
fieldworkers are defined as kin once they are taken in by a family. (This does 
not, of course, mean that they are confused with procreative kin.) 
An illocutionary moment occurs when a kin term is used and establishes 
this relationship. Kin terms in practice then operate across a constative-
illocutionary continuum. Perlocutionary effects follow, because exchange 
relationships flow from such illocutionary moments. Interestingly, such 
moments are ritually displayed in the Mount Hagen society among local 
people themselves most strongly when two people decide to adopt food 
names, because a special ritual must be performed in order to make this 
relationship come into being, perhaps in addition to an existing kinship 
tie (see again Strathern 1977 for details of these remarkable practices 
of ritualised identity creation).
By bringing to bear these concepts from linguistic theory, then—
pragmatics, theories of meaning, and the theory of illocutionary 
statements—we can situate arguments about kin terms in a way that 
is helpful and reformulates or adds to arguments about primary versus 
extended meanings. A virtue of this deployment of linguistic theory is 
that it resonates with a theory of kinship in action, the viewpoint we 
advocated in our book on kinship (Strathern and Stewart 2011). Kinship 
in action is not simply about meanings of terms, but about how people 
use these terms for vital purposes in practical lives. This approach both 
decentres kinship studies away from an exclusive concern with kin terms 
and recentres kinship as social action at the heart of ethnographic work, 
so that kinship is as kinship does, to adapt an expression (‘handsome is as 
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handsome does’). (For further instances of our examinations of issues in 
kinship analysis see Strathern 1972, 1973, 1980a, 1980b; Strathern and 
Stewart 2000a, 2000b, 2004b, 2006, 2010a, 2010b.)
Maurice Godelier’s book on The Metamorphoses of Kinship is another sign of 
renewed interest in the topic of kinship studies (Godelier 2011). Godelier 
seeks to revisit all the classic sites of debate and to add some reflections 
on the state of kinship relations in developed, urbanised social contexts 
in the contemporary world. His work takes us away from the negative 
and deconstructive concerns of David Schneider’s writings and back into 
discussion of major issues around the world, including the relationship 
between terminologies of kinship and social action. In a work of this scope, 
both the overall approach and the analysis of detailed cases are bound to 
be contested. Our own viewpoint enters into this domain from the side, 
as it were. We argue that to understand how kin terminologies work in 
practice, we must understand them in terms of general linguistic theories 
of meaning and also in terms of theories of social action. A combination 
of these viewpoints leads us to infer that kinship implies both a set of focal 
meanings and an important plasticity of usages in practice, modelled on 
the flexibility of social practice. Flexibility of the applications of meanings, 
in other words, goes hand in hand with the flexibility of practice, while 
such flexibility has to be modelled on a certain semantic grid that governs 
the extension of meanings. The argument between extensionism versus 
categories can therefore be reformulated so as to illuminate how social life 
operates. Instead of pitting these viewpoints against each other, we need 
to combine them into a single empirical and explanatory model of what 
kinship is all about, that is, linguistic and social practice.
Kinship studies, as we have noted at the outset, also began as a kind of 
handmaiden to discussions about social evolution. The approach we have 
advocated here resituates kinship in a kind of evolutionary context based 
on language. Evolutionary theorists such as Logan (2007: 241–51) have 
suggested the idea of the ‘extended mind’ as the means whereby shared 
language usages could have contributed to the emergence of human 
communities. Since this extension is an extension beyond each individual 
mind, to which each such mind contributes and from which it draws, it 
is clear that extension as such is an important cognitive basis for social 
life. (Our usage here is of course not the same as Scheffler’s technically 
impeccable use of this term, but it does help to draw out the broad 
significance of such an idea.) It would seem highly appropriate, then, that 
one of the dimensions in which such an important extension could take 
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place would be in the realm of kinship. In other words, the extensions of 
kinship terms were probably crucially instrumental in the evolution of the 
cognitive basis of solidarity in human communities—which is why the 
idiom of kinship continues to carry symbolic power in social rhetorics 
of unity and shared identity.
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Should I Stay or Should I Go? 
Hunter-Gatherer Networking 
Through Bilateral Kin
Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer
Introduction
Mobility and shifting kin associations structure a range of subsistence, 
sharing, and cooperative support networks in traditional human societies. 
Both traditional ethnographic interests in familial alliance and behavioural 
ecology’s comparative focus view postmarital residence as fundamental in 
determining kin associations and group composition. Despite the long 
history of interest in environmental and behavioural factors that influence 
postmarital residence, results from cross-cultural research differ in their 
characterisation of predominant patterns and causal relationships between 
environment, social organisation, coalitionary activities, and residence 
(Ember 1978; Ember and Ember 1971, 1972; Marlowe 2004; Otterbein 
and Marlowe 2005; Quinlan and Quinlan 2007; Rodseth et al. 1991).
In the spirit of Harold Scheffler’s perspective that kinship stems from 
biological relatedness (Scheffler 2001), we see the interactions between 
individuals in Pumé forager communities to be constructed primarily 
according to genetic distance and secondarily through self-interested 
participation in cooperative subsistence efforts. We support the view that 
facultative adaptations of kinship systems are always based in recognition 
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that they primarily derive from and describe genealogical kinship. 
Kinship classifications are not cultural constructs unrelated to descent 
and genetic kinship as has been suggested by Schneider (1972, 1984). 
The extension of these biological terms as facultative kin (that fictively 
assign individuals’ relationships beyond their actual genetic relationship to 
others) creates relationships that are then subject to behavioural and social 
expectations determined by the roles of biological kin. Far from denying 
the importance of descent, such facultative links use biology to structure 
the many uniquely human cooperative behaviours in relation to the kinds 
of self-interested interactions of both close and distant kin. Living with 
an array of recognised close and more distant kin is one way that humans 
structure the cooperative behaviours that are central to our species’ unique 
adaptations. Our perspective in this chapter looks at the advantages that 
bilateral kinship systems have in providing maximally extensive familial 
support networks for hunter-gatherer adaptations. This longitudinal study 
of camp associations among mobile, foraging Pumé of Venezuela permits 
investigation of how long-term residential patterns compare with other 
hunter-gatherer groups living in contrasting environments.
Hunter-gatherer residence
Distinguishing how humans use kin associations may also help 
understand how human life history and complex cooperative behaviours 
evolved as distinct and highly successful strategies. One important 
source of these cooperative activities is through elective membership in a 
community that provides alliances and fall-back options based on kinship. 
In many group-living animals, including primates, individuals emigrate at 
sexual maturity and join new communities. Dispersal patterns lay much 
of the foundation for sociality and are important in the formation of both 
kin and nonkin associations. In humans much debate has surrounded 
postmarital residence and identifying whether a single pattern typifies 
hunter-gatherers. While human dispersal was traditionally portrayed as 
being male-biased, the model of the patrilocal band (Radcliffe-Brown 
1930; Service 1962; Steward 1955) has long been questioned (Ember 
1975; Helm 1965; Hiatt 1962; Lee 1972, 1979; Lee and DeVore 
1968; Meggitt 1965; Murdock 1949; Shapiro 1973; Turnbull 1965). 
Matrilocality generally has been considered less prevalent among hunter-
gatherers (Walker et al. 2013) and is associated with particular activities 
resulting in male absenteeism, such as external warfare (Divale  1974; 
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Ember and Ember 1971), long distance hunting (Perry 1989) and reliance 
on female subsistence (Scelza and Bliege Bird 2008). A number of recent 
case studies have pointed out that residence patterns among foragers 
are flexible, facultative and may vary across the life course (Blurton 
Jones et al. 2005; Marlowe 2010). Several recent cross-cultural studies 
that synthesise much of the comparative data on hunter-gatherers have 
highlighted the importance of bilocal and multilocal residence (Alvarez 
2004; Costopoulos 2005; Gray and Costopoulos 2006; Kelly 1995; 
Marlowe 2004, 2005). The results from these general analyses dispute 
many earlier expectations that most hunter-gatherers can be characterised 
by sex-biased postmarital residence (Cavalli-Sforza 1997; Ember 1978; 
Ember and Ember 1971; Rodseth et al. 1991) and are a  provocative 
contrast to traditional perceptions of hunter-gatherer social organisation. 
Cross-cultural studies
While cross-cultural studies are critical to uncovering large-scale 
patterning, they also have limitations. The cross-cultural databases are 
derived from ethnographies in which postmarital residence classifications 
are taken primarily from interviews and culturally stated marriage 
rules rather than from observation. These norms often do not account 
for intragroup variation in postmarital residence that arises to cope 
with diverse environmental and demographic conditions in traditional 
societies. Informants often describe current conditions that may not 
include temporal histories or account for lifetime changes in residence. 
Because cross-cultural comparisons depend on aggregate data, they 
necessarily overemphasise cultural norms and underrepresent both 
individual and group variation. The coding of ethnographic case studies 
for use in standard comparative samples (Binford 2001; Murdock 1949; 
Murdock and White 1980) involves further abstraction from sources that 
contain inherent differences in data collection methods, thoroughness of 
ethnographic observation and other sampling idiosyncrasies.
To balance the challenges posed by cross-cultural comparisons, 
longitudinal and individual-level data provide an important temporal 
view on marriage dynamics at a time depth unavailable in aggregate 
comparisons. They also are able to capture variability in postmarital 
residence arrangements both within groups and across the life course. 
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The combination of large-scale comparisons across multiple societies 
with focused individual-level longitudinal data is crucial in reexamining 
hunter-gatherer social organisation.
In this chapter we compare postmarital residence patterns among mobile 
Pumé foragers of Venezuela in order to investigate the prevalence of sex-
biased and nonsex-biased residence using detailed data spanning 25 years. 
We first situate the problem of postmarital residence and discuss why 
we expect bilateral kin networks to be key for mobile hunter-gatherers. 
Analyses using the longitudinal Pumé data demonstrate a strong residence 
pattern of natolocality. The discussion turns to environmental influences 
on residence patterns and how different hunter-gatherer mobility can 
accomplish similar ends in maximising bilateral kin affiliations compared 
to sex-biased residence. The Pumé example emphasises ways that men and 
women may strategise opportunities to retain extended kin access in the 
face of stochastic demographic variation in a small-scale foraging society.
Human dispersal and postmarital residence
Historical background
Humans exhibit a broad range of dispersal and postmarital residence 
patterns. This is reflected in the rich anthropological terminology 
describing residential affiliations, social assortment options and the 
obligations and opportunities they provide. While many aspects 
of reproductive behaviour have become important areas of human 
behavioural ecology research (Rodseth et al. 1991), kinship and residence 
studies have languished with less attention. Although a range of hunter-
gatherer behaviours formerly characterised as determined by static cultural 
norms (i.e. sharing, marriage, cooperation) have been reevaluated using 
behaviour observation methods, perspectives on residence patterns have 
remained within the grip of assumed conformity with normative practice.
Early hunter-gatherer studies (Radcliffe-Brown 1930; Service 1962, 1966) 
and some kinship studies appealed to by researchers seeking broad cross-
cultural regularities among all hunter-gatherer populations (i.e. Lévi-
Strauss 1949) emphasised patrilocal organisation as the dominant form of 
social organisation that structured territoriality and exogamous marriage. 
Interest in modern hunter-gatherers during the 1960s challenged this 
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assumption and recognised that many groups maintain very flexible social 
organisation that emphasises association with bilateral kin (Helm 1965; 
Hiatt 1962; Lee and Devore 1968; Turnbull 1965). More recent cross-
cultural surveys emphasise the importance of multilocality rather than 
sex-biased dispersal among hunter-gatherers. Unfortunately the exchanges 
(Costopoulos 2005; Gray and Costopoulos 2006; Marlowe 2005; 
Otterbein and Marlowe 2005) following Frank Marlowe’s (2004) cross-
cultural study of postmarital residence focused on sampling and the use of 
the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, rather than on his demonstration of 
the predominance of multilocality among foragers. Marlowe’s approach 
is a valuable way to try and extract the dynamics of residential variation 
from data collected under assumptions of strict and static cultural norms 
of residential behaviour.
Despite these reanalyses, patrilocality remains a common characterisation 
of foragers (Cant and Johnstone 2008; Cavalli-Sforza 1997; Di Fiore and 
Rendall 1994; Ember 1975, 1978; Otterbein and Marlowe 2005; Rodseth 
et al. 1991). For example, a number of recent genetic studies that address 
residence patterns assume that patrilocality is common among hunter-
gatherers. Patterns of sex-biased dispersal appear evident based on greater 
diversity in mtDNA compared with low variance in Y-chromosome 
expression (Destro-Bisol et al. 2004a; Oota et al. 2001; Seielstad et al. 
1998). Some results are ambiguous (Langergraber et al. 2007; Kumar 
et al. 2006; Wilder et al. 2004) and interpretations of patrilocality may 
not consider whether potentially highly differential male reproductive 
success compared to lower female variance could produce similar patterns 
(however, see Destro-Bisol et al. 2004a).
While kin often are implicated in these interactions (food sharing, 
cooperation, allocare, resource and labour transfers), few quantitative 
data are available for postmarital residence patterns that form the basis 
of these kin associations. Among any foraging population, longitudinal 
observational data are necessary to capture both the variation in camp 
memberships and long-term kin associations that can be evaluated as 
potential strategies of cooperation with relatives. Although interview 
questioning can elicit stated preferences for matrilocal or patrilocal 
residence, it is unclear whether this supports the concept of cultural 
norms or describes situational and variable kin associations. We feel that 
greater time investment is needed to collect empirical data on residential 
patterns.
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Bilateral kin networks
Comparative data suggest that many foraging societies practise situational 
flexibility in the kin with whom an individual or family lives (Alvarez 
2004; Marlowe 2004). Viewed from both male and female perspectives, 
a residence pattern that maintains access to bilateral kin is advantageous 
in many ways. In the absence of compelling reasons to associate more 
closely with virilocal or uxorilocal kin, or for one sex to preferentially 
disperse from their natal communities, bilocal residence creates the 
broadest base of potential kin interaction for mobile foragers. In addition 
to providing opportunities for interactions with parents of both husband 
and wife, bilaterality broadens access to collateral kin—siblings, in-laws, 
cousins, nieces, nephews, and other more distant kin referent to both 
members of the couple (Silberbauer 1972). While in some societies close 
association with certain kin may augment potential conflicts (between 
brothers, or sisters, or in reference to downwardly directed resources from 
wives’ or husbands’ parents), there is no a priori reason to expect that 
conflict is a more important determinant of residence than opportunities 
for cooperation.
In some societies, preferred lineality is an important means of recruiting 
or obliging particular kin to cooperate (Alvard 2003; Alvard and Nolin 
2002). Because lineality incorporates individuals beyond closely related 
kin (Dunbar 2008), it can bring large numbers of individuals together 
where certain tasks require articulation of larger work groups or material 
capital than a nuclear or extended family can muster (Donald 1997; 
Kan 1989; Mauss 1967; Oberg 1973). This is pertinent in large village 
communities, with greater resident populations than are represented by 
most mobile foragers’ camps. In small-scale populations with smaller or 
changing resident membership, preferred lineality would limit the number 
of potential collaborators whereas bilaterality is maximally inclusive of kin 
(Alvard 2002; Ember 1975). This is one reason why the characterisation 
of hunter-gatherers as predominantly patrilineal or matrilineal has been 
challenged (Blurton Jones et al. 2005; Hiatt 1962; Lee 1972, 1979; 
Marlowe 2004, 2010; Scelza and Bliege Bird 2008; Turnbull 1965; 
Woodburn 1972). 
The flexibility of bilateral residential organisation may be especially 
important in small-scale societies where stochastic variation in birth and 
survivorship can result in skewed age and sex distributions (Ember 1975). 
For example, between 1990 and 1993, in one Savanna Pumé community 
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short-term asymmetries in birth and survival rates resulted in four boys 
between the ages of zero and seven, in contrast to 17 girls between these 
same ages (Greaves 1997a). Bilateral residence options permit a facultative 
means to adjust uneven age and sex ratios, either to balance production 
and consumption ratios or to facilitate mating opportunities. Maximising 
rather than biasing potential kin association may be especially relevant 
for foraging economies where subsistence often changes throughout the 
year, and oscillations in residential organisation can respond to changes in 
labour organisation and sharing patterns.
Bilateral kin affiliation also can permit greater potential flexibility 
in residence. In many groups of hunter-gatherers, parents and other 
relatives help support young couples, who may not yet be mature food 
producers (Bogin 1999; Hrdy 2005; Kaplan 1996; Kramer 2008; Kramer 
and Greaves 2010; Kramer, Greaves and Ellison 2009). Rather than 
restricting access to kin, bilateral association can make it possible for 
couples to situationally locate with the kin of either spouse in response to 
demographic changes in family composition. Parents also are expected 
to be self-interested in maintaining potential relationships with both their 
sons and daughters. Parents may manipulate the potential mate pools for 
their children by choosing residences with the highest number (or value) 
of potential mates. These examples are far from exhaustive, but they 
illustrate the benefits of bilateral kin associations. It is not clear whether 
multilocal residential organisation causes such flexibility or reflects extant 
practices. However, situationally responsive kinship options in relation to 
subsistence, marriage, or labour can provide hunter-gatherers with more 
diverse means of confronting environmental variability. In the Lamalera 
example (sedentary Indonesian fisher-traders) a large population is required 
to maintain diverse roles within a unilineal system that structures food 
access through stringently fixed rules of participation and rewards (Alvard 
2003; Alvard and Nolin 2002). Such conditions are rarely encountered in 
small populations of hunter-gatherers (Alvard 2002).
Given the potential benefits of residential flexibility in small-scale foraging 
populations, we test the prediction that Pumé postmarital residence 
will be minimally sex-biased. Although early ethnographic descriptions 
identified the Pumé as generally matrilocal (Leeds 1964; Mitrani 1975, 
1988; Orobitg Canal 1998; Petrullo 1939), we anticipate that sex-biased 
residence will be less common than bilateral association. The Pumé 
are mobile foragers. In contrast to known associations with sex-biased 
residence, the Pumé have a general equality of male and female dietary 
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contributions, food excesses are uncommon, long-distance hunting 
is rare, opportunities for heritable property or status are minimal; there is 
no evidence of coercion or violence toward women and no institutional 
aggressive conflicts with other Pumé or non-Pumé. Additionally, the 
Pumé live in small groups of four to 13 extended families and are subject 
to stochastic variation in age and sex distribution. Given these conditions, 
we expect that bilateral affiliations will be maintained either through 
multilocal or natolocal postmarital residence.
Methods
Study population
The Pumé are indigenous to the low plains, or llanos, in the western 
portion of the Orinoco basin of west central Venezuela. Recent indigenous 
census figures from Venezuela (INE 2001, 2011) significantly over count 
many native groups because of changing recognition of indigenous rights 
following constitutional changes under the Chavez regime. We focus on 
the Savanna Pumé, who are mobile foragers with an estimated population 
of 800 individuals (Gragson 1989; Greaves 1997a, 1997b, 2006). The 
Savanna Pumé are a subset of the much larger Pumé ethnic and language 
group (OCEI 1985: 38, 1995: 32), which also includes sedentary 
horticultural villages and more acculturated towns. The Pumé linguistically 
recognise these three subsistence distinctions in their population.
The llanos are an extensive hyper-seasonal savanna, with approximately 
85 per cent of the annual precipitation falling in the wet season from 
June to November. These grasslands are associated with very low diversity 
and densities of terrestrial fauna. Extreme rainfall variation dramatically 
alters the flora and fauna during each season. The wet season is associated 
with low protein returns (mean = 2 kg/hunter/trip), substantial reliance 
on wild tubers (mean = 12 kg/woman/trip) and small inputs of cultivated 
manioc. Food availability increases during the dry season when men 
focus on aquatic resources. Although the mean fishing returns per trip 
are similar to hunting, more men fish each day, some men fish every day, 
multiple fishing trips by individuals are common on some days, and most 
boys contribute equivalent returns to adult efforts from this low-skill 
foraging activity. Tubers also are an important dry season food. Women, 
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and a few men, collect large amounts of feral mangos (mean = 27 kg/
woman/trip). Both male and female-contributed foods are critical to the 
diet and widely shared.
The Savanna Pumé move residential camps throughout the year in 
response to seasonal subsistence and variation in water availability. For 
example, Russell Greaves followed 11 main camp moves over 24 months 
between 1990 and 1993 (Greaves 1997a) and we identified six main 
residential moves for the same community over the 12-month period of 
the dry season of 2004 through the dry season of 2005. Camp moves 
are associated with changes in the spatial configuration of houses and 
members within the community. Despite these frequent changes in 
family and individual distributions across different camps, the overall 
camp population remains quite stable. Small groups of individuals may 
leave these residential camps and establish temporary camps for a few 
days to a couple of weeks for focused subsistence activities or raw material 
exploitation. Small, short-term fishing camps are particularly common 
during the dry season. Temporary camps can include both spouses’ 
kin, less closely related individuals with close subsistence or labour 
relationships, or other opportunistic arrangements. Membership in these 
temporary camps had few regular associations, except that husbands and 
wives always accompany each other. While we refer to these small, short-
term camps in the discussion, we use the residence patterns of the main 
camps from each of the two seasons for the purpose of the analyses.
Pumé kinship
The Pumé language (Pumé mai) is usually considered to be a language 
isolate  (Mosonyi 1975; Obregón Muñoz 1981; Perez de Vega 1960). 
It  may  have been related to the now extinct Esmeralda or Otomaco 
languages (Hervás y Panduro 1979; Leeds 1964; Loukotka and Wilbert 
1968), but it is completely unrelated to the Guahiboan (Arawak) languages 
of the dominant ethnic groups of the Venezuelan and Colombian 
llanos. Some linguists have suggested that Pumé may be classified as 
macro-Chibchan (Key 1979; Loukotka and Wilbert 1968; Tovar and 
Tovar 1961), Jivaroan (Key 1979), or might be similar to some Andean 
languages (Key  1979). Most discussions of the language affiliation of 
Pumé are simply repeating earlier classifications (de Carrocera 1980; Rey 
Fajardo 1979; Perez de Vega 1960). Vincenzo Petrullo (1939) erroneously 
reported the existence of moieties, a point refuted by Anthony Leeds 
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(1964). Philippe Mitrani (1988: 188–95, tabla 2, figuras 1–3) presents 
the clearest outlines of Pumé kinship as reported by horticultural River 
Pumé. These terms are not very different from those employed by the 
hunting-and-gathering Savanna Pumé. Most researchers (excepting 
Gragson and Greaves) have only reported kinship terminology as a static 
descriptive system, but have not had opportunities to study nuances of its 
use. This is because investigators did not conduct their research using the 
Pumé language and spent little time in the field. All information about 
Pumé kinship terminology presented in this paper is based on research 
performed solely in the Pumé language over the 30 months of cumulative 
fieldwork.
Pumé kinship has been identified as bifurcate merging (Mitrani 1988), 
a Dravidian form of Dakota-Iroquois classification with some additional 
generational distinctions of ego’s grandparents referent to parental sex. 
Dravidian systems are associated with kinship that is not matrilineal 
or patrilineal among indigenous Venezuelan populations including the 
Pumé, although this is not universal in other parts of South America 
(J. Shapiro 1984). The Pumé also distinguish birth-order age differences 
among siblings and parallel cousins that permit checking of relative ages 
within our samples. They do not recognise lineages, clans, or moieties 
(Leeds 1964). 
The extension of Pumé kinship terms to parents’ same-sex siblings does not 
indicate unilineal descent, as Warren Shapiro (1995) has demonstrated. 
As has been noted for many traditional societies (Scheffler 1970, 1972, 
1973; Shapiro 2008 Chapter 1), the Pumé apply the term ‘true’ or ‘real’ 
(tamó) to distinguish biological mothers and fathers from parallel uncles 
and aunts, to name full and half siblings as distinct from parallel cousins, 
and to discriminate parents’ biological children from parallel nieces and 
nephews. The qualifier is rarely applied to distinguish close biological kin 
such as aunts and uncles (or other ascendant or descendant relatives) who 
are siblings of parents from those of more distantly related individuals 
who share merged kinship-term designations.
Kinship is the crucial description of social relationships among the Pumé. 
The Pumé only use kin terms to address each other. No indigenous names 
or nicknames were encountered in our work with the Savanna Pumé. 
Names of adults are used only for interactions with outsiders. They are 
derived from Pumé adaptations of Spanish names, but the Pumé do not 
use Spanish or indigenous surnames. Among the Savanna Pumé, only kin 
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terms are employed both within the community and in reference to the 
normal spheres of interactions with individuals in other communities. 
Only men and women who are rarely encountered (less than once every 
few years) are occasionally referred to by both their kin term and Spanish 
names for clarification. Pumé use names only in reference to children 
under the ages of approximately 11 years. We believe this is because 
the kin terms for nephews, nieces and grandchildren contain minimal 
distinctions of these young people. 
The Pumé daily discuss individuals they identify only by kin terms, each of 
which could equally apply to dozens of individuals resident within a camp 
and hundreds of people in other communities. Geographic residence of 
the person being described helps clarify whom the kin term refers to. 
Another way that these references may be distinctive is that speakers 
use terms appropriate to the ego-centric kin network of the listeners. 
The convergence of terms in a discussion helps to identify one particular 
person within the web of networks represented by a particular audience.
Also common in many other kinship systems (Scheffler 1965, 1972), 
Pumé occasionally use a diminutive form of ‘mother’ (literally ‘little 
mother’) to reference ego’s biological mother’s sisters (MZ). This is not 
necessarily an age distinction among women. The ‘little mother’ term is 
occasionally extended to co-wives of ego’s father, even when they are not 
ego’s MZ. However, the meaning of the term is clearly anchored in its use 
as a linguistic alternative to identifying all of mother’s sisters as ‘mother’. 
No comparable term distinguishes male kin. Although older and younger 
siblings are used to identify ego’s brothers, sisters and parallel cousins, 
there is no birth-order terminology. 
As in many other cultures (Lowie 1920; Marshall 1976; Needham 1954), 
Pumé women often are referred to within camp using a teknonym, 
although the term does not literally translate as ‘mother of x (child)’. 
These teknonyms incorporate the name of a mother’s most recent child’s 
Spanish-based name. As with the ‘little mother’ term applied to MZ, no 
such teknonymic identification of ‘father of x’ is employed for men. These 
kin conventions make greater distinctions between women than men. 
This was initially thought to reflect a matrilocal residential focus where 
potentially larger female family units result in more diverse referent terms.
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This diversity in reference to women is an interesting contrast to the lack 
of such terms for men. In addition to their potential use in matrilocal 
residence, such markers used only to distinguish women might be 
expected in societies with high levels of recognised infidelity and paternal 
uncertainty. However, among the Savanna Pumé we have not identified 
any instances of acknowledged or suspected adultery. This is not due 
to prudery by the Pumé. Topics of social, sexual, or bodily functions 
are readily discussed by the Pumé and no apparent secret knowledge is 
held outside of the public sphere. Such linguistic conventions may be 
a remnant of past social organisation, with comparable levels of infidelity 
to those found among many tropical South American groups (Gregor 
1977; Hill and Hurtado 1996). There are some suggestions that the Pumé 
are a population that moved into their current territory in the llanos of 
Venezuela from another region, possibly as refugee former agriculturalists 
(Leeds 1961; Greaves and Kramer 2014). However, aside from genetic 
differences (blood group, Layrisse et al. 1961, 1964) and the significant 
linguistic distinctions from the adjacent Guahiboan populations in the 
llanos, no secure data can be brought to address this question of past 
Pumé economics. As noted, we felt that this term diversity might reflect 
matrilocality. Our observational data and additional census data prior to 
Greaves’s initiation of research in 1990 provide a longitudinal view 
to address the question of Pumé postmarital residential associations.
Marriage and postmarital residence
Our goal in this chapter is to address how kinship is used in relationship to 
cooperation and subsistence in a challenging environment. To understand 
how the Pumé live in relation to kin networks, we use census data collected 
over a 25-year period to look at postmarital residence and long-term data 
on camp membership. This allows us to document whether community 
associations represent shifting or consistent access to bilateral kin, or are 
biased towards living with particular kin. We explore how mobility, camp 
membership and relatedness among Savanna Pumé foragers demonstrate 
ways that hunter-gatherer populations maximise obligations across broad 
kinship networks. We contrast the Pumé with other well-known hunter-
gatherer groups to show that there is no single pattern in how foragers 
associate with and interact with kin. As with many aspects of modern 
human behaviour and culture, it is the flexibility in recognising the genetic 
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relatedness of other individuals that structures cooperative interactions 
and makes human sociality a highly successful means of surviving in 
diverse environments.
Among the Pumé, marriage is not formalised through ceremony, but is 
socially recognised when a man or woman move in together. Divorce 
likewise is informal and may be instigated by either spouse. Parents and 
other adult kin have major influences on determining initial marriage 
partnerships for young people. However, couples autonomously decide 
whether they remain with their first partners. Subsequent marriages, and 
first marriages of younger men to older women, are initiated by the couple. 
Pumé girls marry and initiate reproduction on average at age 15.5 (Kramer 
2008). Although many girls are betrothed or cohabit before menarche, 
coital relations are not initiated before sexual maturity. We have witnessed 
no examples of coercive sex within the Savanna Pumé, nor heard of any 
such events from informants. Many young men are married either before 
sexual maturity or just after puberty. Young couples often initially live 
in the houses of their parents or other close kin, or in close proximity to 
them. Postmarital residence with a relative does not have a fixed duration. 
Following this period, couples may establish their own houses or live in 
flexible association with younger and older generations. Coresidence of 
opposite-sex siblings and their spouses within a single household also 
has been observed. Household kin associations are commonly re-sorted 
during seasonal camp moves when new structures or house arrangements 
are made that realign former camp arrangements.
Data collection
Detailed census and genealogical data collected between 1982 and 2007 
are used to examine residential patterns among Pumé foragers. Residence 
data are extracted from two primary sources: our own census data and 
Venezuelan indigenous censuses. Greaves conducted censuses and 
genealogical interviews in 1990, 1992–93 and 2005–07. These interviews 
were conducted in the Pumé language. The Pumé do not reckon ages 
but identify life stages associated with specific behaviours (i.e. walking or 
talking for infants, menarche, marriage, or having had a child), height, 
or very broad relative age classes (childhood, maturity, and old age). 
Genealogical data are freely and enthusiastically discussed about both 
living and dead individuals. Interview methods to determine ages and 
kin relations are detailed in previous studies (Kramer 2008; Kramer and 
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Greaves 2007, 2010; Kramer, Greaves and Ellison 2009). Indigenous 
censuses of the Pumé were carried out in 1982, 1986, 1988, 1989 and 
1992 (Lizarralde and Gragson n.d.). These censuses were collected 
primarily in Spanish with the assistance of bilingual River Pumé. We use 
these censuses to extend our residential data and as anchoring events that 
help determine ages for younger individuals. Both sources of census data 
are comparable in including names, ages, genealogical data, identification 
of co-residential units, and past marriage and camp residential histories. 
The time depth of this detailed sample allows us to examine postmarital 
residence, shifts in kin associations and stability in residence throughout 
individual marriages.
Residential data are analysed for two Savanna Pumé villages (Doro Aná and 
Yagurí) that are part of our current demographic and economic research 
and for which we have the highest quality data regarding parentage, 
lateral kinship, and longitudinal data on marriage, reproductive histories, 
ages, subsistence activities and residence. These two communities are 
of equivalent size and have a total population of 164 individuals. The 
sample includes all married adults (105) and all marriages (78) that have 
occurred or were established since censuses were first collected in 1982. 
Both villages interact frequently, have close kin ties, and some migration 
occurs between them as part of postmarital residence. Greaves has worked 
with both communities since 1990. Both villages were established as part 
of a migration to this area approximately 45 years ago from the southern 
portion of Pumé territory near the Cinaruco River.
It is also important to emphasise what we mean by community, village 
and camps in the context of mobile foragers. The terms community and 
village refer interchangeably to an association of people that are relatively 
constant at the scale of the seasonal round. They do not refer to geographic 
or physical locations. Community or village is the group of people that 
moves as a population unit during camp residential moves (sensu Binford 
1980). Within this broad temporal association, there may be seasonal 
household reshuffling within a community and the formation of small 
temporary logistic task groups. Camps identify short-term clusters that 
may contain various members from the larger community. We return to 
the issue of hunter-gatherer mobility in the discussion and interpretation 
of Pumé postmarital residence patterns.
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Data analysis
Postmarital residence is coded in two ways. First, we identify whether an 
individual dispersed from his or her natal village at marriage. Individual-
focused observation is consistent with how ethologists and primatologists 
think about dispersal at sexual maturity. Each adult is coded as dispersing 
or not dispersing from their natal village for their first and all subsequent 
marriages. Because traditional ethnographic classifications are based on 
marriage as the unit of analysis, the second way we record postmarital 
residence is with respect to where a couple resides relative to their 
kin. Marriages are coded as virilocal, uxorilocal, neolocal or natolocal. 
We  use the term virilocal to identify postmarital residence referent to 
the husband’s kin. Uxorilocal refers to postmarital residence in relation 
to the wife’s kin. A marriage is coded as neolocal if the couple moved 
to a  community separate from close kin of either husband or wife. 
In a  small-scale society this does not mean that they would necessarily 
move to a community where they have no kin ties. Neolocality identifies 
couples who disperse away from their natal or closest kin. We use these 
terms both because they are consistent with how Frank Marlowe (2004) 
and others (Ember and Ember 1972) coded their cross-cultural samples 
and because they are a  simplification of the complex anthropological 
vocabulary of postmarital residence in being more inclusive of male and 
female kin associations. A fourth category, natolocal, is added to refer to 
endogamous marriages, where both partners remain within their natal 
community (camp or village) after marriage. Marlowe (2004) notes that 
natolocality is much more difficult to identify from the Standard Cross-
Cultural Sample for foragers than it is for more sedentary societies. This 
is partly because the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample presents a static 
characterisation of societies that cannot systematically address temporal 
changes in residence and because of the more shifting membership among 
many foragers. As noted in Figures 7 and 9, we distinguish natolocality 
referent to foragers’ birth village, not just the household in which that 
individual was born. This modification is necessary among mobile 
foragers as neither houses, locations, nor intrahousehold membership 
remains stable across the changes in camp moves. As an example of how 
to interpret these two coding schemes, if a young woman marries a man 
from another community and he moves to her community, she is coded 
as not dispersing, and the marriage is coded as uxorilocal. However, if she 
married someone within her village, she would be coded as not dispersing 
and the marriage as natolocal.
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Because the Pumé sample has precise information on where couples 
live at different points in their adult lives, we track residential stability 
at two levels. An individual’s residential stability is coded both for 
changes in community affiliation at marriage and for residential moves 
during a marriage union. The latter records multilocality directly from 
longitudinal observation. (The terms multilocality and bilocality are 
used here interchangeably.) Movement within a marriage is recorded for 
a subset of the population (community of Doro Aná) for whom we have 
the most continuous observational data.
We clarify that dispersal and postmarital residence are referent to the 
community in which an individual resided as a juvenile. We refer to this 
as the natal village because in most cases this is the birth village. To reduce 
overcategorisation, natolocality includes individuals who have lived in 
one of the two communities since childhood, but were born elsewhere. In 
the sample, 18 adults (17 per cent) moved into their ‘natal community’ 
as young children. Some of these (33 per cent) moved with their parents 
during the large migration from the south 45 years ago. Most children, 
however, joined the study communities because they were orphaned 
(67 per cent). All computations, descriptive and statistical analyses were 
preformed in SAS version 9.1.3.
Results
Postmarital residence was coded for 105 individuals (55 women and 
50 men) and 78 marriages (Table 1). This included all marriages from 
two Savanna Pumé villages with a total population of 164 individuals. 
For all individuals, 32 per cent of men and 22 per cent of women have 
been married more than once. A nonparametric one-sided Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test shows that while males tend to remarry more 
often, this difference is not significant (z = 1.2006, p = .1149, n = 105). 
Although many young adults have been married more than once, age is 
obviously a significant determinant of times married (model f = 5.58, df 
= 3, p = .0007, n = 105 for a multivariate general linear model [GLM] 
including age [p = .0002] and a quadratic term for age [p = .0002]). Older 
individuals are more likely to experience multiple marriages, but sex is 
not significant when added to the model (p = .2741). Men (15.5 per cent) 
more commonly than women (6.5 per cent) have been polygynously 
married at some point in their adult lives. Of the 78 marriages, 62 are first 
marriages, 14 are second marriages and two are third or more marriages.
149
4 . SHOULD I STAy OR SHOULD I GO?
Table 1. Pumé sample description






















Source: Constructed by © Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer from their fieldwork 
data and the Lizarralde and Gragson n.d. census data‑RG.
Figure 7 shows individual dispersal patterns for Pumé males (n = 49) and 
females (n = 54). The precise dispersal history of two older adults was 
unclear despite multiple interviews. The majority of men (86 per cent) 
and women (76 per cent) marry endogamously and remain in their natal 
village, at least for the entire duration of their first marriage. While more 
females disperse than males, this difference is not significant (Chi-sq = 
1.5730, df = 1, p = .2098).
Figure 7. Pumé postmarital dispersal patterns from natal village for first 
marriage
(n = 49 males, black bars; n = 54 females, grey bars)
Source: Constructed by © Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer from their fieldwork 
data and the Lizarralde and Gragson n.d. census data‑RG.
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To situate postmarital residence patterns as they are commonly coded 
in ethnographic studies, marriage as the unit of analysis is stratified 
by postmarital residence. Of first marriages (n = 62), 66 per cent are 
natolocal (Figure 8). Virilocality, where wives emigrate to their husbands’ 
community, occurs in 19 per cent of marriages. Uxorilocality, where 
husbands move to their wives’ communities, occurs in 15 per cent of 
marriages. 
Figure 8. Pumé postmarital residence patterns
Marriages stratified by whether the couple resides with the husband’s relatives (virilocal), 
the wife’s relatives (uxorilocal), in their natal village (natolocal), or in a village where neither 
has close relatives (neolocal). Shown for first marriages (black bars; n = 62), and second 
marriages (grey bars; n = 15) .
Source: Constructed by © Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer from their fieldwork 
data and the Lizarralde and Gragson n.d. census data‑RG.
Residence decisions during second marriages are examined separately for 
several reasons. To maximise sample size, individuals of different ages and 
couples at different stages in their reproductive careers are included. First 
marriages are overrepresented since all couples have at least one marriage 
to be included in the sample, but not all couples have completed their 
marital history. First and second marriages may show different residential 
choices, with distinctions between younger and older individuals based 
on number of children, extent of within-community alliances, or mate 
availability. Despite these potential differences of residence selection 
following divorce or at initiation of a subsequent union, the pattern for 
second marriages is remarkably similar to that of first marriages (Figure 9). 
Although a slightly higher proportion of individuals emigrate following 
a second marriage, this difference is not significant (Chi-sq = .6043, df = 
2, p = .7392). The majority of second marriages are natolocal, with both 
151
4 . SHOULD I STAy OR SHOULD I GO?
partners continuing to remain associated with their natal community and 
that of their first marriages. Only one case of neolocality was identified in 
our sample. 
Figure 9. Postmarital residential stability for Pumé residents
(n = 49 males, black bars; n = 54 females, grey bars)
Source: Constructed by © Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer from their fieldwork 
data and the Lizarralde and Gragson n.d. census data‑RG.
Postmarital residential stability evaluates the extent to which Pumé 
men and women shift their kin associations with subsequent marriages. 
Figure  7 shows the frequency distribution for males and females who 
remain in the community where they first reside after marriage (whether 
it is natolocal, virilocal, or uxorilocal) compared to those who make one 
or more additional residential moves during subsequent marriages. All 
first marriages within both communities are shown in Figure 9. Most 
Pumé women (87 per cent; n = 54) and men (84 per cent; n = 49) remain 
affiliated with the same community where they lived at the time of their 
first marriage. Postmarital residential stability is independent of sex 
(Chi-sq = .2336, df = 1, p = .6289). When the probability that someone 
who dispersed at first marriage will continue to move during subsequent 
marriages is modelled, results are insignificant (Wald chi-sq = .9781, 
p = .3227, n = 103). While exogamous dispersal at first marriage is not 
a significant predictor of subsequent community shifts for later marriages, 
it is notable that the several individuals who have been married three or 
more times have made multiple residential moves during their adult lives.
Residential changes within a marriage also are rare. Ninety-one per cent 
(n = 42 marriages) of couples remain associated with the same community 
throughout their marriage. Couples that do move tend to be young and 
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the wife and husband each have at least one living parent (so that such 
a move is not neolocal). These couples move infrequently between their 
parents’ communities. While the Pumé have a strong bilateral residence 
pattern, there is a low incidence of multilocality.
In sum, although the Pumé have been culturally characterised as a 
matrilocal foraging society, longitudinal census data and residential analyses 
provide a different and more nuanced view of postmarital decisions. 
There is no evidence of predominantly sex-biased dispersal. Neither men 
nor women preferentially relocate from their village residence following 
marriage. Most marriages in our sample are natolocal, both spouses 
remaining in the community where they grew up throughout their adult 
lives. Individuals that do move after their first marriage exhibit minimal 
subsequent residential reshuffling. Although the incidence of bilocality at 
the scale of community relocation is low, we emphasise in the discussion 
that natolocality is functionally a similar strategy that maintains bilateral 
kin affiliations.
Discussion
The perception that hunter-gatherers are patrilocal persists in many 
formulations about human social organisation despite numerous 
ethnographic examples to the contrary. Recent cross-cultural comparisons 
demonstrate that the predominant residential pattern among modern 
foragers is neither male- nor female-focused, but bilateral, in which ties 
to both male and female kin are maintained (Figure 10). Foragers also 
trace descent bilaterally more frequently than do nonforagers (Marlowe 
2004). Together these patterns strongly suggest that an important general 
characteristic of hunter-gatherer social organisation is access to a broad 
pool of kin through flexible residential association and recognition of 
more kinds of kin than seen among nonforaging groups. Even in societies 
that may be characterised as patrilocal or matrilocal, the recognition that 
they still calculate bilateral kin has become a mundane anthropological 
assumption. However, recognition of bilateral kin is a unique behaviour 
even among the most social of other animals (Alexander 1979; Alexander 
and Noonan 1979; Rodseth et al. 1991). The Pumé results complement 
cross-cultural studies in using individual-level, longitudinal behavioural 
data to show that postmarital residence is organised to maintain strong 
bilateral kin ties.
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Figure 10. Reassessment of hunter-gatherer postmarital patterns from 
Marlowe (2004: 280)
Source: Constructed by © Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer from Marlowe (2004: 
280), n = 36 groups from the Standard Cross‑Cultural Sample, grey bars (Alvarez 2004); 
n = 48 groups from Murdock’s 1967 Ethnographic Atlas, black bars.
Results show a clear pattern of natolocality among the Savanna Pumé 
that keeps both spouses across most marriages in close association with 
their immediate and extended families. Although cross-cultural analyses 
show that the proportions of male contributions to the overall forager 
diet do not result in higher levels of virilocality (Marlowe 2004), there are 
suggestions that uxorilocality may be associated with higher amounts of 
women’s contributions (Korotayev 2001; Marlowe 2004; Scelza and Bliege 
Bird 2008). Given the characterisation of the Pumé as matrilocal and the 
relative equality in importance of male and female foods to their diet, 
we expected that there might be some biases in the variation toward that 
pattern. Although there is much reliance on female food contributions, 
residence favouring association with more female kin is not apparent.
We expected that there might be differences in postmarital residence 
between first and subsequent marriages. Residential decisions may be 
made for various reasons, and second marriages may be made for different 
reasons than initial unions. Younger individuals may be less tethered to 
one community because they have fewer child-support demands and less-
developed adult relationships. Older individuals may be more interested 
in remaining in the village they first marry into because of children, 
offspring support from former spouses or other kin, extant friendships, 
labour or sharing alliances that are costly to abandon. Divorce could 
engender potential conflicts resulting in more exogamous second 
marriages compared with first unions. However, these life-history changes 
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appear to have little effect on residence location following remarriage. 
For all marriages, natolocal and exogamous, lifetime association most 
commonly remains with the community of initial postmarital residence. 
This suggests that established adult relationships, which involve frequent 
labour and sharing interactions, are important considerations in decisions 
about where to live following divorce. Although there is lability in group 
composition during temporary camps, visits or seasonal household 
reorganisation, primary village associations are remarkably stable.
While natolocality and postmarital residential stability are strong patterns, 
some Pumé do separate from their kin and emigrate to households within 
their husbands’ or wives’ communities (20 individuals’ first marriage, 
19.4 per cent of males and females in the sample). Three of these are 
older individuals who emigrated from the parent population that formed 
the communities of Doro Aná and Yagurí 45 years ago. Two individuals 
represent the one neolocal marriage in our sample. One woman and her 
younger brother moved in as young orphans and both married within this 
adoptive group. While multivariate analyses might bring greater insight 
into the conditions under which individuals deviate from the natolocal 
pattern, the sample of exceptions is too small. However, in examining 
these exogamous marriages, we found a suggestive patterned difference 
between men and women that provides a direction for future research. 
Of the remaining 13 men and women whose first marriages were non-
natolocal (four men and nine women), the majority of the exceptions 
fall into two general categories. Most males who relocate into uxorilocal 
postmarital residence are part of large families. They appear to emigrate 
because their available mating options are already coopted by older siblings 
and male parallel cousins. All four men who married exogamously had at 
least three living siblings in their natal communities. In contrast, women 
who emigrate into the communities of their husbands tend to have few 
close kin of their own, and gain larger kin networks through alliances 
with their husbands’ families. Two of the women had no living siblings 
and small families. Another young woman married exogamously when 
she had only one full sibling in her natal group, her mother had recently 
remarried and the family’s status was relatively low. Three women who 
initially resided virilocally during their first marriages have subsequently 
divorced and returned to their natal communities. One woman had been 
raised for most of her life in the non-natal community where she married, 
her father still lives there and her mother lived there for approximately 
13  years. One  woman followed her husband’s relocation to a village 
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where his brother lived, although they both initially resided in her birth 
community. The remaining woman’s situation does not appear to fit our 
generalisation about exogamous marriage. There is no indication that 
sororal polygyny is associated with exogamous female marriage among 
the Savanna Pumé, as found among other foragers (Scelza and Bliege Bird 
2008). Additional support of these patterns is apparent in exogamous 
third and fourth marriages.1 In mobile hunter-gatherers the complexities 
of residential shifts across the life span reinforce the importance of 
bilateral kin association. For example, the three women who returned 
to their natal communities subsequent to dissolution of an exogamous 
postmarital residence and the one woman who had lived as a child in the 
nonnatal community where she married (also see two similar exceptions 
in footnote 1) demonstrate a preponderance of bilateral kin proximity.
In small populations, low levels of exogamous marriage persisting over 
a long period raise obvious concerns about incest avoidance (Bittles 2004; 
Durham 2004). One observation from our fieldwork may address this 
concern and provide insight into a less appreciated form of mobility in 
small-scale societies. Although Pumé community associations are relatively 
stable both at marriage and throughout the duration of a marriage, major 
reshuffling of kin affiliations does occur at a deeper temporal scale.
Both study communities moved to their current territory approximately 
45 years ago from further south near the Cinaruco River. The adults 
in the generation who moved state that they represent more distantly 
related individuals from less intermarried lineage segments who fissioned 
from their parent community. Additionally, following this fission, some 
individuals from nearby villages joined these new communities. This 
move occurred before the data collection used in these analyses, and 
1  The importance we infer for bilateral kin access is also supported by the 12 examples of 
non-natolocal second–fourth marriages in our sample. Four (three men, one woman) of the eight 
individuals with two non-natolocal marriages initiated their first union natolocally, and subsequently 
sought mates in other communities. Two of those same men, and another woman with exogamous 
second marriages had lived in the community they married into as pre-adolescent children for at 
least 10 years before moving away with their parents. One other man’s second marriage took place 
uxorilocally within the same community that he had married into 13 years previously. One woman’s 
second and third marriages were both exogamous (as was her first), although she had lived extensively 
in the two communities where her second–third marriages occurred. She also had a small number 
of relatives in both groups. Only one woman exhibited both marriages that were virilocal without 
having local kin. The other non-natolocal third (n = 2) and fourth (n = 1) unions (representing two 
men) were by individuals whose first marriages were natolocal. Both of these men with the highest 
number of exogamous marriages come from a family with a large number of surviving full and half-
brothers (and natolocally resident sisters).
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confirmation of the relatedness of individuals in this founder group 
compared to their original community membership is beyond the reach 
of the current genealogical data. Following the consequences of the 
Darkness in El Dorado scandal (Borofsky 2005; Gregor and Gross 2004; 
Tierney 2000), genetic testing is unlikely to be permitted by government 
ministries in Venezuela to resolve this issue. Informants, however, are clear 
in their statements that they moved to their current location as less-related 
families from their source residence. This recent migration offers new 
marriage options through a temporal and geographic reassortment of the 
population. These two communities retain ties with each other and with 
other families who also dispersed into other Pumé villages. These provide 
an additional destination and source for low-frequency exogamous 
marriages. For example, as noted above in the discussion of exogamous 
marriages, some camp moves do bring in new members whose children 
marry natolocally (by our coding criteria) but represent individuals from 
outside family groups. While it is unknown whether such reshuffling is 
a consistent feature of Pumé demography or explains natolocality in other 
contexts, such large-scale population shifts are known for other foragers 
(Blackburn 1996; Denbow 1984; Wilmsen 1989).
Another question raised by these analyses, is the role of affinal kin in 
comparison to the apparent importance of bilateral kin access. Both male 
and female resources are widely shared within Savanna Pumé communities 
(Gragson 1989; Greaves and Kramer 2014; Kramer and Greaves 2010; 
Mitrani 1988), and there is no evidence of strict in-law avoidance or 
preferential association in relation to subsistence work or food sharing 
(Mitrani 1988). Quantitative time allocation data would further 
clarify whether the strength of interactions varies between affines and 
consangual kin. Time allocation data on sharing and other interactions, 
the spatial proximity of wives’ and husbands’ parents or other in-laws 
(data available from one Pumé community), and longitudinal persistence 
(potentially available for some of the 25-year genealogical sample) could 
contribute to an improved understanding of affinal roles and variation by 
sex and generation (Coall and Hertwig 2010; Euler and Weitzel 1996; 
Euler and Michalski 2007).
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Environmental influences on bilateral 
kinship organisation
The observation that hunter-gatherers exhibit greater bilateral kin 
identification and more bilaterally referenced residence than nonforaging 
societies (Marlowe 2004) suggests that reliance on wild foods is related 
to broad kinship networks (Ember 1975; Lee 1972, 1979; Silberbauer 
1972). Many foragers exploit a wide diversity of food resources with 
distinct and variable distributions, return payoffs, access and processing 
requirements. Resource variation must be mediated through an array 
of mobility, labour and group size changes (Binford 2001; Kelly 1995; 
Panter-Brick, Layton and Rowley-Conwy 2001; Quinlan and Quinlan 
2007; Scelza and Bliege Bird 2008; Smith 1991; Winterhalder and Smith 
1981). Seasonality influences all of these changing needs, including 
the sex of primary producers and their labour (i.e. multiple female or 
male membership groups) and support (i.e. childcare, food processing, 
mobility, auxiliary help roles) demands. Kinship association is an 
important means to assemble and alter social memberships, at potentially 
different geographical and temporal scales, in response to these changes. 
Foragers living in small communities necessarily cope with variation in 
sex ratios, age profiles, productivity and generosity of kin, as well as both 
anticipated and unforeseen changes in environmental conditions affecting 
subsistence, stress, and future options. In addition, hunter-gatherers may 
use mobility or kinship to change relationships between producers and 
consumers, to recruit labour groups appropriate for particular tasks or to 
adjust for food availability during certain times of the year.
If foragers tend to be more inclusive of bilateral kin relationships than 
nonforagers, is this evident in the different kinds of camps they make? 
We use the Savanna Pumé results to address how bilateral kin affiliation 
can be broadly similar across hunter-gatherers despite differences in 
mobility, camp size and residence patterns. We contrast pumé natolocality 
with the multilocal residence and uxorilocal bias of the Hadza of Tanzania 
to demonstrate how both of these apparently distinct and different 
living arrangements each accomplish similar maximisation of lifetime 
association with a broad set of bilateral kin.
Membership at Pumé main residence camps is stable across all seasonal 
moves. Except for short-term camps, almost identical groups are present in 
each co-resident association across our 25-year sample. The predominant 
pattern of Pumé natolocality appears to be a response, in part, to their 
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marginal environment. Six months of each year are associated with 
seasonal shortfalls in food availability, nutritional stress and increased 
epidemiological challenges. During this season, few men hunt on any 
particular day and returns are normally much smaller than among many 
foragers (Greaves 1997b). Low wet-season inputs of protein and fat are 
offset by highly predictable and larger returns by women collecting tubers 
(Greaves and Kramer 2014; Kramer and Greaves 2017). Unlike many 
other foragers, female foods are extensively shared. These factors may 
condition living with as broadly inclusive a male and female kin base as 
possible. Smaller camps might have fewer consumers, but they also would 
have fewer hunters, smaller areas searched by hunters and lower male food 
returns. In a relatively depauperate terrestrial environment, wet-season 
camps may not atomise because a certain threshold number of men are 
necessary to realise any hunting success. Because husbands and wives are 
always co-resident, this results in a matched labour force. The stability 
of natolocality appears to be an outcome of living in aggregate groups of 
bilateral kin, which may be favoured to minimise resource shortfalls. It is 
notable that smaller temporary camps are common only during the dry 
season, when food is more widely available and parts of the community 
move to productive fishing locations for one to three weeks.
Comparisons to other hunter-gatherers
In contrast, the Hadza rotate membership across a range of smaller short-
term camps (Marlowe 2006, 2010; Woodburn 1968, 1972). Unlike the 
Venezuelan savanna, the Hadza environment has a greater availability 
of large game, tubers of larger package size and reliable sources of 
densely caloric honey. Individual camps are generally smaller (~20–60 
individuals) than most Savanna Pumé residential camps, and potential 
kin associations at any particular camp are less diverse. Hadza men and 
women move between several small camps on average 6.5 times a year 
ranging between 4–20 camp moves per year (Marlowe 2010). The Hadza 
calculate bilateral kinship and have generally uxorilocally referenced 
camp residence (Woodburn 1972). The differences between Hadza and 
Pumé camps on the ground reflect distinct ways of employing bilateral 
kin (Figure 11), which are linked to differences in camp size, aggregation 
and the higher productivity of the Hadza environment. Only a minority 
of Hadza camp moves appear to be related to food shortages, partly 
because small numbers of producers can have an assurance of returns and 
smaller camp size reduces the numbers of consumers (Woodburn 1972). 
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Although each individual Hadza camp may be composed of a narrower 
range of kin, individuals or couples, they associate with a broad range 
of bilateral kin throughout their lives. At a deeper temporal scale, each 
of these temporary camps combines into a larger bilateral kin network 
(Wood and Marlowe 2011).
Figure 11. Schematic model of a married hunter-gatherer’s relationship 
to bilateral kin under two common residential patterns
(a) natolocal residence and stable camp composition, showing occasional temporary camps 
(Pumé-type pattern); (b) multilocal residence and a shifting camp composition (Hadza-
type pattern). Each model represents ego’s (E) residential mobility and the hypothetical 
assortment of kin (x=uxorilocal, V=virilocal) within individual camps across an unspecified 
time period.
Source: Drawn by © Russell D. Greaves and Karen L. Kramer.
The schematic differences between two residential systems such as those 
practised by the Pumé or the Hadza are shown in Figure 11. The figure 
outlines kin associations in a natolocal and a multilocal residential system 
as they might appear across time. The view shows ego’s (E) relationships 
to uxorilocal (X) and virilocal (V) kin who are resident in each camp. 
Because a hunter-gatherer’s individual residential events are subsumed 
within a larger pattern of lifetime interactions, this is a useful scale to 
examine the cumulative system effects of forager residential organisation. 
Figure 11 illustrates how both natolocal and multilocal residence affect 
a similarly broad set of bilateral kin associations.
The residential variation seen among Ju/’hoansi foragers, who live 
in comparable savanna settings, also emphasises the importance of 
maintaining access to bilateral kin. Researchers working with Ju/’hoansi 
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recognise the importance of variable residence associations across a broad 
suite of potential bilateral kin that are responsive to environmental, social, 
and life history changes in foraging opportunities. Richard B. Lee (1976, 
1979) contradicts Lorna Marshall’s (1960) position on patrilineal control 
over waterholes and associated resource areas. Lee explicitly underlines 
the flexible associations among kin across !Kung camp moves (1979: 
61–67, tables 3.13–3.14, figures 3.4–3.6). Marshall (1976) describes 
highly variable potential kin associations, even with an expected period 
of residence with uxorilocal kin for bride service. Lee (1979) agrees 
with this point and indicates that even bride service may include the 
relocation of a husband’s kin to create a bilateral kin-based residential 
camp rather than a strictly uxorilocal-referenced postmarital residence. 
Looking at women’s residence choices among the !Kung, Howell (2001) 
states that post-divorce residence may be determined by the amount of 
time in a particular community before divorce, whether the woman has 
kin in that group, if her parents are still living, whether her children were 
married or the possibility of remarriage to a brother of her ex-husband. 
Polly Wiessner (2002) also emphasises the egalitarian options of men 
and women in choosing associations with particular kin. She identifies 
group membership as facultative and at least partially related to hunting 
ability of central males. Wiessner (ibid.: 422–27, tables 2–4) calculates 
that productive males also have significantly more sharing partners among 
distant kin than poorer hunters, indicating opportunities to extend their 
networks well beyond those of less-skilled hunters who primarily have 
support relationships only with more closely related individuals.
Like the Hadza example outlined above, temporal changes in camp 
membership result in multiple patterns of residential association with 
bilateral kin, not an adherence to any strict and biased norm of preferential 
residence with a more limited set of relatives. For Ju’/hoansi, food 
shortages are not uncommon and a similar shifting residential pattern to 
that employed by the Hadza in a more resource-rich environment is used 
as a social means of accessing variable returns from men and women who 
are both close and more distant kin. The variability in Ju’/hoansi seasonal 
subsistence activities, fluctuating annual and interannual rainfall, and 
occasionally extreme differences in resource availability, appears to result 
in a flexible residential system that maximises potential access to diverse 
locations through fluid tactical associations with a range of kin.
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Conclusions
Our goal in this chapter is to further investigate the challenge from recent 
cross-cultural comparisons that bilateral rather than sex-biased kin affiliations 
are an important pattern in human postmarital residence using longitudinal 
and individual observations for a group of mobile foragers. The Savanna 
Pumé combine close and more distant biological kin, along with affines, 
into networks that generally persist for life. Long-term shifts in population 
reorganise mobile Pumé communities so that natolocality is a stable strategy 
maintaining broad bilateral kin associations. Cross-cultural studies have 
shown that bilateral kin associations are more common in forager than 
food-producing populations. Additionally, such broad access to kin is 
associated with a range of environments, resource productivity, and hunter-
gatherer subsistence practices. We emphasise that natolocality, bilocality and 
multilocality accomplish similar ends in maximising bilateral kin affiliations 
compared to sex-biased kin affiliations. Distinctions between hunter-
gatherer residential organisations appear to be responses to environmental 
differences that adjust labour groups and camp size through manipulation 
of kin associations. Such flexible changes in forager group composition are 
possible because humans recognise a broad range of relatives.
Descent and genetic relatedness are the bases for these kinship systems that 
secondarily link affines into an extensive network. The additional layering 
of more facultative kinship extends the categories and obligations based 
on descent to individuals of economic value and interest (such as good 
producers or visiting anthropologists) to the cooperating community. 
Far from being a cultural construct of human ideation, human kinship 
is grounded in biology. Our unique human diversity employs myriad 
languages, forms of social organisation, knowledge systems, and 
subsistence adaptations across the world. However, a relatively limited 
number of ways to describe kin associations between individuals are 
flexibly used as critical components in those different behavioural 
strategies for social cooperation. In contrast, the more limited variety in 
kinship classification systems used globally reflects their biological basis 
in descent. However, how kinspeople distribute themselves in residential 
and subsistence groups is responsive to the broad range of environmental 
and social challenges that humans face.
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Properties of Kinship Structure: 
Transformational Dynamics of 
Suckling, Adoption and Incest
Fadwa El Guindi
Introduction
It is fitting in a volume edited by Warren Shapiro honouring the ground-
breaking contribution by Harold Scheffler to the study of kinship 
semantics (Scheffler 1972; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971 among other 
works) to present an analysis1 that integrates meaning and semantics 
of kinship terms, concepts and practices, in ways that reveal the logical 
properties of kinship structure, which is my primary concern. 
1  This grew out of a systematic empirical study of kinship practices in Qatar carried out 
over a period of seven years (between 2006 and 2013). The primary data derive from systematic 
ethnographic observations made by the author on Qatari kinship practices and in-depth data obtained 
by a research team headed by the author on the subject of suckling kinship, including elicitation of 
Qatari kinship terms, over a period of three years. The research team consisted of colleague Wesam al-
Othman (former Associate Professor of Anthropology, Qatar University), and undergraduate students 
from the Department of Social Sciences majoring in Sociology and Anthropology, namely Sara al-
Mahmoud, Alanoud al-Marri, Raneen Najjar, Dana al-Dossary and Fatima Abed Bahumaid. The field 
project was funded by two grants from the Qatar National Research Fund under its Undergraduate 
Research Experience Program: (a) UREP 06-012-5-003 (Milk Kinship: The Khalij Case) and (b) 
UREP 09-051-5-013 (Blood, Milk and Marriage: Kinship Behavior and Kinship Terminology in 
Qatar). The grant contents are solely the responsibility of the lead principal investigator and do 
not necessarily represent the official views of the Qatar National Research Fund. I especially thank 
colleague Wesam al-Othman for being a willing mentored and mentoring partner on the research 
project. Ego’s case was elicited in parallel with the research team project. 
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The ethnographic focus of this analysis is a phenomenon I call suckling, 
which relates to, but is separable from, the complex of practices commonly 
labelled ‘milk kinship’ (Altorki 1980; Conte 1987; Giladi 1998, 1999; 
Héritier-Augé and Copet-Rougier 1995; Héritier 1994; Khatib-Chahidi 
1992; Lacoste-Dujardin 2000; Long 1996; Parkes 2004a, 2005). 
The latter is reported as historically common in the wider region covering 
the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Arab and the Islamic East (Parkes 
2001, 2003, 2004b).
Suckling refers to a practice by which lactating women breastfeed babies 
who are not their own by birth, engendering new kin relations and 
networks, and generating new transformations that shift kin status among 
birth and marital kin (El Guindi 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; El Guindi and 
al-Othman 2013). Studying suckling, a practice that is quite prevalent in 
contemporary Arab society, particularly among kinship-intensive Arabian 
Arabs living in the regions of Arabia and the Arabian Gulf, led to new 
insights and perspectives on old issues, some of which are shared in this 
work. The thrust of analytic conceptualisation derives from primary data, 
but additional data were located in secondary sources such as existing 
studies and literature, religious documents, poetry and prose, as well as 
various visual sources.
I propose to establish two points: (1) that suckling, unlike other practices 
of breastfeeding, is kinship, thus belonging in kinship study not social 
relations; and (2) how integrating insights from the analysis of primary 
data about practices of suckling, adoption and incest in Qatar reveals 
general properties of kinship structure. The structure is described in this 
paper.
What is suckling?
It is interesting that the data collected show how suckling kin terms 
and categories are lexically marked relative to procreative kin terms and 
categories. Relatives among themselves and their familiars introduce 
relatives by suckling saying ‘this is my mother, this is my sister’, etc. 
Noticeably, the marker ‘by suckling’ is used in the presence of strangers 
to convey the exact nature of the relationship, but is dropped in ordinary, 
daily interactions among familiars. More can be said but this has to 
await analysis of the body of kin terminology data I gathered as part of 
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the kinship project on Qatar,2 which cover Qatari Arabic kin terms of 
reference and address for kin by birth, marriage and suckling. I contend, 
however, from preliminary analysis that there is sufficient support for the 
modelling notion held by Scheffler, which considers nonprocreative kin to 
be ‘as though’ or ‘modeled after’ kin by birth (Scheffler 1970: 370). In this 
case, the reference is about suckling kin terms.3 Support for modelling is 
also found in Islamic Hadith (Prophetic Narratives, considered sacred but 
not divine) which quotes Muhammad (Islam’s Prophet) as having stated 
that ‘suckling prohibits what birth prohibits’ (al-Tarmathi n.d.: 129–35; 
Sallama 2006). In the course of my fieldwork people often brought up 
this Hadith passage to emphasise suckling kinship’s similarity in kinship 
character to birth kinship.
Equally compelling is the observation that the incest taboo applies equally 
to birth and suckling according to the Qur’an, the Hadith, and the 
ethnography. But, unlike the Qur’an, the Hadith, like the ethnography, 
recognises the attribute of lineal and lateral extensions beyond the 
suckling dyad. The notion of modelling in this case conveys analytic 
significance to the interrelationship among the three kinship practices 
recognised among the population of Qatar, and elsewhere as indicated. 
The analysis goes further by contending how aspects of the practice of 
women’s suckling of nonbirth infants reveal a transformational character 
of kinship. This chapter builds on, but goes further than, descriptive and 
analytic accounts which I have recently published, based on primary 
field data and conclusions from various sources on local knowledge and 
cultural tradition, including original Islamic sources (El Guindi 2011, 
2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2016; El Guindi and al-Othman 2013).
I have argued in earlier publications that sufficient analytic evidence 
supports the cultural view that the kind of suckling (Ar. rida’a) explored in 
the research project is considered kinship, alongside procreative (Ar. nasab4) 
and marital kinship (Ar. musahara). This claim of kinship status is not only 
culture-derived, but is also based on analytic criteria shared by kinship 
specialists. These criteria include classification in terminology (from 
2  Most of it sits in a trunk shipped recently to my home in Los Angeles.
3  Arabic terms for marital kin are distinct from birth kin, and do not carry a marker such as 
‘in-law’ as used in other terminological systems. The significance of the difference between the two 
kin-term sets, that of suckling and that of marriage, will be the subject for another work.
4  The Arabic term nasab is multivocal, sometimes used to refer to genealogical affiliation, other 
times to kin by marriage versus kin by birth. Formally, and as used in this account, it refers to 
procreative kin versus marital or suckling kin.
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preliminary analysis), observations of behavioural reciprocity, and the 
feature of lineality and laterality of recursions in marital prohibitions. It is 
observed that suckling extends links and prohibitions lineally and laterally 
beyond the original suckling dyad, and lifts avoidance and constructs new 
taboos that enable and disable marriage possibilities.
Here I seek to show that the structural property of transformationality is 
key to revealing a kinship structure integrating procreative, marital and 
suckling elements. The analysis draws upon field-derived ethnographic 
cases, which includes adoptive practices, an element in the process which 
made manifest the way prohibitions and avoidances are created and 
lifted. Adoption processes affirm suckling to be not only as an additional 
way whereby persons are incorporated as kin members, itself considered 
important, but also, if not more importantly, it becomes itself a process 
by which a transformational property of kinship structure is revealed. This 
leads to fresh insights into the construct of the incest taboo, and perhaps 
also into adoption.
Three decades before my field study on suckling in Qatar, Soraya Altorki 
published an article in 1980 entitled ‘Milk-Kinship in Arab society: 
An Unexplored Problem in the Ethnography of Marriage’, based on her 
field study of the practice of suckling in Saudi Arabia. This practice is 
also quite pervasive in other parts of the contemporary Arab world. But 
my decision to study suckling kinship independently grew out of an 
anthropological curiosity from directly observing and experiencing the 
intensity of such kinship activity in Qatari life. The constant encounter 
with lived kinship and especially the linguistic, ritual and interactional 
manifestations of suckling kinship (whether in classrooms or weddings) 
aroused my research interest and inspired my seeking two consecutive 
grants from the Qatar National Research Fund to systematically study 
suckling as it relates to kinship in general.
To capture the feel for the kinship-intensive environment among Arabs, 
I venture out of ethnography and into the memoir by Anthony Shadid, 
the late New York Times reporter who died covering the battlefield in 
Syria, in which he vividly describes, in what was to be his last book, his 
days in the hometown of his ancestors in Lebanon uncovering his roots 
as he participates in the project of remodelling his grandfather’s house of 
stone. He covers ordinary daily life, familiar in any Arab society:
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As we sat there [the author writes], he kept introducing people to 
me, usually with a reference to their root in our family … ‘This man’s 
grandmother is a Shadid’ … ‘This man’s mother is a Shadid’ … No 
conversations … more common, more authoritatively deliberated … 
more steeped in encyclopedic knowledge than those about genealogy…
intermarriages … that connected everyone to everyone else … Tracking 
one’s surname was a constant activity: Hikmat belonged to Bayt Farha, 
Isber to Bayt Samara … names themselves were clues to the stories of 
origins’ (Shadid 2012: 74).
As if in response to the view from afar, as it were, about kinship as mutuality 
of being (Sahlins 2013), Shadid goes on: ‘Families always have conflict, 
he told me … from the outside it looks okay’ (2012: 109). It is not that 
the romanticised view of kinship, that ‘people … live each other’s lives 
and die each other’s deaths’ (Sahlins 2013: 28), is wrong. It is incomplete. 
Some relatives behave kindly to each other, others do not. Perhaps this 
is what Marilyn Strathern means when she writes, ‘Mutuality’s largely 
benign connotations lead to some special pleading when it comes to 
malevolent or negative consequences’ (1988: 392).
This analytical approach situates suckling in kinship as conventionally 
construed. It is thus indebted to Harold Scheffler’s critique of kinship 
‘dismantlers’ as he called them (Scheffler 2004: 294), and to Warren 
Shapiro, who has argued convincingly, using ethnographic evidence, 
against Janet Carsten’s analysis of Malaysian ethnography (Shapiro 2011), 
an example of the so-called ‘new kinship studies’. I shall show that radical 
claims of the new kinship studies do not adequately address the complexity 
of the phenomenon of kinship among Qataris.
To return to Altorki. She recognised suckling as a kinship practice, referring 
to it by the local Arabic term rida’a (‘suckling’). Her article drew scholarly 
attention to the practice, otherwise neglected in anthropology, leading 
to further explorations. A century earlier than Altorki’s study, William 
Robertson Smith briefly wrote on suckling in his classic publication 
on kinship and marriage in early Arabia (1885). Presumably he used 
information from the Qur’an, which is considered by Muslims to be 
the most sacred and divinely revealed source. There is significance to the 
fact that Qur’anic passages explicitly define kinship and recognise three 
forms: procreative, marital and suckling. This inclusive quality is further 
supported by other sources, including primary field-derived ethnography 
by Altorki on Saudi Arabia among others, and, independently, in my 
field-derived ethnography on Qatar.
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Peter Parkes (referenced earlier) was moved by Altorki’s article to explore 
the phenomenon further.5 He conducted a search of the literature and 
contributed a synthesis of historical materials describing the distribution of 
apparently similar practices, such as fosterage and wet-nursing, extending 
beyond Arab and Islamic regions, to include Christian groups in the 
Balkans. Some practices, he found, existed prior to Islam. Ethnographic 
accounts of social life in Hijaz during the first two centuries after Hijra 
(roughly the seventh and eighth centuries CE) suggest a pervasiveness 
of the practice of wet-nursing. The record, Parkes further found, points 
to a much earlier presence, as for example, in the Babylonian code of 
Hammurabi—the oldest comprehensive set of written laws, which gives 
a prominent position to ‘Adoption and Wet-nursing’ (Driver and Miles 
1952: 383–406; Goody 1969).
Drawing on ethnographic insights, I contend that not differentiating 
among forms such as ‘adoption’, ‘wet nursing’, ‘fosterage,’ etc. results 
in confusion and ambiguity. Instead, I propose here that the ‘milk 
phenomenon’ subsumes a variety of traditions by which women breastfed 
infants who are not their own. The anthropological literature often 
refers to wet-nursing and suckling interchangeably. I maintain that such 
grouping may be a result of focusing on the substance of milk rather than 
on the properties of the kinship structure.
In his brief discussion on suckling kinship Smith brought out the link 
between the taboo against marriage and the practice of suckling. It could 
simply be a labelling problem when he chose to use the terms ‘foster-
mother’, ‘foster-child’, ‘foster-brothers’ but these are terminologically 
and semantically imprecise, since the Arabic original rida’a stands for 
nursing or suckling, not fostering. My preference is for the term suckling, 
to distinguish the phenomenon of my research focus from nursing 
one’s own babies. It seems too that Smith’s categorisation is ambiguous, 
particularly when he fluctuates among ‘milk kinship’, ‘foster parenthood’ 
and a combined ‘milk-fosterage’. In Arabic there are two derivatives from 
the same linguistic root for nursing r-d-’: istirda’ and rida’a, which refer to 
two identifiably different practices, wet-nursing and suckling. 
5  At a reception at Kent University and before my own interest in the subject, Peter Parkes 
(see references) mentioned his interest in milk kinship, which a few years later turned into several 
publications.
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By converting the three kin positions specified by Smith into two 
dyadic relationships of mother–child and sibling–sibling, we can draw a 
parallel with the relations in the Qur’anic text as illustrated in Figure 16. 
The  Qur’an expresses suckling relations in terms of dyads: ‘suckling 
mothers’, that is mother–child and ‘sisters-in-suckling’, that is sibling 
dyads. Smith wrote of ‘foster-brothers’ as well, but this is inaccurate: in 
the sura 4:23, sexually prohibited kin are positioned from a male reference 
point that, accordingly, refers to sisters and not brothers—that is, it 
assumes heterosexuality. Smith makes no reference to other sources like 
Shari’a, Jurisprudence, or extant ethnographic records. 
Figure 12. Brothering matrilateral parallel cousins
Source: © Fadwa El Guindi, 2014.
Arabs put much stress on mother’s milk. When possible, nursing one’s 
own infants is both desirable and preferred. However, since before 
Islam, women from wealthy families (as is the case with families of 
wealth elsewhere, including Europe) were not expected or obligated 
to nurse their own babies. Whether due to a mother’s death, ill health, 
or wealth, urban Arabs frequently resorted to Badawi (Bedouin) women 
for nursing and early nurturing services, and this led to the development 
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of an institution of wet-nursing or istirda’ in the Arabian region. It was 
common and preferred at that time for families in urban centres such as 
Makka to utilise the service of Badawi women. Newborns were delivered 
to nonresident wet-nurses, to nurse for two years and be nurtured for 
several years beyond that. Wet-nursing was also carried out by resident 
slave women and household help, the latter continuing to this day in 
different parts of Arabia and the Gulf. Although, as already noted, this 
custom was practised prior to the advent of Islam, the Qur’an validated it 
as shown earlier by sacred text.
I distinguish wet-nursing as a paid service, whether in cash or kind, from 
the kind of suckling practices among women in the Arabian area and 
elsewhere in the larger Arabic-speaking region. Until empirical studies 
prove otherwise, I shall contend that most of these forms subsumed 
within the ‘milk phenomenon’ do not adequately qualify to be considered 
kinship.
Scholarly Arabic works suggest that suckling practices similar to those 
studied in my research project on Qatar existed in urban centres such 
as Makka6 at the beginning of Islam (for some references on these 
observations see al-Samhoudi 1505; Ibn Manthur 1311; Ibn Sa’d 844). 
It  is also reported that suckling kinship varies in ethnographic details 
within the same region in Saudi Arabia as well as between the larger 
regions of Najd and Hijaz (Altorki 1980: 238).
Groin, womb and nerve
To convey the similarity of suckling to kin by birth, Smith wrote:
There is a real unity of flesh and blood between foster-mother and 
foster-child, or between foster-brothers; and so we find among the Arabs 
a feeling about milk-kinship so well established that Mohammed’s law of 
forbidden degrees gives it all the effects of blood-relationship as a bar 
to marriage (1885: 176).
6  Reports of life in Yathrib, or Madina, to which Muslims immigrated escaping from Makka 
mention Jewish wet-nurses among the women suckling Arab infants during early Islam. See 
al-’Ayashi, Abdullah, bin Muhammad (1679); and Ibn Manthur, Mohammad bin Makram (1311). 
Lisan al-Arab is a comprehensive classical Arabic dictionary completed in 1290 CE, by the Arabic 
lexicographer Ibn Manthur (1233–1312 CE), al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kubra al-Amirīya, Bulaq 1883–1890 
(20 volumes).
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His phrase ‘Mohammed’s law’ indicates that he was referencing the 
Qur’an, probably through secondary information. His Biblical imagery—
‘real unity of flesh and blood’—to describe suckling kinship relations 
is inaccurate, because it suggests identity with those of procreative 
kinship. The imagery of flesh and blood is used in very specific and 
limited circumstances among Arabs. Moreover, ethnography-based 
conceptualisations of Arabian kinship convey an alternative set of 
concepts: groin-womb-nerve.
Parentation is construed as both paternity in terms of ‘groin’ (solb) and 
maternity in terms of ‘womb’ (rahm). Thus among prohibited kin to 
a male are the wives of his ‘sons by groin’. This phrase is employed in the 
text. ‘Womb’ is mentioned in the ethnographic interview in Figure 14 
describing a relation forged by suckling as analogous to that by birth. 
More extended genealogical bonds are construed in terms of ‘nerve’ 
(‘asab)—an observation widely supported by ethnography.
In an earlier publication I describe how the complementary duality of 
groin-womb represents how Arabs construe procreation (El Guindi 
2012a), an idiom expressing the process of becoming ‘birth kin’. 
By  contrast, in the context of descent groups, genealogical relations 
are construed as generative with ascendants (see El Guindi 2012a for 
argument for ascent over descent) connected by ‘asab (S1, ‘nerve’).7 This 
is a point confirmed in numerous studies describing Badawi (or Bedouin) 
groups, notably in the ethnography by Ahmad Abu-Zeid (1991a: 213) 
on the Egyptian Sinai, where the local terms ‘asib (S1, meaning ‘nerve 
bound’) and ‘asiba (S1, ‘nerve binding’) are used to describe agnatic 
relations. He aptly describes (1991a, 1991b) ‘Asab (S1, ‘nerve’) as the 
principle agnatically bonding Bedouin groups. Here, genealogy becomes 
the framework for corporateness and unity and the idiom by which 
relations are expressed, while, in reality, practices would be generatively 
fluid. Significantly, reputation and honour constitute the core elements 
for corporateness, which incorporated outsiders do not and cannot share 
or transmit (on this, see Lancaster 1997).
7  Syllable stress in the Arabic language is relevant to the meaning of the term. Henceforth stress 
will be marked in parentheses following the term by S for stress and a number designating the syllable 
(1, 2, 3) to which the stress applies.
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Crisscrossing paths of milk
I was struck during fieldwork on suckling by a comment made by a Qatari 
woman, henceforth Ego, during an interview about her own suckling 
practices.8 Casually, Ego recounted: ‘By suckling them, I brothered 
them.’ She used the term khawithom, a gender-neutral Arabic verb form, 
meaning ‘turned them into siblings’. After giving birth to a son of her 
own, Ego herself suckled two other male infants unrelated to her by birth 
or marriage, but related to each other as matrilateral parallel cousins. 
She went on to say: ‘this way I also siblinged my son’, meaning she gave 
brothers to her son by birth. These became her sons. This relationship 
is diagrammed in Figure 12.
One primary data-gathering technique I devised during the UREP kinship 
project was aimed at eliciting data on suckling. The research team was also 
seeking local knowledge among women who are the memory bearers of 
the paths of suckling, and who thus hold the key to decisions on permitted 
or prohibited spouses. The technique consists of templates designed 
on the basis of needed data about all possible suckling kin positions. 
Student researchers went to the field with these templates as a guide to 
elicit data on specific suckling kin positions, using unstructured open-
ended interviews. In the case where the interviewee is not a participant or 
directly familiar with the kind of suckling represented in the template, the 
student interviewer was trained to construct a hypothetical case matching 
that of the template.
Both formulated techniques—the template and the hypothetical case—
constitute a methodological innovation meant to fulfil the need of eliciting 
particular kinship data. The specific template in Figure 13 was designed 
to elicit data by interviewing women (and occasionally men) about 
situations in which a male ego has a brother-in-suckling and a brother’s 
son-in-suckling. This is demonstrated in Figure 13.
8  The extended interview was carried out over several months by myself and my colleague, 
Dr Wesam al-Othman, sometimes together and sometimes separately. This observation was made to 
me directly.
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Figure 13. Template 1 and Hypothetical Case 1, employed in UREP 
project as a kinship elicitation method
Source: Designed by © Fadwa El Guindi, 2014.
The interview itself, translated from Arabic by author, went as follows, 
with Raneen being the student interviewer and Ne’ma, a Palestinian-
Jordanian living in Qatar, the interviewee. The interview is presented 
in Figure 14. To clarify, numbers next to names correspond to numbers 
in the diagram in Figure 13 assigned to kin positions:
Raneen: Um Husein (mother of Husein) (1) suckled at the same time as her own (2) another infant called 
Muhammad (3). What would be the relation between the two boys? 
Ne’ma: Brothers-in-suckling. 
Raneen: What do you mean by brothers-in-suckling? 
Ne’ma: It means that had they been cross-sex they would not be able to marry each other, like real brothers. 
Raneen: What do you mean by real brothers? 
Ne’ma: Procreative brothers from same mother and father, or from mother, or from father. 
Raneen: Why would they not be able to marry, had they been cross-sex? 
Ne’ma: Because in the Islamic religion siblings-in-suckling are tabooed to each other. 
Raneen: Do you know why Islam prohibits such marriage? 
Ne’ma: Yes, because they become womb. 
[skip]. 
Raneen: Had Muhammad had a son called Mohsen (4), what would be the relation between Mohsen (4) 
and Husein (2)? 
Ne’ma: Husein is Mohsen’s paternal uncle-in-suckling. 
Raneen: So, how is Mohsen (4) referred to? 
Ne’ma: Brother’s son. 
Raneen: Do they behave as paternal uncle and brother’s son to each other? 
Ne’ma: They should. 
Raneen: In what way? 
Ne’ma: They visit each other. 
Figure 14. Ethnographic interview conducted by Raneen, student 
researcher on the project
Source: Translation and presentation by author. © Fadwa El Guindi, 2014.
A number of observations can be made from this interview: 
a. Suckling is culturally considered kinship.
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b. Kinship is defined by the incest taboo.
c. Suckling terms are derivative from procreative terms and expected 
conduct is that expected between procreative kin.
d. Procreative siblings share mother and father, mother only, or father only.
e. Suckling relations go beyond the giving–receiving dyad, extending 
prohibitions horizontally and vertically.
Tahrim: Prohibition and avoidance
The Arabic word tahrim, with stress on the last syllable, signifies prohibition. 
I identify syllable stress for semantic reasons. In a kinship context tahrim 
means prohibition from marriage and derives from the root h-r-m which 
‘is among the most important Arabic roots in the vocabulary of Islamic 
practice’, according to some scholars (Reinhart 1995). Kevin Reinhart 
uses the terms ‘forbidden’ or ‘taboo’, evoking constraint and heightened 
sanctity (ibid.: 101). I have previously discussed the multivocal, 
interrelated derivatives of this root and their significance in Arab cultural 
conceptualisation (El Guindi 2003: 82–96). ‘Haram means forbidden, 
prohibited, unlawful, taboo, sacred,’ I wrote. ‘It is a word widely used 
in the Arabic vocabulary … [It] refers to all that is prohibited by divine 
authority’ (ibid.: 84).
My monograph on privacy, first published in 1999, included analysis of 
Arabic-term concepts that are derivatives from the root h-r-m. Among 
these are: hurma (S1), harim (S2), ihram (S1), haram (S1), haram (S2), 
maharim (S2), mahram (S1), muharram (S2). There is also tahrim, the 
subject of this section. The key meaning, shared by these derivatives, 
is embedded in the notion of sacred sanctity, implying respect.
Tahrim denotes the quality of sacred sanctity, of forbidding or prohibiting. 
This denotation is confirmed by ethnographic data and ethnographic 
analysis of other records. The suckling field project shows that analysis 
of suckling must include tahrim as an interrelated process. As Figure 15 
illustrates in graphics and text, two kin whose relationship is culturally 
established as characterised by the incest taboo would not be in an 
avoidance relationship.
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Figure 15. Depiction of mother–son and text illustrating incest and 
avoidance
Source: © Fadwa El Guindi, 2014.
Two Qur’anic verses (suras) deal with tahrim: sura 4:23 (al-Nisa’) and sura 
24:3 (al-Nur). The point of reference in the former is male, the latter 
female. Both are about kin prohibitions, but only sura al-Nisa’ (4:23) 
includes references to suckling. The other sura (24:3, al-Nur) uses a female 
reference point that does not include suckling relations and is charted in 
an earlier publication (El Guindi 1999: 86). In Figure 16, I present an 
original graph of sura 4:23 (al-Nisa’), using standard notational symbols 
based on the text and maintaining the male reference point, in order to 
illustrate prohibited kin in relations of tahrim.9 Also included in Figure 16, 
at the top, is my original passage, which I have translated into English.
All prohibitions specified in sura 4:23 and illustrated in Figure 16 are 
reported to have been in effect in Arabia prior to Islam, except two: 
marrying two sisters (diagrammed in Figure 16) and a son’s claim to 
his deceased father’s wife. Sources indicate that both practices existed 
legitimately and pervasively in Arabia before new prohibitions became 
imposed in accordance with the relevant Qur’anic passages (Al-Magdoub 
2003: 32).
9  I had employed conventional charting kin relations from Qur’anic texts previously, for the first 
time in 1999, primarily to clarify relations specified in Qur’anic passages in order to enhance analysis. 
It probably had the consequence of breaking any implicit taboo against such nonreligious use of the 
sacred text.
















Figure 16. Depiction by author representing kin positions in the sura 
to demonstrate prohibitions
Source: © Fadwa El Guindi, 2014.
The incest taboo and adoption revisited
I find it remarkable that despite the universality of the incest taboo in 
human kinship, a significant anthropological discovery, two widely read 
volumes on kinship—the early compendium by Paul Bohannon and John 
Middleton (1968) and the more recent one by David Parkin and Linda 
Stone (2004)—do not include any chapters on incest. Perhaps this relates 
to the path taken in theorising the incest taboo, namely with focus on the 
hypotheses about its origin as contrasted with its occurrence in ongoing 
social life. Both have received attention in the history of our discipline 
(Cooper 1932; El Guindi and Read 2012; Fortune 1932; Freud 1831; 
Kuper 2002; Lévi-Strauss 1949; McCabe 1983; Turner and Maryanski 
2005; Van Gelder 2013; Wilgaux 2000; Wolf 2014). Noticeably, 
discussion often blurs incest occurrence and incest taboo. The rule of 
prohibition is of great importance for understanding social organisational 
forms in anthropology. 
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Dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions present incest as sexual 
intercourse between individuals related in certain prohibited degrees of 
kinship, and they note that every society has rules prohibiting incestuous 
unions. My concern here is with socially or legally recognised unions 
rather than statistical occurrences of sex among prohibited relatives. While 
sexual avoidance between primary kin is a near-universal in human society, 
cross-cultural studies show diversity in the content of the prohibited pool 
beyond parents and siblings.
In Islamic law maharim refers to a sexually prohibited pool. Muslims 
are minimally bound by the pool specified in the Qur’an. In a book 
dedicated to  the topic of incest (Al-Magdoub 2003), referring to it as 
zina10 al-maharim (adultery among prohibited kin), the term maharim is 
defined as ‘females prohibited to males, by legislation, laws and customs, 
from having sexual relations whether in marriage or outside it’ (ibid.: 87, 
my translation from Arabic).11 Al-maharim constitutes a set of kin (birth, 
marital and suckling) subject to marital prohibitions. By contrast, marriage 
between patrilateral parallel cousins, prohibited in some societies, is 
considered a desirable and preferred union and thus not subject to taboo.
Avoidances are manifested as formal behaviours, separation of spaces, 
and appearances in clothing and gestures that communicate distancing, 
such as the widely discussed practice of veiling by women. The Arabic for 
this kind of ritual avoidance is ihtijab, sharing the same root h-j-b from 
which hijab (‘Muslim woman’s head-cover’) derives (for a full discussion, 
see El Guindi 2003: 77–115).
Both revealing and puzzling in this connection is an incident reported 
in Hadith as having occurred in seventh-century Makka. I translate 
its recorded description this way: a Makkan woman called Zainab al-
Usdiyya came to the Prophet seeking guidance regarding the fact that 
her father died,  leaving behind an owned slave who bore his son. He 
requested to see the son. Upon looking at him he declared him heir to 
the deceased,  then  asked Zainab to ‘avoid’ him (Ibn ‘Abdul Birr 1070 
(463 A.H.): 321–323/4). By declaring him heir the boy was acknowledged 
as ‘son of groin’ of the deceased, but imposing avoidance by Zainab toward 
him means that he was not ‘admitted’ as her brother. Hence Zainab was 
10  Zina is usually used to mean adultery, in this case adultery with prohibited women, while the 
term sifah is more appropriate for reference to incest.
11  For an extended analysis of the derivatives of h-r-m see El Guindi (2003). 
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instructed to ritualise space and appearance and to maintain distancing 
behaviours toward him. In other words, they were not recognised as 
siblings, and thus were not in a relationship of maharim to each other, in 
which case the incest taboo cannot apply and hence avoidance (ihtijab) 
is prescribed. Without access to independent additional details about this 
case, I would guess that the absence of marriage between genitor and 
slave, and the genetrix’s status as slave, are the reasons behind the puzzling 
anomaly of being declared son with full inheritance rights but not brother 
to a ‘daughter of groin’.
Why adoption?
The ethnography of Oceania has contributed in many ways to kinship 
debates (Berman 2014; Brady ed. 1976; Carroll 1970; Goodenough 1956; 
Malinowski 2001; Rivers 1914; Scheffler 1970; Schneider 1984; Silk 
1980; Strathern 1988). Much of it centred on the pervasive phenomenon 
of the circulation of children in Oceania, referred to in scholarly works 
as ‘adoption’. That most circulation was among procreative relatives 
generated much dispute on the relative importance of biology and culture. 
Other explanations have been social organisational (affiliation, succession, 
inheritance), transactional (as exchange), psychological (belonging and 
tension between givers and receivers), and sociobiological (predictability 
on sociobiological grounds of adoptive decisions). Jack Goody (1969) 
contributed a cross-cultural synthesis of the legal aspects of adoption and 
Vern Carroll edited a volume pulling together many ethnographic studies 
on this phenomenon (Carroll 1970).
In his introduction to that volume Carroll defined adoption as 
‘any customary and optional procedure for taking as one’s own a child of 
other parents’ (Carroll 1970: 3). In the United States, ‘adoption’ involves 
securing a child of unknown parentage from an ‘adoption agency’, and 
resorting to complicated legal proceedings (Carroll 1970: 4). Carroll goes 
on to write that American adoption is often a transaction involving total 
strangers, whereas adoption in Oceania is generally a transaction between 
close relatives (Carroll 1970: 7).
But data systematically gathered in the field, as well as secondary data from 
Arab ethnography, can shed a different light on the notion of adoption. 
Adoption occurs among Arabs, but it is not recognised as kinship. It is 
not socially admissible as a means to incorporate nonkin into an existing 
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kinship network. Nonetheless, the sociological question emerging 
from my data is: Can adoption somehow bring about a transformation 
from stranger to kin?
Let me return to Ego, the woman who ‘brothered’ two infants. Her son by 
birth had died shortly after birth from some ailment and, after deliberation 
with her husband, she began the process of adoption, since her advanced 
age would prevent another pregnancy. Adoption is problematic—Islam 
does not legalise it and, as noted, society does not recognise it as a means 
to incorporate new kin. Relating how adoption in Ego’s case was calculated 
conveys processes central to the analysis of kinship structure.
After a long delay Ego succeeded in, officially but not legally, adopting 
a male baby. By then her lactation had stopped. Why is lactation important 
in this case? Ego and her husband are not genetrix and genitor (procreative 
mother and father) to the baby, and since adoption is not recognised as 
creating kinship, the boy remains a ‘stranger’ even after he is adopted. 
Hence the incest taboo cannot apply, and since he is male, avoidance is 
required from resident females. The incest taboo would then be the only 
means for the adoptee to become a kinsman. The activation of the incest 
taboo lifts prescribed, ritualised avoidance among strangers. The other 
means to lift avoidance is marriage, irrelevant to this case. In  order to 
become mother to her adopted son a woman has to nurse him, which was 
no longer a possibility for Ego since her lactation phase had ended.
Since suckling is not confined to procreative mothers and since any lactating 
woman qualifies to suckle within accepted social and cultural norms, Ego’s 
calculation involved locating an appropriate lactating woman at the time 
the baby boy was adopted. What she did was to time adoption with the 
expected birth by her brother’s wife. So once adoption actually took place 
the brother’s wife was lactating, and was asked to nurse the adoptee along 
with her own child. Given the cultural rule discussed earlier, adoptee and 
birth son who cosuckle become siblings. This way the suckling brother’s 
wife became the adoptee’s mother, and by extension Ego’s brother became 
father, and by further extension, Ego became paternal aunt to the adopted 
boy. And the cosuckled infants became siblings.
Given the cultural importance of enforcing cross-sex avoidance in cases 
of nonincestuous relations, Ego continued to have doubts about the 
sufficiency of suckling by her brother’s wife for lifting the otherwise 
prescribed avoidance. Becoming paternal aunt might be adequate, but 
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there was uncertainty as to its sufficiency. Ego wanted to ‘mother’ the 
adoptee, as if she were his birth mother; that is, to nurture him without 
the constrictions of avoidance. The solution was to resort to a means 
which would ‘double lock’ incest, as it were.
The granddaughter of Ego’s husband from a previous marriage (who lived 
in another country) was lactating and she was asked to nurse the adoptee. 
By doing so, Ego’s husband (grandfather of the suckling woman) became 
grandfather to the adoptee (who is now sibling to his birth great-grandson) 
and, by extension, Ego became the adoptee’s grandmother. Ego is now 
both paternal aunt via suckling through the procreative chain of kin, and 
grandmother through the affinal chain of kin. This doubly-secured lifting 
of avoidance enabled Ego to proceed with ‘mothering’ the adoptee.
However, even though Ego was able to become the adoptee’s procreative 
kin through both birth and marital channels, the ethnographic case shows 
that without direct suckling of the adoptee she could never become his 
mother. The only means for transforming stranger to kin are marriage, 
where applicable, or suckling, when possible. Suckling, carefully calculated, 
re-categorises procreative kin and lifts avoidance when it activates the 
incest taboo. It can construct and reconstruct kin by birth or kin by 
marriage. It can convert maternal kin into paternal kin and vice versa. 
The details of the ethnographic case presented here reveal structures and 
transformations with implications for kinship by birth, by marriage and 
by suckling. Finally, it invites reconsiderations of both anthropological 
notions of adoption and the incest taboo.
General conclusions
In conclusion, I restate what my analysis in this chapter sought to 
convey. First, I distinguished suckling as studied in Qatar and practices 
in contiguous areas from other practices of the ‘milk phenomenon’ in the 
region and those reported as having existed historically. Analysis of the 
practice reveals properties necessary as criteria of kinship among Qataris.
Second, analysis of ethnographic data on suckling showed interrelatedness 
among procreative, marital, and suckling kinship practices, which 
therefore constitute an integrated structure of kinship for Qataris. 
Third, and finally, I conclude that studying kinship and the process 
of ‘kinshipping’, as it were, using in-depth primary data, can tell us 
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something about what kinship ‘is all about’: namely a dynamic system of 
relations and transformations, a structure and a social reality in human life 
considerably more complex than reductionist claims can reveal. Suckling 
has a transformative function in kinship relations, constructs new links, 
creates new relations, transforms existing ones, intensifies and interlocks 
kin relations, prohibits some relations and creates others. It categorises 
and re-categorises kinship by birth and kinship by marriage. Adoption in 
Qatar poses a challenge to the cultural system, which legally disqualifies 
it but allows it to occur.
References
Abu-Zeid, Ahmad. 1991a. al-Mujtama’at al-sahrawiyya fi-Misr: shamal 
sina’, dirasa etnographiyya lil-nuthum wal-ansaq al-ijtima’iyya (Desert 
Communities in Egypt, North Sinai – Ethnographic Study of Social 
Structure and Organization). Cairo: al-Markaz al-Qawmi lil-Buhuth 
al-Ijtima’iyya wal-Jina’iyya, Qism Buhuth al-Mujtama’at al-Rifiyya wal 
Sahrawiya (National Centre for Social and Criminological Research – 
Research on Rural and Desert Communities Section).
——. 1991b. al-Mujtamaat al-sahrawiyya i Misr. shamal sina, dirasa 
etnographiyya lil-nuthum wal-ansaq al-ijtimaiyya (Desert Communities 
in Egypt, North Sinai – Ethnographic Study of Social Structure and 
Organization). Cairo: al-Markaz al-Qawmi lil-Buhuth al-Ijtimaiyya 
wal-Jinaiyya, Qism Buhuth al-Mujtamaat al- al-Rifiyya wal Sahrawiya 
(National Centre for Social and Criminological Research – Research 
on Rural and Desert Communities Section).
al-’Ayashi, Abdullah, bin Muhammad. 1679. al-Madina al-munawwara 
fi rihlat al-’ayashi; reprint 1988, edited by Muhammad Amahzun. 
Kuwait: Dar al-Arqam (page references are to the reprint edition).
Al-Magdoub, Ahmad. 2003. Zina al-maharim: al-shaytan fi buyutna 
(Incest: The Devil in our Households) (Arabic). Cairo: Maktabat 
Madbouli.
al-Samhoudi, Ali Bin Abdullah. 1972 [1505]. Khulasat al-wafa’ bi-akhbar 
dar al-mustafa. al-Madina al-Munawwara. Saudi Arabia: al-Maktaba 
al-’Ilmiyya.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
196
al-Tarmathi. n.d. Sunan al-tarmathii: The Book on Suckling (Arabic), Book 
12. Dar Al-Gam’a al-Gadida.
Altorki, Soraya. 1980. ‘Milk-kinship in Arab society: An unexplored 
problem in the ethnography of marriage’. Ethnology 19(2): 233–44. 
doi.org/10.2307/3773273
Berman, Elise. 2014. ‘Holding on: Adoption, kinship tensions, and 
pregnancy in the Marshall Islands’. American Anthopologist 116(3): 
578–90. doi.org/10.1111/aman.12116
Bohannon, Paul and John Middleton (eds). 1968. Kinship and Social 
Organization. Garden City, NY: American Museum Sourcebooks 
in Anthropology, the Natural History Press.
Bonte, Pierre (ed.). 1994. Epouser au plus proche: Inceste, prohibitions 
et strategies matrimoniales autour de la Méditerranée. Paris: Editions 
de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales.
Brady, Ivan (ed.). 1976. Transactions in Kinship: Adoption and Fosterage 
in Oceania. Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania 
Monograph 4. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Carroll, Vern. 1970. ‘Introduction: What does “adoption” mean?’ 
In Adoption in Eastern Oceania, edited by Carroll, 3–17. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press.
Carroll, Vern (ed.). 1970. Adoption in Eastern Oceania. Association for 
Social Anthropology in Oceania Monograph 1. Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press.
Carsten, Janet. 1997. The Heat of the Hearth: The Process of Kinship in 
a Malay Fishing Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
——. 2000. Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Code of Hammurabi of Babylon. ca. 2250 B.C.; reprint 1952, as 
The Babylonian Laws, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, edited by G.R. 
Driver and John C. Miles (page references are to the reprint edition).
Conte, Eduoard. 1987. ‘Alliance et parenté élective en Arabie ancienne. 
Éléments d’une problématique’. L’Homme 27(102): 119–38. doi.org/ 
10.3406/ hom.1987.368814
197
5 . PROPERTIES OF KINSHIP STRUCTURE
Cooper, John M. 1932. ‘Incest prohibitions in primitive culture’. 
Primitive Man 5(1): 1–20. doi.org/10.2307/3316422
Driver, G.R., and J.C. Miles. 1952. The Babylonian Laws, vol. 1. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
El Guindi, Fadwa. 1999. Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance. Oxford and 
New York: Berg.
——. 2011. ‘Kinship by suckling: Extending limits on alliance in 
endogymous systems’. In Anthropologicheskii Forum (Forum for 
Anthropology and Culture), Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology 
and Ethnography ((Kunstkamera), Russian Academy of Sciences, Special 
Forum on Kinship 15(7): 381–84.
——. 2012a. ‘Milk and blood: Kinship among Muslim Arabs in Qatar’. 
Anthropos 107(2): 545–55.
——. 2012b. ‘Suckling as kinship’. Anthropology Newsletter 53(1): n.p.
——. 2013. ‘Inceste, adoption et allaitement: logiques et dynamiques 
de l’évitement’. Incidence Revue 19: 121–37.
——. 2016. ‘Beyond fitness and nurture: The kinship paradox’. Structure 
and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences 9(2): 
66–78.
El Guindi, Fadwa and Wesam al-Othman. 2013. ‘Transformationality and 
dynamicality of kinship structure’. Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of 
Anthropological and Related Sciences 6(1). Online: escholarship.org/uc/
item/98z0r296 (accessed 6 June 2017).
El Guindi, Fadwa and Dwight Read. 2012. ‘Westermarck hypothesis 
reconsidered: A comment on Kushnick and Fessler’. Current 
Anthropology 53(1): 134–35. doi.org/10.1086/663576
Fortune, R. 1932. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. VII, s.v. Incest. 
New York: Macmillan.
Freud, Sigmund. 1831. Totem and Taboo. New York: The New Republic 
Edition.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
198
Giladi, Avner. 1998. ‘Breast-feeding in medieval Islamic thought: 
A preliminary study of legal and medical writings’. Journal of Family 
History 23(2): 107–23. doi.org/10.1177/036319909802300201
——. 1999. Infants, Parents and Wet Nurses: Medieval Islamic Views on 
Breastfeeding and their Social Implications. Leiden: Brill.
Goodenough, Ward H. 1956. ‘Componential analysis and the study 
or meaning’. Language 32(1): 195–216. doi.org/10.2307/410665
Goody, Jack R. 1969. ‘Adoption in cross-cultural perspective.’ Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 11(1): 55–78. doi.org/10.1017/
S0010417500005156
Héritier, Françoise. 1994. ‘Identité de substance et parenté de lait dans 
le  monde arabe’. In Epouser au plus proche: Inceste, prohibitions et 
strategies matrimoniales autour de la Méditerranée, edited by Pierre 
Bonte, 149–64. Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Science Sociales.
Héritier-Augé, Françoise and Elizabeth Copet-Rougier. 1995. La Parenté 
Spirituelle. Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines.
Ibn ‘Abdul Birr, Yusuf bin Abdullah. 1070. al-Isti’ab fi asma’ al-ashab, bi-
hamish kitab al-isaba libn hagar. Dar el-Fikr.
Ibn Manthur, Mohammad bin Makram. 1311. Lisan al-Arab al-muhit. 
Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Lisan al-Arab.
Ibn Sa’d, Muhammad. 844. al-Tabaqat al-kubra; reprint 1985, Beirut: 
Dar Sadir (page references are to the reprint edition).
Jones, Doug and Bojka Milicic (eds). 2011. Kinship, Language, and 
Prehistory: Per Hage and the Renaissance in Kinship Studies. Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press.
Khatib-Chahidi, Jane. 1992. ‘Milk-kinship in Shi’ite Islamic Iran’. 
In The Anthropology of Breast-feeding: Natural Law or Social Construct, 
edited by Vanessa Maher, 109–32. Oxford: Berg.
Kuper, Adam. 2002. ‘Incest, cousin marriage and the origin of human 
sciences in nineteenth century England’. Past and Present 174(1): 
158–83. doi.org/10.1093/past/174.1.158
199
5 . PROPERTIES OF KINSHIP STRUCTURE
Lacoste-Dujardin, Camille. 2000. ‘La filiation par le lait au Maghreb’. 
L’Autre. Cliniques, Cultures et Societe 1: 69–76. doi.org/10.3917/lautr. 
001.0069
Lancaster, William. 1997. The Rwala Bedouin Today. 2nd edition. Prospect 
Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1949. Les structures élémentaires de la parenté. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires Françaises; rev. and trans. James Harle 
Bell and John Richard von Sturmer, edited by Rodney Needham as 
The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969 (page 
citations are to the translated edition).
Long, Debbi. 1996. ‘Milky ways. Milk kinship in anthropological 
literature and in a Turkish village community’. MA thesis, University 
of Nijmegen.
Malinowski, Bronisław. 1927. Sex and Repression in Savage Society. Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd; reprint 2001, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press (page references are to the reprint edition).
McCabe, Justine. 1983. ‘FBD marriage: Further support for the 
Westermarck hypothesis of the incest taboo?’ American Anthopologist 
85(1): 50–69. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1983.85.1.02a00030
Parkes, Peter. 2001. ‘Alternative social structures and foster relations in the 
Hindu Kush: Milk kinship allegiance in former mountain kingdoms 
of northern Pakistan’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 43(1): 
4–36. doi.org/10.1017/S0010417501003565
——. 2003. ‘Fostering fealty: A comparative analysis of tributary 
allegiances of adoptive kinship’. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 45(4): 741–82. doi.org/10.1017/S0010417503000343
——. 2004a. ‘Fosterage, kinship, and legend: When milk was thicker 
than blood?’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 46(3): 587–615. 
doi.org/10.1017/S0010417504000271
——. 2004b. ‘Milk kinship in Southeast Europe: Alternative social 
structures and foster relations in the Caucasus and the Balkans’. 
Social  Anthropology 12(3): 341–58. doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676. 
2004.tb00112.x
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
200
——. 2005. ‘Milk kinship in Islam: Substance, structure, history’. 
Social  Anthropology 13(3): 307–29. doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676. 
2005.tb00015.x
Parkin, David and Linda Stone. 2004. Kinship and Family: 
An Anthropological Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Reinhart, A. Kevin. 1995. ‘Ḥarām’. In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the 
Modern Islamic World, 4 vols, edited by John L. Esposito, vol. 2, 101. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Rivers, William H.R. 1914. The History of Melanesian Society, 2 vols. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sahlins, Marshall. 2013. What Kinship Is – And Is Not. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226925134.001. 0001
Sallama, Amer Hussein. 2006. al-Muharramat min-al-nisa’ bi-sabab al-
Musahara. Alexandria: Dar al-Iman lil Tab’ wal Nashr wal Tawzi’.
Scheffler, Harold W. 1970. ‘Kinship and adoption in the northern 
New  Hebrides’. In Adoption in Eastern Oceania, edited by Vern 
Carroll, 369–89. Association for Social Anthropologists in Oceania 
Monograph 1. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
——. 1972. ‘Kinship semantics’. Annual Reviews in Anthropology 1: 
309–28. doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.01.100172.005121
——. 2004. ‘Sexism and naturalism in the study of kinship’. In Kinship 
and Family: An Anthropological Reader, edited by Robert Parkin and 
Linda Stone, 294–308. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Scheffler, Harold W. and Floyd G. Lounsbury. 1971. A Study in Structural 
Semantics: The Siriono Kinship System. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall.
Schneider, David M. 1984. A Critique of the Study of Kinship. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. doi.org/10.3998/mpub.7203
Shadid, Anthony. 2012. House of Stone: A Memoir of Home, Family, and 
a Lost Middle East. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
201
5 . PROPERTIES OF KINSHIP STRUCTURE
Shapiro, Warren. 2011. ‘What is Malay kinship primarily about? Or the 
new kinship studies and the fabrication of an ethnographic fantasy’. 
In Kinship, Language, and Prehistory: Per Hage and the Renaissance in 
Kinship Studies, edited by Doug Jones and Bojka Milicic, 141–51. Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Silk, Joan B. 1980. ‘Adoption and kinship in Oceania’. American 
Anthropologist  82(4): 799–820. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1980. 82.4. 02a 
00050
Smith, William Robertson. 1885. Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1988. The Gender of the Gift: Problems with 
Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia. Anthropology 
Series. Berkeley: University of California Press. doi.org/10.1525/
california/9780520064232.001.0001
Turner, Jonathan and Alexandra Maryanski. 2005. Incest: Origins of the 
Taboo. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Van Gelder, Geert Jan. 2013. ‘Incest and inbreeding’. In Encyclopedia 
Iranica, vol XIII, 5–6.
Wilgaux, Jérôme. 2000. ‘Entre inceste et échange: Réflexions sur le modèle 
matrimonial athénien’. L’Homme 154–55: 659–76. doi.org/10.4000/
lhomme.54
Wolf, Arthur P. 2014. Incest Avoidance and the Incest Taboos: Two Aspects 




Of Mothers, Adoption and 
Orphans: The Significance 




One day, in 1978, I accompanied a woman I call Lily on a trip that took 
us from the remote Aboriginal community of Numbulwar up the coast to 
an outstation for a few days of respite from the demands and distractions 
of settlement life. We were accompanied by three of Lily’s children and 
one of her sister’s sons, all of whom were of primary-school age. I was 
driving, Lily sat beside me and the children were in the back of the Land 
Rover. Her sister’s son was an active child and on the long and rough trip 
to the outstation appeared to annoy his ‘brothers’, one of whom may 
have smacked him. In any event, the sister’s son began to cry and was 
rebuked, perhaps by his attacker, with, ‘Stop crying, your mummy isn’t 
here’, clearly referring to the boy’s biological mother who had remained in 
the township. Now according to the kinship nomenclature employed at 
Numbulwar, particularly that of the Indigenous language, his ‘mother’ was 
there, for as is the case with Aboriginal kin terminology more generally, 
there is an equation of same-sex siblings; hence all the children with us 
that day called both Lily and her sister, ‘mother’. Still, this child’s ‘brothers’ 
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noted a distinction between their mother and his, and by extension, we 
may presume, between their cousin and themselves. Marshall Sahlins has 
decried the fact that ‘kinship has too often been analysed from the way it is 
lived and learned by individuals’ (2013: 66), but I do just that. Assuming 
that the locus of cultures is to be found in mind, rather than floating 
freely in a social ether (D’Andrade 1995; Shore 1996), the way something 
is ‘lived and learned by individuals’ is often just what anthropologists 
should be studying. Admittedly, as Melford Spiro pointed out with 
reference to a confusion between ‘cultural conceptions of the person’ and 
‘the actors’ conceptions of the self ’ (1993: 117), we should not assume 
that an encoded system of kin terminology is isomorphic with the way 
that kinship is ‘lived and learned’ but this hardly means that the latter 
is not worthy of our attention. Lily’s sons call her sister ‘mother’ and her 
son ‘brother’, but clearly they do not see Lily’s sister in the same way they 
see their mother, or see her son as exactly like themselves. This, I argue, 
is a critical kind of observation for understanding sociality in this remote 
Australian community, and likely elsewhere.
The nature/nurture debate, while quiescent in some anthropological 
quarters, has been characteristic of what is referred to as the ‘new kinship’ 
in which writers, often inspired by David Schneider’s (1968) discussion 
of American kinship, cast it as an entirely cultural construction (Sahlins 
2013). Marshall Sahlins provides us with another classic example of this 
stance, notable both for its persistence and longevity. In a sociobiological 
treatment of ‘Adoption in Oceania’, Joan Silk (1980) may have 
been the first in these debates to challenge his claim, that ‘kinship is 
a  unique characteristic of human society, distinguished precisely by its 
freedom from natural relationships’ (Sahlins 1976: 58; in Silk 1980: 
800). Some 30 years later he continues to provide us with examples of 
the dichotomisations of a topic that, at least, some now think is better 
treated in an integrative manner. Although he pays attention to human 
psychology, he continues to sever ‘meaningful social endowment’ from 
‘mere physiological substance’; insisting that kinship is ‘a thoroughly 
symbolic-cum-cultural phenomenon’ (Sahlins 2013: 65–66). In so doing, 
Sahlins ignores what a number of anthropologists increasingly see as vital 
components of cultural experience, what some describe as our ‘biogenetic 
heritage’: the potentials and constraints of our bodies and brains arising 
from our evolutionary history (e.g. Downey and Lende 2012). In contrast 
to the ‘new kinship’, the ‘extensionist’ position in kinship studies calls for 
just such treatment. Warren Shapiro (e.g. 2005, 2009, 2012) has long 
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and energetically defended extensionism, an approach which assumes 
that people in general are often, if not always, acute observers of human 
activity, including reproductive activity, and that a kinship term such as 
‘mother’ derives its meaning from the observation that a specific woman 
gives birth to a specific child. While these terms may be applied to others, 
in the case of ‘mother’, say, to her sisters, in some cases, it is recognised 
that in its extended application the entirety of its original meaning 
no longer applies. In this paper, I join Shapiro’s, and Silk’s, efforts by 
drawing upon the thinking of several writers who have attempted to 
incorporate inclusive fitness theory into kinship exegesis, thus integrating 
the biogenetic with the social and cultural. It will soon become clear 
that when viewed from an evolutionary perspective, Harold Scheffler’s 
defence of the ‘kinship terms and extensions’ (1978: 21) interpretation 
of Aboriginal kin classification, his ideas about polysemy, the focality of 
some kin, like fathers and mothers, and the extension of labels for them to 
less focal others makes perfect sense, at least in Aboriginal Australia. It also 
illuminates some of the behaviour associated with what I have labelled 
adoption/fosterage in the remote Aboriginal community of Numbulwar.
Inclusive fitness and cultural experience
William Hamilton’s (1964a, 1964b) theory of inclusive fitness, or kin 
selection, as it is sometimes known, has found a place at the centre of 
contemporary evolutionary thinking. ‘Fitness’ is the number of copies 
of an individual’s genes, relative to others of its kind that are passed on to 
the next generation. The idea that organisms increase their fitness insofar 
as they are able to increase that of their close kin, given a cost/benefit 
advantage to ego, helps us understand a great deal about human sociality. 
A brother, say, who instead of having children himself, provides the 
additional calories that his nieces and nephews need to survive, grow and 
reproduce, may well end up with greater fitness than he would were he to 
bring his own offspring into a world that could not support them, or if he 
were to contribute to the children of an unrelated individual. In discussions 
of inclusive fitness it is usually assumed that the probability of sharing 
alleles (a variant of a gene) with a parent or sibling is 0.5 or 50 per cent. 
The coefficient of relatedness between half siblings is 25 per cent, as is 
that of aunt/uncle and nephew/niece, grandparent/grandchild. That of 
first cousins is only 12.5 per cent (Buller 2005: 351–52; Daly and Wilson 
1983: 28–31). When Lily’s sister’s son was crying, he may well have been 
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appealing to her for help in a ‘fraternal’ rivalry, whatever that might have 
been. Crying can be a form of demanding, to which adults may choose to 
respond, or not. It seems a fair assumption that the sister’s son’s behaviour 
was seen by his ‘brother’ as an attempt to gain his mother’s allegiance and 
hence an advantage over her own son. The rebuke, ‘your mummy isn’t 
here’, can be read as a signal both to his rival and to his mother that her 
sister’s child was, in relatedness terms, less worthy of her attention than 
his opponents, her own genetic offspring.
The idea of inclusiveness fitness, like much of evolutionary theory, does 
not require organisms to act consciously in terms of its principles, only 
that their behaviour contributes to their greater relative fitness. Just what 
mechanisms may be at play and just what their ontological status may 
be has been a focus of evolutionary psychology, and considerable debate, 
for several decades (e.g. Buller 2005; Pinker 2003). Ideas about evolved 
psychological potentials, however, do not exclude a role for culture. 
On  the contrary, increasingly culture is understood to have been the 
critical component of the environment in which our bodies and brains 
originated and hence an intrinsic part of almost anything we are and do 
(e.g. Lende and Downey 2012; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Tomasello 
1999). The tricky part is understanding how biology and culture work 
together in human experience. 
Maurice Bloch and Dan Sperber (2002) posit a scenario in which species-
specific, genetically inherited, and hence universal, ‘dispositions’ direct 
our interest and attention to the kind of information we once needed, and 
perhaps still need, in the evolutionary game of reproductive success. This 
may occur even where historical processes have created settings where 
such information is neither emphasised nor valued. These dispositions do 
not create cultural representations, though they may contribute to their 
creation, but rather bias the possibility that such representations may 
stabilise in a cultural community. For example, inclusive fitness theory 
predicts that, ‘individuals would tend to show interest in evidence of 
relatedness, whether or not culturally codified’ (Bloch and Sperber 2002: 
732). Acting as attractors these dispositions create relative stability and 
limited variability in spite of processes—environmental and historical—
that constantly introduce variation and change into any cultural system 
(ibid.: 727–28). We might then understand whatever neuropsychological 
mechanisms exist to implement kin selection strategies as the attractors 
of kin-based behaviour in the midst of stochastic variations introduced in 
historical and environmental processes.
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The distinction between ‘your mother’ and the unspoken, though 
logically implied, ‘my mother’, suggests just such ‘interest in evidence 
of relatedness’ (Bloch and Sperber 2002: 732). Wubuy is the dominant 
Indigenous language of Numbulwar, though most people there today 
speak an English-based creole, called ‘Kriol’ by its speakers. In the Wubuy 
kinship terminology, same-sex siblings are equated linguistically as are 
their children. That is, the children of two sisters would call both of them, 
‘mother’ and the children of both women, ‘sibling’. However, while terms 
of address do not include words for distinguishing a biological mother 
from a classificatory one, the linguist Jeffrey Heath has made note of the 
word, ardiya. It is ‘not morphologically a kin term’, he says, but is used 
to designate an ‘expecting mother’ and distinguish a woman as the ‘true 
(biological) mother (of a particular child)’ (1982: 177).1 Furthermore, 
‘expressions like mana-da:n-jinyung “of the guts’” (i.e. of the womb) can 
be used in conjunction with the word for “mother” or “MoBr” to specify 
“actual mother” or “full brother of actual mother”’ (ibid.: 330). Shapiro 
has observed similar expressions in northeast Arnhem Land (1979: 8). 
In Wubuy only two terms, rrigang and bibi, are used for M, MZ, MB, 
MBD, MBS and MBSS in an Omaha-type skewing of the terminology. 
However, Kriol terms are used by many to distinguish M, MZ and MB 
from the remainder of these Wubuy categories. The former are designated 
as ‘mummy’ and ‘uncle’, the latter as the interchangeable terms ‘barnga’ or 
‘cuz’. While this may be an attempt to bring the local kin terminology more 
into accord with the English system—for Numbulwar is an intercultural 
environment and Aboriginal people often try to communicate in ways 
that English speaking outsiders will understand—we might note that the 
distinctions clearly reflect diminishing coefficients of relatedness: 50 per 
cent to 25 per cent for ‘mummy’ and ‘uncle’, but only 12.5 per cent to 
3.13 per cent for ‘barnga’ and ‘cuz’ and that their use may well represent 
a welcome means of expressing an intuitive sense of these differences.
Given kin selection as a force in human history, it is not surprising that 
humans appear to have capacities for kin recognition (e.g. DeBruine 
et  al. 2009; Lieberman, Tooby and Cosmides 2007a; Porter 1991), 
perhaps particularly those that enable phenotypic matching, the ability to 
1  Heath also points out that Wubuy phrases that may be translated as ‘to beget, sire, be the father 
of ’ or ‘to give birth to, bear, be the mother of ’ ‘are freely extendable to opposite-sex siblings of the 
designated parent; thus a woman can say … “I begat him” of her brother’s child ‘and a man can say 
… “I bore him” of his sister’s child. The mother’s clan or its territorial centre can also be said to have 
“borne” a given person’ (1982: 330).
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recognise kin on the basis of similarity, whether that of appearance, smell 
or sound. This is something that the people of Numbulwar believe they 
can do, on occasion with substantial consequences:
Sometimes a family here don’t like [an unmarried] girl in the first place. 
But when they get pregnant and they have that little baby and when they 
see that baby is true for their son, that baby has their son’s face, they won’t 
growl at that girl. They will feel ashamed [and let] them marry (Teenage 
girl, in Burbank 1988: 109).
Children, say women at Numbulwar, take their mothers’ and fathers’ 
bodies. When a child is a foetus both mother and father grow thin before 
they grow fat: 
The child takes mother and father’s body and makes them weak. Like 
Margira and his wife. They are strong because they don’t have any children.2 
They are a bit old but still strong, not like Margira’s brother who has 
children. He is weak (Woman speaking, unpublished fieldnotes, 1978). 
In particular, a man is said to give his children his face and his foot. 
Lest readers be confused by the word ‘foot’, let me explain that as far as 
the people of Numbulwar are concerned, feet mark the individuality of 
a person much as does a face. The footprints that each person leaves are 
regarded as distinctive and older people, at least, can identify the prints of 
close kin, if not of all familiar individuals. If a woman who is known to 
have a lover bears a child who does not look like her husband, its paternity 
may be suspect. Once, when I was accompanied in the field by my son 
and husband, a visiting neighbour emphatically declared that their feet 
were identical, a compliment, no doubt, on my marital fidelity (Daly and 
Wilson 1982). All of this is to reiterate that the people of Numbulwar 
appear to believe they have the means of distinguishing among actual and 
classificatory parents, children, siblings and other kin. They also, I argue, 
have the motivation to do so. The distinctions that people make between 
‘close family’ and others are, not surprisingly, reflected in behaviour. For 
example, only ‘close relations’ would take part in each other’s fights; should 
an outsider attempt to do so, he or she might well be attacked (Burbank 
1994: 76). And as with linguistic distinctions, these are not a peculiarity 
of Numbulwar. A child socialisation practice at Yuendumu provides 
an example from another remote Aboriginal community. There,  adults 
2  The word ‘strong’ is more often used in the sense of selfish or unwilling, as in ‘He is strong, he 
can’t let them use that tractor’ and is opposed to ‘kind’, giving or kind.
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regularly engage in lani-mani, frightening toddlers with the explicit intent 
of warning them of dangers such as bullocks and snakes. According to 
the ethnographer, ‘One only conducts lani-mani session with one’s own 
children … People say, “You gotta be close to that kid, it wouldn’t be right 
to scare other people’s children”’ (Musharbash 2016: 175).
Adoption/fostering
The ways in which people at Numbulwar both embrace a greater circle 
of kin than is typical in the western world, yet distinguish among those 
kin, and the fact that both the embrace and discrimination can be linked 
to coefficients of relatedness, helps us understand some of the practices 
and ideas associated with adoption/fostering in such a community. 
As neither ‘adoption’ nor ‘fosterage’ provide an adequate translation of 
the kind of alloparental care I discuss (see Goody 1971), both terms are 
used interchangeably to indicate that I am talking about practices that 
resemble both western arrangements.
If a woman has no babies and if another has plenty and if that woman with 
none likes one, she is going to ask, ‘Could you give me one that I could 
look after?’ The woman with plenty can’t say no because she has too many 
[a lot]. That stepmother will keep that little girl for her own, and when 
she is big that woman will do all the talking for her marriage or if there is 
trouble ... If someone asks the mother [about the girl’s marriage], she will 
say, ‘Don’t’ ask me, ask her stepmother’. And if the girl makes trouble the 
stepmother will pay for it, like broken windows. If the mother goes [to] 
another place the stepmother will keep the girl with her. They give little 
boys too (Burbank 1980: 52).3
Alloparental care is a practice both of past and contemporary local scenes. 
A residence survey of the 800 or so people living at Numbulwar in 
2003 indicates that there were at least 18 children under the age of 18 
who were living apart from both of their biological parents, while life 
history accounts of adults sometime include mention that a child was 
raised by someone other than his or her mother and/or father. Children 
have been given to others when their mother dies or when a woman asks 
a kinswoman for one of hers, sometimes because she has none of her own. 
On more than one occasion, when a child was thought to be at risk due 
3  I believe the word ‘stepmother’ used in this account was only for my benefit. It is not a word 
generally used to describe women looking after adopted/fostered children.
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to neglect or abuse, a kinswoman has stepped in and taken the child to 
raise as her own, at least for as long as necessary. Often a close genetic 
relationship, a coefficient of at least 25 per cent, can be traced between 
the carer and the child. In all cases of which I am aware, fostered children 
continue to be regarded as the child of their biological parents; they call 
their foster parents by the kin terms they would have used should they 
have stayed with their birth mothers.
Along with the responsibilities of caring for a fostered child come 
some rewards; there are both observable and less tangible benefits to 
alloparenting. As the speaker above indicates, in the days when girls 
were bestowed in marriage, a foster mother would have the right to 
make the bestowal.4 Today, women who foster infants and toddlers can 
anticipate ‘respect’ from them in future years. While ‘respect’ is a new 
word in the local idiom, people appear to use it to mean the help and 
support due to a person, especially a family member. Once, for example, 
a woman complained to me that a man she had once fostered as a child 
was not taking her side in an argument: ‘They gave him to me’ when 
he was little, after his mother died, ‘I was looking after him, he should 
respect me’ (2004).
Foster children can be of assistance to the fosterer, especially perhaps, 
if they are girls (see Hamilton 1981). A foster grandmother, for example, 
who had been looking after an adolescent girl until she moved on 
to live with other kin, told me how she had been talking to her other 
granddaughters: ‘Because [my foster child is] gone now, you are going to 
help me, wash my clothes, cook’ (2004). And foster parents may receive 
government ‘child cheques’, that is, Child Benefit money. 
There are, of course, also costs to fostering children. Numbulwar, like 
other remote communities in Australia, is a poor community. There are 
few if any people living there who do not sometimes lack for money and 
the essentials it can buy. Perhaps even more critically, there is social want 
as well. David McKnight’s (1986) ‘relational density’, a measure of the 
number of relationships characterised by kin-like rights and duties, is 
useful for visualising daily life at Numbulwar: so many relationships of 
material and emotional significance; so many people with so many needs. 
Looking at any kindred there, one can see, along with familial affection and 
4  This is assuming that the child had not been assigned a husband via mother-in-law bestowal. 
On mother-in-law bestowal, see Shapiro (1970).
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succour, myriad forms of trauma and disadvantage: premature mortality, 
mental and physical illness, disability, substance abuse, domestic violence, 
hunger, truancy, vandalism, unemployment, debt—the list could go on. 
As the speaker above indicates, along with other duties towards a child, 
fosterers may be held responsible for their misbehaviour, a responsibility 
that might, on occasion, even involve a caretaker in a physical fight 
(Burbank 1994). In such circumstances, the presence of a foster child 
might seem to be the straw that breaks the camel’s back (see Silk 1990) 
and we could argue here that the hardship of fostering should disabuse us 
of the notion that inclusive fitness acts as an attractor in the development 
of human culture, that it is instead solely based on moral sentiments. 
Would not a carer be more likely to get more copies of her genes into the 
next generation if she directed resources exclusively to her own biological 
children? Why foster another, less related child? Inclusive fitness theory 
permits another view, however. A broad perspective on human affairs is 
one of its theoretical strengths (Burnstein, Crandall and Kitayama 1994). 
Winning the fitness game takes more than just winning a fitness round. 
And to understand winning even a single round requires knowledge of 
the context in which a contest takes place. In some circumstances, such as 
those found at Numbulwar, fostering has the potential to enhance a carer’s 
fitness, and that of her close kin (see also Silk 1980).
There is considerable evidence that being seen as kin can be advantageous 
(e.g. Burnstein, Crandall and Kitayama 1994). Providing one’s own 
children with additional ‘siblings’ may thus be a way of increasing one’s 
own fitness and fostering may be a means of doing so (Silk 1980). Looking 
for ‘kin detection mechanisms’ among humans, Debra Lieberman, John 
Tooby and Leda Cosmides (2007a) provide empirical support for the 
possibility that ‘mother/child perinatal association’ and ‘sibling coresidence’ 
are two means by which humans are able to calculate relatedness. Some 
of their study subjects had step, adoptive or half siblings. Coresidence, 
in this case, better than belief in whether or not they were genetic kin, 
predicted altruism towards a step, half or adopted sibling (Lieberman, 
Tooby and Cosmides 2007b: 7) suggesting that early and sustained 
contact can lead both a woman’s biological child and her foster child to 
see each other as ‘close’ kin, appropriate recipients of help and generosity. 
As in most of the cases I know, fostered children are already regarded as 
‘close family’, and as such we can anticipate that reciprocal altruism would 
be reinforced, benefitting both the woman’s biological child and the foster 
child throughout their lifetimes, increasing the reproductive success of 
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each. Women then, we might also anticipate, should be motivated to 
treat foster children as their own, for this again would reinforce the lesson 
that all the children in her care are ‘close family’. Children clearly can 
learn that unrelated individuals or lesser kin can be like siblings or ‘close 
family’. But we need to ask why humans learn the kinds of things that 
they do (Bloch and Sperber 2003: 729). Were there not a disposition 
for kin discrimination, and associated neurobiological mechanisms for 
implementing it, could we learn to distinguish kin from nonkin, close kin 
from more distant kin, or care about doing so?
Orphans
In addition to children fostered as infants or toddlers, there are increasing 
numbers of older children at Numbulwar today who have lost one or 
both parents due to divorce, desertion or death. If they are left without 
adequate kin support, these children may become wangulu.
Wangulu is the word that Aboriginal people at Numbulwar use to translate 
the English word ‘orphans’. But wangulu are not necessarily children 
without parents. They are people who have no one to look after them. 
Whether or not one is an orphan is determined by the presence or absence 
of ‘support’, a word I first noted hearing from an Aboriginal English 
speaker in 2005. Adolescents without mobile phones may be described 
as wangulu. Or, ‘when you go anywhere and ask anyone for money and 
they can’t give you, they say wangulu’ (Burbank 2011: 151–52). Speaking 
of the Pintupi of Central Australia, Myers calls orphans yapunta and, 
much like the use of wangulu, says that yapunta may also signify that 
an object ‘does not belong to anyone’ or that ‘it has no one holding or 
looking after it’ (Myers 1988: 55). In the township of Borroloola, roughly 
209 kilometres down the coast from Numbulwar, some adolescent 
suicide victims are described as ‘poddy’ girls or boys, that is, as young 
people who were neglected by their families, often because of parental 
substance abuse (McMullen 2014). Sue McMullen observes that the term 
‘poddy’ appears to have been derived from ‘“poddy calf ”, a calf with no 
mother’ (ibid.: 113). With long experience of the cattle stations in the 
surrounding countryside, Aboriginal people at Borroloola might well be 
familiar with this term. Of the Pintupi yapunta, Fred Myers has said that 
such individuals manifest ‘an anger that is not appeased’ and are more 
likely to become ‘the most active petrol sniffing children’ (1986: 178). 
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Maggie Brady (1992: 75) has observed something similar of adolescents 
in the Western Desert, though it is not clear if these are children without 
parents or children with parents who ‘don’t worry’ about them (McMullen 
2014: 113). I have found a somewhat more complicated picture of people 
who might be considered wangulu at Numbulwar: they may be petrol 
sniffers, but they may also be those who are relatively ‘successful’ according 
to western standards (Burbank 2006: 17, 11).
More than one observer of Aboriginal Australia has noted that the 
highly responsive and nurturing kind of infant care characteristic of their 
communities is followed by a period of lessened parental engagement 
expressed in an expectation that more mature children who are able 
to ask for something will do so. Subsequently, children are largely left to 
their own devices when it comes to satisfying their needs, including their 
need for food (see Brady 1992; Hamilton 1981; Myers 1986). Crying, as 
mentioned above, may be one means of asking for something, an action 
that enables an adult to decide whether or not to respond. Thus children 
who are fostered at a more advanced age may be less likely to receive the 
same degree of nurturing that a younger child receives. Between 2003 and 
2005, I observed several children, both male and female, who appeared to 
be in just such a situation. For example, I repeatedly saw them wearing the 
same dirty clothing in contrast to the sometimes new and usually clean 
attire of their ‘siblings’. This relative neglect may not simply be a function 
of an adult’s awareness of a fostered child’s more distant kin position, 
however. It may also be due to the behaviour of the children they now live 
amongst. Once, for example, I overheard two teenage ‘sisters’ reproaching 
a third, younger, cousin who was being looked after by their grandmother. 
All three wanted a ‘cold drink’ but the money they asked for was not 
forthcoming. The fostered child was then told by her cousins that she 
was ‘a young girl’ now, an adolescent, and should be doing work for her 
fosterer, not asking her for money (unpublished fieldnotes, 2003).
What may be of particular significance in this case is the fact that the 
fostered adolescent’s father was from a distant community, and hence 
probably regarded, at best, as a distant sort of kin. As the theory of inclusive 
fitness goes, kin-based cooperation can be expected to reflect coefficients 
of relatedness. Like Eric Smith, those who work with evolutionary 
theory generally assume that ‘kinship ... is a key organizing principle in 
all societies’ but that ‘coefficients of relatedness drop off rapidly outside 
a narrow orbit of close kin’ (2003: 422). Stuart West, Claire El Mouden 
and Andy Gardner, however, have taken issue with the latter supposition, 
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observing that we assume, sometimes mistakenly, that ‘relatedness can 
only be high between close family relatives’ (2011: 243). They point out 
that the ‘well-known approximations of relatedness’, such as I have used 
above, are based on an assumption that a population is large and genetically 
diverse. We need to ask if this is indeed the case for a community such 
as Numbulwar, or if it is better described as a ‘viscous population’, one 
which is relatively sedentary, with little in or out migration. If the latter is 
the case, then ‘relatedness between group members can be relatively high 
because it will tend to increase the genetic similarity between interacting 
individuals’ (ibid.: 243). Although genealogies show some community 
exogamy occurring over the last four generations, Numbulwar is a small 
and largely stable population, numbering between only about 400 and 
800 people over the 30 years I have been working there. Given polygynous 
marriage, much of it sororal (Chisholm and Burbank 1991), and the 
leverate, practised until only a few generations ago, we might be right 
to assume a relatively high degree of relatedness as a characteristic of the 
community as a whole.5 Thus the extension of focality to seemingly more 
distant genetic relatives may well make sense as much in fitness terms as 
in terms of social solidarity (Park, Schaller and Van Vugt 2008; Shapiro 
2005). At the same time, someone like the adolescent cousin, with 
a parent from a distant population, may actually be less genetically related 
to her cousins at Numbulwar, and to her mother and grandmother, than 
she might have been had her father been a local man.
Close family
As should be apparent by now, people at Numbulwar take care to 
distinguish ‘close family’ from other kin and treat them differently, 
as  a rule. A segment of people in every egocentric social environment 
at Numbulwar is described as ‘close’ or ‘full relations’. The totality of 
these may be described as a personal kindred (Shapiro 1979: 57). One of 
the criteria for recognising someone as a ‘full relation’, or ‘family’ is the 
recognition of a genealogical link such as sharing a grandparent whether 
5  I have undertaken fieldwork at Numbulwar on eight occasions between 1977 and 2007. The last 
series of trips took place between 2003 and 2007. White and Parsons’ study of genetic differentiation in 
Arnhem Land ‘confirmed the relative isolation of the extreme Arnhem Land tribes’ (1973: 5). Although 
the Nunggubuyu were not included in this study, it is nevertheless suggestive in this context. A study in 
which the Nunggubuyu were included found notable genetic differentiation between groups in Arnhem 
Land and elsewhere in Australia (see Balakrishnan, Sanghvi and Kirk (1975).
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MM, FM, FF or MF. All of the people in one’s ‘clan’ are ‘family’ as are 
the people in one’s mother’s clan: ‘My family is Nunggargalung [speaker’s 
mother’s “clan”], like mother and uncle, family. My [mother’s mother] 
and [mother’s father].6 They feeling flesh. We say, “We all one race”’ 
(1978). Someone may, however, be regarded as a ‘full relation’ because of 
a totemic connection: ‘He is full relation to me because of that dreamtime 
story. Goanna comes from his country. I am goanna too, because goanna 
went from Wurindi to Hodgson Downs’ (unpublished fieldnotes, 1978). 
The term ‘close’, however, may be reserved for people with a genealogical 
link; ‘close’ was explained to me with reference to a shared ancestor, 
as in, they are ‘close family’ because they are ‘one granny’. And this in 
turn, as the spatial metaphor would suggest (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), 
is associated by some, at least, with greater cooperation and intimacy: 
‘We are same grandfather and grandmother, we like each other, we can 
share’ (unpublished fieldnotes, 2005).
Sometimes, however, even ‘close’ family may not be close enough. The 
harsh language directed to the fostered adolescent from her older cousins, 
might be interpreted simply as older children directing a younger one to 
do the kinds of things expected of her (see Hamilton 1981). However, the 
teenagers’ words did not strike me as this kind of instruction. They struck 
me as harassment, a mildly aggressive form of competition. I have seen too 
many contests between full siblings to say that competition is restricted 
to those who share smaller coefficients of relatedness. Nevertheless, it may 
be that children are the most active agents of kin differentiation when it 
comes to others who are not their parents’ own. The fostered girl was the 
teenage sisters’ ‘close relation’, but she may not, by virtue of her father’s 
genetic contribution, have been as close to her cousins as they were to each 
other, and they, in turn, to her fosterer, for they were the children of two 
local brothers with spouses from ‘clans’ long associated with Numbulwar. 
The question, however, is how might this discrimination be made? Clearly 
the teens knew that the adolescent’s father came from a distant community. 
But they also knew that the three of them shared grandparents. What 
form of information should take precedence? And how might this occur? 
Thinking again about mother/child perinatal association and sibling 
coresidence (Lieberman, Tooby and Cosmides 2007a), we might ask how 
much time the adolescent and her mother spent at Numbulwar during 
6  ‘Clan’ is what most people at Numbulwar call named groups associated with specific ‘country’ 
via patrifiliation, at least in conversation with whitefellas.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
216
her early years. These authors have observed that ‘when MPA [mother/
child perinatal association] is absent and coresidence is used as a cue to 
relatedness’ between ‘14–18 years of coresidence duration’ is required 
to have the same effect on individuals who have not witnessed mother/
child perinatal association (ibid.: 1). Coresidence, however, as mentioned 
above, can have powerful effects in creating a kin-like relationship 
between unrelated people (ibid.: 7). To  judge by the frequency of the 
adolescent’s visits to her father’s community between 2003 and 2007, it is 
probable that the two teenage ‘sisters’ spent much more time together 
than they spent with their adolescent cousin. The children of siblings 
are often companions throughout their early years, as was the case with 
Lily’s and her sister’s sons, whereas the adolescent cousin was, most likely, 
only an occasional visitor. By the same token, observation of her perinatal 
association with her mother would have been less frequent as well, thus, 
perhaps, creating the overall impression of the adolescent cousin as less 
rather than more a family member.
Sibling rivalry is an old theme in the psychological literature on child 
development. Here in a community where kin terms clearly grounded in 
the reproductive unit are extended to a more extensive range of people, it 
should not be surprising to see that ‘sibling rivalry’ may take place between 
people who are not genetic siblings. What may be more interesting about 
this extended rivalry, however, is the way it enables a fosterer to advantage 
her closest kin, without obviously violating norms of ‘caring and sharing’ 
for members of the larger kindred. The teenagers’ actions obscured the 
fosterer’s reluctance to provide money for ‘cold drinks’, enabling her, 
perhaps, to put her limited resources to better purpose. Silk has observed 
that when children are unrelated to their adoptive parents ‘the addition 
of a child is always costly for the existing children’ (1980: 802). At least 
some children at Numbulwar seem able to recognise this as the case 
when children are less related to the carer, and to themselves, if not in 
the language of fitness, then in the economic language of scarce resources. 
When children who are more related to a carer compete with children 
who are less so, they may be acting not only in their own but also in the 
caregiver’s reproductive interests.
Numbulwar is an environment in which even the unity of ‘close family’ 
might be disrupted for it is fairly described as an environment characterised 
by want. Yet its Indigenous inhabitants are surrounded by ‘whitefella’ 
wealth, much of which appears to be extremely attractive, whether this be 
a mobile phone or a ‘cold drink’ (Burbank 2011). For children especially, 
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the inadequate incomes of their households and the dearth of adult carers, 
due to high rates of premature morbidity and mortality, create a scarcity 
of necessary and desired goods and adults they can turn to in times of 
need. In these circumstance it would not be surprising if the teenage 
‘sisters’ saw themselves in competition with their adolescent cousin for 
essential resources. This observation and others like it suggests that it 
may be children rather than adults who are the primary agents of kin 
discrimination when a foster child is in the family.
Conclusion
In what may be a ‘viscous population’, the fact that kin terms for nuclear 
family members are often extended to others suggests an intuitive 
understanding that many if not most individuals in the community are 
relatively close, genetically speaking. Nevertheless, Aboriginal people, at 
least at Numbulwar, take pains to distinguish actual from classificatory 
kin, and ‘close family’, or just ‘family’, from others. These distinctions 
reflect both biological and sociocultural realities. In an environment of 
scarcity, competition is to be expected and, especially in cases where such 
competition may be critical not simply for quality of life, but for life 
itself, coefficients of relatedness are pertinent (see Burnstein, Crandall and 
Kitayama 1994). Just how relatedness is determined in this community 
can only be extrapolated from the experimental literature. Mother/
child perinatal association and coresidence have a face validity for the 
situation at Numbulwar. However, the children there complicate a simple 
understanding of this process. They are not blank slates ready to receive 
information from something like coresidence without challenge. While 
addressing the topic of ‘parent offspring conflict’, several observers of 
infant behaviour have interpreted night waking as a means of delaying 
the arrival of the next child, an event which could compromise the health, 
or even life, of the existing one (Badcock 1990: 74–75). Here we might 
interpret night waking as an anticipatory form of sibling rivalry, suggesting 
a readiness to attend to information about threats of resource competition 
even from the closest of kin. Hence, other aspects of the environment, 
such as the abundance or lack of food and the presence or absence of 
nurturing adults may provide equally compelling information to which 
children are disposed to attend (see Burbank, Senior and McMullen 
2015; Nettle, Coyne and Colléony 2013).
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Some years ago, Daly, Wilson and Weghorst (1982) observed that 
male sexual jealousy was manifest in societies where its expression was 
contrary to social convention, suggesting that jealousy-like emotions were 
something more than cultural inventions. Similarly, Bloch and Sperber 
have postulated that dispositions exist apart from culture, and that when 
expressed they need not ‘be reflected in a cultural norm’ (2002:  731). 
We probably should not speak of a precultural human, however, for 
culture is so much a part of what we are; our species’ heritage is inevitably 
assimilated into our cultural selves even before birth (Downey and 
Lende 2012; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Tomasello 1999). We are, 
however, also animals and hence our biogenetic heritage needs analytic 
space and attention as an agentic source of our behaviour. In pursuing 
this route, integrating what we know about biology and psychology into 
our ethnographic interpretations, I believe we gain a far more detailed 
understanding of what we currently regard as the cultural aspects of being 
human. Understanding that kin selection and kin recognition are a part of 
what we are and what we do enriches our understanding of our own and 
others’ social arrangements just as Scheffler’s support and elaboration of 
the extensionist position has alerted us to the potential significance of kin 
discrimination in Aboriginal Australian communities. 
Acknowledgements
Fieldwork was supported by the then Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
Studies, now the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Studies, Canberra and by an Australian Research Council 
Discovery Project grant (DP0210203) received with Robert Tonkinson 
and Myrna Tonkinson in 2001.
References
Badcock, Christopher. 1990. Oedipus in Evolution: A New Theory of Sex. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Balakrishnan, V., L. Sanghvi and R. Kirk. 1975. Genetic Diversity among 
Australian Aborigines. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
Studies.
219
6 . OF MOTHERS, ADOPTION AND ORPHANS
Berndt, Ronald (ed.). 1970. Australian Aboriginal Anthropology: Modern 
Studies in the Anthropology of the Australian Aborigines. University of 
Western Australia, Perth: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
Bloch, Maurice and Dan Sperber. 2002. ‘Kinship and evolved psychological 
dispositions: The mother’s brother controversy reconsidered’. Current 
Anthropology 43(5): 723–48. doi.org/10.1086/341654
Brady, Maggie. 1992. Heavy Metal: The Social Meaning of Petrol Sniffing 
in Australia. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press.
Buller, David. 2005. Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the 
Persistent Quest for Human Nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Burbank, Victoria. 1980. ‘Expressions of anger and aggression in an 
Australian Aboriginal community’. PhD thesis, Rutgers University, 
New Brunswick, NJ.
——. 1988. Aboriginal Adolescence: Maidenhood in an Australian 
Community. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
——. 1994. Fighting Women: Anger and Aggression in Aboriginal Australia. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
——. 2006. ‘From bedtime to on time: why some Aboriginal people don’t 
especially like participating in western institutions’. Anthropological 
Forum 16(1): 3–20. doi.org/10.1080/00664670600572330
——. 2011. An Ethnography of Stress: The Social Determinants of Health in 
Aboriginal Australia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. doi.org/10.1057/ 
9780230117228
Burbank, Victoria, Kate Senior and Sue McMullen. 2015. ‘Precocious 
pregnancy: Sexual conflict and early childbearing in remote Aboriginal 
Australia’. Anthropological Forum 25(3): 243–61. doi.org/10.1080/00
664677.2015.1027657
Burnstein, Eugene, Christian Crandall and Shinobu Kitayama.1994. 
‘Some neo-Darwinian decision rules for altruism: Weighing cues 
for inclusive fitness as a function of the biological importance of the 
decision’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(5): 773–89. 
doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.5.773
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
220
Chisholm, James and Victoria Burbank. 1991. ‘Monogamy and polygyny 
in southeast Arnhem Land: Male coercion and female choice’. 
Ethology and Sociobiology 12(4): 291–313. doi.org/10.1016/0162-
3095(91)90022-I
Daly, Martin and Margo Wilson. 1982. ‘Whom are newborn babies said 
to  resemble’. Ethology and Sociobiology 3: 69–78. doi.org/10.1016/ 
0162-3095(82)90002-4
——. 1983. Sex, Evolution and Behaviour, 2nd edition. Boston: Willard 
Grant Press.
Daly, Martin, Margo Wilson and Suzanne Weghorst. 1982. ‘Male sexual 
jealousy’. Ethology and Sociobiology 3(1): 11–27. doi.org/10.1016/ 
0162-3095(82)90027-9
D’Andrade, Roy. 1995. The Development of Cognitive Anthropology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781139166645
DeBruine, Lisa, Finlay Smith, Benedict Jones, S. Roberts, Marion Petrie 
and Tim Spector. 2009. ‘Kin recognition signals in adult faces’. 
Vision Research 49(1): 38–43. doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2008.09.025
Downey, Greg and Daniel Lende. 2012. ‘Neuroanthropology and 
the encultured brain’. In The Encultured Brain: An Introduction to 
Neuroanthropology, edited by Daniel Lende and Greg Downey, 23–66. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goody, Esther. 1971. ‘Forms of pro-parenthood: The sharing and 
substitution of parental roles’. In Kinship edited by Jack Goody, 
331–62. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Goody, Jack (ed.). 1971. Kinship. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Hamilton, Annette. 1981. Nature and Nurture: Aboriginal Child-Rearing 
in North-Central Arnhem Land. Canberra: Australian Institute 
of Aboriginal Studies.
Hamilton, William. 1964a. ‘Genetic evolution of social behaviour, I’. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 7(1): 1–16. doi.org/10.1016/0022-
5193(64)90038-4
221
6 . OF MOTHERS, ADOPTION AND ORPHANS
——. 1964b. ‘Genetic evolution of social behaviour, II’. Journal 
of  Theoretical Biology 7(1): 17–52. doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193 (64) 
90039-6
Hammerstein, Peter (ed.). 2003. Genetic and Cultural Evolution 
of Cooperation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heath, Jeffrey. 1982. Nunggubuyu Dictionary. Canberra: Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
Ingold, Tim, David Riches and James Woodburn (eds). 1988. Hunters 
and Gatherers: Property, Power and Ideology, vol. 2. Oxford: Berg.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh: 
The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: 
Basic Books.
Lende, Daniel and Greg Downey (eds). 2012. The Encultured Brain: 
An Introduction to Neuroanthropology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lieberman, Debra, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides. 2007a. 
‘The  architecture of human kin detection’. Nature 445 (February): 
727–31. doi.org/10.1038/nature05510
——. 2007b. ‘The architecture of human kin detection: Supplementary 
information’. Nature 445 (February): 1–10. doi.org/10.1038/nature 
05510
McKnight, David. 1986. ‘Fighting in an Australian Aboriginal supercamp’. 
In The Anthropology of Violence, edited by David Riches, 137–63. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
McMullen, Sue. 2014. ‘“Growing up fast”: The sexual and reproductive 
health of young women in a remote Aboriginal town’. PhD thesis. 
Charles Darwin University, Darwin.
Musharbash, Yasmine. 2016. ‘Evening play: Acquainting toddlers with 
dangers and fear at Yuendumu’. In Social Learning and Innovation 
in Contemporary Hunter-Gatherers, edited by Hideaki Terashima and 
Barry Hewlett, 171–78. Tokyo: Springer. doi.org/10.1007/978-4-
431-55997-9_14
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
222
Myers, Fred. 1986. Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and 
Politics Among Western Desert Aborigines. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
——. 1988. ‘Burning the truck and holding the country: Property, time, 
and the negotiation of identity among Pintupi Aborigines’. In Hunters 
and Gatherers: Property, Power and Ideology, vol. 2, edited by Tim 
Ingold, David Riches and James Woodburn, 52–74. Oxford: Berg.
Nettle, Daniel, Rebecca Coyne and Agathe Colléony. 2012. ‘No country 
for old men: Street use and social diet in urban Newcastle’. Human 
Nature 23(4): 375–85. doi.org/10.1007/s12110-012-9153-9
Park, Justin, Mark Schaller and Mark Van Vugt. 2008. ‘Psychology 
of  human kin recognition: Heuristic cues, erroneous inferences, 
and their implications’. Review of General Psychology 12(3): 215–35. 
doi.org/ 10.1037/1089-2680.12.3.215
Pinker, Steven. 2003. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human 
Nature. London: Penguin.
Porter, Richard. 1991. ‘Mutual mother-infant recognition in 
humans’. In Kin Recognition, edited by Peter G. Hepper, 413–32. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi.org/10.1017/CBO 
9780511525414.016
Richerson, Peter and Robert Boyd. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture 
Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sahlins, Marshall D. 1976. The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological 
Critique of Sociobiology. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan 
Press.
——. 2013. What Kinship Is – And Is Not. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226925134.001.0001 
Scheffler, Harold W. 1978. Australian Kin Classification. Cambridge 
Studies in Social Anthropology No. 23. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557590 
Schneider, David M. 1968. American Kinship: A Cultural Account. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
223
6 . OF MOTHERS, ADOPTION AND ORPHANS
Shapiro, Warren. 1970. ‘Local exogamy and the wife’s mother in Aboriginal 
Australia’. In Australian Aboriginal Anthropology: Modern Studies in the 
Anthropology of the Australian Aborigines, edited by Ronald Berndt, 
51–69. University of Western Australia, Perth: Australian Institute 
of Aboriginal Studies.
——. 1979. Social Organization in Aboriginal Australia. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.
——. 2005. ‘Universal systems of kin categorization as primitivist 
projects’. Anthropological Forum 15(1): 45–59. doi.org/ 10.1080/ 
0066467042000336706
——. 2009. Partible Paternity and Anthropological Theory: The Construction 
of an Ethnographic Fantasy. New York: University Press of America.
——. 2012. ‘Extensionism and the nature of kinship: Comment’. 
Journal  of the Royal Anthropological Institute (n.s.) 18(1): 191–93. 
doi.org/10.2307/41350814
Shore, Bradd. 1996. Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture, and the Problem 
of Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silk, Joan. 1980. ‘Adoption and kinship in Oceania’. American 
Anthropologist  82(4): 799–820. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1980.82.4. 02a 
00050
——. 1990. ‘Human adoption in evolutionary perspective’. Human 
Nature 1(1): 25–52. doi.org/10.1007/BF02692145
Smith, Eric. 2003. ‘Human cooperation: Perspectives from behavioral 
ecology’. In Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, edited by 
Peter Hammerstein, 429–44. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Spiro, Melford E. 1993. ‘Is the western conception of the self “peculiar” 
within the context of the world cultures?’ Ethos 21(2): 107–53. 
doi.org/ 10.1525/eth.1993.21.2.02a00010
Terashima, Hideaki and Barry Hewlett (eds). 2016. Social Learning 
and  Innovation in Contemporary Hunter-Gatherers. Tokyo: Springer. 
doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55997-9
Tomasello, Michael. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
224
Tomasello, Michael, Malinda Carpenter, Joseph Call, Tanya Behne 
and Henrike Moll. 2005. ‘Understanding and sharing intentions: 
The origins of cultural cognition’. Behavioral and Brain Science 28(5): 
675–735. doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000129
West, Stuart, Claire El Mouden and Andy Gardner. 2011. ‘Sixteen 
common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in 
humans’. Evolution and Human Behaviour 32(4): 231–62. doi.org/ 
10.1016/ j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.001
White, N. and P. Parsons. 1973. ‘Genetic and socio-cultural differentiation 
in the Aborigines of Arnhem Land, Australia’. American Journal of 
Physical Anthropology 38(1): 5–14. doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.1330380106
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Enhancing the Kinship 
Anthropology of Scheffler 




This chapter is an appreciation of a figure in the anthropology of kinship 
in general, and particularly of Aboriginal Australia: Hal Scheffler. Scheffler’s 
brilliant work on the formalisation of types of kinship extension and his 
Australian Kin Classification (1978) have been less appreciated by some in 
the era of ‘new kinship studies’ but the ‘renaissance of kinship’ of recent 
years will certainly restore its currency. Two missing elements in Scheffler’s 
work are the diachronic dimension, and the role of linguistic evidence in 
reconstructing paths of change: this chapter will show concretely how these 
elements add to a more complete kinship ethnology. Scheffler’s concept of 
‘extension’ and his application of it to Australian Aboriginal kinship remain 
the foundation for work in kinship change and reconstruction, and dovetail 
neatly with theories of semantic change via transitional polysemy applied in 
Australia. However, some types of semantic change in kinship terminology 
do not fit so easily within the framework. I argue here that these may be 
more tractable if we recognise variation in pragmatic usage of terms, caused 
by shifts in centricity (Garde 2013; Merlan 1982) as also leading to change 
in meaning of terms without such obvious evidence of transitional polysemy.




In the work of Scheffler, extension describes a purely synchronic 
relationship between a focal kin-term meaning and its other ‘extended’ 
meanings. In the formalism developed by Floyd Lounsbury and Scheffler, 
rules take kin-type strings as input and reduce them to the focal kin type. 
These are often referred to as ‘equivalence rules’ or ‘reduction rules’. They 
are similar to rewrite rules in early generative phonology and syntax.1
Relationships between two or more meanings that are distinguished 
as different words in some languages, but merged as one in others, are 
described in various different ways also. The case where the two meanings 
are represented by one lexical item can be called a ‘syncretism’, or the 
word with two distinct senses can be termed ‘polysemous’. The notion 
of ‘extension’ adds a further element to this by stating that one sense is 
‘focal’ or ‘core’ and the others are extended from that. There is potential 
for confusion in that ‘extension’ can be interpreted as a diachronic process 
whereby at some point in time another meaning or other meanings are 
added; or as a notion defined without reference to change over time.2 This 
chapter aims to distinguish and clarify this ambiguity for the realm of 
kinship terminology at least. 
David Kronenfeld (1996) gives a summary of work in an extensionist 
framework and its advantages over a ‘conjunctivist’ approach such as 
componential semantics. He particularly focuses on kinship analysis 
including his own work on Fanti (2009), which uses a slight modification 
of the Lounsbury–Scheffler framework, enabling use of both reduction 
and expansion rules. He presents some examples of how the Lounsbury 
1  Vladimir Pericliev (2013: 15–20) describes Lounsbury’s extensionist approach and other theories 
that have built on componential semantics. He notes (2013: 16) that the extensionist approach to 
kinship in anthropology goes back to Bronisław Malinowski’s (1929: 525–26) idea that children first 
acquire the terms for elementary relationships like ‘mother, ‘sister’ then extend them to more distant 
relationships to form a classificatory system. It is incorrect that the extensionism of Lounsbury and 
Scheffler truly relies on componentialism in defining the basic elements of kinship strings: rather they 
arise from relative products of elements like ‘mother’, ‘sister’ etc. (see Kronenfeld 1996: 155). 
2  ‘Extension’ has a different meaning in the philosophy of language and often in linguistic semantics, 
where it is contrasted with ‘intension’ as two ways of defining the meaning of a word. In this sense 
‘extension’ involves a listing of the referents of a word, while ‘intension’ defines the word in terms 
of some combination of concepts drawn from a semantic metalanguage. In this theoretical discourse, 
therefore, the ‘extension’ being discussed in this chapter is a variety of intensional definition. While this 
is confusing, it would be more confusing to change the theoretical terminology at this point.
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approach handles Crow skewing (Figures 17–19; Lounsbury 1964).3 
Skewing is a form of extension in which members of adjacent generations 
are referred to by the same term. In order to describe skewing accurately, 
it is necessary to combine the actual skewing rule with other rules that 
are of more general applicability also in systems without skewing such as 
Merging (Figure 17), which is the rule that plays a part in defining, for 
instance, Bifurcate Merging systems.
Lounsbury’s reduction rules for Crow-type 
kinship terminologies: Merging rule
 
 ________ 
 ∣    ∣ →  
 ❍  ❍  ❍ 
     ∣ 
 Figure 17. Somebody’s mother’s sister is equivalent to that somebody’s mother, and reciprocally, some woman’s sister’s descendant is equivalent 
to that woman’s own descendant
Source: Adapted from Kronenfeld (1996: 156, Figure 9.1) and used with permission.
 
i.e. …MoSi →…Mo and 
♀Si… →♀… 
 ________ 
 ∣    ∣    
 ∆  ∆  ∆ 
     ∣ 
Figure 18. Somebody’s father’s brother is equivalent to that somebody’s 
father, and reciprocally, some man’s brother’s descendant is equivalent 
to that man’s own descendant
Source: Adapted from Kronenfeld (1996: 156, Figure 9.1) and used with permission.
3  The original notation of Lounsbury is used here. Elsewhere in this chapter, the kin abbreviations 
are changed from e.g. MoSi to MZ for ‘mother’s sister’ etc. as used in the AustKin project.
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 Skewing Rule (Crow-Type, Type 1) 
 ________ 
 ∣    ∣    
 ❍  ∆  ∣ ❍  
 ∣  ∣  ∣ ∣ 
Figure 19. Somebody’s mother’s brother’s child is equivalent to that 
somebody’s own brother’s child, and reciprocally, somebody’s father’s 
sister’s child is equivalent to that somebody’s father’s sibling
Source: Adapted from Kronenfeld (1996: 156, Figure 9.1) and used with permission.
The extension rules can be classified into a small number of types. Such 
rules working together in constrained combinations can define the range 
of kinship systems that are known in world societies.
Extension rule types: Scheffler on Australia
Scheffler took on a major challenge in dealing with the range of Australian 
kinship systems in terms of the extensionist formalism in his Australian 
Kinship Classification (1978). The seeds of extensionism were present in 
A.R. Radcliffe-Brown but Scheffler went beyond the Radcliffe-Brown 
typology (1930–31), which had been dominant until that time. 
Many found the prose of this book and the kinds of formal rules, as in the 
following example (Scheffler 1978: 145), dense and difficult.
Example of equivalence rules for a ‘Kariera’ system 
from Scheffler
Equivalence rules in Mari’ngar kin classification:
 1. Half-sibling-merging rule
  (PC→Sb), self-reciprocal
 2. Stepkin-merging rule
  (PSp→P) = (SpC →C)
 3. Same-sex sibling-merging rule
  (…m/wSb // → m/w) = (m/wSb//… → m/w…)
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 4. Parallel-cross neutralisation rule
  (FZ. → FB.) = (.wBC →.mBC)
  (MB.→ MZ.) = (.mZC→.wZC)
 5. Parallel-cross status extension rule
  (FFSbxC→MSb) = (PSbxSC →ZC) (1978: 145, Table 4.4)
Nevertheless, the idea of extension and equivalence rules captured well the 
polysemies in these classificatory systems and the variations between the 
different systems in different groups. Others, including me, have tried to 
use the essential insights of these schemes to come up with more general 
and simplified schemes such as shown in Table 2.4
Table 2. Common equations and paths of semantic change in Australian 
kinship terms









A Merger within 
parallel and 
within cross
FF = MMB ≠ MF 
= FMB
‘Kariera’ 5: 226 Parallel‑cross 
status –
extension
B Merger of same 
gender
FF = MF ≠ MM 
= FM

















7: 226; 376 AGA
E Consanguineal-
affinal
FZ = WM 8: 226 Spouse‑
equation




Source: McConvell (2013c: 156).
4  The table has been slightly altered from the published version. AGA (Alternate Generation 
Agnatic) was included in the publication but not AGU (Alternate Generation Uterine).




This ‘extension’ can, I propose, also be extended to describe diachronic 
change in kinship terms, which I shall call ‘extension change’. The addition 
of the Omaha-skewing rule (Code C in Table 2) can, for instance, add the 
meaning MBS to a term meaning MB, and MBD to a term meaning M. 
Subsequently the original meaning may be lost in some languages. 
By hypothesis the change is unidirectional because the extension is from 
for instance MB to MBC, not the reverse. This is in fact what we find in 
all cases in Australia, based on linguistic evidence (McConvell and Alpher 
2003; McConvell 2013b).
Similarly, other equivalences in Table 2 have their counterparts in 
diachronic change. For instance, D, Alternate Generation Equivalence, 
provides for the same term being used for grandparents and siblings or 
cousins, on a synchronic plane. There are also examples of words meaning 
parallel grandparent in some languages and siblings in others, for instance 
the widespread term kaku in Australia. By hypothesis this results from 
a transitional polysemy of this type in which only one meaning survives. 
This diachronic extension may or may not exhibit a fixed directionality of 
change: further research is needed to establish this empirically, for instance 
to determine which is the earlier meaning of kaku in Pama–Nyungan—
elder sibling or father’s father.5
‘Transitional polysemy’ mentioned above is therefore the stage in a change 
process in which two senses of a kinship term are found together in one 
language at one time. Figure 20 is the general form of the process, with 
stage 2 being the stage of transitional polysemy. An actual example is 
given of the change in *kaala due to Omaha skewing.
Stages:  1   2   3 
Senses: A   A + B   B 
Example:  kaala ‘MB’  kaala ‘MB + MBC’ kalay MBC 
  N. E. Qld.  N.W. Qld.  Yolngu 
 Figure 20. Transitional polysemy
Source: McConvell (2013b: 253–54).
5  Kaku for instance turns up as eB in Gumbaynggirr, on the north coast of New South Wales.
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The following sections take a look at the relationship between extension 
and history in two North American language families, before discussing 
the relationship between extension as synchronic overlay and diachronic 
change in general, then returning to discussion of Australia.
Whistler on Wintun
 
1. Half-sibling merging rule 
(PC→ Sb)  → Sb  self-reciprocal 
2. Parallel sibling merging rules 
(♂B. Pa♂…) ≋ (…♂B → …♂)  all 
(♀Zll …♀…) ≋ (…♀Z → …♀)  WPR, WPH, WHHPas, WWMay2, WM 
(♂B+… → (♂…)+) ≋ (…♂B- → (…♂)-) WWSac, WWMc  
(♀Z+… → (♀…)+) ≋ (…♀Z- → (…♀)-) 
3. Skewing rules affecting cross-collateral kin 
3A. Skewing rules affecting FZ etc. 
• Type II Omaha Skewing rule 
3A.  (FZ. → Z+) ≋ (♀BC  . ♀SB-)  WPR, WPH, WHHPas 
• Paternal cross-aunt merging rule 
3Ate (FZ. → MBW.) ≋ (.♀BC  → .HZC) WWMay, WWMc (Gifford) 
 (FZH. → MB.) ≋ (.♂WBC  → .HZC) 
• Cross-nuncle merging rule 
3Aoss (PxSb → PP.) ≋ (.♂/♀xSbC) → PP♂/♀CC)   WWSac, WWMc (DuBois) 
 (PxSbSp → PP.) ≋ (.♂/♀SpxSbC)  → PP♂/♀CC) 
3B. Skewing rules affecting cross-cousins etc. 
• Type III Omaha skewing rule 
3B. (♂Z(.→(♂D…) ≋ (…♀B → …♀F) WPR, WPH,WHHPas, 
       WWMay, WWMc (Gifford) 
 
Figure 21. Extension in change: Whistler on Wintun
Source: Created by Patrick McConvell from information in Whistler (1980: 284).
The extensionist theory of Lounsbury and Scheffler has only rarely been 
applied to diachronic change. One example is the work of Ken Whistler 
in his PhD dissertation (1980) on Wintun kinship reconstruction 
(California). In Figure 21, the Lounsbury-style rules are listed on the 
left by name, then in the middle column the equivalence rules are stated 
formally. In the right-hand column are abbreviations for the languages or 
dialects in which each of the rule variants is found (Whistler 1980: 284). 
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The most important area of variation in equivalence relates to the skewing 
rules. These are all of ‘Omaha’ type but differ from the Omaha Type I 
found most generally in Australia (McConvell 2013b).
George Murdock (1949) proposed a prehistoric development of kinship 
systems in Wintu based on an evolution set out in Figure 22. This is 
what Whistler calls a ‘non-lexical reconstruction’—it does not take 
account of the form of kinship terms. By contrast Whistler’s (1980: 347) 
reconstruction in Figure 22 is based on lexical evidence, and on this basis 
Murdock’s proposal can be shown to be false. Whistler’s reconstruction 
(Figure 23) of the development of different types of Omaha skewing 
traces its stages through a phylogeny of Wintu languages.
Murdock’s  Normal Dakota → Neo-Dakota → Neo-Yuman (Wintu) 
Explicit  
Reconstruction  by residence change by descent change 
 
Extrapolation  
of Murdock’s      Normal Omaha   (Patwin, 
reconstruction           Nomlaki) 
 
 
Figure 22. Murdock on Wintun kinship system reconstruction
Source: Created by Patrick McConvell from information in Whistler (1980: 345).
 
   Iroquois-Omaha I →Calif. Penutian?? 
    ↓ 
      Omaha I   →Pre-Proto-Wintun? 
    ↓ 
     Omaha III   →Proto-Wintun 
   ↙  ↘ 
Patwin, → Omaha IV   Weak parallel  →Pre-Wintu 
      Transmission 
      Omaha-biased 
    ↙ ↓ ↘ 
      various  →Wintu systems 
 
Figure 23. Whistler vs. Murdock on Wintun kinship system reconstruction
Source: Created by Patrick McConvell from information in Whistler (1980: 347).
Both Omaha and Crow skewing are found more widely in California, 
outside the Wintuan family. The combination of Omaha and Crow that 
Whistler calls ‘parallel transmission’ is found only in some of Northern 
Wintuan and is reconstructed back to pre-Wintuan by Whistler. With 
cautious queries Whistler roots the tree in a putative macrofamily of 
Californian Penutian.6
6  While evidence for Penutian seems to have grown since 1980, doubts linger over membership 
of Wintuan specifically, with suggestions that Wintuan is an independent intrusion from Oregon 
in the north.
235
7 . ENHANCING THE KINSHIP ANTHROPOLOGy OF SCHEFFLER
This leaves intriguing questions about whether kinship system prehistory 
can be tied to proto-language stages or may involve areal groupings 
resulting from diffusion, or as I have proposed, from the type of migration 
involved (McConvell 2013b).
Change, variation and overlays
Kronenfeld: Stable core and unstable extensions
Kronenfeld (1996, cf. more general comments on change in Kronenfeld 
2013) also touches on the themes of this chapter—diachrony and the 
contribution of historical linguistics—in a brief reference to Morgan’s 
foundational comparative work in North America. He introduces an 
important hypothesis here, that ‘core’ meanings of terms are stable, but 
extensions are variable and unstable. As far as I know this has not been 
rigorously tested, but a number of the examples used in this chapter could 
be mustered to do this. His example is quite apposite for some of the 
material to be discussed, since it is about variation with a subgroup in 
North America that contains the Crow and Omaha people from whom 
the skewing patterns of the two types were named, as well as groups 
without skewing.
When one examines data on kin terminologies for a large number of 
related languages and cultures—as is assembled, for example, in Morgan’s 
data on the Dakota Indian groups (within his Ganowanian ‘family’ [1871: 
Table—Appendix to Part II, pp. 281–382])—the following facts emerge 
… if we use the full (that is, extended) range of referents (denotata) of 
these terms to infer their signifieds (related to their significata) we find 
a very bad match, since the languages show very different patterns of 
extension. Some of the languages have patrilineally skewed Omaha-type 
terminologies; some have matrilineally skewed Crow-type terminologies; 
and some have unskewed Iroquois-type terminologies. Indeed, the actual 
Omaha Indians and Crow Indians, for whom the two opposed types of 
skewing are named, are closely related members of a Dakota subgroup 
that also includes the Yankton and Oglalla Dakota (Sioux) Indians, who 
have unskewed terminologies. However, contrary to the picture we get 
for extended ranges, when we limit our comparison to kernel or focal 
kintype referents we find an extremely good match across the whole 
Dakota group …
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Since the languages involved are fairly closely related, we know that they 
have each relatively recently developed out of a single, common ancestral 
language. The period of time involved has not been sufficient for the 
terminological labels (signifiers) or the focal referents (pointed to by the 
signifieds linked to each of these signifiers) to drift very far apart. But that 
same period of time has been quite adequate for great changes to occur 
in the extended ranges and thus in the extension operations (or  rules) 
that produce these ranges (that is, extend them from the kernels). Thus 
we have diachronically based comparative data that supports the same 
contrast between relatively fixed, constant focal referents and more 
variable extended ranges that we found synchronically within the single 
Fanti system (Kronenfeld 1996: 164).
Kronenfeld on synchronic variability
This passage should be read in close association with Kronenfeld’s other 
comments on synchronic variability. In Fanti, he identifies three types of 
patterning of kinship terminology in use in the community:
1. The ‘courtesy’ pattern: some terms are used to recognise relative age 
without genealogical specification.
2. The ‘unskewed’ pattern is restricted to actual kin, and includes more 
genealogical information on generation, relative age, gender and side 
of the family.
3. The ‘skewed’ pattern is most marked and is distinguished from 
‘unskewed’ by the addition of a Crow-type skewing rule to the set of 
extension rules; Fanti say that the equation of ‘mother’s brother’ and 
‘sister’s son’ exists because of inheritance by the latter from the former 
(1996: 161).
While there are factors which tend to induce one or other of these patterns 
to be used, he stresses that these are not unbreakable social rules but leave 
some role for individual choice and agency. He gives an enlightening 
example:
In terms of usage and communication—Saussure’s parole—we note that 
the use of particular patterns of extension is not limited to the social 
contexts that occasion them, but rather that every pattern is available 
at all times … Within a given conversation, different speakers may 
use terms from different extension patterns—that is, may use terms 
nonreciprocally—even if the one person’s usage becomes part of the 
context for the other person’s choice of term.
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Thus the terminology with its variant forms as a part of langue provides 
sets of regularities, that is, patterns, which speakers are free to use as suits 
their purposes. This point was brought home to me when I observed 
a pair of Fanti cross-cousins nonreciprocally addressing each other—as 
‘father’ in one direction, and as ‘brother’ in the other (see Kronenfeld 
1970: 104–07). I knew from other interviews with them that both 
men knew (and stated) that the ‘correct’ reciprocal of ‘father’ was ‘child’ 
and of ‘brother’ was ‘brother’; thus the usage I observed did not result 
from any lack of awareness of the pattern or from any resistance to it. 
Further investigation revealed that since they were close kin they felt 
they had to use kinterms in genealogically correct forms, instead of the 
nongenealogical mode of the courtesy pattern; such genealogically correct 
usage also emphasized the genealogical link, which, I gather, they wanted 
to do. At the same time, since they liked and respected each other, each 
man was anxious to show the other as much respect as he could—and 
so each man, in addressing the other, picked the highest status term out 
of the set available to him for that genealogical position. Thus, one man 
picked ‘father’ (from the skewed extension pattern) over ‘brother’ (from 
the unskewed pattern), while the other man picked ‘brother’ (from the 
unskewed pattern) over ‘son’ (from the skewed pattern). Their goal in this 
conversation was not to be correct, but to communicate their messages as 
effectively as possible with the resources that their language afforded them 
(Kronenfeld 1996: 162–63).
While this kind of flexibility is valuable in providing a means of sending 
subtle social messages to conversation participants and audiences, it may 
have a cost in the stability of the overall system (Kronenfeld 2013: 35). 
Children may reinterpret a system if its performance does not provide 
enough evidence for how it is operating to the children at the time when 
they are acquiring it.
It seems quite likely that such intergenerational mismatches lie behind the 
changes that I am discussing in this chapter. However, we do not in most 
cases have direct evidence of the social mechanisms of processes of change 
that may have occurred hundreds or thousands of years ago in such places 
as precolonial Australia or North America. We can know what happened, 
especially because of the evidence of historical linguistics, but finding out 
how it happened in social terms is more difficult.
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Hypothesis that all changes are explained 
by extension
This chapter proposes a strong hypothesis that all diachronic changes 
in kin-term meanings in Australia can be explained as addition of, or 
loss of, reduction rules as formulated by Scheffler, or minor variations 
or sequential combinations of them. The ideas of Kronenfeld about 
contextual variation and overlays (section above) in extension patterns are 
also crucial in explaining transitions in kinship system change in Australia.
In the next section, examples of sequences of kinship system change that 
conform to this hypothesis in Australia are presented, introduced by an 
overview of the database tool we use to provide evidence, AustKin.
In the section following the next, examples are raised that do not conform 
to the hypothesis that all diachronic change in kin-term meanings results 
from extension. Possible reasons for such exceptions include altercentricity, 
such as filiocentricity.
Australian examples of semantic variation 
and change
The Austkin database
The kinship terminology data in this paper is obtained by standard 
linguistic comparison of forms of kinship terms across regions, and the 
whole of Australia, using the database AustKin (Dousset et al. 2010; 
McConvell and Dousset 2012). The searches used include equivalences 
(e.g. where does the word for MB also mean MBS?) and for forms of 
words (e.g. where is the form kaala/kala+ found and what is its meaning?). 
These and other combinations and customised results can be matched 
and mapped using Google Earth, AustLang (ANU/AIATSIS) or other 
GIS programs.
Omaha skewing and asymmetry
Omaha skewing is a form of extension that has led to an extension change 
in Australia several times with different kinship-term forms. Figure 24 
illustrates how the sequence plays out, beginning with ‘overlay’ skewing 
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in which the skewed forms for MBS may only occur optionally or in 
particular context. In the next stage skewing may solidify so that the 
extension (MB to MBS, MBD in this example is always used) followed 
by loss of the form for the original meaning. We do not go into how this 
last stage happens in detail. In Yolngu Matha for instance, in most dialects 
a loanword has been brought in from a non-Pama–Nyungan neighbour, 
ngapipi for the meaning MB. 
MB MB MB MB 
MBS MBS MBS MBS MBS 
No skewing Overlay skewing Full skewing Shift to skewed 
meaning 
Two separate items MB used for MBS 
under some conditions 
MB used for MBS 
unconditionally
Original MB term 
replaced  
Figure 24. A diachronic sequence of Omaha skewing in Australia
Source: McConvell (2013b: 253–54).
Figure 25 shows where reflexes of the term *kaala, originally MB in proto-
Pama–Nyungan,7 occur in Australia. The original meaning MB is found 
in northeast Queensland and there are some instances of skewing of this 
term to MBS or MBS in this area also. The unskewed meaning is also 
found in southeast Queensland, but other than that the meaning has 
changed; in the west (including Yolngu) and south, the skewed meaning 
(MBS, MBC) only is found.8
The diachronic interpretation is that skewing began in the northeast but 
as the term spread out to the west and south, with the expansion of Pama–
Nyungan, the skewed meaning took over for the kaala reflexes and the 
MB meaning was lost (replaced by other forms).
In some cases the meanings of the skewed (cross-cousin) reflexes of 
the root have either the extension of spouse or some sibling-in-law or 
have changed completely to the affinal meaning. This type of extension 
is acknowledged by Scheffler as ‘spouse-equation’ and assigned Type E 
7  Pama–Nyungan is by far the largest language family in Australia covering most of the continent 
except for the Central North. Yolngu Matha is an outlier of Pama–Nyungan surrounded by non-
Pama–Nyungan languages in Northeast Arnhem Land.
8  In northern New South Wales between the areas of nonskewed meanings to the north and skewed 
meanings to the south, there is a case of active skewing in Gumbaynggirr (Morelli 2008). This involves 
the root kawa (probably cognate with *kaala (MB extended (as a contextual overlay) to MBC.
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in Table 2. This provides an indication that either in the present or at 
some stage in history (some type of ) cross-cousin was a marital partner, 
although marriage rules may have changed since that time.
Figure 25. Kaala MB > Cross-cousin/spouse
Source: McConvell (2013b: 254). Mapping from AustKin © Patrick McConvell and William 
McConvell.
The Omaha extension has a corollary. Seen from the other end of the 
extension the female’s child or sister’s child extends up a generation, 
to mean father’s sister’s child (patrilateral cross-cousin). This too has 
a diachronic extension change. In the case of kaala, the corollary is found 
with *tyuwa+ proto-Pama–Nyungan for female’s child. The pattern of 
spread and change in meaning of this root is quite similar to that of *kaala 
and is shown in Figure 26.
Again the original meaning (fC) is found in northeast Queensland, with 
skewing to FZC found in some languages, and to an extent south of there 
in Queensland. Other western attestations have changed to the skewed 
meaning FZC, as in Yolngu, which also has the meaning of husband 
(and his siblings) in the unilateral marriage system there. In the far west, 
cognate forms mean the affinal kin types HZ and BW, derived by the 
affinal extension change from the intermediate cross-cousin meaning.
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Figure 26. *tyuwa+: Woman’s child > FZC > Sister-in-law
Source: McConvell (2013b: 255). Mapping from AustKin © Patrick McConvell and William 
McConvell.
Loss of cross-parallel distinctions
Another important type of extension change is the loss of cross-parallel 
distinctions, called ‘parallel-cross neutralisation’ by Scheffler, and listed as 
Type (Code) B in Table 2. This was a type of change which was proposed 
by the first scholars to work on Australian kinship, Fison and Howitt, in 
their book Kamilaroi and Kurnai (1880). The latter group, in Gippsland, 
Victoria, was notably different from the Kamilaroi and other groups 
known to them, because the Kurnai called their cross-cousins ‘siblings’, not 
some distinctive term. This is an example of cross-parallel neutralisation 
in the zero generation, but among the Kurnai this did not extend to other 
generations like the grandparents. This kind of restriction of cross-parallel 
neutralisation to the zero generation rather than the ‘Hawaiian’ system 
where there are no cross-parallel distinctions in any generation, is not 
uncommon world-wide: Gertrude Dole called it ‘bifurcate generational’ 
(1969: 118).9
9  Fison and Howitt did not have linguistic or convincing ethnological evidence of this direction 
of change in Gippsland but relied on assumptions that the Dravidianate systems elsewhere must have 
been primordial on the one hand, and a highly speculative story of how people arrived in Gippsland 
on the other (Fison and Howitt 1880; Gardner and McConvell 2015). Intriguingly, Lorimer Fison 
later rejected his own story about this, claiming that he had received ‘new evidence’—but there is no 
account of this evidence (Fison 1892).
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In the Western Desert, the so-called ‘Aluridja’ system also features cross-
parallel neutralisation in the zero generation, but as Laurent Dousset 
(2003) has shown, it is actually a contextual overlay used to talk about 
people who are not marriageable, and this often depends on the state of 
relations between groups, not hard and fast rules. This kind of division 
of cross-cousins into the unmarriageable ‘siblings’ and the marriageable 
classificatory cross-cousins is found in other groups. Among the Kija the 
latter group are thamany- MF(’s siblings). It may be though that for other 
groups like the Kurnai, this was once a transitional stage but then the 
naming of cross-cousin ‘siblings’ became categorical.10
The Western Desert (unusually for Australia) also has cross-parallel 
neutralisation in the +2 or grandparental generation, such that there 
is a  term tyamu, which is like English ‘grandfather’ in referring to 
both maternal MF and paternal FF; and kami (and kaparli in different 
dialects) like English ‘grandmother’ referring to both maternal MM and 
paternal FM.
Omaha skewing, discussed earlier, seems to correlate with what I have 
called ‘encroaching or downstream spread’ and loss of cross-parallel 
distinctions with ‘skirting or upstream spread’. Details of why these 
correlations are present still need to be worked out (McConvell 2013b).
Cross-parallel distinctions in grandparent terminology are also lost under 
apparently similar circumstances yielding grandfather/grandmother 
systems from systems which distinguished FF and MF and FM from 
MM, for example in the Chiracahua variety of Apachean (Dyen and 
Aberle 1974), and inland Northern Athapaskan (Ives 1998), as well as 
in the ‘Aluridja’ system of the Australian Western Desert. The restricted 
distribution of this kind of system in Australia can be seen in Figure 27.11
10  This kind of change does not seem to move on to a stage when the original meaning of the 
term is lost, as far as I know. That would mean that an original term meaning ‘sibling’ came to mean 
‘cross-cousin’ only. Preliminary investigation does not reveal any such pathways.
11  It is also found to some extent in the Bandjalangic languages of the eastern Queensland–
New South Wales border.
243
7 . ENHANCING THE KINSHIP ANTHROPOLOGy OF SCHEFFLER
Figure 27. Aluridja grandparents
Source: Mapping from AustKin © Patrick McConvell and William McConvell.
Thanks to linguistic reconstruction we can be sure of the original sources 
in the proto-Pama–Nyungan or some high-level proto-language within 
Pama–Nyungan.
Tyamu clearly derived from an old Pama–Nyungan root meaning MF 
(McConvell 2013a) so was extended to FF in the Western Desert. 
In particular, tyamu or related forms are found in the Pilbara languages 
north of the Western Desert. The region where both icons are found for 
the same languages are where there is MF = FF, and MM = FM, which is 
roughly conterminous with the Western Desert (see Figure 28).
Kami is found in a wide area of Pama–Nyungan, including in the eastern 
states, in the meaning MM and can be reconstructed as MM, so must have 
been extended to FM in the Western Desert.12 Similarly kaparli is found 
widespread as FM and must have been extended to MM (see Figure 29). 
The region where both icons are found for the same languages are where 
there is MM = FM, and is roughly conterminous with the Western Desert.
12  There is an area in Lake Eyre Basin where kami means FM, but this is clearly an innovation 
(McConvell 2013c) and is unrelated to the Western Desert change.
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Figure 28. *tyamu MF > MF + FF in Western Desert
Source: Mapping from AustKin © Patrick McConvell and William McConvell.
Figure 29. Kami and Kaparli
Source: Mapping from AustKin © Patrick McConvell and William McConvell.
Figure 30 shows how the extensions of grandparental terms occurred 
historically in the Western Desert. A hypothesis that the change went in 
the opposite direction would be completely implausible.
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KARIERA	
MM	=	FFZ	 FF	=	MMB	 |	 FM	=	MFZ	 MF	=	FMB	
kami	 	 	 	 	 kaparli	 	 tyamu	
	
ALURIDJA	
	 	 	 MM	=	FM	 	 FF	=	MF	
	 	 kami	in	some	dialects	
	 	 kaparli	in	others	
 Figure 30. Kariera to Aluridja
Source: Drawn by © Patrick McConvell, 2017.
Cases not covered by the hypothesis
Introduction
This hypothesis, that changes in kinship meaning result from Schefflerian 
extensions that are found in transitional polysemies, stands up fairly well. 
But there are a number of cases where change of meaning of a term is 
evident but which cannot be explained in terms of Scheffler’s proposed 
extension rules, and/or do not display evidence of the classic pattern of 
transitional polysemy.
Two types of change are noted here that do not display the classic pattern 
of transitional polysemy:
1. change of gender of +1 (parental) generation terms, affines or with 
affinal equivalences, and
2. change of one generation down, from sibling to child, unrelated to 
any known skewing pattern.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
246
Change of gender of +1 (parental/affinal) 
generation terms
There is a term which began as ramparr in the North Kimberley region 
of Western Australia, diffused southwest, then, changing to lamparr due 
to a regular sound change, diffused west across the south Kimberley and 
a long distance into the Northern Territory (McConvell 2015).
The most problematic part of the history of ramparr is the change of 
the term from mother-in-law and her brother in west Worrorran and 
eastern Nyulnyulan to father-in-law in eastern Nyulnyulan. While these 
meanings both refer to parents-in-law, the change from WM(B) to WF 
is unexpected. Significantly, a change from mother-in-law to father-in-
law apparently represents a contravention of a principle of transitional 
polysemy in semantic change set forth by Nicholas Evans and David 
Wilkins (2001) that I further developed in relation to kinship terms 
(McConvell 2013a). While many changes in kinship-term meanings do 
show these properties of transitional polysemy in Australia, there is doubt 
about whether mother-in-law and father-in-law share the same term 
anywhere, even in any of the Kimberley languages under discussion.
However, in this case, as we have noted, in its early history the term 
ramparr  has a wider meaning of an avoidance relationship which 
encompassed several types of in-laws who may also be designated by 
more specific kinship terms, probably emerging from an original concrete 
meaning of ‘barrier’ extended metaphorically (McConvell 2015). This may 
be then a case of a term in which there is what we might call hypopolysemy. 
That is, one of two meanings involved is broader and includes the other 
narrower meaning. This is common as a synchronic pattern in fauna terms 
in Australia and also explains a semantic shift from the generic term for 
a life form to a species term or vice versa (McConvell 1997).
There is at least one more fairly clear case in Australian kinship where 
a  similar change has happened. In Cape York Peninsula (Paman sub-
group of Pama–Nyungan) the term *mukVr means ‘mother’s brother’, but 
in the rest of the country where cognates of the term are found (mainly in 
Pama–Nyungan) it means ‘father’s sister and/or wife’s mother’ (McConvell 
and Keen 2011). Where the primary meanings of the terms seem to be 
consanguineal, they also both have affinal senses deriving from the rules of 
marriage: the equation FZ = WM is quite widely distributed in Australia 
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especially where there is or was a Kariera system and cross-cousin marriage. 
The common ground between MB (WF) and FZ (WM) could be their 
key role as decision-makers about their daughter’s marriage.13
Change of one generation down, 
from sibling to child
Another different kind of example that does not conform to what the 
hypothesis predicts is a change of the term katya from ‘brother’ quite 
generally, to ‘son’ in the Western Desert and neighbouring regions. Unlike 
the standard extension cases there appears to be nowhere where the term 
means both ‘brother’ and ‘son’—but see the next section for a possible 
example of a parallel change in a root that gives insight into the process 
involved.
Figure 31 shows the distribution of forms cognate with katya in Australia. 
In Western Australia, the forms in the north in the Pilbara in the Ngayardic, 
Kanyara and Mantharda subgroups of Pama–Nyungan have the meaning 
‘elder brother’. Most of these have the form katya but some have kaya 
in languages in which there is a regular sound change of medial lenition 
*ty > y. South of there in the Wati (Western Desert) and Kartu subgroups, 
the form means ‘son’, with a couple of instances on the periphery where it 
is extended also to ‘daughter’.14
There are a number of other instances of katya meaning ‘elder brother’ in 
eastern Pama–Nyungan subgroups which, taken together with the western 
distribution, open up the possibility that this is a proto-Pama–Nyungan 
form in this meaning. This reinforces the idea that ‘elder brother’ is the 
earlier meaning and the meaning ‘son’ or ‘child’ is the innovation in the 
Wati-Kartu subgroup. 
13  However, unlike in the case of earlier broad meanings of ramparr that refer to a range of affines who 
have a hand in marriage decisions, there is no similar evidence to hand so far with regard to *mukr.
14  In a Nyungar dialect Minang, the form kotya, presumably cognate, means ‘elder brother’. Unlike 
some other instances of katya in the Western Desert periphery, which are loans from Western Desert, 
this points to the ‘elder brother’ meaning being present in south-western as well as eastern Australia. 
Forms like katyakatya for ‘child’ are found areally around the southern Gulf of Carpentaria, but this 
may have a different etymology. Similarly, kaathu is ‘man’s child’ in Yolngu Matha, but its cognacy 
with *katya elsewhere cannot be guaranteed.
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Figure 31. Katya brother > son
Source: Mapping from AustKin © Patrick McConvell and William McConvell.
In our extensive survey of kinship terms in AustKin, in no case does 
the reflex of *katya have both senses ‘elder brother’ and ‘son/child’ in the 
same language. This differs from the cases where there is such ‘transitional 
polysemy’ discussed above. Another difference is that while the earlier 
examples can be related to extensions proposed by Scheffler or similar, 
there is no known extension of ‘elder brother’ to ‘son’ discussed in the 
literature. This is a relationship between two adjacent generations but not 
any of the types of skewing have been analysed.
We now move on to examine what can be the cause of this meaning 
change if it is not related to standard types of extension. Other apparent 
examples of change from ‘brother’ to ‘son/child’ in Australia are then 
scrutinised for clues about the underpinnings of this process.
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Altercentricity – filiocentricity
Altercentricity is a term usually used for where there is no propositus 
indicated (e.g. Where is Mum?) and where the propositus as pragmatically 
inferred is other than the speaker, for instance ‘your’ (e.g. Mum in the 
example is taken to be ‘your mother’). 
Such pragmatic inference is commonly found in languages around the 
world. Francesca Merlan (1982, 1989), however, looked into whether 
there are general principles that predict whether such interpretation 
is egocentric or altercentric for the Australian Aboriginal language 
Mangarrayi. She proposes the Juniority–Seniority Principle:
A senior speaker, in talking to a junior relative (especially a young child), 
tends to refer to third persons in terms of the junior’s relationship to them.
A junior person (again the norms are clearer where this is a young child) 
in speaking to a senior relative tends to refer to others in terms of his own 
relationship to them (Merlan 1982: 127–28)
Murray Garde confirms the general validity of this principle in Western 
Arnhem Land. In other words, children addressing senior relatives 
speak egocentrically in referencing others, and senior kin reply to them 
using altercentric terms, for example, (child to father) ‘Where is Mum?’ 
(father to child) ‘Mum is in the garden’ (Garde 2013: 119). This is not 
unfamiliar to speakers of English and many other languages around the 
world (see Agha 2007: 350, 63).
Filiocentricity is the resulting pattern where the term used converges 
on the form used to and by the child in a parent-child dyad. This is 
therefore a term used in a narrower sense than the term teknocentricity, 
which refers to a more general use of terms from the point of view of 
children in a wider grouping, say a whole family group. The particular 
type of historical shift between sibling and child meanings discussed here 
is related to the narrower type—filiocentricity. Whether there are other 
change phenomena related to the broader scope of teknocentricity is not 
investigated here.
In Garde’s data from Bininy Gunwok (again not unfamiliar from many 
other languages), address (vocative) kin terms can be used as referential 
too (Garde 2013: 51, reporting a telephone conversation).




Is that you, Dad?
DjNg: Yoh.
Yes.
Child: [to others] Ngabba … ngabba Manawukan
F.VOC F.VOC [place]
It’s Dad, Dad in Maningrida
How does this relate to our problem of explaining the change of katya 
‘elder brother’ to ‘son’ in the Western Desert? One possibility is that 
this change is mediated by a pragmatic context of ‘filiocentricity’, that is 
fathers, or more generally parents, were using the ‘brother’ term to their 
children to mean ‘your brother/my son’ and the main sense of the word 
became ‘son’.
Robust reconstructions of the changes in meanings of kinship terms can 
be proposed based on linguistics. Most of these changes are diachronic 
versions of Schefflerian extensions. They involve transitional polysemies 
(equivalences).
The Change Brother > Son 
 
Stage 1: Filiocentricity 
  
 ∆ father speaking 
 |  to | 




Stage 2: Adoption of Filiocentric meaning and generation shift 
 
 ∆ 
 | | 




Figure 32. The change brother > son
Source: Constructed by © Patrick McConvell, 2017.
However, filiocentric changes such as the one found in katya ‘brother’ 
> ‘son’ do not show the same kind of transitional equivalences. The two 
senses of the term that is changing are not found as alternatives in the same 
language in the intermediate stage in the same way. Rather, I propose that 
the source of the split is in the centricity of the term’s use. This may be 
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‘shifting’ (Garde 2013) and the diachronic consequence of this may be 
a loss of the original meaning and replacement by a meaning associated 
with filiocentricity. The hypothesised process is shown in Figure 32.
The term for ‘elder brother’ in Western Desert was kurta subsequent to 
this change. This term is also found throughout the Pilbara mainly for 
‘elder brother’ but occasionally for ‘younger brother’. In those languages 
that have both katya and kurta in the meaning eB it would be useful to 
establish if there is or was a semantic difference or if there is a pragmatic 
difference of the two which contributed to the meaning change in katya.
There is one piece of evidence in a Western Desert language that may be 
relevant to this transition of katya, although it relates to kurta, the current 
word for eB. The Pintupi dictionary gives the phrase kutyu kurta, literally 
‘one elder-brother’, as meaning ‘oldest son’ (Hansen and Hansen 1992: 
43). This is taking a filiocentric view of relative age among brothers.
Brother > son elsewhere in Australia
There are a number of indicators that the kind of change from brother to 
son described in the last section for Western Desert is not alone of its kind 
in Australia. While the notes below on these other cases (drawn from the 
AustKin database) are of a preliminary nature, they do tend to support 
the idea that this is not an anomalous exception but part of a more general 
phenomenon.
In southeast Queensland the term tyatya is recorded as eB in a number 
of Waka-Kabi languages, with probable cognates elsewhere in southeast 
Australia. Nils Holmer (1983: 147–59) records the meaning ‘son’ in 
a Kabi language Gubbi-gubbi.
In Paman languages of northern Queensland, some (Kuku Ya’u, Umpila) 
have yapu in the meaning eB, while further south in the rainforest 
Wargamay has yapu-tyu as ‘son’ (-tyu being a common kinship suffix in 
Pama–Nyungan descending from an enclitic form of ‘my’ (McConvell 
2008: 318–21). Another word for ‘son’ in neighbouring and related 
languages yumurru, has become a form for ‘son’ in Wargamay used by the 
referent’s mother ‘to avoid using his name’ (Dixon 1981: 124).
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In the Maric subgroup of languages, Warungu and Gugu-Badhun in 
northeast Queensland near to Townsville have mukina eB, and Gunya, 
a long distance away to the southwest has mukana ‘son’. Between these, 
Wadjalang near Blackall has mutyi(nu) eB. This is a plausible cognate as 
k/ty correspondences are found in Maric and neighbouring languages. 
Further, there are possible cognates in Bandjalangic on the eastern 
Queensland–New South Wales border all in the meaning ‘son’, some 
mutyum with medial ty (Bundjalung, Waalubal, Yugambeh) and others 
muyu(u)m with medial y, due to regular lenition between the dialects.
In South Australia, in the Turra-Yurra subgroup, the form yunga 
(sometimes with a suffix) is the word for eB, but in one language at least, 
Turra, this means ‘son’.
On the north coast of New South Wales, in Gumbaynggirr, there is 
an example which shows more variation in the forms used for kinship 
terminology, not only for elder brother and son, but other terms. 
This relates to the discussion earlier of ‘overlays’ in kinship, and may 
also illustrate at least a nascent form of a trirelational system. This has 
been discussed in some detail for some languages of northern Australia 
(e.g. Garde 2013 for a summary) but has not yet to my knowledge been 
positively identified for southern Australia. In a trirelational system the 
kinship terms vary not only according to the relation between the speaker 
and the referent, but additionally depending on the relation between the 
speaker and the propositus (or addressee).15 So a term might be translated, 
for instance, ‘my son, your brother’ and a different term would be used 
for ‘my son, your mother’s brother’. This obviously adds a new dimension, 
and potentially many terms, to a kinship terminology.
This type of arrangement can be linked to the discussion of altercentricity. 
As Jeffrey Heath writes:
Whenever speaker S and addressee A are both related to a referent R, 
there is a choice between egocentric (‘my …’) and altercentric (‘your …’ ) 
perspectives. Actual usage may be controlled by pragmatic principles, but 
these can be intricate (Merlan, 1982). The forced choice between the two 
perspectives is obviated in some Australian languages in which ‘triangular’ 
kin terms simultaneously specify S’s and A’s relationships to R (2006: 216; 
here ‘triangular’ is used instead of ‘trirelational’).
15  In some languages it seems the third factor is limited to the addressee but for others it includes 
third-person proposituses.
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Some of the discussion of Gumbaynggirr suggests something akin to 
such a system, but calls the terms involved in the variation ‘avoidance’ 
(Williams, Walker and Morelli 2014).
Juulu is a word for ‘brother’ used by, or in the presence of, a person 
who is of the right section to marry the ‘brother’ (usually gagu). In the 
following a woman is introduced by the younger brother to his older 
brother (ordinarily called gaguuga) to her husband-to-be. It only occurs 
in Nymboidan.
Man to woman
(22) Yang nganyu juulu
that 1SG.GEN brother.AVOID
‘That’s my brother’
However, the avoidance term for ‘brother’ juulu is only used in the 
presence of the referent. Where a man talks about his absent brother to 
women marriageable to him he uses the nonavoidance term for ‘brother’, 
but with polite pluralising of the term for ‘brother’:
(23) Yarrang-anga gagu-urra ngayinggi-ng!
that.there-PL.INDF o.brother-PL.POL sit-PST
‘That’s about where my brother lives.’
So, this is like a trirelational term which has a meaning ‘my brother/your 
potential spouse’ (with apparently additional conditions about presence/
absence of the referent).
There are also other words apart from these two for ‘elder brother’ in 
Gumbaynggirr: kuyu ‘brother’ and kuyumpan ‘elder brother’ (Morelli 
2008). Whether these are trirelational or under which conditions these 
are used is not clear.
There are other kinship terms in Gumbaynggirr that are more overtly 
recorded as having variants that are either vocative/addressee forms or 
depend on the addressee/propositus (i.e. quite likely trirelational), such 
as kura (Morelli 2008: gura, son, when parent talking to him). There is 
a possible cognate in Guwar of Moreton Island (which is connected to the 
languages further south) kuran meaning ‘elder brother’. This could then 
be another example of a change from eB to S, and the reference to ‘parent 
talking to him’ would fit with the scenario proposed for the change.
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Conclusions
This chapter began with acknowledging the ground-breaking contribution 
of Lounsbury and Scheffler in establishing the idea, and a formalism to 
express the idea, that extensions are a central part of kinship semantics. 
They are regular and logical and can be reduced to a small number of 
rules, which are in most cases found in many languages. Scheffler took this 
further and provided a thorough application of this idea and formalism to 
Australian Aboriginal kinship.
This chapter has referred to cases in which it has been shown, in the 
Australian context as well as elsewhere, that historical change in kinship-
term meanings is also primarily based on the kind of extension Scheffler 
described. This is also allied to the notion that such changes pass 
through a stage of ‘transitional polysemy’ arising from kinship extension 
of a limited number of types.
Finally, cases were examined where these notions of extension and 
transitional polysemy are difficult to apply. Most emphasis was laid on 
the case of change from ‘elder brother’ to ‘son’ in the Western Desert 
(and quite probably in a number of other regions of Australia).16 Here 
it is necessary to explore in more depth what the notion of synchronic 
variation between kinship terms and ‘overlays’ of different systems mean 
in terms of pragmatics and the social situation. In this case we need to 
broaden the idea of altercentricity and examine how filiocentricity (taking 
children as the pivot or propositus of the term chosen for use) may lead to 
such change. Another puzzle is why, unlike in the case of change following 
more standard extension paths, this kind of mechanism of change seems 
to leave no trace of transitional polysemy, at least as far as has been 
found so far.
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Why Do Societies Abandon 
Cross-Cousin Marriage?
Robert Parkin
Professor Harold Scheffler’s prominence in the anthropology of kinship is 
well established by virtue of his enormous corpus of written work on the 
subject, the logical rigour and scholarly care he evinced in his arguments 
and his influence over American anthropology in particular in promoting 
semantic analyses of kinship terms and terminologies. His studies of the 
latter were no doubt in part stimulated by his fruitful association with 
Floyd Lounsbury, but his independent work was nonetheless strikingly 
consistent in all these respects, and his other main claim to fame in 
kinship studies, his rethinking of the topic of descent, seems to have been 
entirely his own. There have, of course, been controversies and debates, 
some of them quite pointed, especially with various kinds of structuralists, 
who see things pretty much in a diametrically opposed fashion, though 
occasionally also with scholars who in general terms can be located 
within the Scheffler-Lounsbury ‘camp’ itself (see Scheffler and Lounsbury 
1971: 73ff.).
At this point I should admit that for the most part my own training and 
longstanding views oppose me intellectually to that camp. I was trained at 
Oxford in the heyday of structuralism—with which Oxford anthropology 
at the time was widely associated elsewhere—and I was supervised for 
my doctorate on Austroasiatic kinship by N.J. (Nick) Allen, who once 
identified himself to me in conversation as an ‘evolutionary structuralist’. 
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He had been a student of one of Scheffler’s main adversaries, Rodney 
Needham, whom I knew personally and under whose influence I also 
fell, and who at the time counted as a leading British structuralist—less 
explicitly evolutionist than Allen, but still nonetheless interested in how 
both kinship terminologies and marriage practices change.1 Given the 
structuralist aspect, there was also an explicit tendency to see kinship 
more as a matter of category words than of genealogy. Although genealogy 
was not dismissed entirely, it was not ordinarily seen as having much to 
do with how various indigenous peoples saw kinship; a position I adopted 
too at the time. More recently, however, I have moved away from this 
structuralist orthodoxy sufficiently to appreciate more how peoples the 
world over do think genealogically some of the time and that they are not as 
ignorant of the biological aspects of reproduction and parenthood as they 
are sometimes made out to be.2 This has still not made me an extensionist, 
as I made clear in an article published in 1996 on the contextual uses of 
genealogy and category (Parkin 1996). Among other things, that article 
compared Scheffler’s considerations of Tamil kinship with Louis Dumont’s 
more ethnographically grounded studies, to the definite advantage of the 
latter. I suggested that genealogy and category are not mutually exclusive 
ways of interpreting kinship terminologies but rather two different forms 
of knowledge entirely, the latter being a form of classification, the former 
involving step-wise calculation to specify the details of a relationship more 
precisely; their difference is therefore ultimately a matter of the different 
contexts in which they are likely to be used.3
As I still adhere to this position, I do not want to return to this particular 
debate here, but instead will focus on the applicability of Scheffler’s ideas 
to questions of change in kinship terminology and affinal alliance that 
have concerned Needham, Allen and myself for a number of years. That 
applicability is called into question, first by Scheffler’s downplaying of the 
1  I may therefore be said to represent the ‘Needhamite’ tendency in this volume; many of the other 
contributions are closer to the honourand’s intellectual concerns. While I acknowledge Professor 
Scheffler’s recent sad loss, in the remainder of this paper I will use the present tense to discuss his work 
and its impact.
2  For example, Parkin (2013a). I realise the importance of distinguishing between biology and 
genealogy in making this statement. The claim that genealogy does not matter to many peoples in the 
world and that it simply reflects western thinking is ironically the one major feature shared by both 
structuralist approaches to kinship and the Schneiderian cultural approaches that both rejected and 
replaced them.
3  For example, an English speaker may mention that someone is his cousin in ordinary conversation 
as a category, but resort to genealogy in order to spell out the exact route of the relationship for his 
interlocutor. I have briefly returned to these issues more recently (Parkin 2009).
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importance of affinity in kinship terminologies associated with prescriptive 
alliance in favour of his focus on consanguinity; and second, by his 
scepticism, amounting in effect to a denial, that kinship terminologies 
reflect social morphology in any significant sense. These positions were 
largely established in Scheffler’s debates with the structuralists, but 
among other things they minimise the potential significance of the most 
convincing starting point for theories of change, namely the existence 
of some form of cross-cousin marriage.4 More generally, Scheffler’s 
fundamentally synchronic approach cannot satisfactorily account 
for change almost by definition. I shall therefore return to essentially 
structuralist arguments in favour of both the existence of cross-cousin 
marriage (or ‘prescriptive alliance’ in Needham’s early terminology) and 
systemic change by asking: first: Why do societies drift away from cross-
cousin marriage?; and second, What changes when they do so—only ‘the 
system’ of cross-cousin marriage, or rather how key relatives are classified 
(especially, how they cease to be classified as cross-cousins)?
First, however, I will briefly review Scheffler’s main arguments and 
targets, and also indicate my main sources, before setting out my own 
understandings of Scheffler’s two positions just outlined above. Section 
II will discuss the central matter in this article, with examples, namely 
the circumstances in which a society may abandon cross-cousin marriage. 
Section III will examine the proposition that kinship terminologies also 
have a role to play here through the different ways in which they classify 
key relatives in systems of cross-cousin marriage and the practices that 
immediately evolve from them. Section IV provides a brief conclusion.
Section I
Throughout his career, Scheffler has rejected the structuralist position that 
kin terms should be seen as category words that do not primarily have 
genealogical referents. Instead he has consistently advocated the semantic 
theory of kin terms he worked out with the anthropological linguist, Floyd 
Lounsbury. For Scheffler, kin terms are precisely genealogical denotata 
4  This has long been a controversial term for what is recognised to be a form of marriage into 
a category of kin with a wide range of possible genealogical referents, and not only first cross-cousin—
assuming they can even be traced genealogically, or indeed will be, neither of which is necessarily the 
case. Nonetheless I choose it here for reasons of standardisation, and also because some of the data 
and arguments I am using assume a genealogically defined referent of this type. I will occasionally 
refer to alternatives (especially Needham’s ‘prescriptive alliance’) where relevant.
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focused on a single kin type of a sort found within the nuclear  family. 
This focus on genealogy is tied to Scheffler’s doctrine linking polysemy by 
sense generalisation to the extension of meaning of some terms outwards 
from such foci, as well as his rejection of structuralist and structural-
functional assumptions that kinship terminologies reflect certain aspects 
of social morphology. For the Lévi-Straussian structuralist, the latter 
typically means cross-cousin marriage or prescriptive alliance in its 
various forms, which are seen precisely as a reflection of such category 
words and the systems they form. While Scheffler certainly recognises 
the facts of affinal alliance, his focus on genealogy also has the result that 
it renders affinity secondary to genealogy, whereas the structuralists do 
the reverse in making affinity primary in their models of prescriptive 
alliance. Thus, as I shall argue, the disjuncture that Scheffler tends to see 
between terminology and social morphology must be severely qualified 
in relation to prescriptive alliance, although it becomes more evident the 
more a society moves away from prescriptive alliance as the basis for its 
regulation of marriage.
Although Scheffler does deal with other structuralists such as Claude 
Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach on occasion, his key targets would seem 
to be Dumont and Needham.5 His attack on Needham is particularly 
associated with a single book, A Study in Structural Semantics: The Siriono 
Kinship System, written with Floyd Lounsbury and published in 1971.6 
I have relied on it greatly here in setting out Scheffler’s views as I see 
them, though I have also used other sources (Scheffler 1972, 1977, 1984) 
without (re-)reading the whole of Scheffler’s vast corpus.
5  Needham mainly used other people’s work, not his own, to provide the evidence for this view. 
However, Robert Barnes, one of his students, did provide an example from his own ethnography on 
the east Indonesian domain of Kédang (Barnes 1974), which is a structuralist ethnography in every 
way. He also contributed articles on prescriptive alliance based on his own ethnography (e.g. 1973, 
1977), a path followed later by one of his own students, Penelope Graham (1987). Other students 
of Needham’s included Peter Rivière (1969) on the Trio of Guyana, David Hicks, who wrote many 
works on Timor (see especially Hicks 1978, 1990), and Gregory Forth (e.g. 1985, 1988, 1990). 
Later Needham himself was to catch up with a book on the Sumban domain of Mamboru, based on 
fieldwork carried out some years before (1987).
6  The fact of coauthorship means we can never really know who wrote what in this book, but 
that still should not detract from its use here in a chapter dedicated to Scheffler specifically. The book 
appears under Scheffler’s name as well as Lounsbury’s, so one can assume that he agreed with its 
contents. Also, he and Lounsbury were obviously close intellectual allies in general, even though 
Scheffler (1971) did seek to reestablish the identity between Dravidian and Iroquois that Lounsbury 
(1964) had previously been at such pains to refute. See also Thomas Trautmann (1981: 85–88), 
who follows Lounsbury in respect of this disagreement; though otherwise he is critical of semantic 
analysis. Above all, the book on the Siriono handily brings together key Schefflerian perspectives on 
the categorical dimension of kinship.
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I now return to the two main aspects of Scheffler’s work, mentioned 
above, that I am dealing with in this chapter. I shall then address the key 
topic of this chapter, namely the circumstances in which a population 
may abandon cross-cousin marriage for a nonprescriptive form of affinal 
alliance that is no longer reflected in the kinship terminology and can 
therefore no longer be considered prescriptive. The overall arguments are 
first, that Scheffler’s theories make more sense in respect of societies that 
do not pursue cross-cousin marriage than those that do; and second, 
that even so they cannot adequately account for systemic change between 
what are very definitely two different situations or stages.
Consanguinity and affinity
For Scheffler, kinship terms and terminologies are just that: they are 
predicated on local cultural views of procreation and its concomitant 
forms of consanguineal relatedness based on primary links of the sort one 
finds in the nuclear family (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 63). These 
are generally considered ‘focal’ for Scheffler, and other consanguineal 
relationships and their denotata are treated as ‘extensions’ outwards 
from these foci. This is usually demonstrated in his analyses by a variety 
of ‘extension’ or ‘equivalence’ rules (they are apparently the same; 
see Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 51), expressed through a chain of 
genealogical symbols starting with a focal kin type (say, F) and leading 
to those kin types at a further genealogical distance from ego (e.g. FB, 
FFBS, etc.) with which the focal one is equated in the terminology. This 
is in effect the ‘classificatory’ idea, which, of course, has a long history 
of use in the anthropology of kinship. Scheffler also invokes the notion 
of polysemy a great deal; one of his criticisms of other schools of the 
anthropology of kinship being that they ignore it and assume that any 
kin term only has one intrinsic meaning; that is monosemic. For him 
this is connected, inter alia, with the structuralist doctrine that category 
is prior to genealogical position and that categories do not have a focal 
meaning (do not mean F, therefore, in our example), but an intrinsic, 
monosemic meaning along the lines of ‘male patrikin of the previous 
generation’ (i.e. F, FB, FFBS etc.). For Scheffler, when structuralists break 
down categories genealogically, they are relying on polysemy by sense 
specialisation, while at the same time denying the possibility of polysemy 
by sense generalisation, that is, the extensionism described above from 
F to FB, FFBS etc. Formally speaking both are possibilities, but it is clear 
that for Scheffler the latter is more important because he thinks that this 
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is the way most kinship terminologies are structured, as well as accounting 
for—and making manageable, for both the anthropologist and the native 
informant7—all the denotata of an individual term. It is, in short, the way 
most people think most of the time: ‘polysemy within the domain of kin 
classification is really what it is “all about”’ (1972: 325).8 
Three other points ought to be made here for purposes of clarification. 
First, while Scheffler certainly recognises change and history, he sees his 
analyses as basically synchronic in kind (1972: 313–14). This is another 
way in which he departs from the structuralists, especially perhaps 
Needham, who regularly invoked terminological change to explain 
internal inconsistencies in patterning between terminology and alliance 
(e.g. Needham 1966, 1967, 1974), without making that central to their 
work. Second, Scheffler is quite clear that his extensionism is not intended 
to explain how children learn kin-term use. However, they learn, they 
end up learning the adult classification, and that is what the analyst must 
focus on (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 62). Third, Scheffler is clear that 
polysemy does not necessarily introduce metaphor (e.g. 1972: 318ff.). 
Kin terms certainly have metaphorical uses, but Scheffler conducts his 
semantic analyses on the basis that polysemy by sense generalisation is 
a matter of relating the genealogical denotata of kin terms to ordered sets 
of rules. The possible metaphorical aspects of kin-term use should, in his 
scheme, be subject to a separate study.
Since Scheffler sees kin terms as having primarily consanguineal 
significance, he is apt to view affinal denotata as secondary. It is not clear 
whether he thinks that affinal denotata can ever be focal denotata, though 
he appears to make an exception for H and W. However, extensions from 
H or W as focal kin types would not work in the same way as F > FB > 
FFBS links in the normal classificatory sense: one can get from H to HB, 
but then what? Logically, HBFBS etc., but these are not specifications 
the kinship analyst is ever likely to have to deal with. Thomas Trautmann 
was later to identify another problem in deciding, for example, the focal 
specification in equations like FZD = HZ, since neither is obviously 
prior, and positing such equations leads to a circularity in which each 
specification implies the other (1981: 59–60). In the case of prescriptive 
7  Predictability is an aspect of this process that, by following the rules, both the anthropologist and 
the indigenous ego can predict what term will be used to or of a particular alter.
8  The words ‘all about’ were originally Needham’s and are clearly being used ironically by Scheffler 
here. Unfortunately I have not been able to find the original reference in Needham’s copious writings.
269
8 . WHy DO SOCIETIES ABANDON CROSS‑COUSIN MARRIAGE?
terminologies, which may well lack terms that are solely affinal, Scheffler 
chooses to view terms denoting affinal relatives as basically consanguineal. 
For a structuralist like Dumont, by contrast, they, like the terminology 
as a whole, may primarily express affinity, as he found was the case for 
ethnographically Dravidian terminologies like Tamil (Dumont 1953). 
For Scheffler, probably, the very invention of affinal specifications to 
attach to such terms is merely a function of the way the western analyst 
interprets and analyses nonwestern classifications; consanguinity and 
affinity are analytical concepts, but the former has more relevance than 
the latter because it is linked to genealogical ties connected with locally 
valid but still very general cultural ideas of conception and birth. While 
accepting the social uses of kinship terms and categories, Scheffler rejects 
the structuralist notion that kin terms must be considered primarily as 
‘social’ categories both because of the potentially affinal denotations of 
some of them and because of their infinite extension from a specific 
genealogical base through the classificatory idea. That is, he disputes the 
idea that they are anything more than expressions purely of kinship in the 
narrow genealogical sense that he has always been keen to stress as primary. 
Thus, ‘The spouse relationship is essential to any system of consanguinity 
and affinity … but not to systems of consanguinity, i.e. systems of kin 
classification per se [emphasis in original]’ (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 
81 n11). And further, ‘Relations of genealogical connection, or kinship 
proper, are fundamentally different from and are logically and temporally 
prior to any social relations of kinship’ (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 
38)—of a jural kind, more especially (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 39).
Do systems of prescriptive alliance exist?
While Scheffler does sometimes discuss the potential social morphology 
correlates of specific terminologies (see Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 
151–228), his analyses of the latter do not require this and can be and 
normally are conducted in a sociological vacuum. In general, he is sceptical 
of views that particular types of terminology ‘reflect’ aspects of the social 
structure. One of his targets here is A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s suggestion 
(1952: 55–88) that Crow and Omaha terminologies reflect the principle 
of descent-group unity—matrilineal and patrilineal respectively—on the 
basis that some of their internal equations map this out to some extent 
(Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 15–18; also 63–64). Because they 
only do this ‘to some extent’, and because of the considerable variety of 
Omaha terminologies especially, Scheffler denies that this is a significant 
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correlation; in addition, he has also deconstructed the idea of descent 
totally, clearly preferring the notion of filiation, that is, parent–child ties, 
as being more significant.9 Another target of Scheffler’s is the argument 
that cross-cousin marriage in Australia is invariably linked to section 
systems, which he dismisses because of the variation in both cross-cousin 
marriage and section systems that populations there exhibit (Scheffler 
1977). One general principle invoked here (e.g. Scheffler and Lounsbury 
1971: 152–53) is the well-known fact that similarly classified kin are not 
necessarily treated alike jurally; in particular, our obligations to a closely 
related individual in a particular kin class may be followed more diligently 
than in respect of someone in the same kin class who is more distantly 
related to us. To an extent, then, this is also a matter of behaviour as well 
as jural rights and obligations.
More important here, however, is Scheffler’s dismissal of the notion of 
prescriptive alliance as a system reflected in particular forms of terminology. 
Scheffler does not deny that ego may have a claim in marriage on an alter 
who is usually going to be a cross-cousin of some description, but he also 
notes that such claims are rarely enforced across the whole society, that 
they may be evaded without detriment to the way the society defines 
itself, and that as a result the statistical count of such marriages may 
be very low indeed. In addition, societies united in their possession of 
a prescriptive terminology are scarcely similar in any other respect. For 
Scheffler, therefore, attempts by Needham and his followers to treat such 
societies as holistic in the Maussian sense, typically correlating prestations 
and dual symbolic classification to the principles of affinal alliance, are 
ultimately hollow.10 While we may have a marriage rule predicated on 
cross-cousin marriage and the expected terminological equivalences, 
systems of asymmetric affinal alliance—or any other form of affinal alliance, 
for that matter—do not exist for Scheffler: ‘the most distinctive feature of 
those [terminological] systems which do employ the MBD-FZS spouse 
9  One might suggest that, as with extensionism related to the study of kinship terminologies, 
the focus on filiation reflects a preference for stepwise thinking, as well as, here, a recognition of the 
shallowness of genealogical memory that is frequently encountered and an appreciation that descent 
groups rarely act together, whence ‘descent category’ may be more useful. Scheffler’s deconstructions 
of the notion of descent (e.g. 1966, 1985, 2001) are ultimately more cogent than, say, Adam Kuper’s 
exaggerated dismissal (1982) of the whole idea of descent as an academic myth that has had to be 
deconstructed not just once but twice in anthropology’s intellectual history.
10  Good examples are Needham’s analyses of the Purum (Needham 1958) and Lamet (Needham 
1960). Needham did in fact recognise that societies united by prescriptive alliance could vary in other 
ways. For him, principles of organisation—symmetry, asymmetry, transitivity—were more important 
than typologies of societies. See, for example, Needham (1971).
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equation rule is that rule itself ’ (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 220). 
Further, the reciprocal rights associated with affinal alliance exist between 
individuals, not social groups (ibid.: 223). In Scheffler’s view it is therefore 
not correct of Needham to view prescriptive alliance as the cement of 
society, or as holistic in the sense that the whole of society is ordered 
by a simple relation of either symmetry or asymmetry between spouse-
exchanging groups, expressed in symbolic values, as well as in actual 
exchanges of spouses and wedding prestations.11 Also, for Scheffler the 
failure of all egos to marry, say, MBD/FZS, despite a rule enjoining them 
to do so, is to be seen as intrinsic to the way such rights and obligations are 
pursued, not interpreted as breaches of the rules requiring redefinitions of 
the relatives involved (ibid.: 223–24)—the latter being a  key property 
of prescription for Needham (see further below).
Scheffler also evidently feels that Needham himself has caused confusion 
by first positing prescriptive alliance between groups (especially descent 
groups), then being forced to deny, in the face of contrary evidence, that 
groups of any sort were necessary for prescriptive alliance to be pursued. 
Scheffler and Lounsbury make much of this in relation to the Siriono 
of northeast Bolivia, where a rule of asymmetric cross-cousin marriage 
apparently occurs in the absence of any social groups like descent groups 
regularly exchanging alliance partners. As a result, ‘it is not necessary to posit 
a system of affinal alliance between descent groups to give a reasonable and 
satisfactory account of the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage prescription 
of the Siriono’ (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971: 178). There is also a clear 
tendency in their discussions of some of the structuralist ‘classics’ for 
Scheffler and Lounsbury to stress the Crow–Omaha-type equations some 
of their terminologies make and to underplay the alliance aspects. Thus 
the Kachin are described as ‘just an Omaha-type system with an overlaid 
MBD-FZS-spouse equation rule’ (ibid.: 199), which itself merely ‘has the 
status of a corollary of a more fundamental rule’ (in this case an Omaha 
skewing rule; ibid.: 178).
Elsewhere (1971), Scheffler also denies that ‘Dravidian’ terminological 
patterns reflect the practice of bilateral cross-cousin marriage of which they 
are a logical expression. Indeed, he claims that there is no fundamental 
difference between Dravidian and Seneca–Iroquois terminologies, 
11  Needham was following Lévi-Strauss here, but also seeking to go beyond him by listing key 
oppositions that expressed the structure (usually asymmetric). Examples of such ‘total structural 
analysis’ include Needham (1958) on the Purum and Needham (1960) on the Lamet.
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despite his close collaborator Lounsbury (1964) already having shown 
that they were not identical. However, treating them as identical is 
precisely what Scheffler does on the basis of their focal kin specifications 
being identical, and despite Seneca–Iroquois terminologies not being 
considered prescriptive (unlike Dravidian terminologies), partly because 
Seneca–Iroquois terminologies typically have separate affinal terms, and 
partly because they are less consistent in how they treat the cross-parallel 
distinction; for Scheffler, these differences are secondary to what unites 
them, namely their focal kin types. As in the case of asymmetric alliance, 
Scheffler also pointed out that, even in the south Indian region that gave 
them their name, Dravidian terminologies can co-exist with a preference 
for marriage to MBD but not FZD, or vice versa, or no declared preference 
at all, as well as one for the bilateral cross-cousin that the terminology 
expresses (1971). His position here was rejected by Trautmann (1981: 
60–62), after the latter had spent a dozen or so pages of his monumental 
study of Dravidian kinship submitting a logically consistent Dravidian-
type terminology to semantic analysis in the manner of Scheffler and 
Lounsbury and then deciding that it was essentially a circular procedure: 
for instance (and as noted above), it could not handle consanguineal–
affinal equations of the type FZD=HZ, as there was no way of deciding 
which of these kin types was the focal one (if any, as neither occurs within 
ego’s nuclear family; see ibid.: 48–62).
As for the lack of fit between terminology and marriage patterns, 
Trautmann  sought to deal with this by bringing in history and the 
probability that the situation has changed over time: ‘I hypothesize 
that bilateral cross-cousin marriage is ancestral to all particular cognate 
Dravidian systems we find in the ethnographic present [emphasis in 
original]’ (ibid.: 62), regardless of whether such systems have that form 
of marriage at the present day. This recalls a similar démarche made on 
a number of occasions by Needham in relation to asymmetric alliance. 
Thus in one double article (1966, 1967) Needham shows that MBD 
marriage can occur in three societies with a symmetric prescriptive, an 
asymmetric prescriptive and a nonprescriptive terminology respectively 
and postulates historical change to account for this. Another makes 
a similar historical argument in the case of the Warao of Venezuela 
(Needham 1974), who have moved away from bilateral cross-cousin 
marriage while retaining much of the terminology that hypothetically 
originally went with it. The same idea of change also underpins Allen’s 
theory of the earliest human kinship system as tetradic, which he has put 
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forward as a starting point for change of this type, involving a form of 
bilateral cross-cousin marriage closest to the Kariera system, though it is 
not attested ethnographically.12
Nonetheless, it is still possible to find societies with prescriptive 
terminologies where classificatory cross-cousin marriage clearly takes place 
on a regular basis, nullifying Scheffler’s and others’ objections to their 
existence on the basis of low rates of actual cross-cousin marriage and 
inconvenient unilateral preferences accompanying bilateral terminologies. 
Nevertheless, the argument that there is frequently a lack of fit between the 
patterns respectively of terminology and alliance has long been realised. 
Here Scheffler converges just slightly with his antagonists: the question 
is really what to do about it. Needham’s answer (1973) was eventually 
to decide that, despite the word ‘prescribe’ logically being applied to 
the marriage rules, the notion of prescription was really to be located 
in the pattern of the terminology, not in that of alliances themselves. 
As  a  categorical system any kinship terminology defines how people, 
or rather the categories they belong to, are related, but a prescriptive 
terminology also redefines the kin involved in a marriage that breaks the 
rules; further, a terminology cannot be broken in the way that rules can. 
Moreover, one expects rules to be broken as a normal part of the operation 
of social life anywhere, therefore to expect anything approaching 100 
per  cent observance of them is simply unrealistic, just as it is equally 
naïve not to accept that, even while being observed, rules may well be 
manipulated to satisfy particular interests or simply to accommodate what 
is possible for particular egos.13 As a result, one needs a third level of 
analysis, namely actual behaviour; that is, the extent to which people obey 
the rules.14
12  The original statement is Allen (1986, republished with revisions 2004). More recent versions 
include 1989 (written particularly with linguists in mind), 1998 and 2008. In the 2008 publication, 
Allen reviews and answers critiques of his theory (pp. 108–09). I return to his theory briefly below.
13  Prescriptive systems in particular, though not exclusively, often make it possible to trace ties 
with another relative down more than one pathway, for example, enabling one to find a reason for 
marrying alter, as well as for not doing so.
14  See Needham (1973). One example where this three-level analytical model is adopted in full 
for a particular ethnographic case is in Good’s description (1981) of Tamilnad in south India, where 
there is a logically very consistent and ‘pure’ terminology of symmetric prescriptive type and where 
95 per cent of the population marry someone in the prescribed category, though only 25 per cent 
of spouses are first cross-cousins, with a slight preference for FZDy/MBSe. 
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At this point, therefore, we can see that the positions Scheffler has adopted 
form a wide gulf from those of his structuralist opposite numbers, me 
included. In what follows, I will seek to take the matter forward both 
ethnographically and theoretically. Section II is more concerned with rules 
and behaviour, Section III with terminology or the level of classification. 
Section II is also much more rooted in ethnography, whereas the arguments 
in Section III are more general. This means that, apart from the occasional 
stray remark, I am not linking the data in Section II with an examination 
of any associated terminology. Rather, to repeat, my aim is to show that 
having cross-cousin marriage and not having it should be seen as two 
separate situations, possibly linked as stages; and that, despite Scheffler’s 
argument to the contrary, they are not invariably to be interpreted simply 
in terms of a failure to observe marriage rules 100 per cent. If that were 
routinely the case, why have the rules and the associated terminology in 
the first place? Nonetheless, in Section III we return to the terminology as 
a possible explanation for, or at least associated feature of, such changes. 
Discussion here revolves around the insight—drawn partly from how 
prescriptive terminologies work in redefining kin who have married 
‘wrongly’—that classifications do not just reflect the world but determine 
in large measure how the world will be perceived. This insight can, in 
principle, be applied to kinship terminologies as much as anything else.
Section II
In pursuing such lines of enquiry myself, I have adopted structuralist 
paradigms in their essentials, as well as preferring to focus on cases 
where it is feasible, even necessary, to bring in a diachronic perspective 
to explain the synchronic analysis. Synchronic analysis itself often reveals 
inconsistencies in the logical patterning of the terminology,15 which also 
involves relating actual kinship terminologies to a set of types against 
which ethnographic data can be measured. One can then test the basic 
hypothesis that change has taken place in order to account for the logical 
inconsistencies, possible redundancies, in the terminology, etc. There is 
sometimes resistance to such methods. For Ellen Basso (1970), in her 
debate with Gertrude Dole (1969), one needs to seek the reasons for 
a  terminology having the pattern it does in present-day social practice, 
15  North India has a number of examples, for example the Himalayan district of Kumaon (Krengel 
1989) and the Malpahariya of Bihar (Parkin 1998).
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not—as she alleged Dole was doing—rely on either theories of social 
change or alleged deviations from neat typologies to explain that pattern.16 
However, this does not always lead us very far, and when, for example, 
one finds evidence of prescription in the terminology but not the actual 
alliances or marriage rules that would logically correspond with it, then it 
is reasonable to posit that change has taken place in the latter but has not 
started or not been completed in the former.
One factor to be taken into account here is the persistence of theories that 
cross-cousin marriage, especially in its symmetric form, represents the 
original form of marriage in human history and that all other forms have 
derived historically from it. This was the underlying assumption of much 
of Needham’s comparative work on kinship, but in the present day it is 
more usually associated with Allen’s tetradic theory, already mentioned 
in passing in the previous section. This theory postulates a particular 
variant of bilateral cross-cousin marriage as the starting point for human 
kinship. It has become increasingly influential in recent years, though 
also controversial in the sense that its argument that it accounts for early 
human kinship has been questioned by others on ethnographic grounds 
(e.g. Barnard 2008; Layton 2008). Nonetheless, it forms a reasonable 
starting point for theories of the evolution of kinship systems.
Next, therefore, I consider what steps may lead from a system of cross-
cousin marriage (Situation 1 below) to the ‘open’ arrangements of semi-
complex and complex societies (Lévi-Strauss 1949), which lack them:
1. Cross-cousin marriage, with a sociocentric terminology to match, 
whether tetradic, that is with only four terms (Allen 1986) or not, and 
with everyone following the prescription generation after generation.
2. Possible evolution from symmetric to asymmetric prescriptive, 
or to an eight-section system assuming marriage consistently 
(and symmetrically) between genealogical second cross-cousins, or to 
some other system that can be described as prescriptive. These options 
may well be mutually exclusive.
3. Only one member of a group of siblings is required to follow the 
prescription; other siblings may or must marry into other families 
or kin groups (this is more often noted of asymmetric prescription 
16  In the article Basso was criticising, Dole was suggesting yet another terminological ‘type’, namely 
bifurcate generational, that is Hawaiian in ego’s level and bifurcate merging or bifurcate collateral in 
+1 and –1.
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than symmetric) (see e.g. Hicks (1985: 77–78) on Mbae (Manggarai); 
and  Lindell, Samuelsson and Tayanin (1979: 64, 66), on Kammu 
(Khmu)). Around this point, a class of nonrelatives might emerge that 
is not covered by the terminology. I am treating this as a separate stage 
from that in which everyone marries a classificatory cross-cousin.
4. Abandonment of cross-cousin marriage seen as a repeated practice 
of exchange between kin groups, but still a tendency, even a rule, 
for groups of siblings to marry exclusively and sometimes intensively 
with one another, for example through direct exchange within that 
generation. Such marriages may be expressed as taking place between 
siblings-in-law, and they are often associated with a ban on repeating 
alliances between any two groups in the immediately following 
generation(s). Some Munda peoples of central India provide examples 
(see Parkin 1992: 144–87). Terminological change of some sort 
(for example towards Iroquois or Hawaiian, or at least the emergence 
of specifically affinal terms) is likely as a result.
5. Though there are no longer any marriage prescriptions, marriage 
prohibitions continue to be framed in part by referring to kin 
categories and/or social groups, such as clans related in specific ways 
to ego. Often associated with Crow–Omaha terminologies (especially 
by Lévi-Strauss), but not only or necessarily.
6. Even social groups like clans cease to be relevant or even to exist and 
only certain categories named as unmarriageable are left of previous 
situations in which kin categories governed marriage options. 
Inter alia, the situation in most western societies, where for many 
people marriage partners are not supposed to be related prior to the 
marriage at all.
There is a certain tendency for later stages of this sequence to be associated 
with first, a greater dispersal of marriages between groups, and second, 
greater individual freedom of choice unrestricted by social obligations to 
marry in particular ways. Both assumptions have to be qualified. Cross-
cousin marriage may appear excessively restrictive of choice to the western 
mind, but in fact first cross-cousin marriage could not work for simple 
demographic reasons, as not every ego will have a referent in that category. 
As a result, anthropologists soon realised that a wider range of equivalent 
kin is involved, such as second and remoter cross-cousins, or persons 
placed in the same categories but without traceable genealogical links to 
ego, and they developed the notion of the classificatory cross-cousin to 
cope with this. Later, especially after the structuralist revolution in kinship 
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studies, it began to be recognised that suitable spouses need not be defined 
genealogically at all, but should rather be treated as members of a category 
that may be based, for example, on long-term inter-group relations: that 
is, ego seeks a spouse where other members of his or her group have done 
so already in the recent past, without needing to determine exact links 
genealogically with that spouse. In other words, choice is still possible 
with cross-cousin marriage, as ‘cross-cousin’ may actually be quite a large 
category in the indigenous view. Classificatory cross-cousin marriage also 
makes possible the dispersal of alliances between groups, though this 
may be ruled out or restricted where there is a set number of marriage 
classes (e.g. four or eight) or just two moieties. Situation 2 above involves 
such dispersal by definition, and within the same generation. Situation 3 
enjoins dispersal in subsequent generations, by virtue of the ban on repeat 
alliances. Situation 4 ensures it by banning, for example, male ego from 
marrying into his mother’s clan, which is where his father had sought 
a spouse, thus preventing the inter-generational repetition associated with 
cross-cousin marriage. With Situation 5 we arrive at the abandonment of 
any influence of category over marriage apart from the incest taboo. Even 
with cross-cousin marriage (Situation 1), but also more generally, the 
relevant categories may frequently be manipulated to justify technically 
‘wrong’ marriages. Even if that is not the case, there may be more 
than one genealogical path linking ego to a desired spouse, which may 
provide a way of justifying an otherwise questionable match, or rejecting 
a perfectly sound one.
There is, nonetheless, the possibility that cross-cousin marriage still restricts 
alliances in ways that come to be seen as unacceptable and that this induces 
change. Why should this be? Despite Scheffler’s scepticism, it has long 
been recognised that in most societies marriages are not just a matter of 
individual choice but are attached to social obligations between groups—
indeed, individual choice may mean nothing, as in the very many societies 
where children are betrothed or bestowed on their spouses and the latter’s 
social groups by their parents or other senior relatives (Needham 1986). 
These social obligations may be a matter of politics, especially as they may 
be manipulated to suit a particular political strategy—this is the concept 
of alliance, linked to marriage especially by French writers such as Lévi-
Strauss (French allié = affine). To pursue political strategies effectively one 
needs flexibility, that is, the ability to choose from among several partners, 
whether the chosen partner is a spouse or a bestower of spouses. As already 
indicated, a system of strict cross-cousin marriage does not necessarily 
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rule out choice, and the categories even of these systems are perfectly 
capable of manipulation in the interests of pursuing a political strategy; 
though the choice may not be ego’s and alter’s. However, as already noted 
too, choice may be limited if the number of social groups (classes or 
moieties) associated with cross-cousin marriage is also restricted. This may 
lead initially to such groups being abandoned but cross-cousin marriage 
continuing (also to the abandonment of tetradic society). However, even 
this situation will have restrictions that may eventually be seen as irksome, 
and the resulting tensions in the system may then set in train the sorts 
of changes listed above.
Political strategies will, of course, tend to be pursued by the leaders of 
society. However, ordinary members of society may also be led to pursue 
them in their own private interests or those of their immediate family. 
The interests involved may be relatable to notions of romantic love, as 
ideally in most western societies, but more usually they will be connected 
to considerations of one’s future economic survival or appropriate 
social positioning—in some societies, ego may have closer relationships 
with siblings-in-law, who may also be cross-cousins, than with siblings 
(e.g. Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Leach 1960). There is also a gender aspect 
here. Given that most societies have distinct regimes of male dominance, 
women are more likely overall to be the pawns in male games of marriage 
politics than vice versa. Age is yet another factor. Even males, as boys, 
may become pawns in the same game, while in societies where older men 
tend to monopolise marriages through polygyny, as among the Tiwi in 
Australia (Hart and Pilling 1979), younger men may be at the mercy of 
their elders’ political arrangements well into middle life. The individual’s 
desire for a perfect partner, often interpreted as a matter of romantic love, 
is certainly a factor demanding a degree of choice, but it is clearly more 
relevant in the west and societies that have been significantly influenced 
by it. Worldwide it is of less salience than the importance given to 
marriage, and to the use of women in marriage, as a mode of political 
alliance between social groups.17
17  It is not that notions of romance are absent elsewhere, but they may well be placed in a different 
category than marriage, which is seen politically and socially as a more serious matter. The difference 
between the two domains may relate to stages in the life cycle, as with the Muria ghotul or youth 
dormitory in central India, where relationships between the genders formed in the youth dormitory 
are broken off when it comes to marriages, which should proceed in different directions (Elwin 1947). 
Other examples may relate rather to the different contexts of changing social events. For example, 
among the Miao of southwest China courting is placed in a different category than marriage, and 
even married men may take part in ritual events focused on courting (Chien Mei-ling 2013).
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Missionary influence may also have an impact in drawing many societies 
away from cross-cousin marriage, as with at least some Lamaholot villages 
in eastern Indonesia (Barnes 1977: 137, after Raymond Kennedy’s 
unpublished field notes). However, this is not always the case, despite 
the presence of missionaries (e.g. Désveaux and Selz (1998) deny this 
happened among the Cree and Ojibwa of Ontario and eastern Manitoba, 
Canada); similarly, cross-cousin marriage apparently survives among 
south Indian Christians, despite the Catholic Church not approving of it 
(Kapadia 1993: 46).
The Americas
Many sources on the Americas explain the retreat from cross-cousin 
marriage in terms of the physical expansion of hitherto small communities 
and/or their greater contact with neighbouring groups etc. One example 
is Paul Henley, in a brief but wide-ranging comparative study of 
Amerindian kinship in the Amazon (1996).18 He points out that, where 
different populations are scattered along river systems, it tends to be 
those living up the headwaters that pursue cross-cousin marriage, while 
those downstream do not do so. The latter are more in contact with other 
groups, partly because of trade or political conflicts or alliances with such 
groups. However, Henley doubts that the usually suggested trajectory 
from cross-cousin marriage to its absence works in the Amazon, and 
indeed he seeks to reverse it, seeing his ‘Amazonian type’ as being more 
fundamental. This type: 
is similar to the canonical dravidianate insofar as the general distribution 
of terminological categories in the three medial generations is concerned, 
but it is very different in three other crucial and related respects: the 
absence of a positive rule of marriage, the absence of a category of cross-
relative in Ego’s own generation and the presence of a set of exclusively 
affinal terms (ibid.: 62).
It is also evident that both the intensification of sibling exchanges within 
a generation without cross-cousin marriage and the repetition of alliances 
after the elapse of a number of generations also occur in the Amazon, 
though Henley does not list these as features of his type (see Parkin 2013b). 
He does argue that the cross-cousin marriage of groups up the headwaters 
is an adaptation of his Amazonian type to cope with the consequences of 
18  See also the excellent discussion of Henley’s views in Harry Walker 2009: 65–66. 
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
280
population decline and/or small populations, which have fewer options 
than those downstream. He also identifies groups on middle stretches 
of water that have Iroquois crossness, not Dravidian. The geographical 
transitions thus correlate with the typological ones. In particular, the 
upstream groups may be remoter, more peripheral, being those that went 
furthest into the interior, assuming, as is likely, that these river systems 
were the main means of access and movement to and in these areas.
More specific examples include the Urarina of lowland Peru (Walker 
2009) and the various Jivaroan groups by Taylor (1998), also discussed 
in this context by Walker (2009: 65). Other anthropologists too have 
tried to connect geographical isolation of any sort with cross-cousin 
marriage. Needham noted that the Warao, who do not have or no longer 
have cross-cousin marriage, have been exposed to outside influences and 
contacts for centuries through their occupation of part of the Orinoco 
delta, whereas the Yanomamo, although perhaps closely connected with 
them in prehistory, have been much more isolated until recent times up 
the headwaters of the Orinoco and other rivers (1974: 27–29). Needham 
only notes that they also have a symmetric prescriptive terminology 
(ibid.:  28). His point would have been strengthened had he consulted 
their main ethnographer at the time, Napoleon Chagnon, who makes it 
clear that, unlike the Warao, they also have bilateral cross-cousin marriage 
(Chagnon 1968: 125ff.).
In the literature on North America, the explicit focus tends to be more 
on notions of endogamy and exogamy (e.g. Ives 1998; Smith 1974 on 
the Ojibwa), though arguments for their significance tend to resemble 
those made for the South American examples. While the type of group or 
unit to which the endogamy and exogamy apply is not always specified, 
a local residential community composed largely or entirely of recognised 
kin usually seems to be intended. The usual argument appears to be that 
cross-cousin marriage is pursued in such communities as a system of 
close-kin marriage. Conversely, in areas where both population and food 
resources are thinly distributed, cross-cousin marriage may be less viable 
as a basis for cooperation between widely dispersed groups. Also, the 
system becomes less and less attractive as individual communities expand 
demographically and/or geographically, for example, by moving into new 
hunting and foraging territories, whether in the plains or in forests, or by 
expanding trade relations. Under these circumstances a greater range of 
political and trading alliances with other groups becomes necessary, and 
281
8 . WHy DO SOCIETIES ABANDON CROSS‑COUSIN MARRIAGE?
as these are partly pursued through affinal alliance, close-kin marriage 
becomes a constraint, as cross-cousins tend not to be found in these other 
groups. Cross-cousin marriage is therefore progressively abandoned, 
although there may nonetheless be a tendency to marry known kin or 
affines from previous alliances in a more general sense. The terminologies 
are also modified, perhaps in only one or two levels to begin with, such 
as the Hawaiianisation of ego’s level, but also a shift from Dravidian to 
Iroquois crossness, though this is difficult to document. For the Ojibwa 
(Smith 1974), one imperative historically may have been to use affinal 
alliance more widely than cross-cousin marriage to unite all Ojibwa 
groups in a single federation. However, contrary to Hickerson (1962), 
who saw cross-cousin marriage dying out among the Ojibwa in the late-
seventeenth century for reasons that apparently had little to do with contact 
with Whites, Smith argues that the abandonment of this form of affinal 
alliance came much later, in the nineteenth century. It also had reasons 
very much associated with contact: a decline in hunting possibilities, itself 
a consequence of the excessive demands to supply the fur trade, which 
drove out food sources; the United States government’s reservations policy 
and the consequent sedentarisation of Ojibwa and their dependence on 
government handouts; a population explosion; and the rise of individual 
trading and other forms of employment, with less sharing across kin 
groups and the dropping of traditional obligations to kin and affines. 
However, Smith is more inclined to accept the possibility that it was cross-
cousin marriage itself that linked bands in the precontact period. He also 
argues that, in modern conditions, groups became more endogamous, 
as relations between groups became less important. However, he does not 
suggest that cross-cousin marriage was reverted to because of this.
Cross-cousin marriage may be linked to endogamy in this theory, but 
the indications are that, once this form of marriage has been abandoned 
there is no way back, whatever the circumstances. Similar models of 
small, isolated or dispersed populations practising cross-cousin marriage, 
larger, more consolidated ones abandoning it, can be found in John Ives’s 
extensive comparative studies of Native American populations (e.g. 1998 
on Athapaskan, Algonquian and Numan populations). Ives makes much 
of the modalities of what he calls ‘sibling cores’ and their residence patterns. 
In the case of bilateral cross-cousin marriage, where men exchange their 
sisters, it is claimed that they will live together and that their children 
may then marry in the same fashion. However, where the rule is that 
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two brothers marry two sisters, it is linked in this theory with residential 
exogamy. And this seems to reflect deliberate decisions.19 Writing of the 
Wrigley Slavey (after Asch 1998), Ives says that they: 
deliberately fashioned same-sex sibling cores that enforced local-group 
exogamy in the first descending generation. The entire logic of this 
framework is to keep potential affines outside the local group … Asch 
found a distinct tendency to call even cross-cousins by sibling terms, 
widening the field for marriages (Ives 1998: 100).
Yet there is no intrinsic link between residence rules and marriage rules. 
Ives’s theory may reflect local conditions (and his reconstructions are 
meticulous and detailed), but it cannot apply universally.20
The more general theory that cross-cousin marriage disappears with 
increases in group size and consolidation may have something to it, but 
it does rely on a notion of cross-cousin marriage as necessarily close-kin 
marriage, which, as argued above, it may not be. One countervailing theory, 
generally dismissed as unlikely by other anthropologists,21 was put forward 
by Gertrude Dole (1969). She saw endogamy caused by population decline 
among the Kuikuru as forcing a change away from cross-cousin marriage, 
as cross-cousins would live in the same residential cluster and ultimately 
see each other as nonmarriageable kin. The terminology reflects this in its 
19  This itself is not unusual, that is populations thinking about how they marry and asking 
themselves whether they could do it differently (see Layton 2008: 122). Theories of change in kinship 
sometimes forget this point and are often presented as if everything happens without those who are 
affected being aware of it.
20  Nonetheless, similar arguments are occasionally made in relation to other parts of the world. 
Thus R.H. Barnes doubts that change took place from symmetric to asymmetric prescription on Alor 
and Pantar in eastern Indonesia, where both forms occur: 
The symmetric systems of Alor and Pantar are found amongst trading populations situated 
along the coast and culturally distinct from the more anciently indigenous groups of the 
interior. They give the impression of being less permanently settled, and for a shorter time, 
than most Lamaholot communities. It would obviously demand a rather difficult historical 
argument to explain how they managed to retain the original form of social organisation, 
while the agricultural communities to the west of them shifted to asymmetric alliance 
(1977: 153).
The implication is that change, if change there was, proceeded in the opposite direction (this from 
a student of Needham’s otherwise generally under the latter’s influence at that time!). The theories 
of Ives, etc., for North America may also find resonance in the distinction in India between the 
Dravidian south, with bilateral cross-cousin marriage and village endogamy, and the Indo-European 
north, with no cousin marriage and village exogamy, the latter area also featuring dispersal of alliances 
and thus a greater distance between spouses, both genealogically and geographically.
21  One exception is Warren Shapiro, who uses Dole’s theory to support an argument that the 
Siriono may have changed from a lineal (Lowie 1928: 266) or cognatic (Needham 1974: 18) 
terminology to a prescriptive one (Shapiro 1968: 52).
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Hawaiianisation of ego’s level, but not as yet the adjacent levels, a pattern 
Gertrude Dole called ‘bifurcate generation’. This was immediately rejected 
by Basso (1970), from her work on the nearby Kalapalo, where she noted 
that, although here too cross-cousins could live in the same cluster, they 
still married one another. However, they also glossed over the fact so as 
not to draw attention to the reality of affinity (as elsewhere in this region, 
the Kalapalo seek to define affines as consanguines wherever possible).22
Another possible cause is hinted at very briefly by William Elmendorf 
(1961) in his comparison of interior and coastal Salish. While the former 
retains a bifurcate collateral terminology reminiscent of cross-cousin 
marriage, the coastal areas have a ‘lineal’ (or ‘cognatic’, to use Needham’s 
more exact term) terminology and no cross-cousin marriage. The coastal 
areas also have more social and political stratification, with a stratum of 
chiefs. Elmendorf does not elaborate further on the implications of this, 
but he may well have in mind an idea that the constraints of cross-cousin 
marriage were found to restrict the sorts of political alliances in which 
the chiefs presumably indulged. However, South India is replete with 
stratified polities pursuing cross-cousin marriage; in any such society, 
people in lower social strata will refer to and address each other in kin-
related ways, even if they do not do so when looking above them in the 
social scale.
South India
This has long been recognised as an area of extensive cross-cousin 
marriage,  basically bilateral or symmetric prescriptive, but often with 
a preference for one or other cross-cousin without that upsetting 
the symmetric prescriptive terminology.23 It has also given the name 
‘Dravidian’ to this type of affinal alliance, as this is also an area of 
Dravidian speech communities, and there is indeed a high, though by no 
means invariable, association between language and type of affinal alliance 
here (see Trautmann 1981). However, some more recent ethnography 
(Fuller and Narasimhan 2008; Kapadia 1993) indicates clearly that cross-
22  Ellen Basso clearly prefers an explanation in terms of synchronic analysis and rejects 
the evolutionary implications of Dole’s account. Both papers are summarised by Needham (1974: 
32–35). See also Dole’s (1984) reply to Basso.
23  To find asymmetric systems in South Asia, one has to look at the Himalayas, stretching from 
the Indo–Burmese borderlands, with groups such as the Purum and Garo (the latter a mixed system, 
however; see Needham 1958, 1966), to as far west as the Kham Magar in Nepal (Oppitz 1988).
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cousin marriage is no longer being followed as consistently as in the past, 
for reasons ultimately connected to changes in attitudes to arranged 
marriages.
Before discussing these cases, we should turn briefly to the Nayar, 
historically a strongly matrilineal group of subcastes in Kerala with a very 
attenuated system of marriage not involving cross-cousins per se. In this 
system, Nayar women first attained marital status through a ritual involving 
a man from another lineage—a ritual marriage that is not necessarily 
consummated24—before being impregnated through sexual relations with 
a series of other, so-called sambandham partners in a relationship that is 
perhaps most suitably described as concubinage. The usual explanation 
for the emergence of this system is that while some Nayar were rulers 
others formed a military caste, and it was a way of protecting the taravad 
or matrilineal extended family from outside interference when Nayar 
men were absent on military service. Indeed, it had the effect of doing 
this more generally; being a matrilineal unit, the taravad was based on 
brother–sister ties, not husband–wife ties, the role of the sambandham 
partners merely being to impregnate Nayar women and nothing more.25 
Despite the peculiarities of this system, which has been treated as a test 
of the proposition that marriage is universal, both Dumont (1983) and 
Trautmann (1981: 208–14, 417–25) manage convincingly to show that it 
can be fitted into pan- or south-Indian norms respectively. Other reasons 
for thinking that it may represent a shift away from a more original system 
of bilateral cross-cousin marriage are its existence within an area that is 
strongly associated with the latter—the Nayar are also Dravidian speakers, 
after all—and the possibility that the Nayar only became matrilineal in 
historical times, perhaps in the tenth century AD (Moore 1985: 526).26 
Under legal changes introduced originally by the British, most taravads 
have been dissolved, and kinship now basically consists of bilateral nuclear 
24  At the heart of the ritual was the tying of a tali or silver or gold token around the neck of the bride 
by a man of a different lineage (or even caste in some cases, for example Nambudiri Brahmans), as is 
done in ordinary marriages across south India as well. These rituals linked so-called enangar relations 
between different matrilineages, likened by Dumont to the sort of inherited affinal relationships that 
one also finds with the regular relations of cross-cousin marriage, despite the latter’s absence here 
(see Dumont 1983: 117ff.).
25  Often conjugal visits were very brief, not even sleepovers being necessary. At this extreme, 
matrilineal systems do seem to go along with a devaluation of marriage, let alone affinity; another 
example is the Mosuo of southwest China.
26  Moore prefers to see the taravad as a purely residential unit and downplays the matrilineal 
aspects accordingly, but she cannot deny them entirely. More conventional accounts of the Nayar 
system include Kathleen Gough (several works, but especially 1959) and Fuller (1976).
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families. Chie Nakane, in a study carried out in the mid-1950s (1963: 
24–25), indicated that some cross-cousin marriage was briefly being 
revived among the Nayar as the taravads broke up, since it was a way 
of keeping property together that might otherwise have been dispersed 
between competing kin groups. However, she adds that ‘the present 
younger generation strongly avoid cross-cousin marriage, as they think it 
is not good biologically’ (ibid.: 25), perhaps a reference to folk theories of 
inbreeding emerging under western influence.
I turn at this point to more recent material on this region. C.J. Fuller 
and Haripriya Narasimhan (2008) discuss the case of another high-
status Brahman subcaste, the Vattima of Tamilnadu, a state neighbouring 
Kerala. Here, the prevailing influences leading away from cross-cousin 
marriage appear to be exclusively modern, especially the intrusion of class 
values into caste practice. More specifically, these are middle-class values 
that are construed locally somewhat differently from their supposed Euro-
American models, for example, in that they insist on withdrawing women 
from nondomestic labour.
The Vattima are influenced by north-Indian values—in their case by the 
kanya dan ideology of giving a virgin daughter to a family of higher status 
within the subcaste as a supreme gift to one’s superiors—but they have 
traditionally pursued cross-cousin marriage as well.27 However, there has 
recently been a shift in the ideal criteria adopted in seeking spouses, with 
traditional emphases on the importance of a suitable alliance, regardless 
of one’s daughter’s wishes, tending to be replaced by a greater stress on the 
personal characteristics and compatibility of prospective spouses. Added to 
this is a focus on education and employment prospects in India’s modern 
economy, as well as the use of global networks, global forms of advertising, 
etc. to find the right match. Fuller and Narasimhan are careful to point 
out that these are not love marriages and that there is no conflict with 
the concept of arranged marriages; it is simply that those actually getting 
married are more likely to be involved in the arrangements themselves. The 
authors accordingly call these ‘companionate marriages’, to stress this new 
focus on the compatibility of spouses. There are now also more marriages 
to non-Vattima Brahmans, though much more rarely to non-Brahmans. 
There seems to have been a greater stress traditionally on patrilineal descent, 
27  As Kapadia points out in an earlier article ‘by consistently emphasising a “patrilateral” preference 
(with FZS as ideal spouse) [Tamilnad] Brahmins have made the cross-kin system hypergamous’ 
(1993: 28).
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as a bride would stay in her natal home until the birth of at least one child, 
though children were also fostered long-term to MB later. Now conjugal 
nuclear families are established immediately after marriage. The authors 
also state that there are now fewer close-kin marriages, only 10 per cent 
of their sample being with a cross-cousin or sister’s daughter.28 ‘The last 
close-kin marriage in our genealogies occurred in 2002; we know of only 
two others since 1990’ (Fuller and Narasimhan 1980: 742). This is said 
to reflect modern concerns about inbreeding and the greater concern for 
the compatibility of partners, but the imperative of keeping land together 
through cross-cousin marriage is no longer so strong now that so much 
land has been sold outside the community. Furthermore, it is said that 
a daughter-in-law now comes under less pressure from her natal family to 
knuckle under to her new affines if the two families are not already related 
through previous affinal ties. Conversely, north-Indian influence may be 
reflected in the circumstance that the groom’s family is now expected to 
pay less of the wedding expenses. This entails a shift away from the rough 
balance of marriage prestations associated with cross-cousin marriage in 
the direction of an absolute imbalance between the bride’s side giving 
everything as a dowry, while the groom’s side gives nothing, as in classic 
north-Indian practice of kanya dan (lit. ‘the gift of a virgin’ in marriage).
An earlier article by Karen Kapadia (1993) on non-Brahman castes in 
Tamilnad also notes a decline in close-kin marriages, including between 
cross-cousins. As with the previous case, this is felt to reduce the influence 
of the bride’s natal family over that of the groom, and it also means that 
women are left much more to their own devices in disputes with their 
husbands’ families. Indeed, marriages not with close kin are advocated, 
even by women, as a way of reducing marital conflicts, as an aggrieved wife 
finds it less easy to get her natal family to support her if that family does 
not have an existing relationship with the husband’s family. Again there 
is a shift away from a rough balance in marriage prestations to a north–
India-style dowry, aggravated by the large-scale out-migration of men and 
concomitant shortage of husbands. Kapadia is much more concerned 
with the consequences of these changes for women, and she stresses in 
particular the greater seclusion of women, under the apparently mistaken 
28  Sister’s daughter’s marriage is a widespread practice accompanying bilateral cross-cousin marriage 
in many communities in South India. It can be construed as male ego taking his sister’s daughter as 
a wife for himself, not for his son, as with cross-cousin marriage. A useful account is Good (1980).
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local assumption that withdrawing them from their traditional labour 
activities reflects western middle-class values—as if this were upper-class 
Victorian Britain rather than contemporary British society.
As with the previous case, Kapadia mentions education and employment 
prospects as more important considerations than the traditional emphasis 
on kin as marriage partners. The claims of such kin on one another 
are now being ignored in the pursuit of other, more modern, interests. 
One of these is certainly prospective husbands seeking the largest dowry, 
concomitant with their own rise of status in the labour market, as they 
abandon traditional agricultural labour for more comfortable jobs in 
the government service. However, Kapadia’s statistics (1993: 44 ff.) 
indicate that it is the lower castes that are most likely to practice nonkin 
marriage, though still with considerable percentages marrying a close 
or classificatory  cross-cousin or sister’s daughter, and despite the latter 
being regarded as the ideal forms of marriage. However, this is not 
a new situation. As  she explains, ‘Right through the three generations 
considered … [i]t … is clear that there has been a striking discrepancy 
between marriage preference and marriage practice in the non-Brahman 
lower castes for at least five decades’ (ibid.: 46). Only the wealthier 
Vellan Chettiar caste of landowners lived up to this preference, with over 
97 per cent of marriages with cross kin. Despite the changes in lower-caste 
practices, however, there has been no change in the pattern of terminology 
(ibid.: 48–49), which is probably the case for the previous example also. 
This is hardly surprising in itself, given received wisdom that changes in 
terminology lag behind changes in alliance practice, though in Kapadia’s 
case the changes in practice were evidently already in train around the 
time of World War II, 50 years before she wrote. In both these cases, 
modern changes are obviously having an impact. Among these are the 
development of the modern Indian economy; the sale of land; the out-
migration of men especially; urbanisation and modern lifestyles generally; 
and the influence of ideas of class drawn ultimately, if in modified form, 
from the west. However, the spread of north-Indian values relating to 
kinship specifically, especially dowry marriage and marriage to cousins 
and other close kin, can also be detected.
A book by Isabelle Clark-Decès (2014) confirms the sudden and rapid 
move away from close-kin marriages currently among Tevar castes in 
Tamil Nadu. Like Anthony Good (1980), she sees elder sister’s daughter 
marriage as traditionally more important than cross-cousin marriage 
generally in this area, but in respect of both forms she also rejects the 
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alliance perspective deriving from Dumont (especially Dumont 1953), 
seeing Tamil attitudes to marriage much more as a matter of like marrying 
like, of marriage between status equals, not of structured oppositions 
between consanguines and affines who, potentially at least, are status 
unequals. This is especially true of elder sister’s daughter marriage, which, 
she argues, represents a closed marriage within the kin group formed 
of opposite-sex siblings and their descendants, whereas cross-cousin 
marriage has at least the potential for extending links through marriage 
and negotiating status in the usual Indian fashion.
Clark-Decès also offers three explanations for the decline in all close-kin 
marriages in these castes (2014: 123–28). First, improved living conditions, 
public health campaigns and presumably (though not mentioned by Clark-
Decès) ‘modern’-style aspirations for education and steady employment 
have combined to lower family size and increase age differences between 
the generations, thus reducing the number of close kin one may marry, 
while at the same time making it less likely that a mother’s brother and 
an elder sister’s daughter will be of roughly the same age at marriage, 
despite the difference in genealogical level. Second, attitudes have been 
changed by the somewhat distorted ideas of the genetic damage caused by 
close-kin marriages that now circulate freely across India, whether in the 
media or through official public health campaigns. Third, considerations 
of the financial standing and educational levels of both bride and groom 
are replacing the generally very strong claims (Tamil urimai) that close 
kin formerly had on one another as spouses. Contra Kapadia (1995), 
however, Clark Decès does not attribute this change solely to the growing 
practice of dowry payments, which, unlike Kapadia, she does not see as a 
solely modern innovation, any more than are the negotiations over status 
with which the practice is intimately connected. Rather, it seems Clark-
Decès is arguing that young women are catching up with young men in 
the educational stakes, making them a more valuable asset in the marriage 
market and thus contributing to changes in traditional marriage attitudes 
and practices generally.
I should mention one other case, or series of cases, here, namely the Munda 
speech communities further north in India, which were the subject of part 
of my doctoral thesis. I have discussed them on many occasions before 
in this context (see especially Parkin 1992: 144–87) and will only repeat 
here that, insofar as they have abandoned cross-cousin marriage, the 
impetus has almost certainly been the influence of the surrounding caste 
society, which typically marries in north-Indian fashion (that is no cousin 
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marriage at all). It is, in short, an attempt to rise in the local hierarchy by 
imitating elite practice in what is a very status-conscious society, even in 
remote areas.29
Section III
In accounting for change in kinship systems, these examples indicate that 
we can only think in terms of local ethnographic reasons, not global or 
universal ones, for the abandonment of cross-cousin marriage. However, 
because many such changes are accompanied by changes in terminology, 
we may find that the more general explanations may lie in theories of 
classification, rather than of marriage per se. This conclusion is supported 
by the observation that categorical patterns are limited in number in a way 
that the details of actual marriage practices do not seem to be. To quote 
Needham, from his examination of the Warao case, ‘very unlike social 
factors can produce like forms of classification’ (Needham 1974: 40). 
In other words, while potential changes in social morphology and attitudes 
and the reasons for these changes are many, the logical possibilities in 
which a kinship terminology can be constructed are few,30 meaning that 
exact correlations between these levels of analysis, though possible, are 
not inevitable (Good 1981). Needham continues, ‘The decisive factors, 
I suggest, have been, not particular empirical circumstances or legislative 
motives, but general possibilities and constraints of a purely formal nature’ 
(1974: 40).
Methodologically the restricted range of terminological possibilities 
makes it easier to control for variation, as well as to trace possible 
changes themselves, the future direction of which can, to some extent, be 
predicted. One possible approach is that of the lexical universalists, who 
might also be called lexical evolutionists. An early such work was Brent 
Berlin and Paul Kay’s famous and influential study of colour terms (1969), 
which  set out a predictive model of change in respect to the order in 
which some colour terms appear in evolutionary time. This methodology 
was followed in other work by, for example, Cecil Brown on life-form 
terms (1984) and Stanley Witowski on kin terms (1971, 1972). The latter 
29  One should therefore add this to, for example, changing bride price for dowry, and burial for 
cremation, as well as giving up alcohol, youth dormitories and mixed-sex dancing, etc.
30  For example, for +1 male consanguines, only the following four patterns are attested: F = FB ≠ 
MB, F ≠ FB ≠ MB, F = FB = MB and F ≠ FB = MB. A fifth logical possibility, F = MB ≠ FB, is not.
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in particular applied Berlin and Kay’s insights to kinship terminologies 
regarding the predictability and order with which certain features 
disappear in circumstances of change. For example, prescriptive equations 
generally disappear before classificatory ones. Yet kinship terminologies 
are different from the sorts of classification studied by Berlin and Kay, 
and by Brown. The latter grow in number of categories over time, each 
category shrinking in its semantic range as other more specific categories 
emerge, as in the Linnaean classification of the natural world. This reflects 
the growth in knowledge about that world, or, for example, the range of 
colours recognised by a colour terminology.31 Kinship, conversely, is not 
subject to such growth in knowledge—at a basic level, relationships and 
alters (relatives) have always been the same, though classified differently—
so that change can only be effected in the form of how this finite knowledge 
is expressed by each emerging set of categories.32 
Another possibly significant factor is the way in which categories and 
classifications can assume a very real concreteness in people’s minds, 
despite their variations in form over both time and space. Edwin 
Ardener pointed out that ‘worlds set up by categories bear all the signs 
of materiality to the untutored human being’ (1982: 12).33 Earlier in 
the same paper he suggests, ‘Once the classification exists … it is part 
of the total experience of unreflecting individuals’ (ibid.: 6). Finally, as 
Needham remarks, ‘In a prescriptive system especially there is an absolute 
categorical determination which is hard to evade or change [and] which 
tends towards conservatism’ (1974: 41; also 1973). In other words, rules 
and behaviour are more labile than classifications: as already noted, rules 
can be broken, behaviour manipulated, but a classification is fixed, at least 
synchronically, and also diachronically within certain limits. When one 
adds to this the consideration, already noted, that because rules can be 
broken and behaviour manipulated complete uniformity between these 
31  Sometimes traceable: for example, orange, lilac, and purple have known origins as loans into 
English.
32  One of the characteristics of prescriptive terminologies is that they are closed systems of 
classification, meaning that one can give any alter within them a term through a recursive process, 
however long the chain of genealogical symbols. With nonprescriptive systems this recursive process 
does not apply, but one can still locate any alter by using the chains of symbols themselves, however 
long. This has always conditioned knowledge of kin ties and it always will: it is not to be compared to 
the biologist continually finding new species in, say, the Amazon forests or the Mariana trench to add 
to Linnaeus’s classification.
33  In Ardener’s mind, this potentially objectionable word (untutored) probably meant little more 
than that in ordinary social practice ordinary human beings take their classifications for granted and 
are unaware both of this fact and of possible alternatives.
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three levels is not to be expected and is rare in practice, then there is 
almost bound to be a time lag between changes in rules and practices and 
changes in terminology. But, as Needham also says:
Yet prescriptive systems do change, and the problem is how precisely they 
do so. The crucial issue is the extent to which individuals make conscious 
alterations and adjustments; for the more deliberately they are supposed 
to act the more striking it is that their cumulative decisions should result 
in a common type of transformation (1974: 41).
This reference, to the possible impact of ‘cumulative decisions’, is itself 
striking in a paper by such a committed structuralist. However, it suggests 
that the cumulative impact of what are basically the same decisions being 
taken because individuals in a society are repeatedly faced with essentially 
the same circumstances may eventually make the lack of fit between 
terminology, on the one hand, and alliance rules and practice, on the 
other, intolerable. At this point the terminology may begin to change. 
It is grasping these circumstances that is difficult. The necessary evidence 
for change is often circumstantial—the very fact of a mismatch between 
the respective patterns of terminology and alliance—while evidence for 
what may have caused it is even more often nonexistent or irrecoverable. 
However, there are exceptions, as in Europe and much of Asia, where 
there are written records. While there is no evidence that historical or 
prehistorical Indo–European speech communities had cross-cousin 
marriage,34 it is a reasonable hypothesis, based on Han-yi Feng’s careful 
study of kin terms (1937) that China had bilateral cross-cousin marriage 
into the early historical period. Historical records helped Trautmann 
immensely in fixing the limits of Dravidian kinship in South Asia (1981). 
In the Americas, finally, we do have some, often rather patchy written 
sources on Native American kinship patterns—dictionaries and word 
lists, travellers’ and missionaries’ accounts etc.—going back in some 
cases to the sixteenth century, of which anthropologists have made quite 
extensive use.35
34  There are exceptions in South Asia, most prominently Sinhalese (see Trautmann 1981: 153–55), 
but these are most probably due to a population retaining its kinship system on changing its language, 
with terms in the new language being invented or modified to suit. Indeed, this is strongly indicated 
in the Sinhalese by the circumstance that most of its kinship vocabulary is Dravidian, even though 
the Sinhalese language itself is Indo–European. See Edward Bruner (1955) on a lexically English but 
structurally Crow–Omaha terminology in North America.
35  This can be compared to Africa, Australia or Oceania, where contact has been much more recent 
on the whole and the time depth of such sources (if they exist at all) is far shallower. M.V. Kryukov 
(1998: 298–99) lists other techniques to which the analyst may have recourse in reconstructing the past.
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However, the importance of classification ultimately lies in how kinship 
terminologies are articulated with marriage choices. While there has been 
a tendency since Morgan to see change in the former lagging behind 
change in the latter, we have also seen that, where they are congruent, 
the terminology will guide ‘wrong marriages’ (e.g. with a parallel cousin 
instead of a cross-cousin) into the right classificatory channels. Similarly, 
the terminology can be used to rule out all cousin marriage by the simple 
device of classifying cousins as siblings, as in north-Indian terminologies 
such as Hindi, Bengali or Gujarati. This can also have a knock-on effect 
on other parts of the terminology, in which the cross-parallel distinction 
may be modified or abandoned. Certainly the terminology may well 
be reacting to change elsewhere in the system, of the sort discussed in 
Section II. Nonetheless, we are justified in asking just what is meant by 
‘abandoning cross-cousin marriage’ and whether it might not take the 
form of how genealogical cross-cousins are reclassified as kin prohibited in 
marriage, typically as siblings. Genealogically (i.e. analytically), therefore, 
cross-cousins do not disappear, but in the classificatory sense they are 
taken into other categories.
It is also in circumstances of flux and uncertainty that genealogy might 
become more important, since more exact calculations might have to be 
made regarding the suitability of potential spouses, for example, excluding 
genealogical cross-cousins but allowing classificatory ones. Both the 
terminology itself and genealogical reckoning by virtue of it have their 
own dynamics, not just the rules or practices of marriage; and this may 
even be reinforced by the limited number of patterns the terminology 
can assume, as well as by the propensity of any classification to appear 
concrete and ‘natural’, when in fact it is subject to cultural variation.
Section IV
To conclude, Scheffler’s disinclination to see in cross-cousin marriage 
a  ‘system’ is based on the inevitable failure of any society to reach a 
100 per  cent observance of the marriage rule and to that extent is 
understandable. However, although his approach is rooted in analysis of 
the terminology, it fails to recognise the extent to which classifications 
may be articulated in changes in how people marry, as well as in marriage 
practices at a particular point in time. In this respect his approach is 
quite different from the position that Needham eventually adopted 
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(i.e. in  Needham 1973), namely that the classification or terminology 
was where prescription should be identified, not the pattern or rule of 
marriages. Coupled with the synchronic bias in Scheffler’s approach, 
which did not permit effective consideration of change, it can readily be 
seen how his debates with the structuralists could become largely a matter 
of the two sides talking past each other, with little hope of reconciliation.
References
Allen, Nicholas J. 1986. ‘Tetradic theory: An approach to kinship’. Journal 
of the Anthropological Society of Oxford 13: 139–46.
——. 1989. ‘The evolution of kinship terminologies’. Lingua 77(2): 
173–85. doi.org/10.1016/0024-3841(89)90014-4 
——. 1998. ‘The pre-history of Dravidian-type terminologies’. 
In  Transformations of Kinship, edited by Maurice Godelier, Thomas 
T. Trautmann and Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat, 314–31. Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Press.
——. 2004. ‘Tetradic theory: An approach to kinship’. In Kinship and 
Family: An Anthropological Reader, edited by Robert Parkin and Linda 
Stone, 221–35. Oxford: Blackwell.
——. 2008. ‘Tetradic theory and the origin of human kinship systems’. 
In Early Human Kinship: From Sex to Social Reproduction, edited by 
Nicholas J. Allen, Hilary Callan, Robin Dunbar and Wendy James, 
96–112. Oxford: Blackwell. doi.org/10.1002/9781444302714.ch5
Allen, Nicholas J., Hilary Callan, Robin Dunbar and Wendy James (eds). 
2008 Early Human Kinship: From Sex to Social Reproduction. Oxford: 
Blackwell. doi.org/10.1002/9781444302714
Ardener, Edwin. 1982. ‘Social anthropology, language and reality’. 
In  Semantic Anthropology, edited by David Parkin, 1–14. London: 
Academic Press.
Asch, Michael. 1998.’ Kinship and Dravidianate logic: Some implications 
for understanding power, politics, and social life in a northern Dene 
community’. In Transformations of Kinship, edited by Maurice 
Godelier, Thomas T. Trautmann and Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat, 140–49. 
Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
294
Barnard, Alan. 2008. ‘The co-evolution of language and kinship’. In Early 
Human Kinship: From Sex to Social Reproduction, edited by Nicholas 
J. Allen, Hilary Callan, Robin Dunbar and Wendy James, 232–43. 
Oxford: Blackwell. doi.org/10.1002/9781444302714.ch13
Barnes, R.H. 1973. ‘Two terminologies of symmetric prescriptive alliance 
from Pantar and Alor in eastern Indonesia’. Sociologus 23(1): 71–89.
——. 1974. Kédang. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
——. 1977. ‘Alliance and categories in Wailolong, East Flores’. Sociologus 
27(2): 133–57.
Basso, Ellen B. 1970. ‘Xingu Carib kinship terminology and marriage: 
Another view’. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 26(4): 402–16. 
doi.org/10.1086/soutjanth.26.4.3629368
Berlin, Brent and Paul Kay. 1969. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality 
and Evolution. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Brown, Cecil. 1984. Language and Living Things: Uniformities in Folk 
Classification and Naming. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Bruner, Edward M. 1955. ‘Two processes of change in Mandan-Hidatsa 
kinship terminology’. American Anthropologist 57(4): 840–50. 
doi.org/ 10.1525/aa.1955.57.4.02a00080
Chagnon, Napoleon. 1968. Yanomamo: The Fierce People. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Chien Mei-Ling. 2013. ‘Tensions between romantic love and marriage: 
Performing “Miao cultural individuality” in an Upland Miao love-
song’. In Modalities of Change: The Interface of Tradition and Modernity 
in East Asia, edited by James Wilkerson and Robert Parkin, 93–116. 
New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Clark-Decès, Isabelle. 2014. The Right Spouse: Preferential Marriages 
in Tamil Nadu. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cook, E.A. 1969. ‘Marriage among the Manga’. In Pigs, Pearlshells, and 
Women: Marriage in the New Guinea Highlands, edited by Robert 
M.  Glasse and Mervyn J. Meggitt, 96–116. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.
295
8 . WHy DO SOCIETIES ABANDON CROSS‑COUSIN MARRIAGE?
Désveaux, Emmanuel and Marion Selz. 1998. ‘Dravidian nomenclature as 
an expression of ego-centered dualism’. In Transformations of Kinship, 
edited by Maurice Godelier, Thomas T. Trautmann and Franklin E. 
Tjon Sie Fat, 150–67. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Dole, Gertrude. 1969. ‘Generation kinship nomenclature as an adaptation 
to endogamy’. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 25(2): 105–23. 
doi.org/10.1086/soutjanth.25.2.3629197
——. 1984. ‘The structure of Kuikuru marriage.’ In Marriage Practices 
in Lowland South America, edited by Kenneth M. Kensinger, 45–62. 
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Dumont, Louis. 1953. ‘The Dravidian kinship terminology as an 
expression of marriage’. Man 53: 34–39. doi.org/10.2307/2794868
——. 1983. ‘Nayar marriages as Indian facts’. In Affinity as a Value: 
Marriage Alliance in South India, with Comparative Essays on Australia, 
105–44. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, first published 
as ‘Les mariages Nayars comme faits indiens’, L’Homme 1(1) (1961): 
11–36. doi.org/10.3406/hom.1961.366338
Elmendorf, William W. 1961. ‘System change in Salish kinship 
terminologies’. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 17(4): 365–82. 
doi.org/10.1086/soutjanth.17.4.3628948
Elwin, Verrier. 1947. The Muria and their Ghotul. Bombay: Oxford 
University Press.
Feng Han-yi. 1937. ‘The Chinese kinship system’. Harvard Journal 
of Asiatic Studies 2(2): 139–275.
Forth, Gregory. 1985. ‘Layia (FZS, ZH, m.s.): The evolutionary 
implications of some Sumbanese kin terms’. Sociologus 35(2): 120–41.
——. 1988. ‘Prescription gained or retained? Analytical observations on 
the relationship terminology of Ndao, eastern Indonesia’. Sociologus 
38(2): 166–83.
——. 1990. ‘From symmetry to asymmetry: An evolutionary interpretation 
of eastern Sumbanese relationship terminology’. Anthropos 85(4–6): 
373–92.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
296
Fuller, C.J. 1976. The Nayars Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Fuller, C.J. and Haripriya Narasimhan. 2008. ‘Companionate marriage 
in India: The changing marriage system in a middle-class Brahman 
subcaste’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (n.s.) 14(4): 
736–54. doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2008.00528.x
Glasse, Robert M. and Mervyn J. Meggitt (eds). 1969. Pigs, Pearlshells, 
and Women: Marriage in the New Guinea Highlands. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Godelier, Maurice, Thomas T. Trautmann and Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat 
(eds). 1998. Transformations of Kinship. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
Good, Anthony. 1980. ‘Elder sister’s daughter marriage in South Asia’. 
Journal of Anthropological Research 36(4): 474–500. doi.org/10.1086/
jar.36.4.3629617
——. 1981. ‘Prescription, preference and practice: Marriage patterns 
among the Kondaiyankottai Maravar of South India’. Man (n.s.) 
16(1):108–29. doi.org/10.2307/2801978
Gough, Kathleen. 1959. ‘The Nayars and the definition of marriage’. 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and 
Ireland, 89(1): 23–34. doi.org/10.2307/2844434
Graham, Penelope. 1987. ‘East Flores revisited: A note on asymmetric 
alliance in Lebola and Wailolong, Indonesia’. Sociologus 37(1): 40–59.
Hart, Charles William Merton and Arnold R. Pilling. 1979. The Tiwi 
of North Australia. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Henley, Paul. 1996. ‘South Indian models in the Amazonian lowlands’. 
Manchester Papers in Social Anthropology 1.
Hiatt, Lester Richard and Chandana Jayawardena (eds). 1971. 
Anthropology in Oceania: Essays Presented to Ian Hogbin. Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson.
Hickerson, Harold. 1962. The Southwestern Chippewa: An Ethnohistorical 
Study. Washington: American Anthropological Association, Memoir 
92.
297
8 . WHy DO SOCIETIES ABANDON CROSS‑COUSIN MARRIAGE?
Hicks, David. 1978. Structural Analyses in Anthropology: Case Studies from 
Indonesia and Brazil. St Augustin bei Bonn: Anthropos-Institut.
——. 1985. ‘A transitional two-section system among the Mbae-speakers 
of Manggarai, eastern Indonesia’. Sociologus 35(1): 74–83.
——. 1990. Kinship and Religion in Eastern Indonesia. Gothenburg: Acta 
Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
Ives, John W. 1998. ‘Developmental processes in the pre-contact history of 
Athapaskan, Algonquian, and Numic kin systems’. In Transformations 
of Kinship, edited by Maurice Godelier, Thomas T. Trautmann 
and Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat, 94–139. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
Kapadia, Karen. 1993. ‘Marrying money: Changing preference and 
practice in Tamil marriage’. Contributions to Indian Sociology 27(1): 
25–51. doi.org/10.1177/006996693027001002 
——. 1995. Shiva and her Sisters: Gender, Caste, and Class in Rural South 
India. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kensinger, Kenneth M. (ed.). 1984. Marriage Practices in Lowland 
South America. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Krengel, Monika. 1989. Sozialstruktur in Kumaon: Bergbauen im 
Himalaya. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Kryukov, M.V. 1998. ‘The synchro-diachronic method and the 
multidimensionality of kinship transformations’. In Transformations 
of Kinship, edited by Maurice Godelier, Thomas T. Trautmann and 
Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat, 294–313. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
Kuper, Adam. 1982. ‘Lineage theory: a brief retrospect’. Annual 
Review of Anthropology 11: 71–95. doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.11. 
100182.000443
Layton, Robert. 2008. ‘What can ethnography tell us about human 
social evolution?’ In Early Human Kinship: From Sex to Social 
Reproduction, edited by Nicholas J. Allen, Hilary Callan, Robin 
Dunbar and Wendy  James, 113–27. Oxford: Blackwell. doi.org/ 
10.1002/9781444302714.ch6
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
298
Leach, Edmund. 1960. ‘The Sinhalese of the dry zone of northern Ceylon’. 
In Social Structure in Southeast Asia, edited by George P. Murdock, 
116–26. Chicago: Quadrangle.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1949. Les structures élémentaires de la parenté. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires Françaises.
Lindell, Kristina, Rolf Samuelsson and Damrong Tayanin. 1979. ‘Kinship 
and marriage in northern Kammu villages: The kinship model’. 
Sociologus 29(1): 60–84.
Lounsbury, Floyd G. 1964. ‘The structural analysis of kinship semantics’. 
In Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguistics, edited 
by Horace G. Lunt, 1073–93. The Hague: Mouton.
Lowie, Robert 1928. ‘A note on relationship terminologies’. American 
Anthropologist 30: 263–68. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1928.30.2.02a00060
Lunt, Horace G. (ed.). 1964. Proceedings of the Ninth International 
Congress of Linguistics. The Hague: Mouton.
Mogey, John (ed.). 1963. Family and Marriage. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Moore, Melinda A. 1985. ‘A new look at the Nayar taravad’. Man (n.s.) 
20(3): 523–41. doi.org/10.2307/2802444
Nakane, Chie. 1963. ‘The Nayar family in a disintegrating matrilineal 
system’. In Family and Marriage, edited by John Mogey, 17–28. 
Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Needham, Rodney. 1958. ‘A structural analysis of Purum society’. 
American  Anthropologist 60(1): 75–101. doi.org/10.1525/aa.1958. 
60.1. 02a00080
——. 1960. ‘Alliance and classification among the Lamet’. Sociologus 
10(2): 97–119.
——. 1966. ‘Terminology and alliance, I—Garo, Manggarai’. Sociologus 
16(2): 141–57.
——. 1967. ‘Terminology and alliance, II—Mapuche; Conclusions’. 
Sociologus 17(1): 39–53.
299
8 . WHy DO SOCIETIES ABANDON CROSS‑COUSIN MARRIAGE?
——. 1971. ‘Remarks on the analysis of kinship and marriage’. 
In  Rethinking Kinship and Marriage, edited by Rodney Needham, 
1–34. London: Tavistock.
——. 1973. ‘Prescription’. Oceania 43(3): 166–81. doi.org/10.1002/ 
j.1834-4461.1973.tb01207.x
——. 1974. ‘The evolution of social classification: A commentary on 
the Warao case’. Bijdragen tot de Land-, Taal, en Volkenkunde 130(1): 
16–43.
——. 1986. ‘Alliance’. Oceania 56(3): 165–80. doi.org/10.1002/ j.1834-
4461.1986.tb02130.x
——. 1987. Mamboru: History and Structure in a Domain of Northwestern 
Sumba. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Needham, Rodney (ed.). 1971. Rethinking Kinship and Marriage. London: 
Tavistock.
Oppitz, Michael. 1988. Frau für Fron: die Dreierallianz bei den Magar 
West-Nepals. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Parkin, David (ed.). 1982. Semantic Anthropology. London: Academic 
Press.
Parkin, Robert. 1992. The Munda of Central India: An Account of their 
Social Organization. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
——. 1996. ‘Genealogy and category: An operational view’. L’Homme 
36(139): 85–106. doi.org/10.3406/hom.1996.370119
——. 1998. ‘Dravidian and Iroquois in South Asia’. In Transformations 
of Kinship, edited by Maurice Godelier, Thomas T. Trautmann 
and Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat, 252–70. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
——. 2009. ‘What Shapiro and McKinnon are all about, and why 
kinship still needs anthropologists’. Social Anthropology 17(2): 158–70. 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2009.00067.x
——. 2013a. ‘Relatedness as transcendence: On the renewed debate 
over  the meaning of kinship’. Journal of the Anthropological Society 
of Oxford 5(1): 1–26.
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
300
——. 2013b. ‘From tetradic society to dispersed alliance: notes arising 
from a chapter by N.J. Allen’. Journal of the Anthropological Society 
of Oxford 5(2): 194–206.
Parkin, Robert and Linda Stone (eds). 2004. Kinship and Family: 
An Anthropological Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (Alfred Reginald). 1952. Structure and Function 
in Primitive Society, London: Cohen & West.
Reining, Priscilla (ed.). 1972. Kinship Studies in the Morgan Centennial 
Year. Washington DC: Anthropological Society of Washington.
Rivière, Peter. 1969. Marriage Among the Trio: A Principle of Social 
Organization. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Scheffler, Harold W. 1965. Choiseul Island Social Structure. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
——. 1966. ‘Ancestor worship in anthropology: Or, observations 
on descent and descent groups’. Current Anthropology 7(5): 541–51. 
doi.org/10.1086/200770
——. 1971. ‘Dravidian-Iroquois: The Melanesian evidence’. 
In Anthropology in Oceania: Essays Presented to Ian Hogbin, edited by 
Lester Richard Hiatt and Chandana Jayawardena, 231–54. Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson.
——. 1972. ‘Kinship semantics’. Annual Review of Anthropology 1: 309–28. 
doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.01.100172.001521
——. 1977. ‘Review: Kinship and alliance in South India and 
Australia’. American Anthropologist 79(4): 869–82. doi.org/10.1525/
aa.1977.79.4.02a00060
——. 1984. ‘Markedness and extensions: The Tamil case’. Man (n.s.) 
19(4): 557–74. doi.org/10.2307/2802326
——. 1985. ‘Filiation and affiliation’. Man (n.s.) 20(1): 1–21. doi.org/ 
10.2307/2802219
——. 2001. Filiation and Affiliation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
301
8 . WHy DO SOCIETIES ABANDON CROSS‑COUSIN MARRIAGE?
Scheffler, Harold W. and Floyd G. Lounsbury. 1971. A Study in Structural 
Semantics: The Siriono Kinship System. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall.
Shapiro, Warren. 1968. ‘Kinship and marriage in Siriono society: 
A re-examination’. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 124(1): 
40–55. doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90002883
Smith, James G.E. 1974. ‘Proscription of cross-cousin marriage among 
the southwestern Ojibwa’. American Ethnologist 1(4): 751–62. 
doi.org/ 10.1525/ae.1974.1.4.02a00090
Taylor, Anne-Christine. 1998. ‘Jivaro kinship: “simple” and “complex” 
formulas: A Dravidian transformation group’. In Transformations 
of Kinship, edited by Maurice Godelier, Thomas T. Trautmann and 
Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat, 187–213. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press.
Trautmann, Thomas R. 1981. Dravidian Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Walker, Harry. 2009. ‘Transformations of Urarina kinship’. Journal of the 
Anthropological Society of Oxford 1(1): 52–69.
Wilkerson, James and Robert Parkin (eds). 2013. Modalities of Change: 
The Interface of Tradition and Modernity in East Asia. New York and 
Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Witowski, Stanley. 1971. ‘A universalist account of kinship semantics’. 
PhD thesis. University of Iowa.
——. 1972. ‘Guttman scaling of semantic distinctions’. In Kinship Studies 
in the Morgan Centennial Year, edited by Priscilla Reining, 167–88. 




Toward Reinvigorating an 
Ethnolinguistic Approach to the 
Study of ‘Kin Terms’: A View from 
Nascent-based Zuni Relational 
Terminology
Linda K . Watts
Introduction
I welcome this opportunity to honour the work of Harold K. Scheffler by 
suggesting that his semantic extensionist approach to the cross-cultural 
study of kin terminology could be expanded to a broader linguistic field 
than the domain of lexical-referential, genealogically based relational 
terminology forms. A more holistic linguistic account of relational 
terminology is discussed with regard to the relational terminology system 
in use at Zuni Pueblo about which the author and other scholars have 
elsewhere made relevant contributions (Kroeber 1917; Ladd 1979; 
Schneider and Roberts 1956) or have analysed directly (Watts 1992, 2000).
In 1917, Alfred Kroeber asserted that the Zuni peoples’ use of their own 
so-called kinship terminology system was ‘utterly slovenly’ and ‘by rule 
of thumb’ (76–77). In view of observational data he collected on ‘errata’ 
of kin-term applications according to the anthropological perspective 
that the Zuni kin-term system comprises a ‘modified Crow’ type—
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that is, distinguishing mother’s mother from father’s mother as included 
in one sort of Crow system—Kroeber assumed that Zunis had been 
erratically affected by linguistic acculturation to a ‘thoroughly bilateral’ 
pattern (ibid.: 48). This resulted, he thought, in speakers often ‘violating’ 
their native principles of kin-term usage in favour of bilateral as versus 
matrilineal extensions.
The fact is, the Zuni cares remarkably little for system or theory. ‘He is 
an opportunist. He has the broad, vague outlines of his kinship system 
well in mind; but he is not in the least interested in following out basic 
principles into consistent detail’ (Kroeber 1917: 76).
Thus, for instance, Kroeber observed that speakers might address someone 
of a father’s sister (Schneider and Roberts 1956: 3) or a father’s older sister’s 
daughter (Kroeber 1917: 54) kin type with possessively marked forms 
of the relational term tsitda, associated in an ethnogenealogically defined 
Crow system with M/MZ kin types. This so-called ‘bilateral’ principle of 
usage was, in 1917, neither pervasive nor was it systemically diagnostic—
then or since—of the nature of Zuni kin-term usage ‘errata’. Speakers in 
1917 and since were often also addressing and referring to their maternal 
side genealogical +2 generation grandmothers as tsitda, a term culturally 
associated at Zuni with a senior generation, matricentric suprahousehold 
group- (or clan-) based, socially proximal female. An elder female sibling 
or even a friend’s mother or grandmother who adopts, raises, or is 
highly supportive to a person may also be designated and addressed with 
appropriate possessive constructions as one’s Tsitda.1 In 1986, I spoke with 
a centenarian who had been called from a boarding school in Albuquerque 
around the turn of the century to assume the position of Tsitda to her 
mother’s newborn son because her mother had died in childbirth. This 
woman remained Tsitda to her genealogical younger brother all her life, 
and he remained Aktsek’i (‘young household-group boy’) and later Ts’awak’i 
(‘mature’ or ‘kiva-initiated household-group’ ‘teen’ or ‘older boy’) to her. 
I asked if this woman had ever explained her genealogical relationship 
to her Ts’awak’i. After some confusion about why I was asking this, she 
answered simply: ‘That’s possible, I guess; but I will always be his Tsitda’.
Shift forward to 1979 with Edmund Ladd’s reappraisal of Zuni kin-term 
usages from a native perspective. Ladd was a native, fluent Zuni-speaking 
linguistic and cultural anthropologist. Contrary to Kroeber’s grim and 
1  I shall from here on capitalise Zuni household-based role designations.
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rather contemptuous-seeming assessment of Zuni peoples’ ‘slovenly, 
irrational’ use of their own kin-term system—a vital component of Zuni 
language use altogether, even today—Ladd explained native cultural 
principles of alternation in Zuni kin-term usages that revealed how factors 
of relative social distance, relative familiarity, and degrees of relative 
household based and/or ceremonial seniority—that is pragmatic factors—
trump genealogical factors in accounting for the systemic, situational use 
of so-called kin terms by Zuni speakers.
Ladd demonstrated how a speaker might indexically mark degrees of 
relative social—and not necessarily genealogical at all—proximity by 
using Zuni relational kin terms either inclusively or exclusively, often 
applying so-called kin terms to nongenealogical relatives who are socially 
proximal (see Watts 2000: 55), or applying them to indicate ceremonial 
affinity such as kiva group comembership or ‘godparental’ medicine 
society (or Catholic) sponsorship rather than as genealogical markers.
The Zuni relational particle stem form hotda has been ethnogenealogically 
associated with MM/MMZ. Yet informants from one household group 
have told me that in their extended household-group history they have 
chosen not to use any form of this particle for a specific maternal grand-
aunt. This is due to a disagreement over land inheritance between their 
maternal grandmother (whom they address as Tsitda, not Hotda, and who 
owned the house they were raised in) and one of her sisters, who did not 
reside therein as an adult (Watts 2000: 129–32). Members from each side 
of the fission to this day no longer exchange or refer to one another with 
direct relational kin-particle forms at all, employing the Zuni relational 
terminology system principle of exclusion mentioned above that Ladd 
(1979) described.
Another Zuni informant described a long telephone conversation she had 
engaged in with her genitor. This man offered to give her so many sheep if 
only she would agree to address him as datchu (in Crow terms, referring to 
one’s father/father’s brother kin types) in public, especially at ceremonial 
settings. She refused because he had not been socially proximal with her 
since leaving her mother’s household when she was young. She used 
situationally appropriate forms of datchu both in reference and in address 
to her mother’s second (in-household living) husband, and she and her 
children utilised relational terminology appropriately with all of this in-
married man’s maternal and extended household-group members. Rather 
than regarding these usages as polysemic metaphorical extensions of focal 
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
306
genealogical referents, this woman stated emphatically about her genitor, 
‘He has never been a Datchu or ‘hom (1st sg. poss.) datchu’ to me’. This 
same woman also explained to me that rather than using the direct Zuni 
relational expression ‘hom oyemshi’ to refer to her first husband whom 
she had separated from, she would refer to him only indirectly using the 
teknonymous relational expression ‘hom ts’awak’i ‘an datchu’ (1st sg. poss. 
‘older boy-of-household’ 3rd sg. poss. Datchu).
I found that English referential expressions such as ‘my mother’ were 
sometimes linguistically accommodated in place of the Zuni expression 
hom tsitda; for example, in reference to a woman who was the subject’s 
genetrix but who had not served as an adequately socially-proximal mater. 
In these cases generally the subject would address and might refer to her 
maternal grandmother or to an older sister or aunt—whichever female 
had been her primary caregiver while growing up—as her possessively 
marked Tsitda.
So far then we find, in contrasting Kroeber’s with Ladd’s accounts of 
Zuni kin terminology, two at times apparently diametrically opposed 
interpretations of the facts with regard to both referential and address 
forms. Zunis are ‘slovenly’ and ‘chaotic’ in their application of their 
modified-Crow kin terms, or conversely, Zunis maintain a flexible, 
pragmatic, role-based system of social semiotic nomenclature which has 
allowed their traditional domestic and ceremonial household groups to 
persist and indeed to flourish despite stochastic variation in household-
group membership composition for over seven centuries.
Still, there is a bigger canvas to be painted. What if the focus on describing 
a Zuni ethnogenealogically based kin-term system was culturally 
inappropriate from the start? As David Schneider (1984) arguably likewise 
demonstrated for the Trukese of Yap—and as he made observations about 
earlier himself regarding Zuni (Schneider and Roberts 1956)—it could 
well be that a kinship-based analysis deriving from Lewis Morgan’s 1871 
and W.H.R. Rivers’ 1910 ‘genealogical method’ is culturally inadequate 
as a semantic frame of reference for eliciting data about how people refer 
to and address one another at Zuni.
Several scholars—notably including Ellen Basso (1973), Schneider (1980, 
1984), Hansjakob Seiler (1980, 1982), Anthony Wallace (1970), Susan 
Bean (1975, 1978), and Roger Keesing (1969, 1970)—have investigated 
the dimension of address-terminology systems as a sociolinguistic 
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endeavour complementary with the analysis of referential kin term 
systems. Kinship terminology has since Rivers (1910)—notwithstanding 
contrary viewpoints associated with A.M. Hocart (1937), Rodney 
Needham (1962), and Edmund Leach (1958), among others (see Service 
1985)—been based primarily upon the elicitation of referential usages 
of genealogical nomenclature (e.g. ‘What do you call your [genealogical 
kin type]?’). Address-terminology usages, by contrast, comprise a range of 
indexical-symbolic shifter forms which might include morphosyntactic 
variants of kin-term forms but also exceed these, varying pragmatically in 
face-to-face encounters.
Bean (1978; also see 1975), a student of Harold Scheffler, conducted 
a sociolinguistic investigation of address terminology of Kannada speakers 
in South India, in addition to conducting an extensionist-based analysis of 
Kannada kin classification. Bean sees address terminology as comprising 
a pragmatic system of speech markers—an indexical-symbolic, deictic 
system. After focusing her study initially on ‘pure referential’ kin-term 
vocabulary, Bean analysed the full range of linguistic forms in use. Bean 
discovered culturally meaningful and socially relevant principles of usage 
in the Kannada address terminology system that, simply put, would elude 
a more narrow genealogical-referential approach to kin terms.
Bean (1978: 111) includes shortened forms of Kannada kin terms along 
with nonkinship related second person pronouns, personal names and 
status terms in the Kannada address terminology system. She accounts 
for semantically significant features of the address forms using situational 
criteria, including social distance, sex of addressee and seniority. Her 
separate treatment (1975) of a wide array of generalised and metaphorical 
applications of the Kannada term amma (M/MZ per a Dravidian 
genealogical translation) reveals pragmatic patterns of use in face-to-face 
discourse. Most often, Bean finds that Kannada speakers prefer to address 
social relatives with nomenclature other than kinship-based expressions 
altogether. Hence, her study arrives at a wider linguistic analysis of both 
kin-classification and address-based relational terminology than would 
a study of referential kin terms alone.
From a linguistics perspective, relational terminology comprises a higher-
order, more-inclusive ethnolinguistic domain than either a genealogically 
based approach to referential kin classification or a sociolinguistic study 
of address usages. As early as 1923, Franz Boas, in his treatment of 
‘The  relationship system of the Vandau’ (in Mozambique), recognised 
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that referential kin terms—if we should methodologically isolate such 
a vocabulary at all in an a priori manner—represent but one heuristically 
possible component of a broader, more genuinely universal linguistic 
field of relational terminology, available in all languages. Maurice Bloch’s 
‘The  moral and tactical meaning of kinship terms’ (1971), Francis 
Conant’s ‘Jarawa kin systems of reference and address’ (1961), Murray 
Leaf ’s (1971) analysis of the semantics of Punjabi kin terms, and Marc 
Swartz’s emphasis on the situational use of kin terminology among the 
Trukese (1960: 397) also approached kin terms qua a broader system 
of relational terminology ‘shifters’. For example:
Sometimes, however, more than one role is called for and on Truk this is 
accomplished by being able to shift the kin category membership. Given 
the possibility of such shifting, the kin terms cannot be taken to mean 
only a certain genealogical relationship. The properties which people have 
that bring them to be classed together are not only sex, age, generation, 
and so on, but also their standing in various situations or contexts, and 
to understand the use of these terms the situational determinants must be 
analyzed (ibid.: 397).
Still, none of the studies cited above examines an entire relational 
terminology system from a comprehensive ethnolinguistic or social 
semiotic perspective. Linguistic analysis of a total relational terminology 
system, I will go so far as to assert, is what linguistics requires for an 
adequate investigation of how people utilise the full potentials of their 
linguistic system for purposes of social classification and pragmatic social 
interaction. From this vantage point, anthropology has been unnecessarily 
constrained by the misguided notion of genealogical kin-term elicitation as 
being a logical prerequisite or primary domain for the study of a relational 
terminology system and by the concept of kinship itself as a universally 
prototypical semantic domain for social classification. This approach 
limits empirical access to a full range of relational terminology forms 
utilised in the pragmatics of social interaction.
My point is that the entire field of so-called kinship studies in social 
anthropology has been based on incomplete linguistic data elicitation 
procedures resulting in, hence, artificially delimited ethnosemantic 
analyses (see Goodenough 1956; Wallace 1970; Wallace and Atkins 
1960; also see Carsten 2000; Holland 2004). While this problematic 
is embedded implicitly within some of the challenges contained in 
Schneider’s A Critique of the Study of Kinship (1984), Schneider has also 
not recognised the broader linguistic problem.
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It is unfortunate, then, that linguistics has been appealed to and is often 
applied to the limited data of kin terms collected by ethnogenealogical 
and sociolinguistic methods as if such analyses would comprise an 
adequate linguistic-systemic account. Such a study requires collecting 
and observing a full range of linguistic forms-in-use employed to 
accomplish both referential-semantic social classification generally, as well 
as indexical-symbolic pragmatic social interaction. While the linguistic 
scope of relational terminology forms vary typologically from language 
to language, they are likely to include at least minimally: pronominal 
systems, personal names, nicknames, kin terms (or, wider relational 
particle forms where semantically relevant), household-based or land-
holding-based role terminology, ceremonial-status terminology and usage 
protocols, occupational-status forms and principles of use, self- and other-
introductive phraseology, ‘Indian’ or initiatory statuses and names, etc. 
See Linda Watts for a social semiotic account of the range of linguistic 
options available within the Zuni relational terminology system in 1986 
(2000: 61–75).
A relational terminology system includes all lexical and grammatical 
forms—along with their morphosyntactic variants and context-
appropriate reciprocals—of nomenclature and propositional expressions 
utilised within a particular linguistic and cultural system. The linguistic 
composition and native criteria for functional selection and syntactic 
typological expression of these forms (i.e. for referential, introductive, 
polite or impolite address functions, ceremonial formulaic use, etc.) all 
may be documented and analysed within a systemic framework of use in 
relation to whole-language typology in order to arrive at a comprehensive 
systemic analysis. 
A nascent-based view of Zuni relational 
terminology
In The Social Semiotics of Relational Terminology at Zuni Pueblo (Watts 
2000; also Watts 1997), I approach this sort of analytic purview regarding 
the Zuni relational terminology system from a social semiotics frame of 
reference (Fawcett 1984; Halliday 1978). This approach allows me to arrive 
at a revisionist account of Zuni social organisation, social classification 
and pragmatic address and reference as based on household group-related 
rather than essentially genealogical prototypicality and ethnosemantics. 
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Folk definitions, best exemplar focality data, and reported and observed 
usages and reciprocals of Zuni relational nomenclature that I collected 
at Zuni in 1986 analytically bear out this interpretation (Watts 1992, 
1997, 2000).
Alfred L. Kroeber in ‘Zuni kin and clan’ (1917), went further than to 
mechanically apply Rivers’s genealogical method. Kroeber elicited data 
from Zuni informants about referential Zuni kin terms. Yet, to his 
credit as an ethnographer, he also took note of direct observational and 
interview data involving actual usages of not only these elicited kin-term 
forms but also of usages pertaining to social classification and address that 
would not technically be included within the semantic domain of kinship 
vocabulary. As Stanley Newman aptly noted in his ‘Zuni dictionary’ 
(1958), Zuni language includes a broader-than-genealogically defined, 
lexically specialised domain pertaining to pragmatically significant social 
classification. This lexical-pragmatic domain of ‘relational particle’ forms 
incorporates but also notably supersedes kin-term forms.
Thus, Kroeber identified household-based relational nomenclature 
(see  Figure 33), including k’yakwen’ona, people of one’s mother’s—or 
natal—household (k’yakwenne); dak’inne, mother’s husband’s or one’s 
recognised Datchu’s natal household; a:ɫashhina:we, ‘elders’ of a household, 
including deceased ancestral elders (along with okkyana:we, adult women 
of the household; and ottsina:we, adult men of the household); and chawe, 
children of the household). Kroeber also identified (Figure 33) relational 
particle forms referring to some specific household-related affines 
and their households, including: ula:kwe, wife’s husband’s household; 
dala:kwe, husband’s wife’s natal household; and dala:k’i, married-
in daughter’s husband. Kroeber (1917: 70–71) also noted reciprocal 
ceremonial exchanges of relational status forms (suffixed by +mo) that 
include some of the so-called kin-term derived forms along with some 
purely ceremonial lexemes.
Figure 33 shows Zuni relational terminology associated with members of 
an interlinked Zuni household group system comprised of one’s natal or 
core household and interlinked affinal households of a Tsitda’s (maternal 
caregiver) husband’s natal household and the natal household of a Tsitda’s 
brother’s wife, representing much of the household-based nomenclature 
observed by Kroeber. Each of these households may further be associated 
with an extended, suprahousehold group, including usually matrilineally 
extended ‘clan’ households insofar as relations are socially maintained or 
recognised.
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Figure 33. Zuni household-group roles
Note: m. = male, f. = female. Wi = wife, Hu = husband, da = daughter, ch. = child. Upper 
case relational terms are household‑group role terms. Additional household‑group (hh‑gp) 
terms include ula:kwe (husband’s natal household), dala:kwe or dala:k’I (wife’s people or 
natal household), and dak’i:kwe or dak’inne (people of father’s natal household).
Source: Created as original for this article by © Linda Watts .
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Newman recognised in his ‘Zuni dictionary’ (1958) and later affirmed 
in Zuni Grammar (1965) that the so-called Zuni kin terms Kroeber 
had elicited via the genealogical method should be considered as not 
semantically distinct or privileged members of a wider inflectional 
class of ‘relational particles’ that function as ‘active nouns’. Relational 
particles in Zuni comprise an inflectional class that behaves and is treated 
distinctively with regard to morphology and syntax. They are inflected 
for number as a distinctive class and they alternate in usage between 
possessively marked predicative (or relationship-establishing) and 
possessively unmarked (or labelling) stem or reduced forms.
Hence, the so-called kin terms Kroeber identified at Zuni are not simply 
‘nouns’ as are English kin terms; rather, they alternate between stem or 
inflected shortened stem forms of relational particles and several degrees 
of more fully predicative expressions, depending on degrees of social 
proximity, kinds of settings and actual social relations. 
Similarly as Seiler demonstrated for Cahuilla’s labelling/absolutive 
versus descriptive relational expressions (1980, 1982), Zuni relational 
terminology  forms are used according to cultural-pragmatic principles 
involving situationally indexical alternation involving labelling versus 
relationship-establishing relational particle forms. These relational particle 
variants are also systemically interconnected with pronominal forms 
(independent or affixed), personal names, ‘Indian names’, nicknames, slang 
forms and ceremonial status forms within a unified social semiotic system 
of ‘meaning potential’ (see Halliday 1978). That is, depending upon the 
cultural setting and the degree of actual social proximity obtaining between 
interlocutors or speakers, addressees and/or referents, a  Zuni relational 
particle usage will be interpreted as situationally unmarked (i.e. neutral) 
or marked within that setting and for that immediate relation.
Thus, for example, the expression ‘Lukkya hom Tsitda’ [This- [goal] (is) 
she-who-is-TSITDA-to-me] contrasts situationally as a relationship-
establishing expression with the shortened address usage, ‘Tsitd’, which 
is a nonpossessively marked, phonologically reduced relational particle 
stem form. The latter form is used most appropriately in direct address 
to a socially proximal addressee within a familiar (i.e. at home) setting 
(Watts 2000: 49).
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A case in point is the use of the Zuni form homme (<hotda [Eng. geneal. 
transl, mother’s mother/mother’s mother’s sister] +mme [noun class sg. 
suffix]) used in address to an elderly female (Newman 1955: 62–63). This 
term may be used appropriately within one’s familial household setting 
to address a socially proximal cohousehold group, elder-senior female. 
In this context it is a polite, familiar, intimate form of address. However, 
the same form used outside the home to address an elderly female with 
whom one has no close or familial social tie is an impolite, youth slang 
usage translating roughly as ‘rigid, wooden old woman’. This is because 
the suffix +mme is associated with a noun class that includes semantic 
forms pertaining mainly to ‘long, rigid objects’ including desiccated 
wooden objects (Walker 1966: 220).
The primary issue with which I am concerned here has to do with what 
should be adopted as the broader linguistic frame of reference for an 
adequate ethnolinguistic investigation of so-called kin terms. As Michael 
Silverstein declared in 1976, abstracted, nominal referential kin term forms 
have little if any value for anthropological linguistic study except as part 
of—where relevant—a broader pragmatic, morphosyntactic and semantic 
analysis of relational terminology systems in toto. It is unfortunate that 
Kroeber allowed theoretical blinders to shield from his analytic purview 
the rich cultural significance of relational terminology usages he observed 
both within and beyond a kinship context at Zuni. The pertinent fact is 
that Kroeber’s full range of observed Zuni relational nomenclature usages 
are both linguistically valid and culturally significant.
Rather than a narrowly defined set of genealogically-based referential, 
nominal kin terms, we find in pragmatic use at Zuni—in 1917 as yet 
today—a role-based system of relational nomenclature that accords with 
what Anthony Carter (1984) identifies as a household-based relational 
terminology system. Regarding actual usages in this way greatly expands 
a nativistic understanding of Zuni social organisation. As ethnographers 
have long noted (e.g. Cushing 1979; Dozier 1970; Eggan 1950; Mindeleff 
1891; Titiev 1967), the Western Pueblo of Zuni is fundamentally—that is 
culturally—a social system organised around a network of interconnected 
household groups. Social interaction at Zuni involves role relations and 
relative seniority based statuses appropriate to this household-group 
structure (Cushing 1979; Kroeber 1917: 103–09). Zuni ‘families’ are 
organised as a system of interlinked households and socioceremonially 
interconnected household groups. Kroeber (1917) was astute enough to 
comment on this obvious ethnographic fact many times over in his study. 
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Yet, influenced by the anthropological canon of his time of applying the 
genealogical method in order to study the Zuni kinship system, Kroeber 
neglected to ground his analysis of the actual use of Zuni relational forms 
according to household group-based social relations. Almost all of the 
kin-term usage errata mentioned by Kroeber—as he himself notes—make 
sense in relation to factors of domestic and ceremonial household group 
relations (cf. also Eggan 1950: 188–90; Schneider and Roberts 1956: 18):
The house is basic in Zuni life … 
In daily life it is common residence, and known blood common to 
individuals, and even friendship and neighborliness, that count (Kroeber 
1917: 48).
Allow me to close with some key ethnolinguistic facts—observed but not 
systemically accounted for by Kroeber—that serve to further corroborate 
what I classify as a ‘nascent’-based—that is ‘where one was raised, or from 
what household one has emerged’—as versus a ‘descent’-based system of 
use of Zuni relational terminology.
First, one’s ‘family’ may be referred to in Zuni as ‘(Hom [1st sg.poss.]) 
a:willi kyak’wen’ona’. Kroeber correctly noted that a direct translation for 
this expression is not (genealogically kin related) ‘family’ or even ‘relatives’ 
per se but rather, ‘Those I grew up with in the same household’. Thus 
the question, ‘Chuwap do’ a:willi kyak’wen’ona?’ translated broadly by 
Kroeber from an English frame of reference as ‘Who is your family?’ really 
translates: ‘Who are those you grew up/emerged together with in the same 
household/household-group?’
An appropriate answer to the above question might be ‘Hom i:yanikina:we’. 
Kroeber translated this expression into English as ‘my (genealogical) 
relatives/kin’. However, Kroeber also correctly acknowledged that a more 
accurate translation of this Zuni relationship-establishing relational 
particle form in point of fact does not mean kin but rather, ‘those one 
greets (with terms of relationship)’; or, lit., ‘those whom are greeted by 
terms of relation to me (obj)’.
In 1986 I asked a man in his late nineties or early centenary years, ‘Who are 
those who are i:yanikina:we to you?’ His response was to explain that when 
he grew up in the Zuni farming village of Nutria, he was taught from 
an early age that, ‘Everyone in your same village is your i:yanikina:we’. 
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Hence he was to greet anyone within his own village with Zuni relational 
terminology forms, applying the principles of relative seniority and 
relative social proximity appropriately as the situation called for.
In sum, a study of variation in referential kin-term forms in terms of their 
kinship context-based prototypicality and extensional semantics does 
not amount to a full linguistic or ethnosemantic account of a broader 
relational terminology system; or at least it does not do so for Zuni. 
Silverstein framed the problem well:
Such lexical items as so-called kinship terms or personal names in 
any society can hardly be characterized by ‘semantic’ analysis. It is the 
pragmatic component that makes them lexical items to begin with … it 
is the pragmatic functions that make them anthropologically important 
… as Schneider, among others, have never ceased pointing out (Schneider 
1965, 1968 [1976]). Further, so-called folk taxonomies of nominal lexical 
items, again ‘semantically’ analyzed by a procedure of ostensive reference, 
essentially ripped from the context of speech, give us no cultural insight 
(Silverstein 1976: 52).
Certainly there is nothing inherently objectionable with choosing to 
examine kin terminology as if it could be extracted and decontextualised 
linguistically from its broader social-semiotic field of relational 
terminology. Warren Shapiro notes (in Alés, Watts and Shapiro 2009; 
cf. Shapiro Chapter 1), indeed, that he ‘learned to isolate the domain of 
kin term usage by locally pertinent questions’ (Alés, Watts, and Shapiro 
2009: 29), as is true for Bean with respect to her study of Kannada 
kin terminology (1975, 1978). I have no doubt that this could at least 
artificially be accomplished at Zuni, except that the assumptions thus 
imposed would be, I believe, culturally erroneous as traditional core praxis 
and belief. There are simply speaking no terms for ‘true blood relatives’ 
per se at Zuni. I was once told by a Zuni informant, when I asked about 
the value of tracing someone’s ‘blood relatives’, that one should not count 
one’s relations as it would be like counting sheep; accordingly, some 
might die.
The Zuni relational particle stem forms tsitda and datchu, for instance, 
simply are not focally or prototypically identified with nearest genealogical 
referents of genetrix and genitor. Folk definitions and focality data that 
I collected from a wide range of informants in 1986 revealed that these 
terms are focally associated with household-based or otherwise socially 
proximal relations—always—and that they shift in focal reference 
according to actual, ‘on the ground’ pragmatic relations, including 
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nonkinship-based adoption into a household. Thus, for 10 key informants 
representing a range of age, gender and degrees of traditionality variables, 
only one claimed a genetrix as their focal member of the relational class 
‘tsitda’, whereas all 10 (including that same informant) claimed an elder, 
socially proximal female who had ‘raised’ the informant. This was true 
for all ‘primary’ relational terminology forms that informants mentioned 
in their relational histories which I collected prior to eliciting focality 
data (Watts 2000: 90). Folk definitions elicited for these core relational 
particle forms also emphasise roles and social proximity relations, rather 
than genealogical nearness, as primary (ibid.: 212–15).
Shapiro assumes (in Alés, Watts and Shapiro 2009: 29) that the fact that 
Zuni genealogically defined parents may be referred to by unmarked kin-
term stem forms in contrast with in his view metaphorically ‘extended’, 
marked collateral forms associate genealogical focality semantically 
with the unmarked forms, but this misinterprets the Zuni data. The 
so-called marked, ‘extended’ relational forms attaching the independent 
particles łashhi (big/older) or ts’ana (little/younger) to tsitda and datchu 
or other relational particles do not indicate metaphorical extensions of 
genealogically nearest referent forms. Rather, these qualifying particles, 
when used at all, indicate relative seniority status within a role-based 
suprahousehold group cohort. If one’s Tsitda (natal or core household-
based, primary female manager/caregiver) is not the eldest female of her 
natal or adoptive household-based female cohort group, then she is not 
directly in line to assume, for instance, the important ceremonial role 
of a Kuku (i.e. a Tsitda’s husband’s Tsitda’s suprahousehold-group female 
cohort senior) for the speaker’s suprahousehold group once a Datchu’s 
(married-in husband of a Tsitda) natal Tsitdas have died. Someone needs 
to perform important ceremonial roles such as burials and naming 
ceremonies from the Datchu’s (one’s secondary) matricentric household 
group. In similar fashion that a Tsitd’ łasshi may assume the role of one’s 
ceremonial Kuku after the decedence of the original Kuku’s immediate 
cohort set members, according to one informant a Kya’ łasshi (<kyakya + 
łashhi, eldest Kyaykya) may be called in to mediate a family conflict within 
a suprahousehold-group context, in order to facilitate an impartial yet 
caring hearing about the dispute.
One is said to be ‘born into’ one’s natal, core domestic household group, 
while one is ‘born for’ one’s secondary, affinally interlinked Datchu’s natal 
household group (see Figure 33). One’s Kyakya’s (Tsitda’s cohousehold 
group ‘brother’s) offspring from his wife’s natal household are likewise 
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‘born for’ one’s own core household group. Accordingly then, one has 
ceremonial obligations with respect to one’s Kyakya’s wife’s or tertiary 
household-group children. 
Much of the semantic problem involved in anthropological 
misinterpretations of Zuni relational terminology arises from using 
English kin-type translations as assumed denotata for Zuni relational 
particle forms.
So long as the analyst is intent on isolating a narrowly defined, 
semantically nonfocal, morphosyntactically stripped subset of relational 
particle forms, ignoring wider pragmatic principles of alternation 
that would require including additional nomenclature and additional 
linguistic morphosyntactic elements in order to conduct a more holistic 
systemic analysis, then the cross-linguistic analysis of kin terminology 
can proceed—as indeed it has historically and often quite impressively—
according to a controlled, cross-cultural comparative framework. However, 
such an approach to the study of genealogically derived referential kin-
term applications need not, I believe, be undertaken a priori or in the 
absence of a wider ethnolinguistic or potentially even a wider extensionist 
semantic analysis of relational terminology forms.
Zunis—or at least those Zunis who have not been converted (as many by 
now have been) to Anglocentric assumptions about ‘family’, ‘clanship’, 
and ‘kinship’—say that a genealogical approach is not what matters most 
to them; at least, it is not what matters first. Zunis are neither ignorant 
of nor blind to facts of blood relations or to the role of sexuality in 
producing offspring. Indeed, quite often, it may well be the case that 
blood ties are nearly congruent with role relations within a household-
group system such that it is hardly necessary to distinguish between them. 
Nevertheless, the Zuni ‘rule of thumb’ that Kroeber acknowledged yet 
could not bring himself to represent as primary or core to the use of 
Zuni relational terminology is in fact a quite effective, flexible, culturally 
ingenious method for sustaining a traditional household-group and 
communal socioceremonial system over time (Cushing 1979). Principles 
of fission and fusion long acknowledged as vital in the ethnographic 
literature on Zuni and other western pueblos (Eggan 1950; Dozier, 1970) 
are performatively instantiated and indexicalised through utilising Zuni 
relational terminology according to degrees of actual social proximity, 
relative role-based seniority, and an inclusive/exclusive principle 
(Ladd 1979).
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Finally, as I have suggested elsewhere (Watts 2000: 24–29; and in Alés, 
Watts and Shapiro 2009), semantic extension rules could be applied to 
supraclasses and subclasses of Zuni relational terminology forms based on 
culturally attributed focal and extended usages (cf. Sheffler and Lounsbury 
1971). Hence, I believe that Scheffler’s use of extensionist semantics can 
be applied to a much broader spectrum of relational terminology than 
that elicited through a genealogical frame of reference alone. For example, 
while the prototypical, focal referent of i:yanikina:we would likely include 
those one has grown up or emerged with in the same household group, 
this form is extended semantically to interlinked secondary and tertiary 
suprahousehold groups and to wider ‘clan’-interconnected households, 
as well as to one’s initiatory kiva group or medicine society group, to 
ceremonial godparents’ household-groups, to one’s village as a whole, 
and to the political government council. Whether such a broadening of 
analytic scope might serve to help resolve the longstanding theoretical 
debate over ‘old’ versus new’ ‘kinship studies’ (Shapiro Chapter 1) is yet 
to be seen. Notwithstanding, from a linguistic standpoint, widening the 
scope of study to a complete relational terminology system is not only 
possible but it would fill a major gap in our scholarly understanding of 
how relationship classificational systems operate in their entirety.
Focality data, classes and supraclasses of relational terminology, and even 
equivalence reduction rules for the extension of Zuni relational particle 
categories could be analysed in such manner as to throw light on universals 
of relational terminology systems overall. Factors such as degrees of social 
proximity, kinds of settings and situations and features such as familiar 
versus nonfamiliar, formal versus casual, and polite versus impolite 
(cf. Brown and Levinson 1978) might turn out to have been involved 
with the evolution of human cognition and pragmatic social interaction. 
Hence, cultural principles of use applying to the ‘meaning potential’ of 
relational terminology usages (Halliday 1973: 54)—though heuristically 
varying according to types of sociocultural organisation—might be 
indexicalised according to pragmatic selection and alternation rules in the 
use of relational terminology everywhere. Yet, we cannot discover such 
higher-order, possibly universal features or their typologically significant 
modes of variation if we do not examine relational terminology systems in 
their broadest linguistic scope.
For Zuni, relational terminology usages focally refer to immediate 
household group-based and/or socially proximal social relations. Zuni 
relational particle variants can be metaphorically extended to members 
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of the suprahousehold group that includes ‘clan’ relations, on one hand, 
and to members of one’s Datchu’s (natal household married-in pater) and 
Kyakya’s (out-married adult male of natal household’s) affinally interlinked 
household groups, on the other. Additionally, Zuni relational terms can 
be metaphorically extended to members of one’s kiva group and medicine 
society. These are culturally conceptualised as ceremonial household 
groups (cf. Eggan 1950: 190–93), such that relational particles are used 
to frame role relations involving seniority and reciprocal role obligations 
within these groups as well as within familial household-group units. 
I:yanikina:we (lit., those one greets by relational particle forms) also may 
include and be extended by appropriate relational terminology usages to 
‘godparental’ relations and members of their household groups, also to all 
official political and religious leaders, or even to a close friend’s (kuwaye) 
cohousehold-group members, and ultimately to members of one’s entire 
neighbourhood, village, tribe, or historical alliance group (e.g. familially 
interrelated Hopi clan members). Principles involved in the pragmatic 
use of Zuni relational terminology—including the inclusive/exclusive 
principle, degrees of relative social proximity, ceremonial sponsorship 
and relative seniority within and beyond the immediate household—have 
facilitated an enduring flexibility in the traditional role-based organisation 
of molecular household-group units and their wide-reaching extensions 
for many centuries. They remain vital to maintaining traditional values at 
Zuni Pueblo today.
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Hal Scheffler’s work has been fundamental in illuminating studies of 
human kinship and his perspective on kin terms lends itself to a cognitive 
approach. There is a growing body of research (e.g. Leaf and Read 2012) 
showing that the study of kinship has a great potential for gaining insight 
into cognitive processes. Thus studying metaphors that describe concepts 
from the domain of kinship are salient for the study of human cognition.
Advocates of culturalist or performative persuasion argue that native 
theories about biological procreation are purely culturally constructed 
and are only metaphors of social relations, while sociobiologists and 
evolutionary ecologists would have it the other way around: for the 
former, Darwinian fitness is just a metaphor of immortality; for the latter, 
immortality is just a metaphor of Darwinian fitness. Thus Marshall 
Sahlins, a culturalist, argues: ‘Whereas it is commonly supposed that 
classificatory kin relations represent “metaphorical extensions” of the 
“primary” relations of birth, if anything it is the other way around: birth 
is the metaphor’ (2012: 677). What lies at the heart of both positions are 
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metaphors. Metaphorical thought plays an important role in the concepts 
of kinship. As Sahlins notes, kinship is often perceived through shared 
substances of blood, milk, semen, flesh, bone, spirit (2011a, 2011b).
A metaphorical expression provides a relation between a source concept 
and its target concept, which is essentially based on analogy (Pinker 2007: 
253–55). Metaphors are extensions from one semantic domain to another. 
As kinship is by definition relational, I propose here that perhaps the very 
concept of kinship is the model for metaphorical thinking. Metaphors, 
probably unique to our species, are fundamental for human cognition. 
They are produced when a concept from one domain (target source) 
is related to another concept from another domain (Kronenfeld 1996; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980). George Lakoff asserts that metaphors are 
not mere linguistic expressions, but conceptual mappings that physically 
exist in the brain structure. According to Lakoff, the neural theory of 
metaphor explains the ‘neural computational mechanisms’ involved 
in their production (2009: 4).
Social cognition is fundamental for the functioning of human society, 
beginning with the recognition of one’s immediate caregivers, usually 
one’s kin or those who are perceived as kin. Concepts of kinship are often 
expressed metaphorically. I argue here that metaphorical thought might 
have originated at the same time as the need for social recognition that 
required charting and navigating the space of kin. I will draw on recent 
research in psychology and neurology that provide the psychological and 
biological underpinnings of metaphorical thought. Further, I will analyse 
ethnographic examples of kinship metaphors from the Mediterranean 
region, within the domain of plants and the domain of clothing, to show 
that these two semantic domains are members of a more inclusive class 
of ‘coiling things’ finding their way to the domain of kinship through 
the analogy of relations. This is also exemplified in visual metaphors 
associated with kinship that Carl Schuster collected from a broad range of 
societies from prehistoric to living ethnographic examples (Schuster and 
Carpenter 1996). Finally, I will hypothesise that thinking about kinship 
as primarily a system of relations might have been the model for thinking 
about the world. Indeed, we might say that thinking about kinship is the 
mother of all thought.
In Scheffler’s approach, metaphoric extensions of kinship terms from 
focal kin terms to nonfocal ones play a fundamental role (Scheffler 1972; 
Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971). Following Lounsbury, Scheffler writes:
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[M]etaphor is often described as simile without the ‘like’, but we must 
consider the underlying semantic structure of such a comparison. 
It consists in suspending one or more of the defining features (criterial 
attributes) in the primary sense of the word and substituting in its place 
some feature of connotative meaning which is associated with the primary 
sense of the word. In the process connotative features become criterial. 
By this means words may be transferred from one semantic domain to 
another, for example from the domain of classification to the domain 
of classification on the basis of kinds of social or affective relationships 
(1972: 319).
Scheffler highlighted the very nature of metaphorical usage, namely 
metaphors necessarily only partially overlap with their referents’ 
meanings. If the two sets of connotations were the same there would be 
no metaphor. For example, the American kinship term mother only in 
some of its criterial features corresponds to the criterial features of ‘mother 
superior’. Although speakers might refer to the latter only as ‘mother’, they 
know she is only in some attributes like a biological mother. For Scheffler, 
the genealogical reference is primary and its many metaphoric extensions 
are secondary. Moreover, metaphors are not only a partial overlap of two 
concepts across semantic domains, but are based on the comparisons of 
relations between the concepts and other members within their respective 
domains, or between whole classes of objects and their relations.
Social cognition and metaphors of space
It has been suggested that our understanding and descriptions of the 
world are largely, and mostly unconsciously, structured by metaphors. 
Most conceptual metaphors are derived from human spatial orientation 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Pinker 2007). Humans use concrete references 
to orientation in space to express the broad range of other more difficult 
and often abstract or ambiguous meanings. For example, up/down and 
in/out orientations supply metaphorical models for emotional states, such 
as in the expressions ‘the mood was uplifting’, ‘it is all downhill after 40’, 
and ‘she is down and out on her luck’.
Giovanni Bennardo (2010) argues that the ability to think about space 
also allows for the observation of ideas as real objects from different 
perspectives. The conceptual use of space makes use of perspective-taking 
within a Frame of Reference (FOR). In the Basic FOR the viewer (speaker) 
is the central point from which she/he constructs the space within a set 
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of three coordinates: sagittal, vertical and transversal. The Intrinsic FOR 
has at its centre another object separate from the viewer, and the Absolute 
FOR uses fixed orientation markers, such as cardinal points (2010: 382). 
In kinship systems this is evident in the position of ego as well as in the 
ability to put one’s self in the position of alter. Orientation in space, as an 
ontological prime, is replicated in other domains, such as time, as well 
as kinship. Thus time is perceived as motion in the orientation space 
within a FOR and the concept of space is also used as a metaphorical 
referent to time (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Pinker 2007). An example 
of time metaphorically expressed with a space referent comes from 
Croatian colloquial language when space is sometimes substituted with 
time prepositions, as in the expression ‘iza rata’, literally ‘behind the war’ 
instead of after the war.
Ethnographic examples of time-as-space come from the Inca view of time 
clearly rooted in FOR. The Inca culture contemplated the past and future 
in reverse to western cultures, so the past is in front because it can be seen, 
the future is behind because it is invisible. The head is also associated with 
the beginning and the source, while the feet with chaos and the dead 
(Classen 1993: 111–12). One of the most important Inca concepts was 
pachacuti, the reversal of space and time. The reforms of the great Inca 
ruler Pachacutec were considered to have been groundbreaking reversals, 
but the catastrophe of Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire was also 
referred to as pachacuti. Likewise, the millenarian myth of Inkarri foretells 
the return of the metonymic figure of the Inca king and the reversal, the 
pachacuti, to the old Inca ways. It is a concept associated with pacha, 
‘mother earth’, and her spatial as well as temporal attributes (Allen 2002; 
Classen 1993).
Bennardo proposed that the use of different FOR perspectives, ego-
centred or alter-centred, generate kinship terminologies that focus 
on ego or other than ego (2010: 382). In English one’s kin, as well 
as friends, are often referred to as ‘close’ or ‘distant’. One of the most 
common spatial metaphors is the association between closeness and 
warmth derived from the close physical experience when in contact with 
other members of the social group, such as grooming, breast feeding or 
comforting a child, having sex, or just socialising (Ijzerman and Koole 
2011). Research in developmental psychology shows the presence of 
spatial knowledge, as well as the ability to recognise faces in early infancy. 
Based on these findings the two seem connected—closeness/distance in 
physical space and known/unknown faces in social space. In other words, 
spatial orientation and social cognition are connected. According to 
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social psychologists, communal sharing relationships that imply spatial 
proximity are grounded ‘in innate and evolved mechanisms, or relational 
models that allow people to coordinate social interaction’ (Fiske 1992: 
701). This is conceptualised by crossing over from the domain of space 
to the domain of close kin as focal members and its extensions. To cite 
just a couple of ethnographic examples, among many kinship metaphors, 
when extended to nonrelatives, the brother metaphor suggests a horizontal 
egalitarian relationship such as in many ‘brotherhoods’ in the western 
tradition, while father/child indicates a hierarchical relationship (Rigney 
2001). This confirms Mary Douglas’s (1966) suggestion that the human 
body can stand for anything and vice versa, anything can stand for human 
body exemplified in English metaphors ‘the head of state’ and ‘body 
politic’ as well as in the Inca view quoted above where head is associated 
with life and order, and feet with death and chaos. The human body and 
its limbs can also represent kin-group segmentation, such as among some 
Bedouin groups (El Guindi 2010).
Neurological underpinnings for metaphorical 
thought
Although the exact underlying mechanisms involved in the production of 
metaphors are subject to current debates, metaphorical mappings involving 
neural pathways that cross various domains have been corroborated in 
neurological studies (Anderson 2010: 25). Metaphorical use from the 
domain of the bodily experiences, particularly the orientation in space, 
extends to referents in the social domain. How is this grounded in human 
neurology and the functioning of the brain? Lakoff studied the neural 
circuits involved in the production or understanding of metaphors: 
During learning, much of the abstract domain is structured by fixed 
projections from the embodied domain. When processing source 
domain words in the context of a target domain subject matter, the fixed 
connections result in co-activation of the two domains. Thus, source 
domain activations arising from inferences are projected onto the target 
domain via the preestablished mapping (2009: 18).
Neurological research has shown that traumatic injuries to the left 
peri-Sylvan region result in the impairment of relational knowledge. 
Cognitive disorders following stroke and associated with autism and 
schizophrenia, among others, involve the inability to produce or understand 
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metaphors. Cognition seems to be grounded in sensory-motor terms such 
as visual, gustatory, olfactory or tactile. For example, thinking about an 
object recalls a particular physical experience with that object simulating it 
in the brain (Pecher, Boot and Van Dantzig 2011: 218). Metaphors based 
on different sensory-motor concepts may have different neural substrates. 
Metaphorical use of image schemata explain how abstract concepts can 
also be grounded in physical experience (Lakoff 2009; Pecher, Boot and 
Van Dantzig 2011: 219). Neuroimaging studies of the neural basis of 
metaphors show that conventional metaphors found in everyday language 
trigger the neural circuits in the right hemisphere, while unconventional 
ones, such as those found in poetry and literature, activate the left 
(Schmidt et al. 2010).
Kinship metaphors
A broadly defined metaphor is an extension of some attributes of the source 
term out of its domain to a target item in another domain (Kronenfeld 
1996). Moreover, it is an applied analogy of relations (Pinker 2007). 
Research in psychology suggests that the conceptual metaphor is a unique 
cognitive mechanism that shapes social thought and attitudes (Landau, 
Meier and Kiefer 2010). As Scheffler has noted in his discussion of focality 
in kinship (1972), human kinship implies much more than primary kin 
recognition as well as genealogical relationships that might be real or 
fictional. It abounds with multiple symbolic meanings and metaphors that 
presuppose the cognitive abilities far beyond the capacity of nonhuman 
primates (Leaf and Read 2012; Milicic 2013). Understanding kinship 
through metaphors is common across cultures. Thus varied classification 
of kin often includes the denial of biological reproduction, as well as the 
metaphorical creation of kinship ties where there are none. However, that 
does not imply a lack of biological knowledge.
Scheffler’s (1972) stance on metaphors, discussed above, has been amply 
corroborated by several authors (Shapiro 2012; Shapiro Chapter 1). 
According to Lakoff (1990), the English term mother is radially structured 
with respect to a number of its subcategories defined by a cluster of 
converging cognitive models—the birth model, the nurturance model, etc. 
In addition, there are ‘noncentral extensions’ such as birth mother, adoptive 
mother, surrogate mother, etc. that are variants acquired through learning. 
These latter terms are understood via their relationship to the central 
category of mother (ibid.: 91). The capacity for metaphorical thought 
333
10 . CREEPING PLANTS AND WINDING BELTS
implies partial overlap between two semantic domains (Kronenfeld 1996; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Pinker 2007) and a ‘blended space’ (Lakoff 
2009; Pecher, Boot and Van Dantzig 2011). Many cultures use metaphors 
of creeping plants such as ‘grapevines’ (Milicic 1998), or other winding 
objects, to think about kin groups. This metaphorical usage is based on 
image schemata—mental associations between two referents based on 
similarity and important for grounding abstract concepts (Lakoff 1990: 
106). The relative similarity between the source and the target can be in 
shape (denotative), function (connotative), or based on the similarity of 
relation between the source and its larger framework (Kronenfeld 1996).
In the Croatian ethnographic example of the metaphoric use of grapevines 
in the domain of kinship the similarity is connotative: the kin group, 
referred to as a grapevine is based on what it does rather than what it is. 
In the village of B., located on the island of Hvar off the Croatian coast 
with about 150 permanent inhabitants, villagers are keenly aware of their 
kin ties as evidenced by frequent references and discussions about the 
membership in a particular kin group or loza (grapevine). If not entirely 
sure, they employ a kinship calculus tracing the relations, and relations 
of relations, to locate an individual mentally within the kin network. 
The most inclusive category of relatedness is the village itself in opposition 
to another village on the island, or the island in opposition to the entire 
mainland. When in need of favours the villagers refer to one another by 
the generic term zermo (relative). Within the village, individuals were 
most often identified at the level of the loza (grapevine) or kin group. 
A loza is a bilateral localised kin group with an apical ancestor, male or 
female, associated with a house. Its loza name is added to all individual 
names, since many have identical first and last names (Milicic 1998). 
There are about 15 ‘grapevines’ with living members. Many of these 
individual ‘grapevines’ are actually branches of the same ‘grapevine’ that 
got detached from its ‘stem’ in some more or less distant past. Some of 
these original connections are forgotten, but many are remembered and 
often commented upon. The ideal of village endogamy and socioeconomic 
homogamy necessarily presented problems and overlapping of lozas, 
which was partially solved by splintering off.
In the denotative sense of what it is, a grapevine is a plant, while in the 
connotative sense, to what it does, it is a winding, coiling, creeping thing. 
An object not in the domain of plants, but with similar attributes, is the 
zinari, a long winding belt in Greek folk costume, also metaphorically 
used when thinking about kinship. It is wrapped several times around 
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the waist, and it metaphorically represents degrees of blood relatedness. 
In the Greek folk model the contrasting metaphors of blood and oil refer 
to consanguineal and spiritual kinship respectively, the latter established 
through baptism as an extension of the degrees of blood kinship 
(du  Boulay 1984; Just 2000). In the Pidhalion, the Greek Orthodox 
Church instructions, the first permissible marriage is between third 
cousins. In the local interpretation, it is permissible between ego and the 
child of a third cousin. In contrast, marriage is forbidden between affinal 
(in-law) kin of the relatives of prohibited degrees down to and including 
the sixth degree (ibid.: 101). The number of turns of the metaphorical 
belt explicitly describes the genealogical distance as an index of prohibited 
degrees of marriage. The zinari represents the winding path of blood 
that must always be directed in the same direction. ‘The blood must not 
turn around’ lest an act of incest is committed (du Boulay 1984: 548). 
Similarly, god parenthood, or ritual sponsorship, is always asymmetrical 
and collective because it binds not just individuals but two families who 
cannot sponsor each other’s children. The oil, used in the ritual of baptism 
is the symbol of god parenthood and the spiritual counterpart of blood 
and kinship: ‘the oil and the blood must not turn around’ (Just 2000: 
131–35). God parenthood, or fictive kinship, as a collective notion is 
practised asymmetrically in that ritual sponsorship cannot be directly 
exchanged between two families. It is an explicit comparison of the rules 
of marriage that should not take place between those families who are 
already in-laws. Marriage and blood kinship between relatives within the 
prohibited degrees are considered incestuous, as well as direct symmetrical 
exchange of spouses such as two brothers marrying each other’s sisters. 
It is an extension of consanguinity to the prohibition of reciprocal god 
parenthood, itself being a kind of parenthood.
In order to show that a metaphor is structured by our experience, Lakoff 
(1987: 276) asks three questions: (1) What determines the choice of 
a possible well-structured source domain? (2) What determines the pairing 
of the source domain with the target domain? (3) What determines the 
details of the source-to-target mapping? To follow him:
• The blood is a life-giving substance.
• The oil gives spiritual life in the ritual of baptism.
• The grapevine is an easily observable model of a fast-reproducing form 
of life in the environment.
• Kin relationships are similar to the winding grapevine shoots as 
evidenced in the metaphorical use of loza.
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• Kin space is envisioned as the space often ‘invaded’ by the ever-
expanding vines. Grapes are children to the grapevines.
• Kinship groups split when too large.
• Grapevine cuttings are used to plant new plants.
• New families that split off build new houses.
• New grapevines get new nicknames and old connections are broken.
Compared with the Greek example, we can see how both objects, one 
from the domain of plants, the other from the domain of clothing, are 
similar and comparable in terms of some of their attributes. The grapevine 
and the zinari kinship metaphors show how the two classes, plants and 
clothing, are merged into the same more inclusive class of ‘coiling things’ 
based on their shared winding, coiling image (Figure 34).
COILING THINGS (image schema) LIQUIDS 
SHARED FUNCTION SHARED SUBSTANCE 
Connotative Denotative 
(what something DOES) (what something IS) 
GRAPEVINES (Domain of plants) SHARED SOURCE of kin groups 
ZINARI BELT (Domain of clothing) BLOOD (biological)/OIL (spiritual kin) 
Figure 34. Image schema of the domain of plants and the domain 
of clothing
Source: © Bojka Milicic.
Just as the coiling grapevine metaphor facilitates the understanding of 
kinship dynamics in the first case, the Greek example provides insight into 
the character of kinship through the attributes of the long and winding 
zinari belt. In the latter example the analogy is between the domain of 
‘blood’ kin and fictive kin metaphorically associated with the domain 
of another liquid substance—the oil establishing a spiritual relation and 
modelled on the concrete physical relation of ‘shared blood’. The degrees 
of kin distance/closeness is perceived in terms of the clothing domain, 
the zinari belt, referring to it both denotatively (what the zinari  IS) 
and connotatively (what the zinari DOES), coiling around the waist 
in one prescribed direction. But this is not all. This particular element 
of clothing is also analogous to the blood that ‘must not return’ in the 
rules of marriage. Hence reference to an item that coils around the body 
only in one direction also alludes to the ritual oil as the metaphor of 
spiritual kinship that also must not return lest an act of spiritual incest be 
committed.
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Visual metaphors of kinship
Carl Schuster (Schuster and Carpenter 1996) has compiled a collection of 
artefacts from numerous world cultures that depict various representations 
of kinship, from simple notches to elaborate figurative and abstract 
patterns in a broad range of media: clay, cloth, wood, and textiles. Etched, 
painted, carved, or woven objects and tattooed bodies carry motifs that 
represent ancestors expanding vertically or horizontally, and sometimes in 
both directions. Although it is hard to establish such meanings based on 
the archaeological record, many of the ethnographic examples in this work 
are explicitly associated with kinship, such as the motifs that repetitively 
evoke concatenation of stylised or realistically depicted human bodies. 
Alfred Gell (1993) has discussed numerous ethnographic examples 
of Polynesian tattooing patterns in the context of social structure and 
kinship. Thus in the Marquesas, the common tattoo motif of climbing, 
vine-like stylised human figures represents the etua (ancestors). Gell noted 
that one of the main attributes of Polynesian tattooing is its protective 
function of creating a second layer of skin, particularly in the use of the 
images of shell animals such as the tortoise. He also interprets the widely 
used Polynesian mythological motif of doubles in terms of its protective 
attributes. A Samoan tattoo pattern of the pe’a, the flying fox, illustrates the 
metaphorical connection between the domain of animals and the domain 
of kinship. The flying fox, a species of bat, hanging upside down envelops 
itself into its own wings creating a self-protective layer. The pe’a motif also 
occurs carved in the rafters and beams of a house that itself is a spatial 
and temporal representation of a kin group (ibid.: 96–99). Furthermore, 
Gell cites numerous examples of other Polynesian cultural practices, from 
many layers of tapa cloth to layers of fat, in terms of their protective 
functions metaphorically associated with kin groups as protective social 
layers (ibid.: 177–79).
The foregoing, very short selection out of numerous visual and verbal 
examples of kinship metaphors, shows the attributes of kinship expressed 
across the cognitive domains in terms of winding, coiling, layering or 
protective properties of various objects, as well as the analogy of relations 
and relations of relations within and between classes of objects. This 
makes plausible the hypothesis that metaphorical thought, fundamental 
to human cognition, at least originated simultaneously with or perhaps 
developed out of the social cognition and its fundamental field of kinship.
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Possible origin of metaphorical thought
How were metaphors produced in proto-human language and is it possible 
to hypothesise about an actual shift from the premetaphorical stage to 
the metaphor production stage? Steven Mithen (1996) has hypothesised 
that cognitive fluidity took place about 50,000 years ago through the 
opening of the connections between specialised cognitive modules and 
general intelligence, triggered by language bridging across the specialised 
cognitive modules. Using a metaphor from medieval sacral architecture, 
Mithen illustrates the architecture of the mind. In this model, language 
‘vandalised’ the partitions between previously walled-off ‘chapels’, or 
modules, of social, natural and technical intelligence making possible the 
free flow of information between the four domains of intuitive knowledge 
(Figure 35). Thus, ‘the mind acquires not only the ability but a positive 
passion for metaphor or analogy’ (ibid.: 71). Of course, his theory is itself 
a metaphor: a concept or a set of ideas used to elucidate a more difficult 
concept or set of ideas across, in this case, the domains of sacral and 

















































Figure 35. The mind as a chapel
Source: Adapted from Mithen (1996: 67) and used with the permission of © Steven 
Mithen and Thames and Hudson Ltd.
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Mithen associates the transition itself with fully modern behaviour, 
the set of traits distinguishing our species from its predecessors as well 
as other primates, which is inferred from the archaeological record. 
There is a debate whether this transition actually took place as an 
abrupt behavioural change 40,000–50,000 years ago or more plausibly, 
considering the scale of changes, it evolved slowly over a longer period 
(Klein 2000). In a different approach, Murray Leaf and Dwight Read 
(2012) hypothesise the coevolution of thought and social organisation as 
evidenced in the archaeological record in the European Upper Paleolithic 
cave paintings within their new paradigm in the study of kinship. 
In this analysis the representations of various animals grouped together 
according to their respective species may be interpreted as the human 
capacity to understand the concept of class versus an individual as well as 
several more inclusive classes of classes. This is analogous to the ability to 
think about the individual selves, as well as classes of people and relations 
among them (ibid.: 68–88). I contend, then, that this is also the evidence 
of metaphorical thought founded not only on the similarity of objects, 
but on the analogy of relations within and between classes of objects. 
Concepts of kinship are the prime example of such thought associated 
with human behavioural modernity.
Conclusion
As Scheffler has proposed in his approach to kinship terminology, 
metaphorical thought is based not only on the similarity of objects, but also 
on analogical similarity of relation. This is one of the hallmarks of human 
cognition, but it is also the main attribute of kinship. I hypothesised here 
that concrete bodily experiences, rooted in the FOR and closely related to 
social cognition, triggered the metaphorical thought that was then used 
in other semantic domains. This is evident in the widespread metaphors 
of space that are used as concrete referents to the domain of kinship in 
terms of close/distant and transferred to the domain of emotions. The 
ethnographic examples of the referents across the domain of plants to 
the domain of kinship, as well as the metaphorical construction of fictive 
kinship, confirm that metaphorical thought is at the basis of human 
complex social cognition. The transition to cognitive fluidity between 
different semantic domains, probably fully in place by 40,000–50,000 
years ago, perhaps included kinship terminologies providing cognitive 
building blocks for the linguistic production of metaphors.
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Kinship in Mind: 
Three Approaches
Doug Jones
Social anthropologists mostly study kinship as a principle of social 
organisation. But there is also a psychological and cognitive side to human 
kinship, involving questions like: How do people recognise others as kin 
of one sort or another? What do kin categories mean and how are they 
related to one another? What, if anything, distinguishes thinking about 
kinship from other varieties of social cognition?
Different schools of anthropology offer very different answers to these 
questions. Here I review three approaches to the psychology of kinship. 
One has its roots in evolutionary theory and human/nonhuman 
comparisons. The second is concerned with symbolism, culture, and the 
natives’ explicit theories of procreation and kinship. These approaches are 
likely to be familiar to students of evolution and human behaviour, and 
cultural anthropology, respectively. The third approach stems from recent 
developments in cognitive science, especially in the study of specialised 
domains of cognition. This approach is newest, and probably least familiar 
to most anthropologists and even to most cognitive scientists, so it 
receives most attention here. I argue that human beings have a specialised 
cognitive system—which can be called ‘kinship core cognition’ or 
‘kinship conceptual structure’—comprising a set of universal building 
blocks for organising knowledge of kin and kin categories in an abstract 
kinship space. Much of the success of formal methods in the study of kin 
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categorisation, as carried out by authors like Floyd Lounsbury (1964), 
Ward Goodenough (1965), Harold Scheffler (1978), Dwight Read 
(2010), Murray Leaf (Leaf and Read 2012) and others, depends on these 
building blocks. They also turn out to play a role in generating social 
organisation—at least so I argue in a discussion of Aboriginal Australian 
kinship systems. In particular, Hal Scheffler’s monumental work on 
Australian kin classification is a major influence on the last section of the 
paper, which proposes that the conceptual structure of kinship plays a role 
in generating not just kin terminologies but social organisation.
Kinship and attachment
For evolutionary biologists, kinship means genetic relatedness. This can 
be defined numerically, as the coefficient of relatedness of organism B to 
organism A; the expected number of copies of a gene in B that are identical 
by descent with a copy of that gene in A, over and above whatever gene 
copies B shares with A by virtue of being part of the same population. 
(The last part means that the coefficient of relatedness is defined relative 
to some background population.)
Natural selection is expected to build organisms that are sensitive to 
coefficients of relatedness, for several reasons. First, in most populations, 
the gene pool contains some fraction of deleterious recessive alleles, which 
are harmless in one dose (as heterozygotes), but harmful in a double 
dose (as homozygotes). Since the offspring of genetically related parents 
are more likely to be genetically identical—homozygous—at any given 
genetic locus, they are more likely to get a double dose of deleterious 
recessives, and to suffer reduced fitness. So, natural selection is expected to 
favour an inhibition on mating with close relatives. Second, an organism 
that behaves altruistically to a genetic relative, acting in a way that reduces 
its own fitness, while increasing the fitness of its relative, will end up 
leaving more copies of its genes in the next generation than a less altruistic 
one. So natural selection is expected to favour altruism toward genetic 
kin, depending on their coefficient of relatedness.
Such is the theory. But organisms cannot read one another’s genotypes 
directly. Inbreeding avoidance and altruism based on kinship require 
some machinery for kin recognition, sensitive to phenotypic or other cues 
correlated with kinship. Two broad classes of mechanisms are known to 
biologists—phenotype matching and associational cues. Both have been 
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demonstrated in a variety of nonhuman organisms (Hauber and Sherman 
2001; Hepper (ed.) 1991; Chapais and Berman (eds) 2004; Parr and de 
Waal 1999; ), and there is some evidence they operate in humans as well, 
summarised below.
Phenotype matching
Genetically similar individuals are likely to be phenotypically similar, 
so natural selection may favour rules of thumb that say ‘Avoid mating 
with … be extra nice to … those who resemble you.’ Human beings 
seem to be sensitive to olfactory cues in choosing mates, preferring the 
smell of those who differ at genetic loci in the major histocompatibility 
complex (MHC) (Porter and Moore 1981; the MHC controls much of 
the immune system in vertebrates). Friends tend to be more genetically 
similar than expected by chance at loci controlling olfaction (Christakis 
and Fowler 2014). People judge faces that have been morphed to resemble 
themselves as more trustworthy (DeBruine 2002), and (in the case of 
child faces) more appealing (DeBruine 2004). Behavioural similarity also 
may serve as a heuristic cue for kinship (Park and Schaller 2005).
Associational cues
Primates in general (Silk 2001; Pusey 2005), probably including 
humans, rely more on associational cues than on phenotypic similarity to 
recognise kin. An early proposal invoked associational cues as a proximate 
mechanism in inbreeding avoidance. Edward Westermarck (1903) argued 
that children raised together from a young age would later show a lack of 
erotic interest in one another. In most cases these individuals would be 
siblings, and the Westermarck effect would make inbreeding less likely. 
This effect is well-documented among nonhuman animals, under the 
label of negative sexual imprinting (Pusey 2005). In  humans, test cases 
arise when nonsiblings are raised together but sexual relations are not 
discouraged, or are even encouraged. Several versions of this natural 
experiment have been studied, involving adolescents raised together 
in nursery groups in Israeli kibbutzim (Talmon 1964; Shepher 1971), 
married cousins raised in the same extended families in Lebanon (McCabe 
1983), and Taiwanese couples where the girls were adopted at an early age 
into the families of their husbands-to-be (Wolf 1995). These all support 
Westermarck’s hypothesis, which stands as the most plausible explanation 
for the near-universal avoidance of nuclear family incest. An  amplified 
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version of Westermarck’s hypothesis has recently been proposed by 
Debra Lieberman, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (2007; Lieberman 
2009). They argue for two psychological mechanisms regulating kinship 
sentiments, childhood coresidence, and observing one’s mother caring for 
a newborn. The evidence is that both sorts of cues affect both altruism and 
sexual indifference.
This research suggests some obvious extensions. If older siblings bond to 
an infant cared for by their mother, then men may bond to an infant cared 
for by a long-term sexual partner. And both sibling and paternal bonds 
may extend to an infant known to have been born to a woman even when 
she is not directly observed caring for the child.
Kinship and cultural models
In the documentary Stories We Tell, filmmaker Sarah Polley (2012) tells the 
story of her discovery that her late mother’s husband is not her biological 
father. A crucial moment comes when she learns that a DNA test has 
assigned paternity to one of several potential genitors with 99+ percentage 
probability. She comes to know her biological paternity with much more 
certainty than if she relied just on an evolved modular kin-recognition 
system, which in this case could never support more than suspicions. But 
this only works because Polley accepts what she has been told about genes 
and genetic testing. Her theories about the biology of kinship, acquired as 
part of her culture, affect her beliefs about who her ‘real’ kin are and the 
strength of her attachment to them.
This clearly poses a puzzle, because formal theories and informal cultural 
models of kinship are not guaranteed to agree with the modern biologist’s 
theories of genetic relatedness and genetic inheritance. Before the 
twentieth century even experts had some strange ideas. Charles Darwin, 
for example, made a considerable effort, mostly unsuccessful, to discover 
the nature of heredity. His investigations convinced him that traits 
acquired during the course of an organism’s lifetime could be passed on 
to its offspring (1868: vol. II: 23–24). He was also convinced by reports 
of telegony in horses and pigs, in which offspring supposedly inherited 
traits from their mothers’ previous mates (vol. I: 403–05, vol. II: 264). 
He tried to come up with a physiological mechanism that would make 
these unusual modes of inheritance possible.
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Similar beliefs—in the inheritance of acquired traits and telegony 
(in  the guise of partible paternity)—are recorded for many societies 
(e.g.  Beckerman and Valentine (eds) 2002). And anthropologists have 
reported other exotic native statements about procreation. In some cases, 
the substance of a child is said to come only from its father, with the mother 
being just an incubator. Conversely, according to some anthropologists, 
paternity and even the necessity of intercourse in conception may be 
denied. (For the Trobriand Islands, see Malinowski 1987: 142–66; but 
cf.  Weiner 1988: 53–58. For Aboriginal Australia, see review in Hiatt 
1996: 120–41, and a sceptical take in Scheffler 1978: 5–13.)
Taken at face value, these accounts raise the possibility that kinship 
means something different in different cultures. Some anthropologists 
go so far as to propose that the western concept of ‘kinship’ does not 
translate everywhere. Perhaps anthropology needs to replace the study of 
kinship with the study of an open-ended fuzzy domain of ‘relatedness.’ 
Relatedness might result not just from intercourse or parturition, but 
from sharing a wet nurse or sharing meals, from being born at the same 
time or place, or working together (Sahlins 2013).
This approach is defended at some length by Janet Carsten in an 
ethnography of Malay kinship. According to Carsten, the Malay villagers 
she studied conceptualise kinship as shared blood. While this sounds 
close to prescientific western ideas of blood kinship, Carsten argues that 
her subjects saw blood as malleable. ‘Blood changes through life – as 
does kinship’ (1997: 107). Blood is manufactured from food, especially 
heated food, so people sharing food at the same hearth—including 
adopted children—come to have the same blood, and ‘children’s physical 
appearance and character are believed to be strongly influenced by the 
people they reside with’ (ibid.: 60). Carsten herself was told that she 
was coming to resemble members of her host family. Also, blood is 
transformed into milk, so children who share a wet nurse come to be kin, 
and are covered by an incest taboo, even if they have different mothers 
and fathers.
These Malay beliefs about relatedness and inheritance have different 
sources. Concepts of ‘milk kinship’ and related incest taboos are 
apparently of Muslim origin. The idea that hereditary traits are not 
fixed at birth, but unsettled throughout life, up to death, is widespread 
in the Austronesian-speaking culture area, and may originate in a body 
of custom, or adat, going back to a founding population of farmers 
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and mariners on Formosa (Bellwood, Fox and Tryon (eds) 2006). It is 
interesting to note that many of the strong claims about the cultural 
construction of kinship have come from anthropologists working with 
Austronesian-speaking populations. On Yap, in Micronesia, it has been 
claimed that natives denied the role of intercourse in conception and 
considered that a woman’s children become kin to her husband because 
she works on his land (Schneider 1984). In Polynesia, adoption and 
coresidence were supposed to generate relatedness (Caroll (ed.) 1970; 
Brady (ed.) 1976). On Madagascar, it is said that inherited potential is 
flexible, and that membership in hereditary groups is fixed at death rather 
than birth (Astuti 2001).
These accounts seem hard to square with either the evolutionist’s view that 
human behaviour toward kin is governed by evolved mechanisms of kin 
recognition, or the classic social anthropologist’s view that genealogy is 
the universal underpinning of kinship. It is important to note, therefore, 
that there are good reasons to question whether the culturalist account 
is really the whole story about kinship. First, there are serious questions 
about whether the ethnographic evidence really supports the strong 
theoretical claims made for it. For Malaysia, Warren Shapiro (2011) cites 
ethnographies that seem to undermine Carsten’s more extreme claims. For 
Yap, Adam Kuper (1999) is sceptical on a number of grounds. For example, 
based on David Labby’s (1976) work, either Schneider’s understanding 
of Yapese conception beliefs was seriously incomplete, or those beliefs 
changed radically in just 20 years. For Oceania, Joan Silk (1980) argues 
that adoption overwhelmingly involves closely related families, and is 
largely consistent with predictions from the theory of kin selection.
Second, research in cognitive science shows that what people say they 
believe, and how they think, are two different things. Explicitly avowed 
theories and models are an imperfect guide to the implicit concepts that 
may actually guide reasoning (Kahneman 2011). Consider religious beliefs, 
for example (Barrett 1999). Adherents of the major monotheistic religions 
explicitly avow that God is omnipotent, and can do any number of things 
at once, but when asked to reason about God’s actions they imagine that 
God finds it easier to act sequentially rather than simultaneously. There 
may be a similar disconnect in the psychology of kinship. Some evidence 
comes from the Vezo of Madagascar (Astuti 2001; see also Bloch, Solomon 
and Carey 2001, for the Zafimaniry, another Madagascan group). Like 
many other Austronesian speakers, the Vezo profess that individuals take 
on the character of their surroundings. They claim, for example, that 
adoptees grow to resemble their adoptive parents, and that children who 
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spend a lot of time associating with missionaries turn light skinned. Yet 
in psychological tests involving scenarios of infants switched at birth 
to a different family, Vezo adults clearly differentiate between physical 
traits resulting from biological parentage, and social traits influenced by 
adoptive parents—between nature and nurture. In short, at some level, 
Vezo do not reason in accordance with their professed beliefs. Rita Astuti 
(2001) argues that these beliefs constitute an ideology, which supports 
cultural practices like adoption and the symbolic demotion of nuclear 
family ties in favour of wider connections. However, this explicit ideology 
coexists with an implicit concept of kinship close to the western one.
Kinship and conceptual structure
Suppose we try to split the difference between the evolutionist and 
the culturalist account of kinship. Perhaps the evolutionists are right 
in thinking that people have emotional machinery that leads to the 
formation of attachments, the strength of which roughly correlates with 
genetic distance via some proximal cues. Perhaps the culturalists are right 
in thinking that there is wide variation in cultural models of how people 
come to be related one another, with less of a common core across cultures 
than one might expect. The evolutionist account might work best for 
behaviour toward close kin, while the culturalist account might work best 
for behaviour toward distant relatives (Rodseth and Wrangham 2004).
I think, however, that neither the standard evolutionist account, nor the 
culturalist account, nor a blend of the two offer a full theory of human 
kinship. Kinship also includes a special-purpose cognitive/conceptual side, 
evident in kin terminology and other areas of social interaction, where 
interacting individuals draw on their common knowledge of conceptual 
universals to construct shared codes for categorising and dealing with kin. 
Kin terminologies reveal the working of the kinship part of the mind with 
exceptional clarity. Across cultures, there are regularities in which kin types 
are terminologically merged and separated, or otherwise linguistically 
unmarked and marked, that implicate a common conceptual structure 
underlying local vagaries in theories of relatedness and procreation (Jones 
2010). These regularities include: 
1. Kin terminologies form a closed system, a separate semantic domain. 
Terms for kin—like father or aunt in English—are distinct from 
terms for other social relationships, like boss or friend. Words for kin 
are sometimes used for nonkin as well, but for core kin terms it can 
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be shown, sometimes by the evidence of marked linguistic forms like 
godfather, sometimes by patterns of usage, that these nonkin uses are 
secondary.
2. Kin terminologies are systematically related to one another. Kin 
terminologies form around a core set of terms, which can be combined 
to give terms for more distant relatives. For example, father’s sister and 
mother’s sister are both aunt in English. These mappings are highly 
structured. Thus aunt is a nondisjunctive category, built from the 
natural classes of parent and sister. Disjunctive categories—a single 
word for mother and father’s sister, which excludes mother’s sister—
are logically possible, but rare or non-existent (Hage 1997). 
3. Kin categories map onto genealogical categories. Words like father, 
mother and aunt can be assigned to positions on genealogical charts, 
and this is true of kin terms across cultures. That kin categories are 
genealogically structured is not a logically necessary truth, but one of 
the great empirical discoveries of anthropology.
4. Kin terms are subject to formal analysis, using methods analogous—or 
even identical—to those in linguistics. A large literature demonstrates 
the success of formal analysis of kin terms, although there are 
differences among scholars over preferred techniques. The parallels 
with formal linguistics have been noted by many authors (Greenberg 
1966, 1990; Jones 2010; Kroeber 1909; Lévi-Strauss 1969).
I suggest that the best explanation for these findings is that kinship is 
governed not just by machinery for emotional attachment, but by 
a  specialised panhuman conceptual system. In the rest of this section, 
I consider how this hypothesis fits within a larger universe of overlapping 
research programs in cognitive science, which go under the names of 
conceptual structure (Jackendoff 2002; Pinker 2007), domain specificity 
(Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) 1994) 
and core cognition (Carey 2009). 
What these research programs have in common is the theory that the 
human mind comes equipped, from birth, not just with sensory, motor and 
motivational systems, but with a system of innate abstract ideas. In a sense, 
this amounts to trying to put Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of knowledge 
on a scientific footing (Kant 2009; Kitcher 1990; Pinker 2007: 153–233). 
Kant argued that concepts of number, space, time, and causation could 
not be derived from experience, but had to be already present in the mind 
to organise the raw material of perception (2009). For example, in the 
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absence of some preexisting conceptual structure relating to causation, 
nothing in experience implies a distinction between ‘A happens, then B 
happens’ and ‘A causes B’. In the modern cognitive science reworking of 
this argument, innate conceptual structure is organised into a number 
of domains. These domains probably include interconnected concepts: 
of stuff and things in space; of processes and events in time; of quantity, 
including amount, number, and likelihood; of force and causation; of life, 
animacy and living kinds; of the minds of others; and of possession and 
other social relationships and responsibilities. On the account proposed 
here, the conceptual structure of kinship is a major subdivision of the last 
of these domains.
Below I review two domains of conceptual structure: the domains of 
objects in space and of kinship. The first is of interest here because the 
conceptual structure of objects in space seems to be a kind of master 
domain, from which derivative domains, including kinship, borrow much 
of their organisation. This means that when we review the conceptual 
structure of kinship, it will turn out to be organised around an abstract 
‘kinship space’.
A major source of evidence for conceptual structure comes from language, 
with different conceptual domains attaching themselves to different 
linguistic domains. In English, for example, the conceptual structure of 
space attaches particularly to spatial prepositions like on, in, over, along, 
and so on. Other languages use other word form classes (Levinson 2003; 
Levinson and Wilkins (eds) 2006). Languages vary not only in the form 
classes they recruit to express spatial conceptual structure, but in the range 
of spatial positions covered by a given construction. For example, English 
‘A is on B’ requires that A and B be in contact (‘The table lamp is on the 
table’, but ‘The hanging lamp is over [or above, but not on] the table’). 
However, English on does not require that A be above B (‘The picture is on 
the wall’). By contrast, Japanese ue works differently, applying to the first 
two cases but not the third (Levinson and Wilkins 2006a: 554).
Underlying this variation are some common principles that suggest the 
language of space is built on a common foundation across cultures. 
A review of cross-cultural evidence suggests that the prototypical spatial 
scene involves ‘a relatively small, manipulable, inanimate, movable and 
independent figure object ... in close contiguity with a relatively large, 
relatively stationary ... ground object—for example a cup on a table’ 
(Levinson and Wilkins 2006b: 515). Normally the smaller object is 
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
352
the figure, or focus of attention, but exceptionally the figure/ground 
relationship is reversed. Spatial terms recognise variations from this and 
a few other prototypical scenes corresponding to a limited number of 
distinctive features—whether or not the figure is in contact with the 
ground, or above it, or enclosed by it, and so on. Across languages, the 
number of distinctive features organising the language of space is probably 
in the low tens, with some features very widely used, others less so.
The kind of information conveyed by the language of space is limited, 
implying that the representation of space in conceptual structure is pretty 
schematic compared to its representation in perception (Pinker 2007: 
174–88). Scale is largely absent: ‘The plane is on the tarmac’ gets the same 
preposition as ‘The fly is on the table’. Metric information (‘10 metres’, 
‘30 degrees’) is largely omitted from prepositions and other spatial terms, 
as is most information about shape, except for a few dimensional contrasts 
(0-D/point-like versus 1-D/elongated versus 2-D/flat), and much other 
important information, like the worth of the object on the table. Almost 
any such information can of course be conveyed by stringing words 
together into sentences (‘The lamp is on the table, 18 inches from the 
edge.’ Or ‘Reno is 427 miles west by southwest of Salt Lake City.’), but 
this falls outside the scope of the language and conceptual structure of 
space, properly speaking.
The language of space, as encoded in prepositions or other closed-class 
forms, seems to be a window onto a particular representational system. 
This system does not register everything that might be of interest about 
a collection of objects in space, but rather generates a stripped-down 
sketch of figure/ground spatial relationships. It exists alongside other 
representational systems that allow for a richer representation of other 
aspects of a scene, as needed.
The cross-cultural commonalities in the language of space suggest 
panhuman psychology. Further evidence for this comes from cognitive 
psychology, especially developmental psychology. Contrary to William 
James claim that an infant’s world is ‘a blooming buzzing confusion’, 
babies seem to come into the world primed to recognise and track objects. 
Much of the evidence for this comes from studies of habituation: babies 
(and other folk as well) will spend more time staring at unusual events, 
as when an object moving behind a barrier is absent when the barrier is 
removed. Susan Carey (2009: 67–116) summarises the extensive evidence 
for ‘core cognition’ of objects in space, for ‘representation of objects … 
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created by modular, encapsulated, perceptual input analyzers that have 
a long evolutionary history [and] continue to articulate our representation 
of the world throughout life’ (ibid.: 115).
An anthropologist familiar with kin terminology who learns about 
the conceptual structure of objects in space may experience a sense of 
recognition. The connection between the language of space and its 
inferred conceptual structure looks a lot like the connection between the 
language of kinship and its inferred conceptual structure. Consider some 
of the parallels. Kin terms form a closed semantic domain. Although 
kin terms are nouns in the syntax of most languages, semantically 
they are more preposition-like than noun-like. They are about ‘where’ 
(metaphorically speaking), not ‘what’. They denote relationships, not 
individual qualities—one is only aunt in relation to somebody. Kin 
relationships situate a figure (conventionally alter) in relation to a ground 
(conventionally ego). Alter is normally foregrounded, so that, for example, 
sex-of-alter distinctions are more common than sex-of-ego distinctions 
(but see the discussion of Lapp and Aboriginal Australian kinship below 
for motivated exceptions). Some kin types are cognitively prototypical, 
especially father and mother, as shown by patterns of linguistic markedness 
(Greenberg 1966, 1990; Shapiro Chapter 1). Kin terms differ from one 
another in distinctive features, and across cultures the number of such 
features is limited—probably not many more than the eight proposed by 
Alfred Kroeber (1909). These features rarely include quantities like ‘more 
than 10 years older’ (but see Gould 2000: 138–42 for an exception in 
Samoan), or important information like ‘richer’. Even some particulars of 
spatial representation carry over. Distance is one dimension of variation 
in kin terms, and there is a vertical dimension as well, including older/
younger than ego, and ascending/descending generation. Of course, there 
are important differences too between kinship space and physical space; 
most notably kinship space is built up by compounding genealogical 
primitives, instead of being a preexisting background.
The parallels between physical space and kinship space are only one 
instance of a broader pattern in conceptual structure. Linguists have noted 
for some time that just about every domain of conceptual structure studied 
so far—including time, causation, change of state, and possession—seems 
to borrow some of its organisation from the conceptual structure of objects 
in space (Jackendoff 2002; Pinker 2007). In some ways, this puts theories 
of conceptual structure at odds with standard evolutionary psychology, 
which emphasises how different cognitive domains are specialised for the 
FOCALITy AND ExTENSION IN KINSHIP
354
adaptive demands of different cognitive tasks, rather than how they share 
a common organisation (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992). However, 
these cross-domain similarities have a potential evolutionary explanation, 
in the principle of homology. Homology is familiar in the study of 
anatomy; human hands and feet differ from each other because they are 
specialised for walking and grasping, but they have important structural 
similarities because of a shared evolutionary history. By the same token, 
in the course of human evolution, the neurological machinery specialised 
for spatial cognition may have been duplicated and reassigned the task 
of representing more abstract domains. Very recently, neuroanatomical 
evidence has been collected that supports this theory (Parkinson, Liu and 
Wheatley 2014; Parkinson and Wheatley 2013).
On a purely adaptationist account, one might expect the evolved 
psychology of kinship to consist of a collection of mechanisms optimally 
engineered to assess coefficients of relatedness. But the conceptual structure 
of kinship on display in kin terminology looks more complicated than 
this, and may bear the marks of a deeper evolutionary history.
Aboriginal Australians in kinship space
The previous section argued that kin terminology provides an especially 
clear view of the conceptual structure of kinship. This section argues that 
the conceptual structure of kinship is involved not just in kin terminology 
but in kin categorisation and social organisation more generally. It traces 
a path from conceptual structure to social structure, from figure/ground 
distinctions in kin terminology to Aboriginal Australian marriage rules 
and sections.
As noted above, figure/ground relationships—with the figure being the 
focus of attention—are a major feature in the conceptual structure of both 
kinship and physical space. In physical space, the figure is syntactically 
privileged as head of a noun phrase (‘the lamp on the table’) or the subject 
of a sentence (‘The lamp is on the table.’). Usually the smaller and more 
moveable of two objects is the figure, but exceptional circumstances lead 
to the reverse (‘The table you’re looking for is under that lamp.’).
Kin terms are generally nouns, so figure/ground relationships in kinship 
space, involving alter, ego, and linking kin, do not show up in prepositional 
argument structure as they do for spatial prepositions. However, they 
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may be evident in other ways, as markedness relationships involving the 
presence or absence of sex distinctions, for example. Typically, alter is the 
figure and ego is the ground. This is how English works: knowing that 
A is granddaughter to E, tells you the sex of A but not E. In English, 
both grandparent and grandchild terms mark the sex of alter, not ego, 
indicating that more attention is focused on alter. However, in some 
cases other factors dominate categorisation. Konkoma Lapp provides an 
example. Terms for grandparents handle sex distinctions as English does: 
parent’s father is aggja and parent’s mother is akko, giving sex of alter, 
not ego. But grandchild terms work the opposite way, giving sex of ego, 
not alter. Man’s child’s child is aggjot and woman’s child’s child is akkot, 
so knowing that A is akkot to E tells you the sex of E but not A (Gould 
2000: 289–91). What’s going on in this case is that giving the sex of the 
senior individual in a kin relationship (a grandparent) is more important 
than giving the sex of the junior (a grandchild), regardless of who is alter 
and who is ego.
Aggjot and akkot are inverse terms. A gloss on ‘A’s aggjot’ is ‘he/she to whom 
A is aggja (grandfather)’, and a gloss on ‘A’s akkot’ is ‘he/she to whom A 
is akko (grandmother)’. Following Gould, these grandchild types might 
be labelled ‘grandfatherling’ and ‘grandmotherling,’ or Grandfather-1 and 
Grandmother-1 (ibid.: 28). With these terms, ego is figure, not ground, 
because he or she is more perceptually salient by virtue of being senior. 
Consistent with their inverse status, the two grandchild terms are obvious 
morphological derivatives of the two grandparent terms, coming close to 
merging with their reciprocals.
Inverse kin terms are analysed by Joseph Greenberg (1990), and shown 
by George Murdock (1970) to be widespread. They are an instance of 
a common situation in linguistics where multiple constraints may be 
active—in this case, roughly, ‘Emphasise alter over ego’ and ‘Emphasise 
senior over junior’—but one or the other is given precedence in cases 
of conflict (Jones 2010). In the rest of this section I argue that how this 
semantic conflict is resolved can have consequences not just for what people 
call their kin, but for how they organise their social lives. I look at kinship 
systems in Aboriginal Australia, where opting for inverse kin terms and 
corresponding categorisations have far-reaching social structural effects.
Although there is some variation, Aboriginal Australian kinship systems 
tend to fit in the broad category that anthropologists label Dravidian 
(Godelier, Trautmann and Tjon Sie Fat (eds) 1998; Scheffler 1978; 
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Trautmann 1981). In a generic Dravidian system the suppression of 
lineal/collateral distinctions coexists with parallel/cross distinctions 
and cross/affine equations. The first two principles mean that parents 
are terminologically equated with same-sex siblings (parallel), but 
distinguished from opposite-sex siblings (cross). These mergers and 
distinctions also extend to more distant relations. Mother’s sister’s child is 
equated with mother’s child and thus with sibling, and father’s brother’s 
child is equated with father’s child and thus with sibling. These equations 
extend to reciprocals as well, so that man’s brother’s child and woman’s 
sister’s child are equated with own child. Cross/affine equations mean 
that cross-kin are systematically equated with affines: Mother’s brother’s 
child and father’s sister’s child with spouse or spouse’s sibling, mother’s 
brother with spouse’s father, father’s sister with spouse’s mother, and man’s 
sister’s child and woman’s brother’s child with child’s spouse. Cross/affine 
terminological equations are accompanied by marriage rule; opposite-sex 
cross-cousins are not just labelled husband and wife, but are preferred or 
prescribed spouses.
Most Aboriginal Australian systems depart from generic Dravidian in 
one important respect (Scheffler 1978; Shapiro 1970, 1979; Viveiros 
de Castro 1998). They start with inverse kin categories for children, so 
that the fundamental distinction among children is not between son and 
daughter but between man’s child and woman’s child—‘fatherling’ and 
‘motherling’ in Gould’s nomenclature (2000: 28)—although a secondary 
distinction between male and female children may be included as well. 
This distinction is combined with a parallel/cross distinction among 
siblings’ children. A man’s brother’s child (who calls him their ‘father’), 
along with his own child, is man’s child, or ‘fatherling’. A woman’s sister’s 
child (who calls her their ‘mother’), along with her own child, is woman’s 
child, or ‘motherling’. The parallel/cross distinction means that the 
children of same-sex parents are not equated with the children of opposite-
sex parents, leaving several options for labelling children of cross-siblings. 
In the most economical case, since a man has already used up ‘fatherling’ 
for his own and his brother’s children, he uses ‘motherling’ for his sister’s 
children, and a woman uses ‘fatherling’ for her brother’s children. Other 
terminologies add additional terms for these cross-kin types.
On the surface it looks as if there are two kinds of crossness, Dravidian and 
Aboriginal Australian, that differ in how they classify own and siblings’ 
children. However, I propose that, at a deeper level, what is involved is 
an interaction between: (1) a single parallel/cross distinction, operating 
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in both standard Dravidian and Aboriginal Australian, and (2) a senior-
focused sex distinction, operating in Australian, but not Dravidian, 
resulting, in G-1, in an ego-focused inverse fatherling/motherling 
distinction. (In addition, Dravidian and sometimes Aboriginal Australian 
may include the more standard alter-focused son/daughter distinction.) 
As we have seen in the discussion of Lapp above, it is possible to have 
senior-focused kin terms, with sex-of-ego distinctions when ego is senior, 
without parallel/cross distinctions. Treating the Dravidian/Aboriginal 
Australian difference as the product of the interaction of constraints 
already observed in other contexts is more economical than inventing new 
varieties of crossness.
The Aboriginal Australian classification of G-1 relatives has further 
structural consequences, which have been spelled out by a number of 
authors (reviewed by Scheffler 1978). The division of G-1 relatives into 
‘fatherling’ and ‘motherling’ classes (i.e. man’s child/brother’s child, and 
woman’s child/sister’s child) mirrors a division of G1 relatives into father 
and mother. To maintain the symmetry of descending and ascending 
generations, father’s sister can be grouped with father and mother’s brother 
with mother. The result is to partition G1 and G-1 relatives together into 
two superclasses: a father/fatherling class (father, father’s sibling and their 
reciprocals), and a mother/motherling class (mother, mother’s sibling and 
their reciprocals). And two more superclasses may be recognised as well. 
In G0 there is a category of siblings and parallel kin including father’s 
fatherling and/or mother’s motherling, plus a category of potential spouses 
and cross-kin, including father’s motherling and mother’s fatherling. This 
G0 bifurcation can be extended to the alternating generations, G±2. In G2 
the parallel class can be expanded to include father’s father and mother’s 
mother, and the cross-class to include father’s mother and mother’s father. 
In G-2 the parallel class can be expanded to include fatherling’s fatherling 
and motherling’s motherling, and the cross-class to include fatherling’s 
motherling and motherling’s fatherling.
This division into four superclasses is implicit in standard Aboriginal 
Australian kin categorisation. As long as people follow the rule of not 
marrying members of the three classes that stand to them as father, 
mother and sibling and marrying the fourth class that stands as cross-
cousin, everyone will agree on where the lines between classes are drawn.
As a number of authors have recognised, this division of kin into implicit 
classes is probably the basis for the section systems seen in much of 
Aboriginal Australia (Scheffler 1978: 432–80). ‘The categories and 
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intercategory relations of section and subsection systems are derived from 
the highest-order superclasses of systems of kin classification’ (ibid.: 432). 
Where sections exist, each section is related to two other sections as father/
fatherling, and mother/motherling, and to one other section as cross-
cousin/potential spouse/potential sibling-in-law. Membership in sections 
is normally transmitted according to the same logic of patrifiliation 
and matrifiliation as membership in superclasses, although section and 
super-class do not always coincide exactly and additional rules are needed 
to resolve inconsistencies when someone’s parents have made a marriage 
that violates the rules. In the earlier literature, sections are sometimes 
called marriage classes, but this is often a misnomer. In many, not all 
(Shapiro 1979), Aboriginal Australian groups, membership in egocentric 
kin categories rather than section membership is used to settle marriage 
rights when the two are in conflict, and the chief importance of sections is 
religious and ritual (Scheffler 1978: 474). This and other lines of evidence 
led Scheffler and others to argue that egocentric genealogical categories are 
logically prior to sociocentric sections. They are probably historically prior 
as well, with section systems developing just a few times as a reification 
of genealogical superclasses, and then diffusing, in some cases to societies 
without the corresponding kin categories.1
To further demonstrate the importance of genealogically based 
categorisation to social structure, compare the rather different structural 
possibilities inherent in standard Dravidian. At first blush, the Dravidian 
categorisation of kin, like that in Aboriginal Australia, seems to allow 
a division of relatives into four superclasses. Among generation G±1 kin, 
Dravidian allows a division between parallel and cross-kin (in contrast 
to the patrifilial/matrifilial division in Australia). Parallel G±1 kin include 
parents and their same-sex siblings, plus reciprocals (own children and 
children of same-sex siblings). Cross G±1 includes parents’ opposite-sex 
siblings, plus reciprocals (children of opposite-sex siblings). And a G0 
1  This argument could be extended further. For example, Aboriginal Australian subsection systems 
follow from Aranda kin categorisation, as spelled out in Scheffler (1978: 453–60). And the section 
systems found in scattered locations outside Aboriginal Australia (Viveiros de Castro 1998) may also 
derive from kin superclasses. Among Panoan-speaking groups in Western Amazonia, FZ is grouped 
with F rather than with MB … different kinds of grandkin are distinguished from each other and 
equated with kin or affines at Ego’s own generation. This Kariera-type terminology is in perfect 
agreement with their system of sociocentric, alternating generation marriage classes (Hornborg 1993: 
104). One such group, the Sharanahua, lack named sections, but have just eight basic kin terms 
dividing Ego’s kin into four Aboriginal Australian–style superclasses, further distinguished by sex or 
cross-sex (Siskind 1973: 47–66).
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parallel/cross distinction operates as in Aboriginal Australia, distinguishing 
siblings and parallel cousins from cross-cousins, who are also potential 
spouses.
However, in contrast to the Aboriginal Australian case, this division cannot 
form the basis for a sociocentric four section system, because people will 
disagree on who belongs to what section. A man will consider a wife or 
potential wife, in his own generation, to belong to the cross category, 
while his father will belong to the parallel category. But the position of 
his mother will be ambiguous; parallel to him, but cross to his father. 
Ego and his kin will thus not be able to agree on a division of their kin 
into four sections. The best that can be managed by way of sectioning 
in a system of Dravidian categories is a two-fold division into moieties, 
patrilineal or matrilineal, with own moiety and opposite moiety standing 
as consanguines and affines.
Aboriginal Australian and Dravidian categorisations also have different 
consequences for marriage rules. In generation G0, both systems are 
consistent with a rule of cross-cousin marriage, but they treat cross-
generational marriages differently. Under Aboriginal Australian 
categorisation, kin in generations G1 and G-1 fall into father/fatherling and 
mother/motherling superclasses, and are normally ineligible for marriage. 
Under Dravidian categorisation, by contrast, these relatives are merely 
members of the affine superclass, and may be possible or even preferred 
spouses (Good 1996; Trautmann 1981). Cross-generational marriages, 
especially between a man and his sister’s daughter—an unmarriageable 
‘motherling’ under Aboriginal Australian rules—are common in many 
Dravidian systems in southern India and Amazonia.
By way of summary, let us run through the argument backwards. 
Differences between Aboriginal Australian and Dravidian social 
organisation, including section systems and marriage rules, seem to derive 
from differences in kin categorisation: Scheffler (1978) and others make 
a strong case that the causal arrow runs from categorisation to social 
structure, rather than vice-versa.
And in turn, key differences in kin categorisation seem to derive from the 
possibilities inherent in the conceptual structure of kinship; in particular, 
from different ways of assigning figure and ground roles to ‘objects’ 
in kinship ‘space’. So without denying the evidence that cosmology 
is enlisted as an ideological prop for Aboriginal Australian sections 
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(von  Brandenstein 1970), or the possibility that ecological factors are 
involved in the genesis of Aboriginal Australian–type systems in Australia 
and elsewhere, what stands out here is the way these systems seem to be 
exploring the combinatorial potential of conceptual structure.
Conclusion: Good to think
The study of kinship is one of the great success stories in social anthropology. 
Yet this empirical success is in some ways a theoretical embarrassment. 
Kinship rules in many societies seem to be more structured, and 
structured differently, than one would expect just from people helping—
and not copulating with—other people according to inferred coefficients 
of relatedness. And the organisation of kinship categories around a set 
of underlying universals seems to go beyond what one would expect if 
kinship were just a poorly demarcated cultural domain at the intersection 
of social life and folk theories of heredity. Here I have made the case that 
kinship is also a domain of evolved conceptual structure. Sharing this 
conceptual structure makes it easier for people to converge on shared-
kin categories and associated rules, while the permutations permitted 
by the structure can generate variation in kinship systems and kin-based 
social organisation, such as the difference between standard Dravidian 
and Aboriginal Australian systems. I suggest that kinship systems are as 
orderly as they are, and the study of kinship is as successful as it is, because 
human kinship is partly about what is ‘good to think’.
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Do Women Really Desire Casual 
Sex? Analysis of a Popular Adult 
Online Dating/Liaison Site
Michelle Escasa‑Dorne and William Jankowiak
Introduction
Although Hal Scheffler never wrote on sexual behaviour per se, his 
overall approach in kinship studies lends itself readily to a Darwinian 
approach to the study of casual sex. To this end, we want to explore the 
sex differences in men’s and women’s willingness to seek out casual sexual 
liaisons. The incidence of casual sex promoted amongst straights appears 
to be a prominent feature in modern society (Grello, Welsh and Harper 
2006; Hatfield, Forbes and Rapson 2011; Lambert, Kahn and Apple 
2003; Paul, McManus and Hayes 2000) and has a number of colloquial 
terms, including ‘hooking up’ and ‘no strings attached’ sex. If ‘hooking 
up’ (i.e. casual sex with a stranger with no intention of meeting again) 
has become the preferred and most common form of sexual liaison, it 
would constitute a historic shift in female sexual behaviour. Moreover, the 
pervasiveness of popular ‘dating’ sex sites poses a potential challenge to 
evolutionary theory of human sexuality that has consistently documented 
sex differences in male and female erotic perception, imagination and 
behaviour (Baumeister, Catanese and Vohs 2001).
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In this chapter, we investigate Adult Friend Finder, a large popular 
sex site—it claims to be the largest online sex and swinger personals 
community website in the world. It is consistently ranked between the 
40th and 60th most visited website on the Internet with claims to over 
20 million members. If there is a shift in sexual attitude amongst females 
in terms of their openness to casual sexual liaisons, their online profiles 
should be more explicit in stating a desire for entering into a casual sexual 
encounter.
Sex differences: An overview
A large body of evidence supports general expectations concerning sex 
differences in perceptions of sexual behaviour and psychology. An early 
compilation of various surveys, primarily from the United States (US), 
suggests that men prefer young, healthy and physically attractive partners, 
whereas women seek ambitious, generous and socially and economically 
successful partners when evaluating potential mates (Symons 1979). 
Related research finds males more than females utilise prostitutes, 
consume pornography, require less time before consenting to sex and 
sex with a stranger, and display higher rates of sex with farm animals 
(Gray and Garcia 2013; Mealey 2000). Differences are further manifested 
in men having more spontaneous thoughts about sex, a greater variety 
of sexual fantasies, greater frequency of wanting intercourse and with 
a larger number of partners, and higher participation in masturbation 
(even in societies that strongly discourage it) (Baumeister, Catanese and 
Vohs 2001: 242). In  contrast, women give greater weight to cues of 
emotional intimacy with someone who is open to establishing an ongoing 
relationship (Buss 2003; Regan and Berscheid 1999; Schmitt, Shackelford 
and Buss 2001).
Sexual selection theory and data on sexuality suggest that heterosexual 
women’s short-term sexual strategies may be motivated by accumulation 
of resources (Buss 2008; Hrdy 1999; Symons 1979; Townsend 1998), 
mate switching (Betzig 1989), or out of a desire to evaluate a prospective 
long-term mate (Buss 2008; Buss and Schmitt 1993; Greiling and Buss 
2000; Meston and Buss 2007) rather than motivation to find momentary 
sexual pleasure. However, the emergent research on bisexual women finds 
they have on average more sexual partners than heterosexual or lesbian 
women. This research also finds that bisexual women often have higher 
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testosterone levels than women in the general population (Lippa 2006). 
The higher testosterone levels may contribute to bisexual women having 
a stronger sex drive and thus desire to seek out more opportunities for 
short-term sexual encounters. Another exception is female swingers, or 
married women, who seek out sexual variety within spouse exchange 
contexts (Jankowiak and Mixson 2008). In this setting, women engage 
in casual sexual encounters that allow for the possibility of a physiological 
release, while also signalling to themselves and others that they are 
sexually attractive and therefore desirable (see Gangestad and Simpson 
2000). Previous literature has also noted that extra-pair mating may be 
the stimulus necessary to activate women’s short-term mating strategies 
(Pillsworth and Haselton 2006). Clearly, some women do engage in 
short-term mating encounters.
Although popular media has highlighted ‘hooking up’ as constituting 
a  new trend whereby females avidly seek out casual sexual trysts, 
empirical research continues to find persistence sex differences, more 
men than women are seeking short-term sexual encounters (Garcia and 
Reiber 2008). Moreover, academic research regarding the ‘hooking up’ 
experience on college campuses finds young women overwhelmingly 
complaining that a ‘one-night stand’ is not emotionally satisfying (Bogle 
2008; Campbell 2008; Garcia and Reiber 2008). College men seldom 
voiced a similar complaint (Townsend 1998). It is, thus, puzzling to find 
a proliferation of sexually oriented dating websites claiming that every 
locality has females eager to engage in casual sex encounters.
In the 1990s, due to the increased popularity of the web, there appeared 
numerous sex sites that advertised as being links for individuals who want 
to engage in nonmonetary ‘no strings’ casual sexual encounters. These 
websites were designed to provide a means for individuals interested in 
a short-term sexual tryst to more effectively ‘hook up’. Moreover, these 
dating sites appear to be highly profitable. The ubiquity of the online 
sex sites raises an intriguing question: Are the participating women 
harbingers of an emerging shift in American female sexual behaviour? 
This  raises other related questions: Who uses these sites? Is  there a 
difference in the profiles of males and females? In what way, if any, do the 
well-documented sex differences continue to be manifested in profile ads 
or is there a striking transformation in females’ public sexual persona? To 
this end, we hypothesised:
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1. If a shift has occurred, straight and bisexual females’ ads on the casual 
sex dating site will be more explicit in stating their desire for a casual, 
noncommittal sexual encounter.
2. If sex differences continue to be present, female profiles will have more 
qualifications and stipulations that seek to obtain evidence of a male’s 
interest in forming an emotional attachment.
3. If sexual orientation and, thus, hormonal difference is a factor, there 
should be more bisexual women’s ads compared to straight female 
profiles stating a preference for casual sexual encounters.
4. Because coitus is a favour women grant men, their ability to control 
the pace of a relationship ensured their profiles would be more explicit 
in stating their expectations and, thus, preference for a specific sex act 
or acts. Conversely, males’ desire for some kind of sexual encounter 
contributes to the writing of a more flexible and, thus, less precise or 
demanding profile requesting a specific sex act or acts.
Methods
We assumed that people who advertise on casual dating sites were not 
representative of typical American males or females. However, cultural 
anthropologists have historically sought to identify emergent cultural 
patterns in the behaviours of what could be considered to be sociologically 
marginal individuals. It is something of a truism that what was once 
marginal often, in time, becomes a new mainstream cultural pattern. 
In this way, it  is fruitful to investigate the possibility that online casual 
sex dating sites may represent the nascent presence of a new behavioural 
pattern within America’s regional cultures.
Adult personal websites allow individuals to create a profile to advertise 
their availability and seek other individuals who may be interested in the 
same type of relationship or activities as themselves. Similar to other large-
profile dating websites, such as Match.com or Chemistry.com, individual 
profiles include photographs, descriptive information from chosen 
categories and written information providing additional information 
about the individual and the type of person he or she is seeking. Unlike 
websites tailored to find a relationship (or, more directly, to ‘find love’, 
as one popular dating outlet states), adult online dating sites advertise 
themselves as websites to find sexual partners. While the layout of the 
adult dating site may be similar to other dating websites, the content, 
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photographs and expectations are typically more sexually inclined and 
quite explicit in an individual’s phrasing of what he or she is looking for 
in a partner. For example, 80 per cent of female profiles contain a photo(s) 
that had semi or full nudity, with 78 per cent of the ads containing 
sexually explicit words or phrases that would have been deleted had they 
been expressed on a mainstream media outlet. In this and many other 
ways, sex dating/liaison sites differ from eHarmony.com and Match.com.
Given the online sex sites’ sexual explicitness, we assumed that men and 
women who placed an ad should have had a greater interest in short-term 
mating encounters compared to men and women who use more standard 
and socially respected dating sites (e.g. Match.com and eHarmony.com). 
Many other outlets for finding casual sexual encounters are available via 
websites. For this project, we focused on Adult Friend Finder for several 
reasons. While Craigslist offers a section for casual encounters, a  large 
number of postings were found to be hinting towards prostitution. One 
new site, Ashley Madison, has gained recent popularity due to the specific 
nature of the website in offering an outlet for individuals who are already 
partnered or married and who are looking for an extra-partner affair. 
Because our intent was to focus on the mating preferences of females and 
males who are not currently partnered, we did not further analyse profiles 
in AshleyMadison.com. Given the commonality between these sites, we 
are confident that the adult dating we focused on is highly representative 
of other non–prostitution oriented, online sex dating services.
To test our hypotheses, the authors collected data from individuals’ profiles 
on a large, casual sex dating website. The site is highly profitable and is 
found around the world (e.g. in Europe, Asia and Africa). The website 
defines itself as an ‘adult personals’ website where individuals can create 
a profile to advertise their availability and seek other individuals who may 
be interested in the same type of relationship or activities as themselves. 
The casual sex site offers two membership options: a ‘silver’ membership 
at approximately US$30 per month and a ‘gold’ membership at US$50 
per month. A silver member has a limited amount of times they may 
contact other members, while a gold member has unlimited access to look 
at and respond to ads. Due to the initial uncertainty regarding individual 
or profile differences between gold and silver members, profiles were 
selected from each category equally. After an initial analysis, there were no 
differences between the gold and silver profiles in the prose, photo type, 
content or type of sexual encounter/relationship requested. We combined 
the two types of profiles for analysis.
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Sample methods included a randomised selection of male and female 
profiles from a variety of geographical regions in continental US. The 
regions we sampled included the east, south, midwest and western US. 
We selected four states from each region. These states in alphabetical 
order are California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Utah. Analyses showed no differences in 
sexual or relationship profile content by region. Certain cultural styles 
were evident in local areas. As an example, there were a larger number of 
beach photographs and surfer images in California and Florida profiles 
over the other states. In total, 50 ads (25 gold and 25 silver levels) per 
gender were selected by coding every third page on the website within 
the respected gold and silver categories. This provided an original sample 
of 1,508 profiles, which included an equal number of males and females.
The site asks individuals to list their age, height, body type, educational 
level, race and sexual orientation from a set selection of choices. In many 
cases, members are given the option to refuse disclosure of such information. 
Sexual orientation was by far the category most often checked as ‘prefer 
not to say’. We treated these ads as a separate category unless we were able 
to determine their orientation from information in their profile. In most 
cases, we were able to determine a person’s sexual orientation if they were 
seeking men, women or both. There were 13 incidences where a profile 
listed ‘prefer not to say’ concerning an individual’s sexual orientation, 
yet had a profile statement that explicitly stated a preference for sex with 
males and females. In these instances the person was recoded as having 
a bisexual orientation.
There were four primary sexual orientations: heterosexual, homosexual, 
bisexual and bicurious (i.e. women who thought about but had not 
participated in a same-sex sexual encounter). We dropped from our 
sample the six homosexual profiles (i.e. profiles stating they were only 
interested in a same-sex partner) that had been erroneously included by 
the dating site in the heterosexual category. We kept the categories of 
bisexual, bicurious and heterosexual. Of these categories, 57 per cent of the 
females and 76 per cent of the males described themselves as heterosexual. 
The percentages of bicurious and bisexual females were modest (17.2 and 
21.6 per cent, respectively), while males self-coded themselves in these 
categories to a lesser degree (6.9 and 6.6 per cent, respectively). A small 
number of males (10 per cent) and females (5 per cent) did not disclose 
sexual orientation nor were researchers able to classify their sexual 
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orientation based on profile content. In these instances, we dropped the 
profiles from our sample.1 Further details of the breakdown of our sample 
size categories can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Descriptives of the sample
Femalesa Malesa
Age
18–24 40 (7 .3) 36 (5 .3)
25–29 67 (12 .3) 92 (13 .6)
30–34 130 (23 .8) 127 (18 .8)
35–39 130 (23 .8) 163 (24 .1)
40–44 86 (15 .8) 104 (15 .4)
45+ 93 (17) 155 (22 .9)
Ethnicity
Caucasian 404 (74) 537 (79 .3)
Black 72 (13 .2) 81 (12)
Hispanic 27 (4 .9) 24 (3 .5)
Asian 8 (1 .5) 0 (0)
Other/No Data 35 (6 .3) 35 (4 .8)
Education
High School 67 (12 .3) 71 (10 .5)
Associate’s Degree 29 (5 .3) 25 (3 .7)
Some College 146 (26 .7) 145 (21 .4)
Bachelor’s Degree 220 (40 .3) 342 (50 .5)
No Data 84 (15 .4) 94 (13 .9)
Sexual Orientation
Heterosexual 309 (56 .6) 515 (76 .1)
Bicurious 94 (17 .2) 47 (6 .9)
Bisexual 118 (21 .6) 45 (6 .6)
No Data 25 (4 .6) 70 (10 .3)
Body Type
Slim/Petite 8 (1 .5) 1 ( .1)
Athletic 99 (18 .1) 379 (56)
1  Lisa Diamond (2008) argues that bisexuality (she prefers the term nonexclusive) is a deeply 
problematic category, as ‘it is not clear if it refers to sexual identity, sexual behavior or sex orientation’ 
(ibid.: 13).
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Femalesa Malesa
Average 173 (31 .7) 227 (33 .5)
Extra Padding 188 (34 .4) 53 (7 .8)
Ample 68 (12 .5) 10 (1 .5)
Not Determinable 10 (1 .8) 7 (1)
TOTAL 546 (100) 677 (100.1)
a . Listed as n (% within gender)
Source: Collated from data collected by the authors. © Michelle Escasa‑Dorne, 2014.
Research on the validity of online nonsexual dating sites finds a great deal of 
‘deception’ with facts (Toma, Hancock and Ellison 2008; Hatfield, Forbes 
and Rapson 2011). For example, men tend to exaggerate their height, 
income and occupation, whereas women misrepresent their age, level 
of physical attraction and whether they have children. For the purposes 
of  this study, we assumed that if and when individuals exaggerated the 
‘facts’ in their profiles, it should be in the direction of what they truly 
value, prefer and want in a sexual encounter. 
The researchers printed and then coded each profile by analysing the 
content of the profiles, as well as the listed relationship type and/or 
activities sought. Of our initial 1,508 profiles, there were 141 vague ads 
(e.g. had minimum or no information on what they wanted). These ads 
were dropped from our sample. Fourteen ads, all from females, were clearly 
about prostitution (i.e. ads acknowledging they would do ANYTHING 
in exchange for these special gifts). These ads were also dropped from 
the sample. We also identified (as stated in a person’s ad) 130 swinger 
or spouse-exchange requests. The majority of swinger ads stated both 
partners were involved in creating the profile. Thus, we did not include 
swingers in the final analysis. However, we included men and women 
who claimed to be divorced, soon to be divorced or just married. After 
dropping the prostitution, swinger and vague ads, our original sample was 
reduced to 677 males and 546 females (n = 1,223). We did not conduct 
an in-depth survey of who actually used the site, thus we cannot be certain 
who actually engaged in casual sexual encounters. Our pilot survey, albeit 
large, is suggestive and not conclusive.
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Five researchers served as coders of the individuals’ profiles. We coded 
relationship type as ‘casual’, ‘conflicted’ or ‘long-term/romantic’ (LTR). 
Profiles were coded as LTR when individuals stated a preference for 
a continuous ‘relationship’ (e.g. going out on multiple dates, being friends 
first, emphasising having to know and trust a person, etc.). Moreover, 
individuals who were classified as having an LTR profile emphasised 
they were not looking for flings, promiscuous sex or one-night stands, 
but were more interested in developing a continuous, ongoing mutual 
relationship. Casual ads stressed a preference to meet numerous members 
of the preferred sex, did not mention a preference to establish an ongoing 
relationship and emphasised a desire for sexual satisfaction. Conflicted 
profiles included individuals seeking what the site refers to as a  ‘friends 
with benefits’ relationship (these were identified from key phrases in 
profiles that highlighted a preference for establishing some type of 
emotional involvement). For women, this included a partner who would 
be available for a weekend of walks, talks, dinner, movies and sex; whereas 
for men, ‘friends with benefits’ usually meant wanting a sex partner who 
would meet at an appointed place for an allotted amount of time. Some of 
the ads contained mixed or conflicting messages in their profile statement. 
These mixed messages stressed different and, often contradictory, motives 
(e.g.  a  desire for a boyfriend and in a separate paragraph ‘no strings 
attached’ sex). Whenever a profile contained conflicting goals (i.e. wanting 
a casual sex encounter as well as a long-term relationship), the profile was 
coded as a conflicted profile.
All data were analysed using SPSS 16.0 for Windows. Except where stated, 
all analyses used a Chi-squared goodness of fit test and all tests assumed 
an alpha of 0.05.
Results
The motivation for being on the sex site significantly differs by gender 
(χ2 = 125.01, df = 2, p < .001). Females’ profiles were more likely to seek 
an LTR than males’ profiles (see Table 4). Male profiles overwhelmingly 
(52 per cent, n = 350) emphasised a desire for casual sex compared to only 
26 per cent (143) of female profiles. Conflicted profiles were fairly evenly 
distributed between males and females. These findings suggest that female 
profiles were less explicit in stating a desire for casual sex, while male 
profiles appeared more open to anonymous or casual sex.
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Post-hoc tests reveal a pattern in women’s profiles based on sexual 
orientation. When profiles of heterosexual women were separated 
from bisexual and bicurious women a significant pattern emerged—of 
the heterosexual women (n = 309), only 19.4 per cent (n = 60) sought 
a  casual relationship. Comparatively, of the bicurious and bisexual 
women, 36 per cent (n = 77) sought a casual relationship. Forty per cent 
of straight women preferred a long-term romantic relationship, compared 
to an average of only 20 per cent for the bisexual and bicurious women 
(see Table 6). Further, bisexual profiles often expressed a preference to 
form an emotional monogamous relationship with one sex, while stating 
a preference for casual encounters with the other sex.
We also examined evidence of associations between individual physical 
characteristics and stated motives on the sex site. For these post-hoc 
analyses, we sought to see if there is a relationship between age, body 
type (e.g. thin, athletic, average and a few extra pounds) and degree of 
openness to casual sexual encounters. We found a positive statistical 
association between body type and relationship desired for females (χ2 = 
27.10, df = 10, p = .003) but not for males (χ2 =6.70, df = 10, p = .753) 
(see  Table  3). There was, however, an association between age of the 
subject and relationship desired for both males (χ2 = 33.778, df = 15, 
n = 677, p = .004) and females (χ2 = 40.700, df = 15, n = 546, p < .001) 
(see Table 4). 
Of all the females who were between the ages of 18–24 (n = 40), 
17 (43 per cent) expressed an interest in casual sex versus six (15 per cent) 
who were looking for an LTR relationship. Of the 93 females who were 45 
and above, 46 were coded as seeking an LTR relationship (49.5 per cent) 
while only 11 (or 12 per cent) wanted variety or casual sex.
All profiles were coded to determine whether there was a difference 
between males and females seeking or offering specific services, sexual 
or nonsexual (e.g. conversation, hugs, or dinner dates), from potential 
partners (χ2 = 109.568, df = 4, n = 546, p < .001). Only 7 per cent (n = 38) 
of females offered services, compared to 19 per cent (n = 131) of males. 
In the context of a potential first-time sexual encounter, males tended to 
be less demanding and were more willing to provide noncoitus sexual 
services. Based upon this evidence, hypothesis 4 is supported.
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Table 4. Type of encounter sought by males and females






















Motives by Body Type
LTR*b Conflictedb FB**b Casualb n χ2 df p
Males 677 11 .535 15  .714

















Ample 1 (10) 3 (30) 0 (0) 6 (60)




















































No Data 2 (20) 4 (40) 3 (30) 1 (10)
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Motives by Age
LTR*c Conflictc FB**c Casualc n χ2 df p










































68 (43 .9) 155










































11 (11 .8) 93
* LTR: Long‑term/romantic; ** FB: Friends with benefits/‘fuck buddy’
a . listed as n (% within gender) 
b . n (% within body type)
c . n (% within age)
Source: Collated from data collected by the authors. © Michelle Escasa‑Dorne, 2014.
Additionally, profiles were coded for instances of listing specific traits 
desired of a partner. These traits included sexual characteristics or 
personality characteristics (e.g. wanting someone with certain types 
or standards of looks, intelligence, sexual openness to specific acts or 
behaviours, etc.). Profiles of individuals who expressed flexibility in traits 
or characteristics of a partner were coded as ‘trait flexible’ (see Table 5). 
Profiles that were trait flexible were those of females or males that stated 
they were open to all age groups, looks, backgrounds, etc. In our data, 
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both sexes were overwhelmingly trait flexible. We suspect this was due 
to both sexes wanting to attract the largest number of responses possible. 
Trait flexibility was reported for 405 females (74 per cent), while 139 
females (26 per cent) were coded as trait specific. Males followed a similar 
pattern: 556 men (82 per cent) were trait flexible, with 116 (17 per cent) 
of the men trait specific.












116 (17 .1) 5 (0 .7) 13 .683 10  .188
18–24 34 (6 .1) 1 (0 .9) 1 (20) 36 (5 .3)
25–29 78 (14) 15 .8 (12 .1) 0 (0) 92 (13 .6)
30–34 106 
(19 .1)




25 (21 .6) 1 (20) 163 
(24 .1)








139 (25 .5) 2 (0 .4) 9 .183 10  .515
18–24 30 (7 .4) 10 (1 .8) 0 (0) 40 (7 .3)
25–29 54 (13 .3) 13 (9 .4) 0 (0) 67 (12 .3)
30–34 99 (24 .4) 30 (21 .6) 1 (50) 130 
(23 .8)
35–39 95 (23 .5) 35 (25 .2) 0 (0) 130 
(23 .8)
40–44 56 (13 .8) 30 (21 .6) 0 (0) 86 (15 .8)
45+ 71 (17 .5) 21 (15 .1) 1 (50) 93 (17)
* listed as n (% within sexual content)
Source: Collated from data collected by the authors. © Michelle Escasa‑Dorne, 2014.
Twenty of the 60 heterosexual female profiles coded as seeking casual 
sex had profiles that explicitly stated the woman was coming out of 
a recent ‘sexless’ marriage and desiring a relationship that, in the words 
of a 38-year-old woman, would make her ‘feel sexually desired once again’. 
This is consistent with research that found women prefer sexual validation 
instead of momentary physiological pleasure (Meana 2010).
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Table 6. Females’ motives listed by sexual orientation
Motives Bicurious Bisexual Straight No Data Total
LTR
Count 24 18 124 8 174
% within Motives 13 .8 10 .3 71 .3 4 .6 100 .0
% within Sexual Orientation 25 .5 15 .3 40 .1 32 .0 31 .9
Conflicted
Count 21 26 67 6 120
% within Motives 17 .5 21 .7 55 .8 5 .0 100 .0
% within Sexual Orientation 22 .3 22 .0 21 .7 24 .0 22 .0
Friends with Benefits/‘Fuck Buddy’
Count 22 24 58 5 109
% within Motives 20 .2 22 .0 53 .2 4 .6 100 .0
% within Sexual Orientation 23 .4 20 .3 18 .8 20 .0 20 .0
Casual
Count 27 50 60 6 143
% within Motives 18 .9 35 .0 42 .0 4 .2 100 .0
% within Sexual Orientation 28 .7 42 .4 19 .4 24 .0 26 .2
Total
Count 94 118 25 309 546
% within Motives 17 .2 21 .6 4 .6 56 .6 100 .0
% within Sexual Orientation 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0
(χ2 = 36.360, df = 9, p < . 001)
Source: Collated from data collected by the authors. © Michelle Escasa‑Dorne, 2014.
Finally, there is little sex difference in ad content across all the US regions 
coded. If a state had a fluid or static migration pattern or high or low 
percentage of college graduates, male and female, the ads are strikingly 
similar.
Discussion
Camille Paglia points out that ‘since the sexual revolution of the 1960s, 
American society has become increasingly secular, with the media 
environment drenched with sex’ (2010: A23). The cultural shift away from 
sexual restraint to a greater openness and tolerance in public expression 
of sexual desire does not mean there has been a corresponding shift in 
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women’s sexual behaviour. Edward Laumann et al.’s (1994) extensive 
survey of sexual behaviour in the US did not find strong evidence for 
this nor did our online study of female sexual preferences. The majority 
of heterosexual women’s profiles, regardless of the degree of sexual 
explicitness, overwhelmingly noted a preference for sex within some type 
of ongoing or imagined relationship. In this way, evidence for heterosexual 
women’s preference for ‘no strings attached’ sex, or, sexual variety for its 
own sake, continues to be absent. This is consistent with other studies 
(Buss 2008; Jankowiak, Gray and Hatman 2008; Schmitt, Shackelford 
and Buss 2001; Symons 1979; Townsend 1998) that repeatedly found 
women to be the choosier sex, showing overwhelming preference for some 
form of a ‘relationship partner’ over an anonymous ‘one-night stand’ 
sexual encounter.
Kathleen Bogle’s (2008) research on contemporary college ‘dating’ 
provides another correction to the media’s assertion that there has been 
a  fundamental shift in female sexual behaviour. Her research found 
female casual sexual encounters were confined to their college years. Upon 
graduation, men and women returned to more conventional forms of 
dating in an effort to find a long-term mate. Further, Bogle reports that 
college women who did engage in numerous casual sexual encounters 
showed disappointment, regret and remorse. For most American women 
a ‘one-night stand’ produced an acute negative emotional reaction (as 
opposed to a moral objection).
Russell Clark’s (1990) research found that heterosexual women had no 
problem dating a stranger; however, they did have a problem immediately 
having sex with a stranger. John Townsend’s (1998) ethnographic 
study of American women’s ‘one-night stand’ dating behaviour found a 
similar negative reaction. In a different but related study, Townsend and 
Wasserman (1998) found American women required more information 
than men in order to make the decision to have sex with someone. In this 
way, women required some form of contextualisation, imaginary or real, 
before entering into a sexual encounter with a stranger. Highlighting the 
importance of communication and trusting a sex partner, when women 
could talk with their sex partner about their experience with him, they 
were able to personalise that experience and were thus less troubled with 
entering into a casual sexual encounter (Paul and Hayes 2002). Women’s 
need to be able to, in some fashion, ‘control’ the way they participated 
in a sexual encounter was also evident among American female swingers 
who did not immediately select the first attractive male they saw, but, 
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rather, preferred to wait and discuss things with their husband, meet with 
the desired individual(s), exchange small talk and then, and only then, 
decided to have or not have sex (Jankowiak and Mixson 2008).
In contrast, men, especially men in their 20s, remained keenly focused on 
seeking out a variety of sex partners. It is a motivation that makes young 
men more than any other age cohort attracted to finding ‘no  strings 
attached’ sex opportunities. As men age, however, we found a shift in their 
use of language away from an exclusive emphasis on ‘no strings attached’ 
sex to one more open to the possibility of forming an ongoing relationship 
(Table 4). Is this shift in men’s language representative of a shift in male 
sexual desire or evidence only of a shift among more mature or experienced 
males in their understanding of what females want? We suspect it may be 
a little of both. As men learn that women do not want ‘no strings attached’ 
sex, they also realise they too want some of the emotional benefits that can 
only be gained from being in an ongoing relationship. However, women’s 
conflicted profiles may be nothing more than a  by-product of a new 
cultural tolerance toward the acknowledgement, if not advertisement, of 
an interest in sexual pleasure.
It could be argued that these mixed signals found in the female profiles are 
the by-product of an individual female making a nod toward fitting into 
a cultural role of dampened sexual desire, while preferring to engage the 
newer ethos of sexual frankness, sexual exploration and sexual casualness. 
In this way, the conflicted profiles may represent nothing more than a 
partial presentation of a proper persona. If this interpretation is correct, 
how can we account for the low frequency of mixed messages among 
the bisexual profiles? After all, bisexual women who have been socialised 
within similar age cohorts and live across the US in similar communities 
should have internalised a similar sexual script concerning social propriety 
and sexual respectability. Why then, were their profiles more direct as to 
their interest in and desire for casual sex? In every way, bisexual women’s 
profiles were closer to heterosexual men’s profiles than they were to 
heterosexual women’s profiles.
It is revealing that of the females who expressed the strongest preference 
for partner variety, the majority of the females are bisexual. It is significant 
that 54 per cent of females who stated or strongly hinted at wanting 
‘no strings attached’ sex were bisexual/bicurious. This is a rather high 
percentage and requires further commentary. 
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We did not anticipate that bisexual females would be the most prominent 
users on the dating site. It is consistent, however, with studies that 
find a  strong relationship between higher testosterone and enhanced 
sexual desire (van  Anders, Hamilton and Watson 2007). There is also 
a relationship between testosterone and sexual activity itself—it has been 
noted postmenopausal women using testosterone patches reported an 
increase in sexual activity (Bergner 2009: 5). Other research has found 
that bisexual women tend to have higher levels of testosterone, which 
may contribute to their having a stronger sexual desire (Brizendine 2006). 
Lippa’s (2006) survey research, which did not collect testosterone data, did 
find that women, but not men, who admitted to having a high sex drive 
also stated they had a greater sexual attraction to both sexes. Whatever the 
relationship between testosterone and heightened or diminished sex drive 
turns out to be, it cannot account in and of itself for a woman’s sexual 
orientation. Lisa Diamond noted that prenatal testosterone exposure did 
not produce a lesbian or bisexual woman. Rather, it appeared to produce a 
more fluid sex orientation, whereby a woman may have a periodic same-sex 
attraction (or be bicurious), while also preferring a heterosexual relationship 
(Diamond 2008). Diamond did not discuss whether a  high amount of 
prenatal testosterone could account for a woman having a  stronger sex 
drive. However, research on polycystic ovary syndrome, characterised by 
higher than normal testosterone levels in women, suggests higher reports 
of bisexuality and changing sexual orientation than the control group of 
women (Manlove et al. 2008).2
Many bisexual women acknowledged that they were sexually attracted 
to one sex while being emotionally drawn to forming a relationship with 
the other sex. Moreover, the sex they were more emotionally attracted 
to was the sex they wanted to form a monogamous relationship with. 
In contrast, the sex they were physically attracted to was the one they 
preferred to have ‘no strings attached’ sex with. Typical of these women 
was the following ad written by a 43-year-old bisexual who desired an 
emotional connection more than straightforward sexual satisfaction. She 
wrote that ‘Men capture my attention in an instant with their muscle, 
strength, cologne, deep voice, a 5 o-clock shadow, the feel, smell and taste 
2  Bisexual/bicurious interest may also be associated with childhood abuse. Laumann and 
colleagues’ US sexual survey (1994) found a correlation between women who claimed to be bisexual 
and women who reported childhood sexual abuse. Perhaps a difficult parent–child relationship makes 
it more difficult to bond emotionally with one sex, contributing to a greater willingness to state a 
preference for both sexes.
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of them. How they are different from me’. She added, however, ‘women 
too hold a fascination for me: softness, unexplored yet familiar territory, 
physical knowing, and the emotional connection. How they are similar to 
me’. She concluded by noting she ‘longs to give the same things that I seek 
in another … friendship, passion, desire, comfort, humor, tenderness, 
mental stimulation, soulful nourishment and perhaps even love’. For her, 
the stronger subjective and emotional connection was with the female or, 
in her words, ‘her soul mate’, and not the male.
Our study found that, at least for women who constructed ads on 
the sex website, the ‘new’ heterosexual female sexual persona may be 
essentially something of a tease to attract a potential partner’s interest 
with little genuine interest in having a casual sexual encounter. David 
Buss (2008) referred to this female strategy as an example of a ‘bait and 
switch’ marketing ploy whereby a female’s dress, gestures or voice are 
sexually suggestive, while there is no serious intention of entering into 
an immediate sexual tryst. The straight female profile ads suggest a sexual 
openness and thus availability to any and all men, while continuing to be 
insistent on engaging in sex only within an established relationship.
A separate, albeit related, control study featured a middle-aged male’s facial 
photo with a profile that stated: ‘have an interest in hot pleasurable sex’. 
Over a two-month period, the profile attracted 15 female emails. Each 
email was sent the same sentence: ‘I think you are hot, too, let’s meet.’ 
Only two of the 15 initial females responded to the message. One female 
acknowledged she was a swinger and invited the man to participate in 
a threesome with her husband. The other reply was from a 20-something 
female who sent a new set of pictures of herself wearing a bikini and 
asked if she ‘was sexy’. A return email requesting a meeting did not receive 
a response. It is possible to interpret the females’ correspondence with 
the man’s profile as never being truly interested in meeting. Instead, they 
may have wanted to see if their overture email would invoke a reply that 
would mean, from their perspective, an unfamiliar man desired them. 
We are not alone in this interpretation: in our larger sample we would 
occasionally find a male ad that shouted  in large bold print: ‘DOES 
ANYONE ON THIS SITE RESPOND TO ADS AND EMAILS? 
COME ON LADIES!’. We did not find a single female profile wondering 
if anyone responds to these profiles. Nor did we find a single male profile 
asserting they were ‘Not interested in a one-night stand’ or ‘No married 
women, please!’. More to our point, heterosexual women’s (but not men’s) 
profiles overwhelmingly and repeatedly asserted they were not interested 
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in a ‘ONE NIGHT STAND!’. For women who are not in a swinger 
relationship or identifying as bisexual, it seems that the urge to be desired 
is fulfilment enough. 
Lisa Diamond (2008) suggested that for females there is a strong link 
between intimacy and sexual desirability. Women want, first and foremost, 
to be validated; thus, seeking casual sexual opportunities has less to do with 
sexual pleasure than it does with wanting to be desired. In concurrence, 
Marta Meana (2010) suggested that women’s primary personal validation 
is based on a narcissistic need to be seen as sexually desirable more than 
it does with finding a physiological outlet for sexual fulfilment (Bergner 
2009). In this way, it is significant that 20 of the 60 straight women who 
expressed a strong interest in ‘no strings attached’ sex also noted they were 
coming or just about to come out of ‘dead marriages’. Rebound dating is 
often more about ego validation that one is still sexually desirable than 
it is about obtaining just sexual satisfaction. For example, a 24-year-old 
woman wrote:
I’m on the prowl for athletic guys that take very good care of their bodies 
and have a great style. Finally ended a bad relationship and am ready for 
something totally new and different. I’m fun, athletic, blond and brown 
with crazy night and a very active day life. If you are fat or gross don’t 
bother, yes you know who you are. My age limit is 26, if over that 
don’t bother.
In time, however, rebound sex dating usually leads to the establishment of 
another relationship. For example, a 38-year-old straight woman who was 
preparing to leave a sexless marriage wrote: 
My situation is changing rapidly. I need something to get out of the rut. 
I’m not single yet, but I will be VERY soon. Looking for a guy that has 
his own things in life that he enjoys … I totally believe in family, and 
romance for that matter, and if I was with a man that I love you would be 
all mine and no one else’s, that’s just how I feel about it.
If the bisexual, bicurious or heterosexual women coming out of 
a ‘dead marriage’ are dropped from the sample, there are only 40 women, 
or 7 per cent of our entire sample population, who state they are interested 
only in a casual sexual encounter. Of the 40 women who expressed this 
interest, it is difficult to know if they truly wanted a series of anonymous 
sexual encounters or were only using a highly suggestive ad to see who 
responded as a means to validate their own desirability. For women who 
are not in a swinger relationship or identify as bisexual, the urge to be 
desired may be fulfilment enough.
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At first, it may seem contradictory that females would use a sex site to find 
a relationship. However, as we thought more about this, it made some 
cultural sense. Females appear to be engaging in a form of intrasexual 
competition with other females. In a culture that has come to embrace 
sexual satisfaction as an important aspect of a satisfactory life, and where 
30 per cent of the American female population reports having a low or 
nonexistent sex drive (Diamond 2008), it may be a good mating strategy 
to demonstrate the presence of a strong interest in sexual enjoyment.
Conclusion
Adult Friend Finder is the world’s largest online dating site. Its home 
page advertises itself as being a site where men and women can find 
good opportunities to find like-minded people interested in casual sexual 
encounters. We found the site functions, however, more as a dating site in 
which heterosexual women, in spite of their sexually suggestive profiles, 
prefer to form some type of ongoing relationship.3 Straight women often 
3  Not every male in our sample advertised as wanting only a casual sexual encounter. Our sample 
found 66 males (10 per cent) who were straightforward in acknowledging they were more interested 
in finding a steady girlfriend than engaging in anonymous sex. This seems to be slightly correlated 
with age. A majority of males (>50%) from 18–39 listed casual sexual encounters as the desired 
motive; however, by 40 and above more men’s ads stated an interest in multiple motives—that is, they 
continued to state a willingness for ‘no strings attached’ sex while also noting an openness to a long-
term/romantic relationship (LTR). The correlation between men aging and desiring a LTR may not 
simply be an artefact of them becoming cleverer in the way they prepared their profile. For example, 
Mathes, King, Miller and Reed (2002) found a strong correlation between increasing age and men’s 
desire to form stronger emotional bonds. Similarly, Del Giudice (2009) noted that, ‘males throughout 
the world tend to shift from high mating effort in young adulthood to a phase of increased parental 
investment’ (also see Winking et al. 2007). While our findings did see a trend for a majority of males 
on the website who were seeking casual sex, it is also important to note that men may not be solely 
seeking sex with no emotional implications. Men, too, have been noted to have romantic inclinations 
and fall in love just as women do. As sex and sexuality is an important facet of human evolutionary 
lineage, ‘choosing mates carefully and establishing long-term mateship were adaptive problems faced 
by both sexes, not just females, throughout evolutionary history’ (Salmon and Symons 2003: 68). For 
example, a 43-year-old wrote that his ideal person is: 
someone who is not interested in one night stands or likes to sleep around … if that’s you, 
please pass me up … I’m worth more than that and wish for someone who feels the same. 
I know that lots of women won’t make it this far [reading the ad] but I trust that if you have 
that you will give me some feedback … good or bad. 
He added ‘he would very much like to meet someone who was looking for a short term/long term 
lover or great friend with relationship benefits to enjoy’.
A 36-year-old man concurred and wrote, ‘I am a good looking male that is currently looking for one 
and only one awesome lady to spend some one on one time with having fun in and out of the bed’. 
He added, ‘There are a lot of game players out there but I am willing to wait to meet my special lady’.
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tease an interest in a ‘hook up’ encounter or willingness to enter into 
a casual sexual tryst when most have no intention of doing so. With the 
exception of a few heterosexual women (who were not bicurious or 
bisexual), our study found most heterosexual women are not interested 
in short-term mating for the primary purpose of seeking sexual pleasure. 
What American women’s profiles repeatedly emphasise is the desire to 
form some type of ongoing relationship. This raises the never-ending 
question: Is the qualified caution found in women’s profiles the result 
of lingering cultural restraint, or is it further evidence of the presence of 
underlying evolutionary derived sex differences? Clearly, we need renewed 
scholarly effort.
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